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Abstract 
This thesis examines the linkages between economic development in the predominantly 
Kurdish provinces in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia (ESA) and Turkey’s Kurdish 
question. The study adopts a historical, structural, and political-economic approach, which 
entails that socioeconomic and political developments, structures and transformations in ESA 
are analysed in juxtaposition with those of other domains within the context of the larger 
geographical area and political entity of which these territories have constituted a part: the 
Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. 
The study is comprised of three main parts. The first part discusses the key theoretical 
foundations of the research: theories on Kurdish identity; theoretical perspectives on the 
Kurdish question in Turkey; and theoretical approaches to socioeconomic development in 
ESA. The second part explores the social, economic and political alterations, formations and 
events in Ottoman Kurdistan after 1514 when the bulk of the Kurdish territories largely 
located in ESA came under the administration of the Ottoman Empire. The final part deals 
with issues pertaining to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent foundation 
and evolution of the Turkish Republic and Turkey’s Kurdish question.  
The central argument of this thesis is that there is a symbiotic relationship between the 
Kurdish question in Turkey and the peculiar form of underdevelopment witnessed in ESA, 
which is accurately captured by the notion of de-development. De-development is an 
economic process generated by a hegemonic power to ensure that there will be no economic 
base to support an independent indigenous existence (Roy, 1995). Underlying de-
development in ESA as well as Turkey’s Kurdish question is the Turkish elite’s paramount 
political-national objective of maintaining Turkey’s national unity and territorial integrity. 
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Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with the role and impact of economic development in the 
predominantly Kurdish provinces in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia (ESA) on the rise and 
evolution of Turkey’s Kurdish question. As background to the exploration of these domains 
after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, this study traces the political and 
economic history of ESA. Thus, although the study focuses mainly on events that 
materialised after the establishment of the Republic, nevertheless it deals also, rather 
extensively, with broader historical issues germane to the subject matter of this investigation.  
The guiding research questions in this study will be the following: How developed or 
underdeveloped was ESA during the Ottoman period? What were the economic and social 
impacts of the institution and the suppression of the Kurdish polities in Ottoman Kurdistan? 
Is the relatively worse-off position of the predominantly Kurdish provinces a by-product of 
uneven capitalist development in Turkey? Or is it attributable to the lack of transformation in 
the inimical social structures in these domains? Alternatively, can the economic, social and 
political actualities of these regions be imputed to the discriminatory policies implemented by 
the Turkish state against Turkey’s Kurds? How has Turkey’s exposure to the forces and 
features of neoliberal capitalism influenced the Turkish state’s preoccupation with the 
Kurdish question and the issue of socio-economic development in ESA? 
The concepts, theoretical debates and methodology utilised in this study stem in large 
measure from the nature of the subject and the motivation to study Turkey’s Kurdish question 
in the context of economic development and political change in the Ottoman Empire and 
modern-day Turkey. The relevant central concepts, theories and methodology for this thesis 
will be delineated and deliberated in the succeeding chapter, but it is worth at this early stage 
to elaborate on what the key issues are and to clarify how some of the central concepts will be 
mobilised by this investigation. 
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In this study, development denotes a qualitative process of widespread structural 
transformation at all levels of society: economic, social, cultural, and political. Development, 
therefore, necessitates augmenting the productive performance of the economy to meet 
essential human needs as much as it requires enhancing political liberties and the range of 
human choices via the abolition of suppression and dependence. Nonetheless, owing to the 
lack of longitudinal assessments of economic changes in ESA, and the implications of 
economic issues for socio-political manifestations and alterations in these domains, 
development, as measured by the degree of structural change, will be analysed largely 
through an economic lens.  
Similarly, the thesis emphasises the multidimensional context of the Kurdish question. This 
issue is examined as a corollary of rather complex interactions, including concurrent and 
sequential operations of a diverse array of interacting social, economic, cultural and political 
factors. The socioeconomic disparities between the ESA regions and the rest of Turkey, the 
negation of the collective rights of the Kurds in Turkey, the popular mobilisation of the Kurds 
against the imposed Turkish identity and authoritarian political system with the desire for 
political pluralism and/or autonomy, and the Kurdish insurgency post-1984, are constitutive 
aspects of the Kurdish question in Turkey. Following Steven Metz and Raymond Millen 
(2004: 2), insurgency in this study connotes the following: 
‘[A] strategy adopted by groups which cannot attain their political objectives through 
conventional means or by quick seizure of power….characterised by protracted, 
asymmetrical violence and ambiguity, the use of complex terrain (jungles, mountains, [and] 
urban areas), psychological warfare, and political mobilization—all designed to protect the 
insurgents and eventually alter the balance of power in their favour. Insurgents may attempt 
to seize power and replace the existing government (revolutionary insurgency) or they may 
have more limited aims such as separation, autonomy, or alteration of a particular policy.’  
19 
 
Even though it became a central theme of political debate in Turkey only after 1984 with the 
emergence of the Kurdish insurgency conducted by the Kurdistan Workers’ (Party Partiya 
Karkarên Kurdistan, PKK), the Kurdish question has been an incessant feature of Turkish 
politics throughout the twentieth century. The protracted armed struggle waged by the PKK is 
only the last and the most prolonged of a series of Kurdish rebellions instigated against state 
authorities. Hence, in order to apprehend comprehensively the roots and trajectory of this 
issue a terse analysis of the relevant events and policies that have surfaced pre-1980s is in 
order.   
The transfiguration of a multinational (Ottoman) empire into a (Turkish) nation state involved 
a nation-state building process that necessitated economic, social and political reforms 
implemented by a Turkish nationalist elite bent on creating a ‘homogenous’, ‘secular’ and 
‘westernised’ Turkish nation. Nation-state building in the post-Ottoman political space, as 
was the case in Europe, North America, Latin America, Asia and Africa, describes a twin 
process, where ‘nation-building’ implicated ‘the process whereby a sense of shared identity, 
patriotism, and loyalty to homeland develops’, while the notion ‘state-building’ entailed ‘the 
construction of governmental and political institutions’ (Bill and Springboard, 1990: 40). 
Moreover, as rightly observed by James A. Bill and Robert Springboard, ‘[t]he more the 
artificial the country, the more difficult are the challenges of nation- and state-building’ 
(ibid.: 40). 
The delimitation of the national identity as solely Turkish and such that it outlawed the public 
countenance of minority cultural differences, as well as the construction of a unitary and 
authoritarian political system in Turkey, were offshoots of this process. As conveyed by the 
following unreserved speech by İsmet İnönü, Turkey’s second president, in 1925: 
‘We are frankly [n]ationalists… and [n]ationalism is our only factor of cohesion. In the face 
of a Turkish majority, other elements have no kind of influence. We must turkify the 
20 
 
inhabitants of our land at any price, and we will annihilate those who oppose the Turks or ‘le 
turquisme’ [Turkism]’ (Barkey and Fuller, 1998: 10). 
The birth of the authoritarian Turkish nation state ensued the economic peripheralisation, 
territorial losses and demographic changes that befell the Ottoman Empire during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These vicissitudes were to large extent repercussions 
of the growing influence of Europe in the Ottoman Empire and the reactions it occasioned in 
the Ottoman state and society. The European influence on Ottoman polity and people was felt 
in three different but interrelated spheres: first, the incorporation of the Ottoman lands into 
the capitalist world system, which began in the late eighteenth century and gathered pace in 
the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Second, the expansion of the influence of the Great 
Powers of Europe (such as Great Britain, France, Austria, and Russia), as evinced with the 
British economic and political hegemony as per both trade and loans to the Empire after the 
imposition of the free-trade regime in 1838. Third, the impact of European ideologies of 
nationalism, liberalism, secularism and positivism (Zürcher, 1994: 11-94, Quataert, 1994: 
759-934; Pamuk, 1-17: 2010 [1987]).     
Following the conclusion of the war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia in 1812, Sultan 
Mahmut II (1789-1839) began to implement westernisation and centralisation reforms, which 
were continued by his successors. Full-scale Ottoman restructuring was unleashed by the 
Imperial Rescript of 1839, which had determined the nature of the policies in the Tanzimat 
period (1839-76). This Rescript set out the following modifications: (i) ‘an orderly system of 
taxation to replace the system of tax-farming’; (ii) ‘the establishment of guarantees for the 
life, honour and property of the sultan’s subjects’; (iii) ‘a system of conscription for the 
army’; and (iv) ‘equality before the law of all subjects, whatever their religion (although this 
was formulated somewhat ambiguously in the document)’ (Zürcher, 1994: 53). These 
reorganisations were designed in order to modify the Ottoman political, administrative and 
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social structure in line with the prerequisites of the international capitalist system on the one 
hand and, as part of the central authorities’ strategy to recapture control over provinces and 
attenuate fiscal resources of the Empire on the other. 
The administrative, social and political arrangements aimed at centralising the Empire and 
absorbing the Christian and non-Turkish populaces initiated the obliteration of local 
autonomy. Unsurprisingly, the fusion of centralist reforms and the spread of nationalism in 
the Empire set in motion a series of rebellions in Serbian, Greek and Lebanese Christian 
communities, as well as among Muslims in Ottoman Kurdistan who had been accustomed to 
varying degrees of self-rule (Özoğlu, 2004; Celil, 1992). Thus the promise – even if on paper 
– of equality with the Muslim majority did not inhibit the proliferation of ethno-nationalism 
particularly among the Christian communities; leading to the birth and sharpening of what 
came to be termed among foreign diplomats the ‘Eastern Question’. That is, the question of 
how to satiate vying Balkan nationalisms and the imperialist objectives of the major powers 
without engendering the demise of the Ottoman Empire or, if its destruction was inescapable, 
to dismember it without disturbing the balance of power in Europe and triggering a general 
war.  In addition, the economic privileges granted to Europeans in order to maintain the flow 
of urgently needed loans were often extended to their non-Muslim partners too and 
consequently the Empire’s Christian bourgeoisie gained the most from Ottoman trade with 
Europe in the nineteenth century (Kasaba, 1988; Keyder, 1987).  
These occurrences alienated the Muslim communities in the Empire and fostered trepidations 
amidst the Ottoman political leaders about how to maintain the Empire’s position and 
preserve its political and territorial integrity. The amalgamation of these consternations laid 
the groundwork for two significant phenomena on the eve of the twentieth century: the 
emergence of nationalism among the Muslim populace, and the formation of the Ottoman 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in 1889. The CUP led the Young Turk Revolution 
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of 1908 under the banner of ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, and Justice’ and thus promised 
political pluralism and establishment of constitutional order. However, soon after the 
Revolution – for reasons discussed at length in Chapter 4 – the CUP reneged on both of these 
assurances and adopted an aggressive and exclusionist form of Turkish nationalism. This 
ignited successive Kurdish revolts in the Ottoman Kurdish emirates, some of which, like the 
Baban, Bitlis and Barzan revolts, were organised with pro-self-rule demands, and others were 
solely mobilised against the perceived injustices in the policies of the CUP administration 
explicated in Chapter 4 (Celil, 1992: 201-16, Burkay, 2008 [1992]: 457-69, Jwaideh, 1961: 
295-97).  
The belligerent pan-Turkist policies of the CUP coupled with the destructive ramifications of 
the First World War transformed ESA from imperial borderlands into imperial shatter zones. 
The widespread devastation that the Armenian and Greek communities experienced during 
and after the War substantially altered the demographic landscape of the Ottoman Empire. As 
a consequence of not attaining the autonomy promised to them by the European victors of the 
Great War in the Treaty of Sèvres – signed on 10 August 1920 between the Allies and the 
Ottoman government – which decreed independence to Armenia and administrative 
autonomy to Kurdistan, the Kurds were the only non-Turkish ethno-national community at 
the birth of the new Republic. Article 62 of the Treaty of Sèvres stated the following: 
‘A Commission sitting at Constantinople and composed of three members appointed by the 
British, French and Italian Governments respectively shall draft within six months from into 
force of the present Treaty a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas 
lying east of the Euphrates, south of the southern boundary of Armenia as it may be hereafter 
determined, and north of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia, as defined in 
Article 27, II (2) and (3)’ (McDowall, 2000: 464). 
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Although this Treaty was superseded by the Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July 1923 – which 
formally established the currently existing borders and sovereignty of Turkey – as a result of 
the successful rebellion led by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), the fret of Kurdish autonomy 
always weighed strongly on the minds of the rulers of the Turkish Republic. Put differently, 
at a time when a new regional system, based on two independent states (Iran and Turkey) and 
two mandatory states (Iraq and Syria) had been established, the autonomy promised to Kurds 
in the former Treaty ostensibly engendered a new ‘Eastern Question’ for the rulers of the 
Turkish Republic. And ever since there has been a tendency to assess the demands of the 
Kurds in Turkey along conspirative lines with persistent reference to the ‘Eastern Question’ 
and the Treaty of Sèvres.     
After the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, Turkish republican nationalism or Kemalism, 
named after the founder and maiden President of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal, became the 
official state ideology and the source of an array of social, political and economic reforms. 
The social engineering projects implemented by the Republican People’s Party (RPP) during 
the single-party period (1923-1945) as expounded in Chapter 4, prompted the conflictual ties 
between the Kurds and the Turkish state and wrought socio-economic destruction to the ESA 
regions. The Kemalist centralist authorities had obdurately defended the doctrine of the unity 
and indivisibility of the Turkish state, its territory and its people. This dogma became the 
established reason for suppressing the linguistic, cultural and collective rights demanded by 
the Kurds because these demands were perceived as a threat to the unitary and uniform 
structure of the nation and the state.  
The freedoms, albeit limited, granted by the 1961 constitution enabled Kurds to raise their 
demands and address some of their grievances through legitimate channels, as evinced with 
the ‘Eastern Meetings’ of the 1960s. The ‘Eastern Meetings’ were the pinnacle of Kurdish 
activism in that decade. Commencing on 13 August 1967 in Silvan, a sequential series of 
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protest were held against the underdevelopment in ESA in Diyarbakir on 3 September 1967, 
Siverek (Urfa) on 24 September 1967, Batman on 8 October 1967, Tunceli (Dersim) on 15 
October 1967, Ağrı on 22 October 1967, and the finale took place in Ankara on 18 November 
1967 (Beşikçi, 1992). These robust protests were directed against the traditional policies of 
the Turkish state and excessive power of the Kurdish clientele rural elite in ESA, and thereby 
threatened the rule of both the former and the latter in these domains. The political activism 
of the Kurds in the 1960s and 1970s enabled pro-Kurdish campaigners to make significant 
electoral gains. For example, in the 1977 municipal elections Mehdi Zana, a supporter of the 
Kurdish left-wing organisation Partiya Sosyalista Kurdistan-Tirkiye (Kurdistan Socialist 
Party-Turkey, KSP-T), won the mayoralty of Diyarbakir, considered as the Kurdish cultural 
and political centre. However, with the arrival of the coup d’état in 1980, all of the gains, 
activism and organisations of the progressive left-wing movements, of which Kurdish 
activists constituted an important part, were supressed, leading Kurdish campaigners to seek 
other avenues to address their demands.  
The most vital and violent expression of this search has been the guerrilla warfare waged by 
the PKK in 1984. Thus, as rightly indicated by Hamit Bozarslan, ‘1980 is a turning point in 
Kurdish history in Turkey: all nationalist activity was suspended following the military coup, 
and the subsequent return to civil administration has been marked above all by a continuing 
guerrilla warfare’ (2003b: 15). The war between the PKK and the Turkish state has had 
collossal political, social and economic consequences, which will be explicated in Chapters 4 
and 5. Despite the period of relative détente in Kurdish-Turkish relations, due to the 
significant reduction in the military activities of the PKK following the ceasefire declared in 
1999 and the timid recognition of the Kurdish identity and cultural rights by the Turkish state 
in the past two decades, the Kurdish question is still awaiting a perpetual solution and the 
conflict is ongoing.  
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Unsurprisingly, the emergence of the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish army 
and the surge in the Kurdish nationalist movement in the Middle East from the 1980s on 
witnessed a parallel increase in scholarly studies and research on the Kurds. Overall, these 
works attempt to account for a multifarious range of issues and concentrate on varying 
periods and aspects of Kurdish society and politics. Nearly all of these scholarships either 
analyse the genesis and evolution of Kurdish nationalism in the Middle East
1
 or examine 
Kurdish nationalism and the political history of the conflict in Turkey.
2
 In comparison to the 
conflict analyses and political history literature, there are relatively miniscule studies 
synthetically investigating the economic and political history of the predominantly Kurdish 
areas of ESA.
3
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The conflict analyses and political history literature readily accept that ESA constituted one 
of the least developed areas of the Ottoman Empire. In postulating causal explanations for the 
existence of the conflictual ties between the Turkish state and its Kurdish citizens, these 
studies, on the one hand, emphasise the role of socio-economic inequality and regional 
underdevelopment in fostering Kurdish discord in Turkey and on the other, highlight the 
significance of the Kurdish society’s urbanisation, migration, and contact with the wider 
world during the 1960s and 1970s in the political expression of Kurdish discontent (Kirişçi 
and Winrow, 1997; Barkey and Fuller, 1998; McDowall, 2000; van Bruinessen, 2000; 
Gunter, 1990; Taşpınar, 2005; Ibrahim and Gürbey, 2000; White, 2000). However, none of 
these studies systematically analyse the economic history of ESA and/or the economic 
aspects of the Kurdish question.  
Studies focusing on the economic features of ESA provide fragmentary accounts of the 
economic history of these territories and only study the years prior to the armed conflict 
between the PKK and the state (M. E. Bozarslan, 2002 [1966]; Jafar, 1976; Beşikçi, 1992 
[1969]) or years just after the armed conflict (Z. Aydın, 1989; Sönmez, 1992 [1990]). 
Relatedly, a methodical investigation incorporating the political and economic experiences of 
Eastern and Southeastern Anatolian societies during the Ottoman and contemporary era is a 
desideratum. This is precisely why this thesis has decided to examine Turkey’s Kurdish 
question and the issue of economic development in ESA within a historical framework. 
Research Motivations and Contributions  
Evidently, this research agenda can be addressed in different forms and with manifold 
purposes. This research topic is of interest for a trinity of reasons. Firstly, although there are 
fragmentary accounts of the economy of the primarily Kurdish provinces in ESA, there has 
been no comprehensive and longitudinal investigation of this complex subject. This has 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Ekonomik ve Etnik Temeller (The Order of East Anatolia: Socio-Economic and Ethnic Foundations) (Ankara: 
Yurt Yayınlar, 1992 [1969]). 
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resulted in political transformations within these regions being studied largely without a 
detailed analysis of the pivotal economic changes. The paucity of research on economic 
activities, relations and transformations in the predominantly Kurdish domains is due to a 
combination of data-related issues, like the existence of miniscule historical archival 
resources, and profounder ontological (i.e. how the Kurds are defined), methodological (i.e. 
how the Kurds are studied), and epistemological (i.e. how knowledge about the Kurds is 
produced) issues.  
As expounded in Chapters 3 and 4, because of the minimal quantitative historical information 
presently available on the economy of Ottoman Kurdistan, economic life in this Ottoman 
borderland is the terra incognita on the Ottoman history map. David McDowall in the 
Foreword to his highly influential study on the Kurds A Modern History of the Kurds, 
highlights the lack of coverage in the historical archives of the economy of this Ottoman 
frontier region and the resultant void it has caused to the study of this area with the 
noteworthy observation that:  
‘[P]erhaps the most important [void] were the process of economic and social change. I 
cannot help feeling that if these were better documented and understood, many of the events 
we do know about in Kurdistan would undergo re-evaluation’ (McDowall, 2000: xii).  
Yet, the lack of historical archives on the economy of these regions is not the sole reason for 
the aforementioned lacuna. The long-standing failure of the academic studies on the Ottoman 
Empire to aptly analyse Ottoman Kurdistan and the Kurds coupled with the tendency of 
recent investigations on this domain making political relations between the Kurdish rulers 
and the Ottoman state the sole locus of their analysis (Özoğlu, 2004; O. Kılıç, 1999; Sinclair, 
2003; Öz, 2003), have contributed to the absence of a systematic examination of the economy 
of the primarily Kurdish provinces in ESA.  
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Mainstream academic research on the history and legacy of the Ottoman Empire often do not 
properly account for the incorporation of the Kurdish emirates into the Ottoman Empire 
and/or address the legacies of the Ottoman period in the remnants of Ottoman Kurdistan in 
contemporary Turkey. As pointed out by the erudite Armenian scholar, Stephan H. Astourian, 
up until very recently, ‘Kurds, for their part, [were] simply left out of Ottoman historiography 
altogether, although they constituted a plurality in the eastern provinces’ (Kaiser, 1998: ix). 
To cite a few revealing examples, in spite of the momentous events that occurred during and 
after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire involving the Armenians and the Kurds 
inhabiting the ethnically heterogeneous Eastern provinces, L. Carl Brown in the Introduction 
to the oft-quoted Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East 
glosses over the legacy of Ottoman rule in ESA. More staggeringly, in the detailed list of 
‘Dates and Duration (Number of Years) of Ottoman Rule by Country or Region’ outlined by 
the author, Ottoman Kurdistan is unstipulated (Brown, 1996: xiv-xvi). In The Shaping of the 
Modern Middle East, Bernard Lewis states that the Kurds are one of the remaining linguistic 
and ethnic minorities of any importance surviving in the central lands of the Middle East. 
Besides that, the Kurds are only alluded to very briefly as an obstacle to Arabism in Iraq 
(Lewis, 1994: 19, 94-5). 
In other publications such as Anadolu’nun Tarihi Çoğrafyasına Giriş (An Introduction to the 
Historical Geography of Anatolia) authored by Prof. Tuncer Baykara, and published by the 
Research Institute on Turkish Culture (Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, TKAE)4, the 
very existence of Ottoman Kurdistan is openly negated, and the Kurds are defined as ‘Turkish 
people who live in the mountainous regions of Turkey’ (Baykara, 1988: 26). Baykara’s study 
is emblematic of the plethora of ‘scientific works’ produced by mainstream academics in 
Turkey from the 1930s onwards, demonstrating the ‘Turkish’ origins of the Kurds or, to 
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TKAE, see: Landau (1995). 
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employ the official definition ascribed to Kurds in Turkey up until the late twentieth-century, 
‘mountain Turks’. These Turkist studies attained their theoretical nourishment from the 
Kemalist mythomoteur of pre-Islamic Turkic civilisations as the source of all civilisations and 
languages, which came to prominence after the First Historical Congress of 1932 organised in 
Ankara under Atatürk’s direction.5  
All of the above stated lacunae are inextricably linked to how knowledge about the Kurds and 
Kurdish-dominated regions have been produced by conventional Middle Eastern studies and 
the academic and research circles in Turkey. As accurately postulated by Colin Willams in 
Minority Nationalist Histography, historical and geographical accounts of a region or state is 
customarily analysed by the use of materials written in the languages of the dominant nations, 
rather than minority languages; thus the minorities’ ideas are meagrely represented, if at all, 
in scholarly literature. Put differently, historical accounts of an area or polity regularly ‘tell it 
from the victor’s angle’ (1988: 203-04). The Kurds, up until very recently, were marginalised 
in all their host countries, so their account of or role in history, were largely defectively 
covered or represented by mainstream researchers of the Middle East.  
With restricted freedom of thought and expression, seeped in Turkish nationalism, academic 
science in Turkey has been made to conform to the ideological interest and policies of the 
state.
6
 Research produced about the Kurds within academic circles in Turkey is often aimed 
at producing applied knowledge. That is to say, they formed knowledge on the principally 
Kurdish regions and their population with the aims of buttressing the official discourse or 
state ideology on Kurds and laying the foundations for state interventions in these regions via 
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theorising on issues of population policies, modernisation, and territorial integration. On the 
other hand, studies that fell into conflict with the hegemonic ideology on Kurds were vilified 
within academic circles, and scholars that undertook heterodox research on predominantly 
Kurdish inhabited areas were removed from their academic positions. This was exemplified 
with İsmail Beşikçi’s academic profession coming to a swift expiration after authoring Doğu 
Anadolu’nun Düzeni: Sosyo-Ekonomik ve Etnik Temeller – first published in 1969 – wherein 
he committed an academic crime by formulating the unspeakable: the ethnic dimension of the 
predominantly Kurdish ESA regions.
7
 
The practice of producing, reinforcing and disseminating the official discourse about the 
Kurds began during the late Ottoman period. In accordance with the instructions of Talat 
Pasha to investigate Anatolia after the 1913 Unionist Coup, Turkist missionary ethnologists 
and sociologists such as Mehmed Ziya Gökalp
8
 (1876-1924), studied the Kurds and Kurdish 
tribes with the purpose of assimilating them into the Turkish culture (Dündar, 2002; Üngör, 
2011). Throughout the Republican era too, social engineering specialists were sent to ESA to 
collate information and, in turn, produce reports about the social organisation, economic 
wealth and relations, and ethnic characteristics of the indigenous population. These field 
studies in East and South-East Turkey formed the basis of the plan of ‘Reform of the East’ in 
the 1920s (Bayrak, 1994). Similarly, in the multi-party period the ‘East Group’ within the 
State Planning Organisation (SPO) produced policy-oriented reports like ‘The Principles of 
the State Development Programmes in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia’, which was 
prepared in 1961. The common theme in these state-sanctioned reports was that the native 
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tribal social structure fostered the ‘backward’ nature of the Kurdish-majority regions and thus 
necessitated state intervention in these areas in order to transform the ‘primitive’ 
autochthonous structures and people. State interference in these domains involved 
‘turkification’ of the local populace and deportation of the members of the disobedient 
Kurdish tribes, a subject matter fully discussed in Chapter 5.   
Analogous studies on the primordial loyalties and structures in ESA continued from 1980s 
on, this time under the aegis of the state-led Project of Southeastern Anatolia (Güneydoğu 
Anadolu Project, GAP).  Institutes working on the GAP were founded within universities. 
The academic research and surveys conducted by GAP Research and Practice Centres 
established in the Middle East Technical University and Dicle University in Diyarbakir in the 
1990s, unswervingly highlighted the severity of the tribal structures and the pivotal role state 
initiatives employed under the GAP could adopt in order to resolve this issue and nurture 
modernisation and development. All of these reports at no time mention the ethnic 
component of the Kurdish question or the armed conflict between the state and the PKK 
(Özok-Gündoğan, 2005; Scalbert-Yücel and Le Ray, 2006).  
These studies made the autochthonic tribes in ESA the central focus of their research and 
thereby postulated them as explanans (that which contains the explanation) for 
underdevelopment in the predominantly Kurdish populated ESA regions. This approach 
renders the tribal organisation as the determinate source of attaining knowledge about the 
Kurds and the principally Kurdish provinces and as immutable and fixed entities as though 
they are a fact of nature that unequivocally determines the behaviour of Kurds. In other 
words, the above-mentioned state-sponsored studies fail to account for the specific social, 
economic, and political conditions that mould and transform tribal identity and organisation, 
and, owing to the rural-centred analysis, overlook structures, activities and developments in 
predominantly Kurdish cities in ESA. As a result, mainstream ethnographic and sociological 
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studies in Turkey have precipitated three pitfalls, which have hitherto devalued and 
obfuscated the undertaking of a longitudinal analysis of the economy of the principally 
Kurdish regions of Turkey: (i) depriving Kurds of their proper national and socio-economic 
characteristics; (ii) analysing Kurds without a diachronic and holistic perspective of their 
social, political, economic and territorial interactions, organisations and activities; and (iii) 
depicting the largely Kurdish regions as static ‘primitive regions’ on account of the 
persevering regressive social structures that are not conducive to economic development. For 
the purposes of systematically analysing the linkages between economic development in ESA 
and Turkey’s Kurdish question –free from the long-standing drawbacks of the dominant 
scholarships summarised above – one of the overriding aims and contributions of this study 
will be to provide a detailed account of the political and economic structures, relations and 
changes in these domains pre-and-post-1923.  
The second reason for the pursuit of this research project is pertinent to the diminutive 
significance that scholars – particularly economic historians – have ascribed to the 
ramifications of a chilling series of violent events in ESA during and after the First World 
War on the economy of these regions in the years subsequent to the institution of the Turkish 
Republic. For instance, the economic historian Zvi Yehuda Herschlag in his widely cited 
Turkey: An Economy in Transition hypothesises that after the War private enterprise in 
Turkey was too weak, and the state had to act as the locomotive of economic life in the 
Eastern provinces (1958: 39-40). Hershlag’s oft-quoted postulation is made without any 
consideration of the issue of dispossession and uprooting of the indigenous entrepreneurs, 
especially – but not exclusively – Armenian and Kurdish, as part of the nationalist 
demographic policies implemented in ESA during the CUP period (1913-1918) and after the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic. Correspondingly, more contemporary researchers of 
the Eastern economy such as Servet Mutlu in Doğu Sorunun Kökenleri: Ekonomik Açıdan 
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(The Roots of the Eastern Question: An Economic Perspective), study the continuity of 
Eastern and Southeastern Turkey’s underdevelopment with minimal engagement with the 
wars, ethnocide and forced deportations experienced by the autochthonic inhabitants in these 
regions, as though they never happened and economic impoverishment was inexorable.  
In this study, the notion of demographic engineering will be used synonymously with social 
engineering and population politics to denote ‘a series of coercive state measures in pursuit of 
population homogeneity’ (Bloxham, 2008: 101). As laboriously outlined by Milica Zarkovic 
Bookman (1997), states attempt to obtain homogenisation by means of implementing six 
different social engineering policies: (1) manipulation of the censuses; (2) natality policies 
that aim to obtain the numerical superiority of the dominant national core or group at the 
expense of minorities; (3) border alterations to attain total overlap between ethnic and 
political boundaries; (4) dragooning of the minority groups into the dominant cultural 
identity; (5) forced deportation to decrease the populace of undesirable sections of society in 
a particular area; and (6) economic and/or political incentives and pressures to leave the 
country. This study will concentrate on the latter three policies in illuminating how Turkist 
demographic policies implemented in the ethnically diverse ESA have shaped the economic 
decline of these territories.   
The failure of scholars to overlook the repercussions of the pre-1923 violent encounters and 
actions on the Eastern economy runs the risk of producing an ahistorical economic analysis of 
these regions by rejecting all prior (Ottoman) history. This approach to the history of these 
regions is analogous to the Kemalist interpretation of Turkish history lucidly summarised 
with the following words of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk): ‘The new Turkey has no relationship 
to the old. The Ottoman Empire has passed into history. A new Turkey is born’ (Timur, 1987: 
5). The epistemic value of assessments of the Kurds and the predominantly Kurdish regions 
that do not exhaustively scrutinise events, processes and state practices in the pre-Kemalist 
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period are dubitable. This is because, as pointed out by Andrew Mango, ‘[t]he ideology 
which has shaped the policy of the government of the Turkish republic towards its Kurdish 
citizens antedates Atatürk’ (1990: 10). Thus, the precondition of obtaining an accurate 
understanding of the evolution of political, economic and social structures and processes in 
ESA is to review the occurrences prior to 1923 in these regions.  
One of the initial scholars to study the nationalist population policies was İsmail Beşikçi, who 
analysed the 1934 Settlement Act and explained the deportations orchestrated by the 
Kemalist rulers (Beşikçi, 1991). Despite shedding much needed light on a hitherto under-
studied area and instigating further research on the field of social engineering in Turkey, 
Beşikçi’s approach had two drawbacks. Firstly, he began his periodization in 1923 and 
resultantly glossed over the CUP deportations during the First World War. Secondly, he gave 
minimal importance to the economic ramifications of these forced displacement policies. 
Other researchers have investigated this matter further, contributing immensely to the 
widening of knowledge about demographic engineering policies. However, either they have 
researched nationalist population policies only during the CUP period (Dündar, 2002; 
Akçam, 2012) or until the end of the Republican period (1923-1950) (Çağaptay, 2006; 
Üngör, 2011), and resultantly the social engineering programmes actuated in post-1950 have 
not been deliberated. Considering that in the second half of the twentieth century, according 
to official figures, around one million Kurds had been forcibly displaced from their ancestral 
lands; it is of vast importance for any study dealing with socio-economic and political history 
of principally Kurdish regions to assess the deportation policies executed after the single-
party period in Turkey.  
The third and final motivation for this study stems from a strong element of dissatisfaction 
with the prevailing development paradigm concerning ESA, that is, underdevelopment. In 
light of the longitudinal data prepared for and analysed in this study, it is highly desirable to 
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revaluate this age-old and readily accepted heuristic device of regional underdevelopment. 
Put differently, the novel empirical facts germane to the Kurdish-dominated regions of 
Anatolia attained by this study necessitate a rethinking of the underlying assumptions of this 
prevailing theoretical approach. These are that the predominantly Kurdish provinces of pre-
and-post-1923 Anatolia have been underdeveloped areas not conducive to capitalist 
development on account of several regional features: the dominance of feudal social 
relations, the lack of modern infrastructure, and ESA’ geopolitical position – far afield from 
both the former imperial capital, Istanbul, and the contemporary political capital, Ankara.  
Structure of the Chapters 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 presents a detailed critical examination of 
the main theoretical perspectives concerning the Kurds, the Kurdish question in Turkey and 
socioeconomic development in ESA, as well as outlining methodological resources that the 
thesis draws upon in conducting this research. Chapters 2-3 paint a picture of political, social 
and economic life in Ottoman Kurdistan. Chapter 2 looks at the political and economic events 
and changes in this Ottoman borderland in the years 1514-1800. That is, the period from the 
time when the Kurdish principalities were incorporated into the Ottoman Empire and the 
semi-autonomous Kurdish regimes were established, until the dawn of the suppression of 
these polities. Chapter 3 investigates the political and economic history of Ottoman Kurdistan 
in the years 1800-1914: the era during which all semi-autonomous regimes in Ottoman 
Kurdistan had been overthrown, the penetration of world capitalism into the Ottoman 
Anatolia had deepened and the First World War begun. The structures and changes in this 
region in these three centuries will be compared with those of the bordering Ottoman 
territories, which today constitute modern-day Turkey.  
Chapter 4 deals with issues pertaining to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the 
subsequent formation and evolution of the Turkish Republic and Turkey’s Kurdish question. 
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In this chapter, socioeconomic and political developments, structures and transformations in 
ESA will be juxtaposed with those of other regions within the context of the larger 
geographical area and political entity of which it is a part: the Turkish Republic. There will 
be four separate sub-sections dealing with three successive periods under the following 
headings: 
- ‘The Collapse of the Empire, Rise of the ‘National Economy’ and the Implementation of the 
Nationalist Population Policies (1914-1918)’ 
- ‘From the Mudros Armistice of 1918 to the Lausanne Treaty of 1928’ 
- ‘Society, Economic and Politics in the Republican People’s Party Era (1923-1950)’ 
- ‘Transition to a Turbulent Democracy and ‘Incorporation’ of ESA (1950-1980)’ 
Chapter 5 assesses how the neoliberal restructuring of the Turkish polity and economy in the 
years 1980-2010s has influenced Turkey’s Kurdish question and socio-economic 
development in ESA. Finally, Chapter 6 outlines the findings of this thesis and discusses the 
possible political and economic steps that could be taken to resolve the Kurdish question in 
Turkey and overcome the barriers to socio-economic development in ESA.  
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Chapter 1  
The Kurds, the Kurdish Question in Turkey, and Economic Development in ESA: An 
Exploration of the Central Theoretical Debates and Outline of the Methodological 
Resources  
 
1.1 Defining the Kurds  
Kurdish ancestry, ethonogenesis, native land and language are matters of persistent scholarly 
debate. Different theories exist concerning the ancestry of the Kurds. Certain scholars claim 
that they were the people of ‘Gutium’ in ancient Sumeria (Izady, 1988, 1992). The most 
prominent hypothesis, particularly among Kurds, is that the Kurds descended from the 
ancient Indo-European people, the Medes, who established the Median Empire (728-550 
B.C.) in the current areas of South-Eastern Turkey, Northern Iraq and Western Iran (Wahby, 
1982; Kendal, 1996). Another line of thought conceives that the modern Kurds, while 
possibly descending from some or all of the above ancestries imputed to them, were formed 
as an amalgamation into a novel, ethnically distinct people (Bois, 1966).  Other researchers, 
in the same vein as the aforementioned TKAE-affiliated Turkish nationalist scholars, 
vehemently dispute all of these views and instead maintain that they are a branch of the 
Turkic people, negating that the Kurds are a distinct people (Kırzıoğlu, 1963; Türkdoğan, 
1997).  
However, what may be the least controversial definition is the degree of consciousness 
among Kurds in Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria that they constitute one people. They brand 
themselves Kurds, even with the dissimilarities in their economic activities, political and 
economic development and modern history. Kurds and most researchers attempting to define 
them approve of this postulation.  
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However, the causality of this ethnic/national consciousness has been a source of 
controversy. Broadly speaking, there are two main streams of thought on this interminable 
debate: the primordialist or essentialist and the constructivist. The former argue that the 
nation is a natural and perennial entity that has existed since time immemorial and predates 
nationalism (Armstrong, 1982; Geertz, 1973). Thus according to the primordialist, the source 
of modern national awareness is the old and acutely felt ethnic, linguistic, religious and 
cultural differences. In that vein, the Harvard academic of Kurdish origin Mehrad R. Izady 
posits that the period from the 5
th
 century BC through to the 6
th
 century AD ‘marks the 
homogenization and consolidation of the modern Kurdish national identity. The ethnic 
designator Kurd is established finally, and applied to all segments of the nation’ (Izady, 1992: 
23). The Kurdish linguist Jamal Nabaz postulates a classic example of the primordial 
conceptualisation of the Kurdish identity and nationalism. Nabaz contends that the ‘Kurdayetî 
[Kurdish Nationalist] movement, as we see it, is not the construction of any class or group… 
Kurdayetî is a natural, dynamic, and perpetual movement. (Sheyolislami, 2011: 52). As 
correctly observed by Abbas Vali, ‘[t]he mainstream Kurdish nationalist…is “primordialist”. 
For him/her the Kurdish nation is a primordial entity, a natural formation rooted in the nature 
of every Kurd defining the identity of people and community history.’ (2003b: 59). 
Therefore, studies or individuals influenced by this dominant approach overlook the modern 
character of the Kurdish identity and the socially constructed nature of its features.  
The constructivists argue that nations are relatively recent and contingent entities generated 
over the last two centuries by the development of modern economic, social and political 
conditions. Within constructivism, there is a wide range of different approaches. Ernest 
Gellner (1992) emphasises the importance of industrialisation and the shift from pre-modern 
village communities. Benedict Anderson (1983) stresses the development of print culture or 
‘print capitalism’ and of people who are conscious of a common identity. Marxist writers like 
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Eric Hobsbawm (1990), analyse the rise of national economies and social classes as the basis 
of nations and nationalism.  
Anthony Smith (1986), who highlights that the pre-modern basis of nations permits for 
modernist change but on grounds of historic continuities, espouses a ‘third way’ stance 
between primordialist and constructivist approaches. In other words, Smith hypothesises that 
nation is the advanced version of ethnicity and the main difference between the two is that the 
latter does not have a common polity. Ethnic community or ethnie, according to Smith, is a 
historically specific segment of a country’s population that shares the following six features: 
collective name, a common myth of descent or mythomoteur, a shared history, a distinctive 
shared culture, an affiliation with a specific territory, and a sense of solidarity (1986: 22-32).   
This thesis perceives the construction of the Kurdish identity and Kurdish nationalism from a 
constructivist perspective and recognises the vital role played by historical, international, 
socio-economic and political factors in the construction of national identities and nationalist 
movements. As cogently contended by Fred Halliday, the constructivist approach ‘need not 
rest on a narrow, industrial-society model: rather, starting from the rise of modern industrial 
society in Europe and the USA, it seeks to show how the impact of this society was felt 
throughout the world, in economic change and industrialisation certainly, but also in the 
political, social and ideological changes that accompanied the subjugation to this model of 
the world, in the two centuries 1800-2000’ (2006:15). Relatedly, Halliday proposes a 
constructivist framework for studying the history of Kurdish nationalism and the basis of 
Kurdish identity formation, applying four extensive processes of modernism: ‘War and 
conflict’, ‘nationalism and state building’, ‘ideology’ and ‘socio-economic transformation’ 
(ibid.: 15-8).   
The concepts of the nation and nationalism as the sole and supreme focus of one’s loyalty is 
relatively new having only commenced in the latter part of the 18
th
 century and specifically 
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during the 1789 French Revolution. After 1789, the nation became a way of legitimising the 
political domination of social classes of people by the new capitalist class – the bourgeoisie –
and had fundamental ramifications for the process of state building. Skirmishes for 
participation in the state assumed confrontations between the feudal aristocracy and the 
bourgeoisie, whose interests were often represented by a parliament. The latter claimed to be 
the advocates of ‘the nation’ and in opposition to the former insisted they were the true 
espousers and defenders of ‘national liberties’.  
During the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries, moreover, the concept acquired a cultural meaning, 
referring to a unique people with distinct identities. This change in meaning was as a result of 
the cultural understandings of community and power undergoing alterations following the 
economic changes, social and scientific innovations, and the expansion of communication, 
initially in Western Europe and subsequently elsewhere, after the 19
th
 century. In other 
words, the concurrent expansion of capitalism, means of communication (particularly print 
materials) and the development of vernacular languages beside Latin, played a pivotal role in 
large groups of people perceiving themselves as distinct communities (Anderson, 1983).  
Hence, the idea of the nation came to denote a community of people shaped by common 
descent, culture, language, aspirations, and history. Nationalism as both a modern ideology 
and a social or political movement aims at the formation and upkeep of self-government 
and/or the creation and reconstruction of collective cultural/national identity for a group who 
believe themselves to be a nation or proto-nation. 
The percolation of the concepts of nation and nationalism in the minds of the Kurds, when 
compared to European nations, is comparatively newer. As posited by van Bruinessen (2000, 
2003), H. Bozarslan (2003a) and Vali (2003a), the construction of Kurdish national identity 
and the birth of Kurdish nationalism are recent phenomena, dating back to beginning of the 
last century. Van Bruinessen rightly observes that under Ottoman rule, Kurds, analogous to 
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other people in the multi-religious and multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire, despite being aware of 
their Kurdishness, did not categorise themselves as an ethnic group or nation in the way they 
do today, because tribes were the main collectivity with which Kurds identified (2003: 43-
45). Similarly, Dennis Natali espouses the view that ‘in both the Ottoman and Qajar [Persian] 
Empires the absence of an exclusive official nationalist project based on ethnicity prevented 
Kurdayetî from becoming salient or highly ethnicized’ (2005: 24). In other words, in the pre-
20
th
 century there were neither political nor socio-economic prerequisites in Kurdistan for the 
existence of any notion of the nation. Despite the Ottoman Empire’s centralisation policies 
and the infiltration of capitalism into Ottoman Anatolia post-1830s arousing nationalist 
proclivities amidst Ottoman Kurds, most of the Kurdish movements were Ottomanist in 
outlook (H. Bozarslan, 2003a: 165-72) and this was a restricted process, encompassing 
exclusively the Kurdish elite (van Bruinessen, 2003: 55-6). Nevertheless, the Kurdish upper 
class encountering European notions of nationalism from the late nineteenth century onwards 
was vital for the pre-history of the contemporary mass Kurdish nationalist movement in the 
twentieth century (White, 2000; van Bruinessen, 1992). 
Kurdish nationalism and the politicisation of the Kurdish identity were largely catalysed by 
four different factors. The first of these is the assimilationist policies stemming from Turkish, 
Arab, and Persian official nationalisms (Natali, 2005; Vali, 2006; van Bruinessen, 2000). 
That is to say, the exclusionary policies and monolithic understanding of society and state by 
the states that host Kurds impelled them to conserve their distinct identities, and thereby 
initiated a symbiotic development of Kurdish and Arab/Turkish/Persian nationalisms. The 
second factor that fostered Kurdish identity and nationalism is the uneven socio-economic 
and political development commonly experienced by the Kurdish societies in the modern 
Middle East. As rightly noted by Tom Nairn, nationalism has commonly ‘arisen in societies 
confronting a dilemma of uneven development…where a conscious, middle-class elite has 
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sought massive popular mobilization to right the balance’ (1977: 41-2). Michael Hechter also 
makes a similar and pertinent observation: ‘to the extent that social stratification in the 
periphery is based on observable cultural difference, there exists the probability that the 
disadvantaged group will, in time, reactively assert its own culture as equal or superior to that 
of the relatively advantaged core. This may help it conceive of itself as a separate ‘nation’ 
and seek independence’ (1975: 10). As these valuable annotations highlight, nationalism 
neither emerges erratically in the history of a populace, nor is it a perennial or romantic 
phenomena; it is a contingent phenomenon rooted in the socio-economic actualities of the 
modern age.  
In addition, the spread of war between the Kurdish armed organisations and the states that 
host the Kurds post-1960 (i.e. Iraq: intermittently from 1960-2003, Iran: intermittently from 
1980-present, Turkey: intermittently from 1984-present) has amplified the shared socio-
economic and political problems experienced by Kurds, and, in turn, nurtured national 
awareness among Kurds, even with their territorial, linguistic and political fragmentations. 
These wars have engendered a constant movement of Kurdish populations, often to similar 
destinations, such as the metropolis of the hosting states or the megalopolis of Western 
Europe; enabling them to share experiences of struggle, displacement, poverty, and 
homelessness. The fourth factor that fuelled Kurdish differences and political subjectivity is 
the absence of the Kurdish nation-state (van Bruinessen, 2000; Yavuz, 2007). The non-
existence of a Kurdish state, as accentuated by M. Hakan Yavuz (2007), has stimulated Kurds 
to constantly maintain and stress their differences in response to the perceived belligerent 
policies commonly pursued by the modernising regimes vis-à-vis the Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, 
Iran and Syria.  
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The emergence of the modern nation-state coincided with the rise of capitalism, a novel type 
of economic structure, ideology and political structure to that existing under feudalism.
9
 
Under feudalism in Europe, for instance, political domination had been legitimised by 
reference to the divine right of the kings to rule. Theoretically, under capitalism notions of 
‘popular sovereignty’ or ‘common will’ define the nature of political authority in the 
constitution of the nation-states. A chain of bourgeois revolutions gave an end to the feudal 
aristocracy’s rule and gave birth to the nation-states. The classic example of this is the above-
mentioned French Revolution.  
The existential and core principle of the nation-state is that all its citizens are members of a 
single political unit, regardless of their ideational dissimilarities. This principle habitually 
assumes an organic link between the dominant nation and the state. The construction of the 
nation-states in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, which began soon after the First World War, 
shared this ethos. Often, the cement of this unison is a form of national myth, which unites 
and defines the features specific to each nation. Put differently, most fellow-members of a 
nation will never know each other, but they will entertain the identical national myth. Thus 
the nation has been perceived as an ‘imagined community’, since the ‘image of their 
communion’ is instilled in the minds of each member of any given nation (Anderson, 1983: 
6), unlike in pre-capitalist or traditional societies, where most members of society know each 
other. Kurds have also employed the appeals to ‘imagined community’ in mobilising national 
sentiment. 
                                                          
9
 Feudalism in this thesis will denote a social and economic arrangement, characterised by an obligation laid on 
the producer by force and independently of their own volition to fulfil certain economic demands of an overlord, 
that is, the feudal superior, whether these demands take the form of services to be performed or of dues to be 
paid in money or in kind. This coercive force may be that of military strength, possessed by the feudal superior, 
or of custom backed by a juridical procedure, or the imposition of law.  
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The construction and deployment of a myth of origin tracing the origins of the Kurds to the 
first millennium B.C. to an ancient people, the Medes, and the Newroz myth
10
 in the political 
discourse of the Kurdish national movement have been highly influential in the awareness by 
Kurds that they constitute one people (Güneş, 2012; D. Aydın, 2014). As asserted by 
McDowall, these myths ‘are valuable tools in nation building, however dubious historically, 
because they offer a common mystical identity, exclusive to the Kurdish people’ (2000:4). In 
brief, real socio-economic and political problems commonly experienced by Kurds in the 
modern Middle East combined with the fictitious or constructive factors have shaped the 
process of national identity formation among Kurds.  
The amalgamation and culmination of the fictive and real factors at the turn of this century, 
as observed by van Bruinessen in the mid-1990s, ‘have strengthened contact between the 
Kurds of Turkey, Iran; there is now a stronger awareness of belonging together than there 
was in the past. The wish for a separate state, uniting the various parts of Kurdistan, has also 
become stronger’ (2000: 62). The formalisation of the semi-independent Kurdish 
administrative unit in Iraq following the US-led invasion of this country in 2001, and in 2014 
Kurds gaining control of the de facto autonomous region in Northern and Northeast Syria, 
validate van Bruinessen’s observation.  However, these developments do not implicate that 
Kurds have transformed into a unitary, collective actor with common purposes and 
resultantly done away with all divisions, since there still exists diverse political agendas 
amidst Kurdish political actors. Yet what these contemporary political events germane to 
Kurds accentuate is that drawing on Miroslav Hroch’s model of nation-building11, the 
                                                          
10
 The myth of Newroz narrates the toppling of the Assyrian King Dehak by a mass uprising led by Kawa the 
Blacksmith (Kawayi Hesinkar), who, on 21 March 612 BC initiated an uprising by the Medes, defeated the 
Assyrian Empire, annihilated Dehak and liberated the Medes (the supposed ancestors of Kurds) from years of 
oppression and tyranny. Kurdish nationalist construct the myth of origin around the Newroz festival 
(traditionally celebrated across the Middle East on 21 March, which coincides with the spring equinox, as a New 
Year festival) as a national festival date.  
11
 This model distinguishes between a maiden phase where activists commit themselves to erudite inquiry into 
the cultural, historical and linguistic features of their ethnic group; a penultimate stage where a new range of 
activists emerge, trying to gain the support of as a many of their compatriots as feasible for the project of 
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majority of the Kurds have reached the final phase of nation-building and national 
consciousness has become the concern of the majority of the Kurdish population. However, 
in virtue of multifarious and complex international, historical, political and economic factors 
explored in the subsequent sections of this study, even with the recent Kurdish regimes 
established by Kurds in the twenty-first century, they have been unable to institute an 
independent state. Accordingly, the Kurds claim the status of the largest nation without a 
state of their own. 
Language        
The Kurds speak an Indo-European language, Kurdish, which is a branch of the Iranian 
language family. There are a number of dialects and sub-dialects of the Kurdish language. 
Kurmanji is the most widely spoken dialect by northern Kurds (in Turkey) and by western 
Kurds (in Syria) as well as by Kurds in ex-USSR (Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan). Kurds 
living in Iraq, or southern Kurds, mostly speak Sorani. Sub-dialects or local dialects include 
those mostly used by Kurdish-inhabited areas of Iran (eastern Kurds) of Kirmanshani, Gurani 
(Gorani) and Leki (Laki). A minority of northern Kurds also speak Zaza. There is 
disagreement however, about whether Zaza is actually a Kurdish language, because it is 
noticeably different, though not completely dissimilar, to Kurdish dialects, except Gurani 
(Gorani) (McDowall, 2000: 10). An additional problem is the different written scripts of the 
Kurdish language. It is written in the Arabic, Latin, and, in the case of Kurmanji in Armenia, 
Georgia, and the Azerbaijan republics, in the Cyrillic alphabets.
12
  
Religion 
The Kurds are overwhelmingly Muslim. The majority of the Kurds are Sunni Muslims who 
are a part of the Shafi’i school of Islam unlike their Arab and Turkish Sunni neighbours who 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
creating a nation; and a final period when the national consciousness becomes the concern of the majority of the 
population (1993: 3-20) 
12
 For detailed and differing explorations of the Kurdish language, see: MacKenzie (1961: 68-86); Minorsky 
(1927: 1151-1155); and Kreyenbroek (1992: 68-83). 
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mainly adhere to the Hanafi school, and their Azeri and Persian neighbours who are Shi’ites. 
Most of the eastern Kurds living in the provinces of Kermanshah and Ilam are Shi’ite. Other 
Kurds observe heterodox and syncretistic sects ‘with beliefs and rituals that are clearly 
influenced by Islam but owe more to other religions, notably old Iranian religions’ (van 
Bruinessen, 1991: 7). Such sects include the Ahl-i Haqq (‘People of Truth or the Kaka’is), the 
Alevis (otherwise known as the Qizilbash) and the Yezidis. There are small communities of 
Kurdish Baha’is, Christians and Jews.13   
Land      
It is generally agreed that the Kurds have lived in a geographical entity, namely, Kurdistan 
(literally, the land of the Kurds). However, owing to the various political, economic and 
social vicissitudes, the geographical extent of Kurdistan has varied significantly over the 
centuries and its territorial confines have been a matter of contention among its researchers. 
Indubitably, the following four core characteristics of Kurdistan have fuelled this debate 
(O’Shea, 2004):  
(i) it is not, and never has been, recognised as an independent state;  
(ii) it does not constitute an economically distinct area;  
(iii) it is not, and at no time has it been, entirely ethnically, linguistically, or religiously 
cohesive as a region;  
(iv) it lies on the major overland trade routes between Asia, Europe, Russia, and the 
Arab Middle East, as well as being home to rich oil and water resources, prompted 
outside powers to become involved in its fate.  
The amalgamation of the aforementioned factors engendered the elasticity and the 
degeneration of the notion of Kurdistan over centuries.  
                                                          
13
 For in-depth analysis of religion in Kurdistan, see: van Bruinessen (1991: 5-27); and Kreyenbroek (1996: 85-
110; 1998: 163-84). 
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In the 11
th
 century, the Geographer Al Qashgari produced a stylised map of what he entitled 
States of the East, which built-in, along with all the ‘races’ acknowledged in the East, the 
land of the Kurds. This perhaps is the first map to include Kurdistan (O’Shea, 2004: 230). 
During the 10
th
 and 11
th
 centuries, whilst part of the Arab Caliphate (7-11
th
 centuries, CE), a 
number of Kurdish dynasties – the Shaddadids (951-1174, Transcaucasia), Hasanwaydhids 
(959-1095, Dinawar), Marwanids (990-1096, Diyarbakir), and Annazids (991-1117, Hulwan) 
– took control of their local matters, but were wiped out by the invasions of the Seljuk Turks 
(11-12
th
 centuries, CE) (McDowall, 2000: 21-4; Hassanpour, 1992: 50). In the year 1150 CE, 
the Seljuk Sultan Sanjar created a province of Kurdistan, with the town of Bahar as its capital 
and it comprised of areas that are presently located in the predominantly Kurdish regions of 
contemporary Iraq and Iran, namely, provinces of Dinawer, Kermanshah, Shahrazur and 
Sincar (Kendal, 1996: 10). Yet, it was not until the 16
th
 century that the geographical 
expression Kurdistan came into common usage to denote a system of Kurdish fiefs generally, 
and not merely the Seljuk-designated province.  
The geographical extent of this definition grew immensely during the next three centuries 
owing to the instigation of a few interrelated processes from 1514 onwards: the incorporation 
of nearly all of the Kurdish principalities in or around Eastern Asia Minor into the Ottoman 
Empire, and the migratory movements of the Kurds. The aggrandisement of the territorial 
scope of Ottoman Kurdistan becomes apparent when the investigations of 19
th
 century 
contemporaries on its territorial confines are surveyed. Probably the most detailed account of 
it is delineated in a little-known study of the Ottoman military scholar, Ahmed Cemal.  
In 1895, Cemal, after having graduated from the Ottoman Imperial War Academy in 1892, 
with the blessing of the Meclis-i Maarif-i Askerriye (Council of Military Education) 
published a geography textbook titled Çoğrafya-yi Osmânî (Ottoman Geography) in an 
attempt to acquaint senior high school students with the topography of the Empire. It was 
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republished in 1900 and 1903, but in the ensuing years, possibly because of the political 
developments during and after the CUP period outlined in Chapter 4, its educational role and 
importance appears to have gradually diminished.  
Çoğrafya-yi Osmânî divides Ottoman lands into three separate entities: Avrupa-yı Osmânî 
(Ottoman lands in Europe); Asya-yı Osmânî (Ottoman lands in Asia); and Afrika-yı Osmânî 
(Ottoman lands in Africa). Kurdistan, along with the Anatolian Peninsula, Arabian Peninsula, 
Yemen, Hejaz and the Islands of Crete and Cyprus, is a constituent territory of Asya-yı 
Osmânî, and it consists of the eyalets (provinces), sancaks (sub-provinces) and kazas (judicial 
districts) displayed on Table 1.1. (Kürdoloji Çalışmaları Grubu, Kürt Tarihi Araştırmaları-I, 
Osmanlı Kürdistanı, 2011).  
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Table 1.1 Eyalets, Sancaks and Kazas in Ottoman Kurdistan in c.1890 
Eyalets Sancaks Kazas 
Erzurum 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mamuretülaziz  
 
                                                
 
 
 Erzurum 
                       
                            
                           Bayburt 
                           Ova 
                           Pasinler 
                           Hınıs 
                           Kiği 
                           Tercan 
                           Tortum 
                           Kiskim 
                           İspir 
 
 Erzincan                            Kemah 
                           Kuruçay 
                           Refahiye 
 
 Bayezid                            Diyadin 
                           Kara Kilise 
                           Eleşkirt 
                           İntap 
Mamuretülaziz                   Harput 
                  Arapgir 
                  Keban Madeni 
                  Eğin (Kemaliye) 
                   
Malatya                   Hısnımansur-Adıyaman 
                  Besni 
                  Akçadağ 
                  Kahta 
                  Şiro 
 
Dersim                   Ovacık 
                  Çemişgezek 
                  Çarsanacak 
                  Mazgirt 
                  Pah (Kocakoç) 
                  Pülümür 
                  Kızıl Kilisa (Nazımiye) 
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Diyarbekir 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bitlis 
                  Bitlis                                       Ahlat 
                                      Hizan 
                                      Mutki 
 
                  Muş                                       Malazgirt 
                                      Bulanık 
                                      Varto 
                                      Sason 
 
                  Siird 
 
 
        Genç 
                                      Garzan 
                                      Şirvan 
                                      Eruh 
                                      Pervari 
 
                          Çapakçur 
                                      Kulp 
                                      
 
 
 
 
 
                    
     
   Diyarbekir                                
             
 
           Mardin 
                                
 
 
                               Silvan 
                               Lice 
                               Derik 
 
                               Cizre 
                               Nusaybin 
                               Avniye (Sürgücü) 
                               Midyat 
                               Şırnak 
 
       
           Ergani 
                                
                               Palo 
                               Çermik 
                               Siverek 
 
 
51 
 
Hakkari 
 
Musul 
 
                  Musul                                     Akra 
                                    Zebar 
                                    Duhok 
                                    Zaho 
                                    Sincar 
                                    İmadiye 
 
                  Şehrizor                                     Revandiz 
                                    Erbil 
                                    Köy Sancak 
                                    Salahiye 
                                    Ranye 
 
                  Sülemaniye                                     Gülanber 
                                    Bazyan 
                                    Merge 
                                    Şehripazar 
 
 
   
Source: Çoğrafya-yi Osmânî, Ahmed Cemal, 1895: 105, 114, 130-51, 181-94, 231-38 in 
Kürdoloji Çalışmaları Grubu, Kürt Tarihi Araştırmaları-I, Osmanlı Kürdistanı, 2011: 181-
232  
 
  
                  Van                                     Karcikan 
                                    Şatak (Çatak) 
                                    Gevaş 
                                    Adilcevaz 
                                    Erçiş 
                                    Bargiri  (Muradiye) 
                                    Müks (Bahçesaray) 
 
                  Hakkari                                     Albak 
                                    Gever (Yüksekova) 
                                    Şemdinan (Şemdinli) 
                                    Mahmudiye 
                                    Nurdüz 
                                    Hoşab 
                                    Beytüşşebab 
                                    İmadiye 
                                    Oramar (Dağlıca) 
 
52 
 
 
Cemal’s demarcation of the geographical extent of Ottoman Kurdistan is in accord with the 
detailed map of Kurdistan produced by Britain’s military attaché at Constantinople14, Major 
F.R. Maunsell
15
, in Military Report on Eastern Turkey in Asia as a consequence of his travels 
in 1892 ( Map 1). Ever since the First World War, by virtue of the political and military 
affairs that had surfaced in the Ottoman Empire and the neighbouring polities at the dawn, 
during and after the War that are explored in Chapters 2-5, there is much debate
16
, albeit with 
little consensus, on the issue of where the borders of Kurdistan lie.  
Discussions pertaining to the territorial confines of Kurdistan are with regard to the political 
and social nature of the concept of Kurdistan, because in the wake of the First Word War 
Kurdistan was divvied between the various countries of the Middle East. Today the bulk of 
the Kurds live in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and a tiny fraction within several republics of what 
used to be the Soviet Union (i.e. Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan and 
Turkmenistan), which had passed into these areas when territories were ceded by Persia in 
1807-1820, and by Ottomans in 1878 (Meho, 2001: 4).  
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 Maunsell remained in this post until 1905, and was responsible for the War Office’s maps of the Middle East 
during the period prior to the First World War. 
15
 For other investigations of Maunsell on Kurdistan, see: F.R. Maunsell (1901: 121-41).  
16
 For a detailed exploration of the contentions surrounding the geography of Kurdistan from the onset of the 
First World War, see: O’Shea (2004).  
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                                                               Map 3  
                                 Map of Kurdistan by F.R. Maunsell, 1892 
                                             Source: O’Shea, 2004: 127. 
 
 
54 
 
                                          
Population 
The Kurds in Turkey constitute the majority of the population in ESA– see Map 2 below for 
the approximate distribution of Kurds in each of the provinces in these regions. These 
domains today consist of ethnically and religiously mixed provinces such as Malatya and 
Erzurum, with various combinations of Kurds, Turks, Sunnis and Alevis. This diversity has 
geared nearly all of the scholars to use the geographical designation of “predominantly 
Kurdish regions” rather than that of Kurdistan and this thesis will follow suit.   
On account of forced displacements during the 1920s and 1930s and as part of the 
counteroffensive against the guerrilla insurgency by the PKK in the 1990s as well as due to 
voluntary migration throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Kurds currently populate all cities in 
Turkey. Moreover, since the 1960s, particularly from the 1980s onwards, there has been a 
rapid increase in the Kurdish immigrant communities in many of the West European 
countries.    
According to the Turkish census data, the inhabitants of the Turkish Republic whose mother 
tongue was Kurdish were 1.4 million in 1935, 1.4 million in 1945, 1.8 million in 1950, 1.8 
million in 1960, and 2.3 million in 1965. That meant Kurds constituted 9.2 per cent of the 
population in 1935, 7.9 per cent in 1945, 8.9 per cent in 1950, 6.7 per cent in 1960, and 7.7 
per cent in 1965 (Heper, 2007: 36). It is apt to point out that such censuses do not equip one 
with the actual size of the Kurdish population in Turkey in the above stated years. This is for 
two main reasons. The first of these is – bearing in mind the suppressive political milieu in 
Turkey in the years 1935-1965 – many Kurds were somewhat reluctant to stigmatise 
themselves by pronouncing their Kurdish identity. The other factor is that some of the 
enumerators may have ‘corrected’ their data in order to arrive at politically acceptable data 
(van Bruinessen, 2006: 22-3).    
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After 1965, the Turkish state abandoned and suppressed official censuses to establish ethnic 
distribution in Turkey. Resultantly, ever since 1965, there has been much speculation 
regarding the population of Kurds in Turkey. Commentators in the last two decades or so 
have given estimates as ranging from 7 million to 30 million. This study will employ the 
breakdown of the Kurdish population prepared by McDowall, which fall in the middle of 
range approximations (McDowall, 2000: 3-4).
17
 
Table 1.2 Kurdish population estimates, 2000 
Country Total Population                  Kurds                      % of Population 
      
Turkey  60,000,000  13,200,000            22% 
Iraq                                    19,300,000     4,400,000            23% 
Iran 61,000,000                             6,100,000            10% 
Ex-Soviet Union                                                                 500,000  
Elsewhere                                                                           700,000                                                                                
                                                                             Total  26,000,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17
 For alternative studies regarding the size of the Kurds in Turkey see: Mutlu (1996: 517-41); and Sirkeci 
(2000: 149-75).  
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                        Map 4 
          Distribution of Kurds in Turkey 
                                                          Source: McDowall, 2000: 1. 
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1.2 Differing Theories on the Kurdish Question in Turkey 
The socio-economic disparities between the predominantly Kurdish ESA regions and the rest 
of the Turkish Republic, the lack of recognition of the collective rights of the Kurds in 
Turkey, their mass mobilisation around the demands of political pluralism and autonomy, and 
the PKK-led Kurdish insurgency, continue to be constitutive aspects of a thorny and 
multidimensional issue in Turkey: The Kurdish question. Although Turkey’s Kurdish 
question is today generally examined as an amalgam of complex problems, for many decades 
after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic this question was conceptualised and analysed 
in a rather static and unilinear fashion, largely dominated by the paradigms devised by the 
Turkish state.  
Up until 1990, the Turkish state authorities denied the Kurdishness of the Kurds and the 
Kurdish question, or, put differently, they negated the existence of the Kurds as a separate 
people and the ethno-political component of the Kurdish issue, and generally controlled 
representations regarding this matter. This success in dominating characterisations of the 
Kurdish question was largely in virtue of three key factors: first, the Turkish state authorities’ 
ability to quell pro-Kurdish movements and with it encumber all alternative formulations and 
projections of the Kurdish question. Second, state-centric representations of the Kurdish 
question regularly attaining international acceptance and recognition, with the Turkish state 
being able to govern the Kurdish population in Turkey with very little international 
interference. Third, the poverty of knowledge on Kurds in Turkey because of the state 
ceaselessly bowdlerising publications
18
 and investigations on Kurds. As these features 
                                                          
18 One of the earliest texts on the socio-economic and political structures of the Kurds, Şeref Han’s 1597 
manuscript Şerefname on the Ottoman Kurdish principalities, was translated into Turkish for the first time in 
1971. Upon its publication, the Public Prosecutors in Turkey immediately filed a case against the book on the 
grounds of it ‘making propaganda aimed at destroying or endangering [Turkey’s] national feeling on the basis of 
race’ (M. E. Bozarslan, 1990: unpagenated), and asking for its collection. Until 1980, the study by Basile 
Nikitine, Les Kurdes: Etude Sociologique et Historique, published in Paris in 1956, and Vladimir Minorsky’s 
subject entries for ‘Kurds’, ‘Kurdish’ and ‘Kurdistan’ in the Encylopedia of Islam, both of which were translated 
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indicate, and as the exploration below will emphasise, the formulations and evolution of the 
Kurdish question is inextricably linked to political and socioeconomic events within and 
outside of the borders of the Turkish Republic and resultantly ever since 1920 the Kurdish 
issues has been both an international and transnational issue.  
The Kurdish Question as a ‘Question of Underdevelopment’ 
From the establishment of the Republic up until the 1950s, the Kurdish question was 
formulated as an issue of perseverance of the feudal or backward structures, to be resolved by 
relevant modernising social reforms. Relatedly, the founders of the Turkish Republic 
portrayed the question as a clash between a progressive modern state and archaic reactionary 
structures. The unsuccessful revolts of the Kurds in the initial years of Republic – i.e. Şeyh 
Said Rebellion (1925), Ararat Revolt (1927-30) and Dersim Rebellion (1937-38) (see Chapter 
4) – were portrayed as the work of the reactionary feudal leaders against a modern state 
structure that promised progress and prosperity. As rightly observed by Yeğen, this 
representation of the Kurdish question in Turkey is exhibited in the following speech of the 
chairperson of Court of Independence in 1925, which condemned the leaders of Şeyh Said 
Rebellion to death: 
‘[S]ome of you used people for your personal interest, and some of you followed foreign 
incitement and political ambitions, but all of you marched to a certain point: the 
establishment of an independent Kurdistan [...] Your political reaction and rebellion were 
destroyed immediately by the decisive acts of the government of the Republic and by the 
fatal strokes of the Republican army.[...] Everybody must know that as the young Republican 
government will definitely not condone any cursed action like the incitement and political re-
action, it will prevent this sort of banditry by means of its precise precautions. The poor 
people of this region who have been exploited and oppressed under the domination of sheikhs 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
into Turkish, constituted the main sources on Kurds and Kurdish history unblemished by state-centric 
perspectives in Turkey.         
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and feudal landlords will be freed from your incitement and evil, and they will follow the 
efficient paths of our Republic which promises progress and prosperity’ (2011: 69). 
Because the problem was conceived as a socio-economic problem, rooted in the philistine 
and pre-modern structure of the region, it was thought it could be fixed by Kemalist mission 
civilisatrice. For example, the Prime Minister, İsmet İnönü, portrayed the Dersim Rebellion 
as follows: 
‘The Government has been implementing a reform program for Tunceli [Dersim] for the past 
two years. It includes wide-ranging work…in order to civilise the region. Some of the tribal 
chiefs of the region…have not welcomed the [governments’] program. [Nevertheless], the 
program of reform as well as the civilising of Tunceli [Dersim] shall go on! (Beşikci, 1990: 
82-3).  
By the 1950s, armed Kurdish resistances had ended, but socio-economic disparities between 
the predominantly Kurdish ESA regions and the rest of Turkey had widened and reached an 
indubitable level. In this context, the state represented the Kurdish question as by-product of 
socio-economic underdevelopment emanating from a lack of economic integration. 
Accordingly, as accentuated by Yeğen (2009), the government programs during the 1950s 
and 1960s promised to diminish the economic divergences between the principally Kurdish 
regions and the rest of Turkey (159-70). For instance, the 1969 government emphasised the 
issue of ‘the development of the eastern region’ and stressed the importance of ‘special 
measures in the regions where backwardness is massive and acute’ (ibid.: 164-65). Some of 
governments in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s also portrayed the Kurdish question as a ‘socio-
economic problem of underdevelopment enhanced by the feudal structure’ (Gençkaya, 1996: 
94-101). Hence, after 1950 the question came to be entitled the ‘Doğu Sorunu’ (‘Eastern 
Question’) and perceived as a socio-economic question by an increasing number of scholars 
and researchers in Turkey.  
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The paradox of the representation of the Kurdish question as a problem of endurance of the 
traditional structure by nearly all of the governments in the years after the transition to multi-
party democracy in 1946 laid in the continual alliance between the Kurdish rural elite and 
political parties leading these governments. Most of the mainstream political parties that 
came to power post-1950 successfully obtained a Kurdish clientele group that consisted of 
the receptive elements within the Kurdish landed and/or religious elites, who were able to 
garner a large number of votes. For example, Mustafa Remzi Bucak and Ziya Şerefhanoğlu -
members of venerated Kurdish tribes - were elected as candidates of the The Democrat Party 
(Demokrat Parti, DP) in 1950. In the succeeding years, with the exception of the far-right 
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party, NAP), all of the mainstream parties co-
opted a section of the Kurdish propertied class, and had Kurdish representatives belonging to 
this segment in the National Assembly. As well as legitimising state rule in the 
predominantly Kurdish provinces in ESA, this integrative policy also revitalised the 
traditional structure in these regions and reinvigorated the power of the Kurdish rural elite - 
most of whom were deported during the single-party era (1923-1945) and were only granted 
the right to return with the rise of DP to power in 1950.     
In the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, Kurdish activists and intellectuals played a key 
role in the discussions of the ‘Eastern Question’ and saw it as a conduit to raise demands of 
social and economic equality for the Kurds. The leading members of the new Kurdish 
politically active intellectual included Musa Anter, Yusuf Azizoğlu, Mehmet Emin 
Bozarslan, Faik Bucak and Sait Elçi, all of whom played a pivotal role in debates surrounding 
the Kurdish question in Turkey in the later years.
19
  M. E. Bozarslan authored a very 
influential study entitled Doğu’nun Sorunları (The Problems of the East) in 1966, wherein 
                                                          
19
 For more information on this period and the role of these leading members, see: Anter (1999); Edip Karahan 
(2005); and Güneş (2012: Chapters 3-4). 
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the socio-economic problems in ESA were addressed and possible solutions were 
hypothesised.  
The Kurdish Question as a ‘Natural and Instinctive Impetus for Liberation’ 
At a time when the Kurdish question was mainly perceived through the lens of the ‘Eastern 
Question’ in Turkey, in Europe, particularly in France, Kurdish nationalists were circulating 
publications outlining the nature and necessity of the ‘national liberation movement’ of Kurds 
with a view to influencing the European communities (Scalbert-Yücel and Le Ray, 2006: 4-
8). As a result, Kurds living abroad and writing in French made the first explicit reference to 
the ‘Kurdish question’. In 1930, in a book authored by Dr. Bletch Chirguh, the penname of 
Celadet Bedirkhan, published by the Kurdish nationalist organisation Khoybûn
20
, described 
the Kurdish question as a political question, more specifically, as a question of ‘national 
liberation’. Chirguh in La Question Kurde: ses Origines et ses Causes (The Kurdish 
Question: Its Origins and Causes) posits that the Kurdish question consists of ‘the struggles 
that have lasted for more than three centuries and that have always aimed at national 
independence’ (1930: 3 in Scalbert-Yücel and Le Ray, 2006: 4). 
Three decades after the publication of La Question Kurde: ses Origines et ses Causes, 
Kamuran Bedirkhan, in another study in French, La question Kurde (The Kurdish Question), 
defined the Kurdish question as:  
‘[T]he fight of the Kurdish people since one century for its liberation. It is the natural and 
instinctive impetus of this people who wants to remain Kurd, to speak freely his language and 
preserve his national patrimony […] The Kurdish question consists in convincing the states 
that share Kurdistan to behave towards the Kurds in accordance with the judicial and moral 
principle universally acknowledged and inscribed in the United Nation Charter and in the 
                                                          
20
 Khoybûn (Independence) was formed in Bhamdoun, Lebanon, in October 1927 by Kurdish intellectuals living 
in exile. Leading figures of Khoybûn included Kurds of aristocratic background such as the Bedirkhan brothers, 
Celadet Bedirkhan and Kamuran Bedirkhan, scions of the princely family that once ruled the Kurdish emirate of 
Bohtan. Khoybun sought to establish a strong Kurdish national liberation movement. It instigated the 
unsuccessful Ararat uprising of the Kurds in Turkey in 1927-1930, discussed in Chapter 4.  
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Declaration of Human Rights’ (1958: 8-9 in Scalbert-Yücel and Le Ray, 2006: 4-5, italics 
belong to me).  
As can be deduced from the quotation above, maiden formulations of the Kurdish question by 
Kurdish nationalists framed it as a question of ‘national liberation’ emanating from the 
perturbed relationship between the oppressive states and the oppressed Kurds. Moreover, 
these representations, akin to the aforementioned primordialist or essentialist studies on 
Kurds, considered the nation and national identity as a ‘natural and instinctive impetuses’ or, 
put differently, conceived of identity as a fixed entity assuming it to be an essentially 
unchanging quality. Despite influencing the views of particularly French researchers studying 
the Kurdish question like Joyce Blau and Gerard Chaliand (see: Scalbert-Yücel and Le Ray, 
2006), the studies by the Bedirkhan brothers were not influential in Turkey at the time of 
their publication largely because of the aforementioned expurgation of studies regarding 
Kurds. 
The Kurdish Question as a ‘Foreign Conspiracy’ 
The other prevailing conceptual framework intermittently used by the Turkish state to 
characterise the Kurdish question in Turkey, particularly at times of rising Kurdish 
discontent, was that it was a consequence of foreign provocation and thus, the issue was 
reduced to the state subduing the disorder incited by the foreign elements. Underlying this 
sporadically used characterisation for the Kurdish question is the ‘Sevres Syndrome’, a long-
enduring trauma shared by the post-Ottoman rulers and society in Turkey owing to the 
‘divisive’ promises made by the triumphant Allies or Entente Powers of the First World War 
to the Armenians and Kurds in the Treaty of Sevres (1920). Despite this Treaty overriding the 
Treaty of Lausanne (1923), the spectre of the past haunted and recurrently informed the 
state’s notion that foreign powers are provoking Kurdish rebellions in Turkey. This view is 
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exemplified by the judgment of a case in 1963, wherein prominent members of the Kurdish 
opposition of the time were sentenced: 
 ‘During the Republican period […] some foreign states intended to cause trouble in Eastern 
Anatolia. As a matter of fact, the Sheikh Said, Ağrı and Dersim rebellions were due to the 
counter revolutionary actions of some tribes which were incited by foreign powers […] The 
content of foreign incitement at present [however] is not the same as that of the past. While 
previous foreign incitements […] were caused by the imperialists states which had interests 
in the Middle East, at present, these incitements are caused by communist activity. Today, 
[…] the Kurdish ideal is entirely the product of incitement by international communism. 
(Yeğen, 2011: 72). 
Mahmut Rışvanoğlu’s extensive study, Doğu Aşiretleri ve Emperyalizm (The Tribes of the 
East and Imperialism), published by Türk Kültür Yayınlar in 1975, offers an emblematic 
defence of the ‘foreign incitement’ hypothesis. Rışvanoğlu postulates that the Kurdish 
identity is a construct of Orientalist scholarship built to cater for the needs of international 
imperialism. According to him, initial studies on the Kurds by Russian scholars Vladimir 
Minorsky and Basile Nikitine who settled in Britain and France after the October Revolution 
(1917), served the interests’ of the imperialist countries to where they had migrated by 
inciting Kurdish unrest.  
The Turkish state and pro-state researchers or academics laid the blame for the existence of 
Kurdish uprises and the Kurdish question on the foreign powers that they perceived as an 
external threat. The nature and the source of the peril to Turkey changed in accordance with 
who/what the Turkish state perceived as the enemy. Immediately after the War of 
Independence, the threat was the Western imperialist powers. During the Cold War, Turkey 
allied with the West and acted as eastern embankment against the spread of communism, thus 
the source of the Kurdish unrest in the 1960s and 1970s was the Soviets. With the end of the 
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Cold War, Kurds were portrayed as the agents of Greece, Israel, and the European Union 
(EU). 
The Kurdish Question as ‘National Liberation Struggle against Colonialism’ 
During the 1970s and 1980s, Kurdish left-wing movements in Turkey – i.e. the Ala Rizgari, 
the Kawa, the KSP-T, and the PKK – emphasised the political nature of the Kurdish question 
and articulated it as an issue of national self-determination. Such a conceptualisation by 
Kurdish organisations in Turkey altered the question from being discoursed and theorised as 
a socio-economic problem to one of national oppression. All of the aforelisted Kurdish 
political currents, through appropriation of certain elements of Marxist and/or Leninist 
theory, espoused the notion that Kurdistan was a colony of Turkey Iraq, Iran and Syria, and 
began to look towards the anti-colonial liberation struggles in Asia and Africa.  
In the 1978 manifesto of the PKK, the founder of the Party, Abdullah Öcalan, outlined the 
colony thesis
21
 with the following words: 
‘In political terms, Kurdistan is under the rule of four colonialist states that collude with 
imperialism. Each of these states, in accord with its interests and the interests of the 
international monopolies, plays a central role in developing colonialism in the part it keeps 
under its rule’ (1992 [1978]: 100). 
Deriving from such an analysis, Öcalan emphasised the importance of national liberation 
struggle in order to attain economic independence and political unity in Kurdistan: 
                                                          
21 Dr. Sait Kırmızıtoprak (Nom de guerre Dr. Şivan) (1935-1971) initially formulated this thesis and the 
necessity of waging an anti-colonial liberation struggle against the Turkish state in the late 1960s. Dr. 
Kırmızıtoprak was from Tunceli (Dersim). He studied medicine in university. During Adnan Menderes' 
government's crackdown on Kurdish intellectuals in 1959, he was arrested and tried – this episode came to be 
known as the ‘49’ers Incident’ (see section 4.5 for further details). Dr. Kırmızıtoprak was one of the leading 
figures of the pro-Kurdish movement in the 1960s. Kırmızıtoprak published articles in newspapers and 
magazines such as Akis, Forum, Vatan, Yön, Dicle – Fırat, Sosyal Adalet and Milliyet. His published books 
include Ezen ve Ezilen Millletler Sorunu  (The Problem of Oppressing and Oppressed Nations); Kürt Millet 
Hareketleri ve Irak’ta Kürdistan İhtilali  (Kurdish National Movements and the Kurdish Revolution in Iraq); 
Zımanê Kurdî  (Kurdish Language) co-written with Kamuran Bedirkhan; and Ferheng Kurdî û Tırkî (Joyce 
Blau’s Kurmanji-English-French dictionary translated to Turkish by Dr. Şivan with numerous additions). 
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‘Economic independence could only develop in an environment where there are no 
exogenous imperialist intrusions and internally there is political unison. In Kurdistan these 
conditions have not materialised, and, in the present conditions, can only develop subsequent 
to the victory of the national liberation struggle’ (ibid.: 142).  
KSP-T’s founder Kemal Burkay22, in a conference in London in 1984, postulated a similar 
description of Kurdistan, and hypothesised that one of the reasons for socioeconomic 
underdevelopment in Kurdistan was its colony status: 
‘The states that have divvied Kurdistan have reduced each part of it to a colony. When 
compared to Western countries, Turkey, Iraq and Iran are backward countries. Yet, within the 
last 40-50 years, important developments have taken place [in each of these countries]. 
Despite [these developments] there exist major developmental divergences between 
Kurdistan and the remaining parts of these countries. […] The vast natural resource wealth of 
our country [Kurdistan] is an important factor in its division and the poverty endured by our 
people [Kurds]. The states that have apportioned Kurdistan and their imperialist chiefs have 
aggressively plundered and scrambled the natural and mineral resources, reducing our 
country to a colony. We are yet to see a development policy from Turkey. (1999: 5).  
Despite the similarity in their theoretical analysis of the socio-economic and political 
conditions and relations in ESA, the PKK, when compared to the aforementioned Kurdish 
left-wing organisations in Turkey, emphasised extensively and systematically the need for 
violent resistance in order to achieve the ‘national liberation of Kurdistan’ from the 
                                                          
22 Burkay and a few other authors quoted in this section of the thesis, by virtue of being both organic 
intellectuals and instigators of pro-Kurdish political activism in Turkey, have authored scientific and 
militant/political works. Since up until very recently scientific and militant/political works on the Kurds were 
heavily bowdlerised, it was common for both forms of publications to be jointly published. Thus, on account of 
these two factors, in the writings of these influential Kurdish authors it is not always possible to distinguish 
clearly between scientific and militant/political publications. That said, this study has carefully surveyed articles 
penned by these individuals and has cautiously quoted their works; that is to say, the thesis has given special 
care to avoid employing militant/political publications by these figures.  
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‘colonisers’ and bring about a ‘socialist revolution’.23 Moreover, Öcalan considered violent 
struggle as not only a means and necessity of national liberation, but also the very condition 
of individual manumission. PKK launched its guerrilla campaign on 15 August 1984.  
From the mid-1980s on, the trajectory and perceptions of the Kurdish question in Turkey 
were to be determined by the success of the projections and actions of a constellation of 
actors. That is, the Turkish state, the PKK, pro-Kurdish legal political parties in Turkey, 
Kurdish clientelist formations, the Kurdish nationalist movements in Iraq, Iran and Syria, and 
global-imperial actors, most notably the US and the Western European powers, who played a 
fundamental role in the delineation of the political borders in the region throughout the 
twentieth century.  
In the early 1990s, the increasing number of armed clashes between the PKK and state forces, 
the electoral success of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Labour Party (Halkın Emek Partisi, HEP) 
alliance with the Social Democratic People’s Party (Sosyaldemokrat Halk Partisi, SHP) in the 
1991 general elections, winning 22 seats in Parliament, and the Iraqi Kurds attaining de facto 
autonomy following the Gulf War in 1991, had made the negationist paradigms of  the 
Turkish state regarding the Kurds and the ethno-political component of the Kurdish question 
unsustainable. Resultantly, in 1991, Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel made an 
unprecedented speech in Diyarbakir wherein he declared that the state recognised ‘the 
Kurdish reality’, and within the same year, the Turkish Assembly enacted a law annulling the 
1983 ban on speaking Kurdish in public. 
The recognition of the presence of the Kurds, however, did not implicate or result in the 
recognition of their collective rights.  
 
 
                                                          
23
 For an extensive comparative study of the political manifestos and organs of the Ala Rizgari, the Kawa, the 
KPS-T, and the PKK, see: Güneş (2012: 65-100).      
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The Kurdish Question as a Question of ‘Separatist Terror’  
The Anti-Terror Law of 1991 (Act No: 3713), enacted within the same year as the speech by 
Demirel, defined terror in an across-the-board manner: it included nearly all of the activities 
tied to the advancement of Kurdish rights and culture, and it has since been invoked to detain 
and imprison Kurdish activists, intellectuals and politicians (Güneş and Zeydanlıoğlu, 2014: 
13-4). The enactment of this draconian law was not only emblematic of the confines of the 
recognition policy of the Turkish state; it also was illustrative of the dominant paradigm that 
would replace the negationist model of discourse and theorisation of Turkey’s Kurdish 
question. That is to say, having acknowledged the ethnic constituent of the Kurdish question, 
the state throughout the 1990s would characterise the question as one of ethnic insurrection 
with a secessionist and divisive aim, which therefore necessitated military/security measures. 
Expectedly, as mentioned in the previous chapter, during the late 1980s and the 1990s the 
central focus of nearly all of the academic literature and discussions came to be to the 
political history of Kurdish nationalism and conflict analyses. Whereas in the 1960s and 
1970s the focus of the discussion about the Kurdish question was the socio-economic features 
of the issue, from the latter part of the 1980s the political dimension of the question took 
precedence. 
Because the political and cultural aspects of Turkey’s Kurdish question constitute the main 
source of contention or conflict between the pro-Kurdish actors and the Turkish state, since 
1990, scholarly research and debates regarding this issue have concentrated on these two 
components, resulting in the economic constituent of the question being under-researched. As 
rightly observed by van Bruinessen, ‘[when compared to the political and cultural features of 
the Kurdish question] on the nature of the economic aspect of the question, there is broad 
range of agreement between Kurds and non-Kurds’ (2004: 5), which has been a contributing 
factor for the economic feature of the question attaining relatively little attention.        
68 
 
1.3 Alternative Perspectives on Economic Development in ESA 
The central focus and vantage point of virtually all of the literature analysing the connections 
between economic development in ESA and the Kurdish question has been the hypothesis of 
regional underdevelopment. This said, there exists two opposite poles of thought with regard 
to the causality of underdevelopment in these regions. Some of the literature attempts to 
account for the thesis of underdevelopment by prioritising the role and impact of 
infrastructural, economic and social factors such as the level of regional infrastructure, the 
logic of capitalist accumulation, regional industrialisation, and the tribal structure in these 
regions (Z. Aydın, 1986; M. E. Bozarslan; 2002 [1966]; Boran, 1974; Özer, 1994; Sönmez, 
1992 [1990]; Heper, 2007). Others instead have sought to understand and explain the 
postulate of underdevelopment via the binary and hierarchical state-versus-society model and 
thus have given pride of place to ethno-political issues as explanatory factors, i.e. the 
conflictual relationship between the state and the Kurdish population inhabiting these regions 
(Aytar, 1991; Beşikçi, 1992 [1969]; 2004 [1990]; Burkay, 2008 [1992], 1995; Bayrak, 1999; 
H. Yıldız, 1989).  
The overview contained in this section seeks to map this theoretical field by providing an 
introductory presentation of the core assumptions of the main proponents of these differing 
perspectives, and then drawing on that, this study will account for the specific theoretical 
foundations and limitations of each perspective. The thesis has purposively selected literature 
from different periods and extremes of thought in order to exhibit the diversity, continuities 
and change regarding discussions on the correlation between the Kurdish question and 
economic development.   
Contributions from the initial strand of studies commonly identify the dominance of the tribal 
social structure, the non-existence or inadequacy of modern infrastructure, and the 
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destruction of manufacturing after the nineteenth century, as factors that have played a central 
role in shaping social, economic and political processes and structures in ESA. Relatedly, the 
roots of underdevelopment in these areas are sought in the interplay of these factors.  
The decision of the Ottoman state in the sixteenth century to recognise the political, legal and 
administrative autonomy of the tribal Kurdish lords in the provinces of Diyarbekir, Bitlis and 
Van in exchange for military obligation and regular payment of tribute to the state is 
regularly hypothesised to have constituted an incessant impediment to socioeconomic 
development in these areas, as well as a persistent factor influencing political events 
involving Kurds (Pamuk, 2010 [1987]: 98-9; Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 79-80; Heper: 2007: 5; Z. 
Aydın, 1986: 15-7). This agreement is alleged to have entailed the dominance of tribal rule 
by dint of which not only had the Kurdish notables accumulated excessive landed and fiscal 
wealth, but there had also been ‘minimal implementation of the governing timar system’. 
Consequently, the Ottoman state had ‘never been able to become a powerful force in the 
Region’24 (Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 79). Moreover, these studies habitually hypothesise that the 
centuries-long autonomy of the Kurdish notables ‘remained unbroken during the nineteenth 
century’ (Pamuk, 2010 [1987]:98; Heper, 2007: 5; Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 79). Since the 
enactment of the Land Code of 1858, which de facto recognised the existing land distribution, 
it is argued that large tracts of land continued to remain in the hands of the Kurdish rulers, 
who had not ‘been interested in increasing productivity in agriculture’ (Heper, 2007: 16). 
Thus, the centralisation attempts by the state during and after the 1830s are often recognised 
as hardly affecting the political, social and economic powers of the tribal elite in these 
regions, to the detriment of social and economic development in ESA (Pamuk, 2010 [1987]: 
98-9; Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 86-8; Heper: 2007: 5).  
                                                          
24
 In most of the publication on the Kurdish question and/or ESA, the term ‘the Region’ is used to denote the 
predominantly Kurdish populated provinces in ESA.   
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Additionally, the very inadequate and expensive means of transportation and the absence of 
railroads in ESA is consistently posited to have largely ‘secluded’ these territories from the 
transformatory changes goaded by the capitalist world market in the Ottoman Empire 
throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Pamuk: 2010 [1987]: 97-9; Sönmez, 
1992 [1990]: 79-80). Owing to the absence of modern infrastructure up until the early 
twentieth century, the argument goes; the agricultural produce of these areas of Anatolia 
could not regularly be transported to long-distance markets (Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 105; 
Pamuk: 2010 [1987]: 97). Resultantly, ESA, when compared to other areas of the 
predominantly agrarian Ottoman Empire, was least affected by the world market-induced 
commercialisation of agriculture during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
(Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 79; Pamuk: 2010 [1987]: 97).  
However, the unavailability of the indispensable modern infrastructure, it is further 
commonly contended, cannot be imputed to the policies of the Ottoman state, because firstly, 
the Western quarters of present-day Turkey were provided with railroads by the industrialised 
capitalist countries, which were interested in importing raw materials from this region; 
secondly, the rail line projects of the dominant Western countries in these regions, namely, 
the United States’ Chester Railway Project (1908-1913) and Germany’s Berlin-Baghdad 
Railway Project (1914-1989), had not materialised on account of exogenous events. The 
former was dropped by the U.S. state when the Mosul region remained in the hands of the 
British state who also blocked the Berlin-Baghdad Railway Project for it had it’s own eyes on 
Middle East’ resources (Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 104-06; Heper, 2007: 6-7). 
Unfavourable agronomic conditions, largely emanating from the enduring supremacy of the 
Kurdish landed or propertied elite, are usually construed as being influential in the success of 
manufacturing in ESA:  
71 
 
‘the relative scarcity and poor quality of agricultural land and the low level of 
commercialization of agriculture may also have been an important factor in the flourishing of 
manufactures in these areas [Eastern Anatolia and Northern Syria]’ (Pamuk 2010 [1987]: 
112).  
The most important concentration of Ottoman textile manufacturing activity existed in 
Northern Syria, Southeastern Anatolia, and to some extent Eastern Anatolia during both the 
earlier and later parts of the nineteenth century. However, in the period after the first quarter 
of the nineteenth century manufacturing in ESA, especially cotton textile manufacturing had, 
as elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, met with immense competition from European imports, 
which on account of the Industrial Revolution in Europe had the advantage of rapid 
mechanised production. Such competition plus the tariff policies in the 1838 Anglo-Turkish 
Convention had initiated a ‘period of destruction’ of cotton textiles in the Eastern Anatolian 
provinces in the ‘latter part of nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries’ (Sönmez, 
1992 [1990]: 104-05). 
Studies that have sought to elucidate regional underdevelopment by giving primacy to the 
obstructive role and impact of social, economic and infrastructural factors have, furthermore, 
regularly argued that, in spite of the remarkable advancements witnessed after 1923, these 
regions maintained their relatively worse-off positions in present-day Turkey. It is claimed 
this is principally because, even after the establishment of the Turkish Republic the feudal 
relations in these areas did not dissolve and ESA remained predominantly rural territories 
bereft of modern industry and infrastructure, which made it difficult to attract private sector 
investment to these regions. Most of these studies emphasise the destruction wrought by the 
armed conflict between the Turkish state and PKK after 1984 to the economy of these regions 
– i.e. the loss and/or removal of the local populace, stagnation of private investment, 
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incomplete state subsidised projects, and destruction of the local infrastructure (Heper, 2007: 
6; Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 249-51).   
Nonetheless, there are differing assessments on the question of why before 1984 the 
predominantly Kurdish-inhabited ESA lagged behind other parts of Turkey in social and 
economic development. Some of the literature correlates the paucity in development with the 
powers of the Kurdish tribal leaders and/or the absence of transformation in the social tribal 
structure (Heper, 2007; Özer, 1994; M. E. Bozarslan, 2002 [1966]). Others alternatively 
attribute underdevelopment to the uneven development of capitalism in Turkey (Boran, 1974; 
Z. Aydın, 1986; Sönmez, 1992 [1990]). Studies of the frequently quoted sociologist Ahmet 
Özer are exemplary of the former approach. Özer, who regularly conducted research for the 
GAP and SPO in Southeastern Anatolia, in his oft-cited GAP ve Sosyal Değişim (GAP and 
Social Change), published after two years of field research in the province of Urfa, has two 
inextricably linked conclusions: the first, the structure in these regions is traditional and has 
to be modernised; and, the second, the GAP regional development project is a socio-
economic initiative that could play an instrumental role in modernising the age-old social 
structure as well as fostering socio-economic development in these regions (Özer, 1994: 88-9 
and 150). Thus, the Kurds’ discontent and the underdevelopment of the predominantly 
Kurdish regions were hypothesised to have been engendered by perseverance of the social 
tribal structure and relations.  
Additional studies on the question of development in modern-day Turkey have proposed an 
alternate account of the hypothesis of underdevelopment by attributing underdevelopment in 
these regions to the logic of capital accumulation and the uneven development of (Turkish) 
capitalism postulated by Karl Marx. According to Behice Boran
25
, the underdevelopment in 
                                                          
25
 Behice Boran (1910-1987) was an immensely influential Turkish Marxist sociologist, author and politician. 
Boran, who was an associate professor at Ankara University, Faculty of Language and History-Geography, 
played a prominent role in shaping the views of many on the left on, among other things, the question of 
capitalist development in Turkey.    
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ESA is an inevitable consequence of the capitalist Turkish economy, the aim of which is to 
grow continually through investment in the areas where the highest rate of profit is possible. 
Investments, according to the same argument, are unequally distributed within Turkey 
because the factors determining the rate of profit are unevenly distributed. Consequently, 
Boran argues, ‘the people of the East do not experience differential treatment because of 
speaking another language, [differential policies concerning the East of Turkey] stem from 
the uneven development of capitalism [in Turkey]’ (1974: 189). Zülküf Aydın in 
Underdevelopment and Rural Structures in Southeastern Turkey (1986: 26-9) further 
develops the very general characterisation of regional underdevelopment posited by Boran by 
adopting Ernest Mandel’s theory on underdevelopment and applying it to the specific 
conditions of Turkish capitalism.  
Aydın claims ‘that uneven development and underdevelopment are basic features capitalism, 
and regional uneven development is the spatial juxtaposition of these two features of 
capitalism’ (ibid.: 26). Bourgeois states, in creating the national market, ensure the flow of 
labour from the underdeveloped to the developed regions. Underdeveloped regions are not 
only a source of labour for the developed regions; they are also an important market. For 
instance, during the early years of the Turkish Republic (i.e the ètatist period) the state took 
advantage of the labour reserves in ‘the Region’ and by building railways connected the 
remote parts of ‘the Region’ with the developed Western regions of Turkey (ibid.: 29). 
Deriving from such a causal theory of underdevelopment, Aydın argues that the ‘Kemalist 
policy [in Eastern Anatolia] stemmed from the profit logic of capital, not from the fact that 
Eastern Anatolia was Kurdish’ (ibid.), since ‘capitalists are interested in accumulating 
capital; they are not concerned with the ethnicity of the people whose surplus product they 
appropriate’ (ibid.: 25). Accordingly, ‘the transfer of the surplus produced in the region’, 
states Aydın, ‘is the prime reason of underdevelopment [in these regions]’ (ibid: 17). In a 
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similar vein, Sönmez (1992 [1990]) argues that the role of ESA in the regional division of 
labour in Turkey is to provide energy and agricultural products whilst being a market for the 
industrial West of Turkey. Consequently, the underdevelopment of these regions, above all, 
should be sought in the regional divisional of labour in Turkey (1992 [1990]: 247-48). 
On the other hand, scholarship that has attempted to explain the economic, social and 
political features and processes in the predominantly Kurdish provinces in ESA by employing 
a binary model of state-versus-society has devised an alternative interpretative framework for 
the correlation between regional underdevelopment and the Kurdish question. The theoretical 
paradigm of underdevelopment formulated in these studies is based upon a critique of the 
causality of underdevelopment embodied in all of the above surveyed literature. Specifically, 
this body of literature classifies the causes of underdevelopment in the above-summarised 
studies (i.e. the social, economic and infrastructural factors) as the effects of the conflictual 
relationship between the Kurdish people and the Turkish state. The source of the perturbed 
ties between the central state authority and the Kurdish populace, as well as the 
underdevelopment of ESA, is habitually purported to lie in the ‘colonial’ and ‘assimilationist’ 
policies implemented by the rulers of Turkey (Aytar, 1991; Beşikçi, 1992 [1969], 2004 
[1990]; Burkay, 1995, 2008 [1992]; Bayrak, 1999; H. Yıldız, 1989). 
Advocates of this dualistic model customarily posit that long-standing issues pertaining to 
tribalism and inequitable land tenure are results of the Ottoman and the Turkish state policy 
of maintaining and consolidating the traditional Kurdish ruling stratum and of burgeoning 
divisions and enmities amidst territorially segmented Kurdish tribes in ESA since the early 
sixteenth-century. It is argued that the decision to incorporate the Kurdish principalities into 
the Ottoman Empire, derived from the strategic objectives of (i) making the predominantly 
Sunni Kurdish principalities Ottoman protectorates against the rival Shi’i Safavid forces in 
Eastern Asia Minor; (ii) formalising and preserving the tribal kinship system; and (iii) 
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apportioning the Kurdish principalities on the basis of territoriality and kinship ties (Beşikçi, 
1992 [1969]: 128-29; H. Yıldız, 1989: 38-9; Burkay, 2008 [1992]: 279-82). The ‘differential’ 
and ‘ambivalent’ policies executed by the Ottoman state in ESA in accord with these aims are 
hypothesised to have nurtured tribalism and inter-communal rivalries, and thereby laid the 
foundations for the underdevelopment in ESA (Beşikçi, 1992 [1969]: 113-27; H. Yıldız, 
1989: 37-41). 
The advocates of this theoretical model commonly maintain that ever since the creation of the 
Turkish Republic, the Turkish ruling classes have pursued a policy akin to that of the 
Ottoman statesman and have resultantly preserved the traditional structures and hindered the 
reforms necessary for social and economic development in ESA. The ‘failed promise’ of a 
Land Reform during the single-party period (1923-1945) and the ‘institutionalisation’ of the 
‘feudal hegemonic forces’ in the multi-party system post-1945 are regarded as quintessential 
examples of  the enduring ‘cooperation’ between the Turkish state and the dominant ‘feudal 
forces’ in the predominantly Kurdish provinces of Turkey (Beşikçi, 1992 [1969]; Burkay, 
1995).  
Authors that employ the binary model of state-versus-Kurdish-society argue that the Turkish 
state inhibited socioeconomic development in these regions by infinitesimal public 
investment in infrastructure, and insistence on not recognising the Kurdish identity of the 
local populace: 
‘The East has been neglected for centuries and as a result it became a zone of deprivation 
(mahrumiyet bölgesi). This negligence continued during the republican era. Regardless of 
their party belonging, every politician, in order to assimilate the people and the intellectuals 
of the East, systematically and purposefully, represented the East, to the world and Turkey, as 
an area full of fanaticism, ignorance and the enemy of civilisation’ (Edip Karahan, 1962: 4 in 
Güneş, 2012: 54).   
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In addition, it is hypothesised that the predominantly Kurdish areas are ‘colonised’ in order to 
cater for the needs of Turkey’s industrialised regions: ‘like most colonized regions, 
Kurdistan’s stores of raw material, its vast natural wealth in petroleum, copper, coal and 
phosphate, soil, forests, and water are exploited and marketed for industry’ (Beşikçi, 2004 
[1990]: 19). Relatedly, studies informed by this theoretical viewpoint agree on the 
proposition that the state-sanctioned GAP project constitutes an archetype of the Turkish 
Republic’s ‘colonial’ policy in ESA. The GAP project was implemented as a regional project 
in 1989 and, it is argued, under the ‘façade’ of ‘regional economic development’ this project 
enables the ‘exploitation’ and ‘colonisation’ of  ESA (Aytar, 1991; Burkay, 1995). The GAP 
initiative is therefore conceptualised as being ‘the new chain of exploitation and colonisation 
of natural and human resources in the Region’ (Aytar, 1991:7). This ‘feature’ of the GAP 
project is evinced, the argument goes, with the energy-oriented state investment in 
predominantly Kurdish populated provinces in South-East Turkey, which substitutes the 
exigent needs of the local dwellers for the requirements of industrialised Western quarters of 
Turkey (Aytar, 1991; Beşikçi, 1992 [1969]; 2004[1990], Burkay, 1995). 
The Limitations of Existing Theories  
Despite shedding light on issues that impede social and economic progress, the existing 
literature on the question of development in ESA merely enables one to understand the 
obstacles to development in these territories, but does not explain them. This is due to two 
common omissions of the current studies. The first of these is that they do not systematically 
account for the historical antecedents of Eastern Turkey’s economic development. Put 
differently, political and economic changes that have fostered or hindered development in 
ESA during the Ottoman period are not thoroughly examined in the current investigations of 
the question of development in these domains. The second lacuna in the development 
literature on these regions is that it fails to analyse comprehensively the relationship between 
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the Turkish state and the predominantly Kurdish populated regions of Turkey. A closer and 
critical exploration of these studies will help elucidate the above-mentioned explanatory 
limitations. 
Modernisation Theory 
Studies that correlate underdevelopment with the persistence of feudal relations and 
structures have constituted the bulk of the development literature on ESA. Some of the 
proponents of this hypothesis, like Özer (1994) Heper (2007), in the same vein as the 
aforementioned post-1950 government programmes, ascribe the endurance of these 
unfavourable economic conditions primarily to the perseverance of inimical and obstreperous 
primordial values and practices in these regions. They advocate the view that the question of 
underdevelopment and the Kurdish question hinge above all on modernising the traditional 
tribal structure in ESA.  
Scholars characterising the difficulties and deficiencies of economic and social 
transformation from the above-summarised viewpoint borrow heavily from modernisation 
theory in that the prevailing traditional tribal organisations and ties are professed to having 
persistently conserved underdevelopment in these regions. The modernisation school of 
thought initially developed in the Cold War era of the 1950s and comprises a range of 
perspectives inspired by the sociological theory of Max Weber that follow the same basic 
argument. That is, nations remain underdeveloped when traditional customs and culture 
hamper individual achievement and kin relations dominate, thus the development of societies 
is dependent on the adoption of modern capitalist values and practices. Modernisation 
theorists attempt to explain the diffusion of Western styles of living, technological 
innovations and individualist types of communication as the superiority of secular, 
materialist, Western, individualist culture and of individual motivation and achievement 
(Lerner, 1958; Schramm, 1964). 
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Scholars influenced by the modernisation approach frequently construe the tribal social 
structure in ESA as persistently impeding the Kurds from partaking in Turkey’s modern 
social life and adjusting to latter-day lifestyles, as alluded to by Heper in The Kurds and the 
State: 
‘In Turkey, as compared to those who live on the plains, the Kurds, who live in the 
mountains, have not intermingled with the Turks to any great extent. The tribal social 
structure of the area also rendered difficult the acculturation of the citizens’ (2007: 7).  
However, the hypothesis that the tribal structure is the perpetual obstacle to structural 
economic changes in the principally Kurdish areas of Turkey is founded upon a deterministic 
and ahistorical conception of Kurdish tribes and tribalism. It depicts the Kurdish tribal 
identity and structure as an immutable and fixed feature of Kurdish society, devoid of wider 
processes of nation building, capitalistic property relations, urbanisation, and trans-border 
relations with other Kurds situated in neighbouring states. It is indubitable that tribes and 
tribalism have been features of Kurdish history, but that does not entail or validate an 
immutable and static conceptualisation of tribes, unaltered by economic and political 
transformations in or around the society in which it exists. In other words, tribes are not 
explanans, as they themselves need explaining. 
 As rightly pointed by Eugene Kamenka, tribalism - akin to national consciousness - is 
historically specific, reliant on ‘specific social and historical content, deriving from specific 
social and historical conditions’ (1973: 6). The Kurdish tribes seems to be permanent and 
unchanging due to its continued presence throughout different societies with different modes 
of production, but this is a pretence; the tribal entity of today is substantially different from 
its pre-capitalist descendants. Many examples exist of the changing nature of Kurdish tribal 
identity and structure throughout the history of the Ottoman Empire and the modern Middle 
79 
 
East, as alterations are made in accordance with economic and/or political changes
26
 (see 
Chapters 2-4). One of the many illuminating and relatively recent examples of the fluidity of 
the Kurdish tribal organisation and identity was witnessed after the transition to multi-party 
democracy when the traditional Kurdish elite in line with the Turkish states’ policy of 
incorporating landed and/or religious Kurdish rulers into the state apparatus was integrated 
into the Turkish political system. This policy resulted in the bulk of the old Kurdish elite, 
unlike their descendants, disavowing their Kurdish origin in order to become more closely 
integrated members of the Turkish ruling class. Villages controlled by the traditional Kurdish 
rulers became political fiefdoms of various rival mainstream political parties previously 
loathed by the local populace. 
Studies that ascribe the lack of economic advancement primarily to the absence of 
transformation in the archaic customs and practices in ESA fail properly to account for the 
possible spillover effects of the cooperation between the traditional Kurdish elite and the 
Turkish state for the social, economic and political relations and structures in these domains. 
As a result, these studies avoid an exploration of the issue of how this collaboration might 
have maintained feudal relations in these regions by dint of the state not implementing the 
long-awaited land reform opposed by the co-opted traditional Kurdish elite and resultantly 
leaving the land tenure bequeathed from the Ottoman era fundamentally untouched. Besides, 
the possible connection between the Turkish state-Kurdish traditional elite alliance and 
Turkey’s Kurdish question is omitted. In other words, the likely links between the 
bourgeoning socio-political and economic demands of the Kurds during and after the 
transition to multi-party democracy in Turkey, starting with the ‘Eastern Meetings’ of the 
1960s, and the desire of the Turkish state to block these demands by preserving the feudal 
structure in these regions are not examined.  
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 On the Kurdish tribes and their evolution, see: Bozarslan (2006: 130-47). 
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In addition, researchers that have sought to explain underdevelopment by, above all, imputing 
it to the persistence of feudal social organisation in the Kurdish society tend not to examine 
incidences and developments in the pre-Republican period (1923). In so doing, 400 years of 
Ottoman Kurdish history are overlooked, and the seismic social, political and economic 
changes during and immediately after the First World War are eluded. Consequently, these 
explanations of underdevelopment fail to asses the links between the uprooting and seizure of 
the resources or properties of the indigenous people in ESA after 1913 and the lack of capital 
and the absence of innovation or ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ in these regions.  
Other investigations that have associated underdevelopment in ESA with the perseverance of 
feudal relations have sought to explain this anomaly with the enduring excessive powers of 
the Kurdish tribal and religious leaders (M. E. Bozarslan, 2002 [1966]). M.E. Bozarslan’ 
epoch-making work in the late 1960s, Doğu’nun Sorunları, has identified the absence of land 
reform as well as the lack of industrial development and infrastructural modern facilities in 
ESA as the main reasons for Kurdish tribal and religious leaders’ powers. The problem of 
underdevelopment in these regions or the ‘Eastern Question’ will be remedied, according to 
M.E. Bozarslan, with state sponsored industrialisation, the reform of the age-old land tenure, 
and adequate public investment, because these measures could play a catalytic role in 
dissolving the feudal structure and ties necessary for development.  
Albeit illuminating pivotal issues overlooked in the works of the previously surveyed authors, 
most notably the negative ramifications of the collaboration between Kurdish aghas and the 
Turkish state for socioeconomic advancement, the influential study by M. E. Bozarslan (2002 
[1966]) embodies nearly all of the inadvertences of the modernisation approach. More 
specifically, Doğu’nun Sorunları fails to analyse exhaustively the structures, processes and 
events before 1923, and thereby paints a rather unhistorical picture of ‘the East’ by treating 
the year 1923 as the ‘Year Zero’. This influential study also does not systematically analyse 
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the question of how the forced displacement and confiscation policies of the Ottoman state 
and the Turkish state have influenced social, political and economic developments, or the 
lack thereof, in ESA. In addition, underdevelopment in these domains is conceptualised as 
solely a socioeconomic and cultural problem devoid of political components or demands, as 
evinced in the following definition of development postulated by M.E. Bozarslan: 
‘Development… is a multidimensional problem that does not have the possibility of being 
realised from one dimension [only]. The development of a country, or a region, is also tied to 
the industry and transportation as much as it is tied to culture. Because social, economic and 
cultural matters are tied to each other…Development in the East [of Turkey] cannot solely be 
attained by economic incentives, nor can it be accomplished by cultural activities; it can only 
be attained by the combination of both [economic and cultural means]’ (2002 [1966]: 203). 
In 2002, Doğu’nun Sorunları was republished with a revised preface wherein M.E. Bozarslan 
in harmony with the aforementioned critique argued that what he described as being 
exclusively socioeconomic and cultural ‘problems of the East’ in the 1966 publication of this 
work were in fact germane to or spin-offs of the Kurdish question in Turkey. Consequently, 
M.E. Bozarslan further argues, if he were to write a separate book about development, he 
would entitle it ‘The Kurdish Question’ and not ‘The Problems of the East’ (2002 [1966]: 9-
14).  
Dependency Theory    
Studies that have accounted for underdevelopment in ESA by correlating it with the 
economic and structurally asymmetric relationship between the overwhelmingly Kurdish 
areas of Turkey and the Turkish state are largely informed by the theoretical paradigm that 
arose as an alternative to modernisation theory, namely, dependency theory. The authors of 
these studies regularly define the Kurds as a ‘dependent nation’ and draw heavily from the 
national movements in the Third World context. Moreover, they emphasise the role of 
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‘national oppression’ to which the Kurds were subjected to Turkey in engendering the 
socioeconomic ‘backwardness’ of the predominantly Kurdish regions, which they believe to 
be the root cause of regional underdevelopment.  
Dependency theory is a theoretical current that came to the fore in 1960 as a heterodox 
response to the politics of modernisation and its in-built bias towards capitalist-induced 
development. Architects of the dependency theory include Andre Gunder Frank, Samir Amin, 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Walter Rodney, and Immanuel Wallerstein. Dependency 
theorists commonly maintain that the inadequate development witnessed in ‘peripheral’ 
countries is the product of a process of impoverishment and distortion, or the ‘development 
of underdevelopment’ (Frank, 1966), which is an offshoot of subordinated participation in a 
polarised and hierarchical world system. The principal focus of the attention of the latterly 
mentioned theoreticians has therefore been on the mechanisms that generate dependent or 
peripheral underdevelopment.  
Two types of mechanisms have been posited by dependency theorists to cause 
underdevelopment and the impoverishment of the ‘periphery’ to the advantage of the ‘core’. 
The first one consists in the systematic extraction of the surplus and resources from the 
periphery to the core through such means as plunder and unequal exchange. The other 
consists of the distortions introduced to the national political and economic structures of 
peripheral social formations as a consequence of their subordination – e.g. through the 
establishment of a ‘comprador bourgeoisie’ that earns its gains from collusion with the 
international extraction of the surplus rather than from ‘autonomous’ capitalist exploitation.  
As often indicated by studies that characterise the Kurdish areas as a colony of the Turkish 
state, centre-periphery relations determine the relationship between the predominantly 
Kurdish ESA and the Turkish state, with the latter as the dominant ‘centre’ economy and the 
former as its ‘subordinated’ counterpart. The colonial policies of the Turkish state in the 
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primarily Kurdish populated ESA, the argument goes, is directed to meet the Turkish states’ 
requirements for natural and human resources. This lopsided relationship between the former 
and the latter not only obstructs the Kurdish regions from freely integrating with the world 
capitalist system, it also shapes underdevelopment in these regions. Additionally, the 
distortion of local political and economic structures by virtue of the incorporation of 
traditional landed and/or religious Kurdish elite into the Turkish state apparatus, according to 
the advocates of the colony postulate, preserves and exacerbates underdevelopment in these 
regions.  
Burkay argued that colonialism constituted a major impediment to development in Kurdistan 
and hypothesised the persistence of feudalism in ESA as a corollary of colonial rule in these 
regions: 
‘Capitalism [in Turkey], even if in an evolutionary form, has superseded feudalism to become 
hegemonic. In Kurdistan though, the feudal structure perseveres. This situation is 
undoubtedly fostered by the Turkish bourgeoisie’s colonialist mechanism in Kurdistan. 
Kurdistan’s raw materials (in particular oil, copper, iron, chrome, and coal) are being 
exploited; Kurdistan is the region that provides the cheap workforce for the west [of Turkey]; 
the capital accumulated in this region is flowing to the west; and Kurdistan became a very 
convenient market for the bourgeoisie to introduce its products’ (1995: 5)           
Similarly, Bayrak in Kürt Sorunu ve Demokratik Çözüm (The Kurdish Problem and the 
Democratic Solution) through examining a range of state-sanctioned reports and policies after 
1923 concerning ESA describes how the Turkish state has ‘colonised Kurdish lands’, and 
thereby nurtured underdevelopment in these areas (1994: 188-198). In spite of there being no 
definitional or critical exploration of the notion of colonialism, it appears that Bayrak 
conceives ESA as a colony based on the ‘continual seizure’ and ‘turkification’ of Kurdish 
lands in these regions by the Turkish state after 1923.  
84 
 
One of the most influential explorations of the colony thesis was posited by Ismail Beşikçi in 
his seminal work Devletlerarası Sömürge Kürdistan (Inter-state Colony Kurdistan) (2004 
[1990]).
27
 Beşikçi described the history of colonialism and ‘colonial rule’ in Kurdistan with 
the following words: 
‘The history of colonialism separates colonies into two main groups: full colonies and semi-
colonies. Full colonies are societies which have not yet reached the stage of founding a 
state…Semi-colonies are societies which have a state founded on a traditional social order 
and possessing a long history…Kurdistan is neither a full nor a semi-colony. The political 
status of the Kurdish nation is far less than the status of a colony. The Kurds are a people the 
world wants to enslave, render devoid of identity, and wipe off the face of this earth…until 
every trace of Kurdish identity has been eliminated…Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, in 
addition to being collaborators with outside powers, are also occupation forces which have 
portioned and annexed Kurdistan’ (Beşikçi, 2004 [1990]: 18-9).  
Recent scholarly publications on Kurds do also employ the colony thesis. For instance, Nader 
Entessar’s relatively recent publication, Kurdish Politics in the Middle East, brands the 
predominantly Kurdish territories of Turkey as an ‘internal colony’ of the Turkish state 
(2010: 7). Likewise, in the Introduction of another recent study, The Kurdish Question in 
Turkey: New Perspectives on Violence, Representation, and Reconciliation, Güneş and 
Zeydanlıoğlu characterise the Turkish states rule in ‘Kurdistan as an undeclared internal 
colony’ (2014: 18).  
Based on the different descriptions of the ‘colony’ postulate it can be argued that there are 
two separate claims, namely, colonialism and internal colonialism, which are distinct. 
Colonialism is the imposition of monopoly control by an alien state over the economic, 
political and social life of another land or polity. While in the case of internal colonialism – 
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 For a contemporary defence of this thesis, see the following interview conducted with Beşikçi: ‘The Turkish 
advocate of the Kurds – Dr. Ismail Beşikçi’ in Kurdish Globe (2013). 
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which is a process of exploitation of one group or groups of people by another within a state 
through structural arrangements – there exist the following conditions:  
(i) a high degree of administrative and legal integration, between what is considered 
to be an internal colony and the rest of the polity; 
(ii) all of the subjects are citizens of the same state; 
(iii) the relationship between the colonial core area and the territory deemed to be the 
internal colony has a long history (Hechter, 1975: 32-3).  
Based on this distinction, it would stretch the definition of colonialism to apply it to the 
relationship between the Turkish state and the principally Kurdish ESA.  
Unlike many of the Third World formations described by dependency theorists, these 
territories do not comprise of a sovereign state or even an entity on its way to attaining self-
rule. ESA is administratively and legally integrated with the Turkish Republic, and these 
territories are geographically contiguous with the rest of Turkey. Furthermore, the 
discriminatory policies of the Turkish state vis-à-vis the Kurdish people notwithstanding, the 
primarily Kurdish inhabitants of these regions are citizens of the Turkish Republic. Some 
aspects of the policies of the Turkish state in the years 1923-1990 vis-à-vis its Kurdish 
citizens, as comprehensively analysed in Chapters 3-5, could however, be placed in the realm 
of the colonial. The policies implemented by successive governments in Turkey during the 
seven decades after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic were intolerant of local 
cultures, were determined to impose a single hegemonic culture (i.e. Turkish culture), and 
they were accompanied by a large-scale campaign against those who refused to be 
browbeaten. Relatedly, internal colonialism is the only viable theoretical toolkit that can be 
used by the advocates of the colony thesis.  
The explanatory value of the internal colony postulate in elucidating the relationship between 
the Turkish state and the Kurdish people is dubitable, since all of the applications of this 
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model are founded upon a unidirectional and static conceptualisation of the relation between 
‘powerless and peripheral’ Kurdish areas and the ‘all-powerful and dominant’ Turkish state. 
Albeit shedding some light on certain features of the relationship between the latter and the 
former, this characterisation obscures many aspects of the relationship between the central 
state authorities and the Kurdish populace or regions because it fails to account 
systematically for the influence of the periphery over the core.  For instance, the impact of the 
altering interests of the propertied traditional elite in these regions, and their project to woo 
Turkish statesmen in order to establish new networks of support so as to enhance their 
authority, particularly in the post-RPP era, in shaping the Kurdish policy of the Turkish state 
is not properly analysed in these studies. In addition, the mass migration of the Kurdish 
people to the industrialised metropolis of Turkey and its impact on the Turkish economy and 
society is not methodically investigated in publications that draw heavily from dependency 
theory.   
The relationship between the Kurdish regions and the rest of Turkey extends the dependency 
bonds to one that acknowledges relations of mutual dependence. In order to analyse aptly this 
reciprocal tie it is essential to recognise that the social, the political and the economic in 
Turkey, as elsewhere, do not have one single centre, but many. Hence, it is necessary to 
analyse activities and deeds of a range of actors and dynamics, networks and interactions. As 
rightly highlighted by H. Bozarslan, Kurds are not mere ‘passive agents of a system imposed 
by Ankara. Various mechanisms of subordination, clientelism and participation link them to 
the center… [These] links imply negotiation and a constant game of legitimization between 
them and the center as well as the political parties. The terms of these negotiations and 
legitimization game are determined, among other elements, by army pressure, Kurdish 
radicalism and ongoing guerrilla warfare since 1984, evolution of clientelist groups and the 
transborder nature of the Kurdish issue’ (1996: 136).         
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It is also worth noting that the authors of the colony postulate do share some of the common 
deficiencies of the above-summarised alternative theoretical approaches on the question of 
development and underdevelopment in ESA. They do not thoroughly interrogate the 
ramifications of economic and political transformations in the Ottoman period for regional 
development, or lack thereof, in these territories. This is because they take for granted two 
interrelated postulations: (i) the dominance and manipulation of Ottoman Kurdistan via the 
divide and rule policy of imperial Istanbul, and (ii) the relatively worse-off position of ESA, 
when compared to other regions of the Empire, because of the fragmentation arising from the 
divisive policy of the Ottoman rulers with regard to Ottoman Kurds.  
The protagonists of the colony hypothesis, moreover, do not systematically account for the 
population policies implemented in the years 1915-1990. Despite regularly referring to 
policies of displacement and seizure of Kurdish lands, they habitually only refer to policies in 
the single-party period. Consequently, the mass deportations and confiscation of immovable 
and moveable properties belonging to the indigenous dwellers of these regions prior to the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic and/or after the mono-party period is not adequately 
explicated.      
Traditional Marxist Perspectives in Turkey 
As displayed with the literature review above, studies that have analysed the question of 
development in Turkey based on a Marxist perspective agree on the hypothesis of 
underdevelopment in ESA. When compared with other regions of Turkey, the comparatively 
late interaction of these areas of Turkey with the transformatory changes induced by 
capitalism is a consequence of the uneven development of capitalism in Turkey. One of the 
merits of this approach is that it provides a valuable insight concerning certain aspects of the 
evolution of Turkish capitalism, which is often not detailed by the previously mentioned 
development literature swayed by non-Marxist interpretations of (under)development.  
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Nevertheless, their analysis of underdevelopment in ESA has commonly embodied a number 
of vulnerabilities. One of the central weaknesses of this interpretation is that it regularly 
presents a notion of development that is economistic – i.e. in analysing development and 
underdevelopment in Turkey, priority is given to economic relations, often without 
considerable regard to pivotal political, social, and cultural relations. This is demonstrable 
with the overarching role ascribed to the logic of capital accumulation or surplus 
appropriation when analysing (under)development in Turkey by Boran, (1974), Aydın, 
(1986).  This economistic conceptualisation of development is founded upon a deterministic 
and univocal interpretation of the relationship between the economic base and the political 
superstructure, which implicates a ‘vulgar materialist’ analysis of development avidly 
criticised by leading Marxist scholars amongst others. As rightly highlighted by the Marxist 
historian Eric Hobsbawm, ‘economic development is not a sort of a ventriloquist with the rest 
of history as its dummy’ and neither are humans ‘exclusively money-making machines [...] 
immune to the political, emotional, ideological, patriotic or even racial appeals’ (62: 2002 
[1987]). Thus, noneconomic factors that underlie social progress or its absence need 
necessarily to be systematically considered by investigations that make socioeconomic 
development their thematic concern.  
The second drawback of this approach pertains to the diminutive role imputed to the national 
conflicts and struggle of the indigenous populaces of ESA in shaping the social and economic 
history of these regions. Since precedence is given to economic relations or antagonisms as 
explanatory factors for (under)development, economic issues or conflicts are conceived of as 
the dominant force of history, frequently with little regard for other questions or struggles, 
like national and cultural conflicts, which influence how history unfolds. As a result, socio-
political issues of the Kurdish populace in these areas and the role of these problems in 
influencing the social and economic history of ESA have not been adequately analysed. This 
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deficiency in the historical accounts of the Marxists in Turkey cannot solely be understood by 
imputing it to their economistic approach; it is also a result of the influence of Kemalism on 
the political left in Turkey (Yeğen, 2007: 1208-36). Throughout the history of the Turkish 
Republic virtually all of the left, including most Marxist currents, in Turkey have been 
heavily influenced by the dominant ideology of the Republican elite, Kemalism. For instance, 
the leaders of the Turkish Communist Party (Türkiye Komünist Partisi, TKP) welcomed the 
Republican government by agreeing that the basic problem was to wage a nationalist struggle 
against the imperialist powers and feudalist social forces (ibid.). The paradoxical modus 
operandi of Marxists under the influence of Kemalism has been to approve the ethnic 
dimension of the Kurdish question, while distancing themselves from the secessionist ideas 
or struggles acknowledging national unity and/or delaying the resolution of the question to a 
future post-revolutionary socialist Turkey.       
The other shortcoming of this perspective consists of what the Marxist scholar Jairus Banaji 
refers to as substituting ‘theory for history’ – i.e. reducing the investigation of the concrete 
‘to programme of verifying ‘laws’ already implicit […] in the materialist conception of 
history’ (2010:47). A corollary to this, in the context of the discussion of development and 
underdevelopment in Turkey, consists of using the process of uneven capitalist development 
proposed by Marx as a necessary feature of capitalism in order to describe the 
underdevelopment of ESA as a by-product of this in-built predisposition of capitalism. This 
teleological form of analysing history inhibits a thorough examination of the role and impact 
of other intervening noneconomic factors or processes stated above that have played an 
influential role in prompting regional disparities in Turkey. In other words, it hinders an 
understanding of the concrete as the site of many determinations, requiring careful analysis as 
opposed to merely serving to validate a priori theoretical postulates. As suggested by Marx in 
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the following oft-quoted passage in Grundrisse: ‘the concrete is concrete because it is the 
concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse’ (Marx: 1973 [1857]: 101).  
On account of deputising history for theory authors, like Boran and Aydın, have failed to 
adequately address the relations between uneven capitalist development in Turkey and the 
policies of dispossession and destruction of productive resources systematically implemented 
by both the late-Ottoman and Turkish polities in ESA. Another common shortcoming of these 
researchers is that they do not thoroughly investigate the repercussions of the rise and fall of 
over 300-year-old Kurdish polities on the social, economic and political developments, or 
lack thereof, in these regions. 
The selective and problematic employment of certain features of Marxist theory in 
interpreting underdevelopment in ESA by the above-mentioned authors, however, do not 
annul the important contribution that the historical materialist approach formulated by Marx 
and Engels and other Marxist authors can provide to the study of historical development of 
societies. Once historical materialism is detached from deterministic and teleological 
interpretations or applications critically assessed above, it can offer useful tools for analysing 
development.  
Scholarly analyses on the question of development in ESA surveyed above do converge 
along a number of lines that are particularly relevant for this study. All of the theoretical 
models surveyed above are founded upon a structuralist interpretation of development. 
Structuralist theories of development are those that regard development as a process of 
structural socioeconomic change whereby underdeveloped economies overcome specific 
structural barriers, by dint of which they are able to pursue a path of growth. Development is 
therefore understood as the qualitative growth-enabling process of overcoming those barriers. 
This thesis concurs with the structuralist interpretation of development.  
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All the theoretical explorations surveyed above, albeit on dissimilar and conflicting causal 
grounds, posit that two long-standing structural barriers engender underdevelopment in the 
predominantly Kurdish populated regions of ESA: (i) the dominance of the tribal elite in land 
ownership and tenancy patterns and (ii) the very low-level of industrialisation in the years 
ensuing the destruction of manufacturing in these regions after the nineteenth century. There 
is also scholarly unanimity regarding the unilinear continuum of inadequate development 
characterising the economic history of these regions.  
In the following Chapters, by exploring the political and economic history of the ESA 
regions, these oft-postulated factors for underdevelopment and the paradigm of continual 
underdevelopment in ESA will be critically analysed in order to verify the veracity of these 
interrelated perspectives and to attest their relevance to the Kurdish question of Turkey.    
A central tenet of this research is that the question of development in ESA and the Kurdish 
question of Turkey are inseparable and can only be aptly comprehended in relation to the 
political, social and economic history of the polities of which it has formed a part, namely, 
the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. Hence, this study will examine the economic, 
political and social features of these regions within the context of the larger geographical area 
and political entity it has comprised since the sixteenth century. In doing so, this thesis has 
relied heavily on a historical and structural approach, which draws its principal insight from 
historical materialism.  
As universally agreed in the development literature on the ESA, there has been relatively late 
and little contact with capitalist development in these predominantly Kurdish regions, 
compared to other regions of Turkey. This thesis will argue that this is on account of the de-
development process initiated by the dominant forces in these regions in order to prevent the 
formation of an economic base for the autonomous existence of the non-Turkish autochthonic 
societies in ESA that could jeopardise the political-national imperative of maintaining 
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Turkey’s national unity and territorial integrity. De-development, as outlined by Sara Roy in 
The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-Development, is an economic process 
generated and designed by a hegemonic power ‘to ensure that there will be no economic base, 
even one that is malformed, to support an independent indigenous existence’ (1995: 4). This 
process consists of policies that not only hinder but also ‘deliberately block internal economic 
development and the structural reform upon which it is based’ (ibid.: 6). 
Relatedly, contra to the scholarly wisdom apparent in the development literature reviewed 
above, this research hypothesises that continual inadequate development has not been a 
characteristic feature of ESA’s economy. Ever since the early 16th century, these regions have 
witnessed economic prosperity, followed by underdevelopment and de-development. De-
development in ESA commenced as a product of the state policies implemented in these 
regions after the Unionist seizure of power in the 1913 coup d’état that differed greatly from 
those of the previous regimes. The CUP rulers, and their political and ideological heirs, the 
Kemalists, pursued ideological, political and economic programs – i.e. the construction and 
preservation of a Turkish national economy and state as well as the pursuit of population 
homogeneity based on Turkist ideals – that were qualitatively different from those of their 
predecessors. These objectives spurred policies of mass murder, deportations, expropriation 
and dispossession of economic resources, and the suppression of all forms of non-Turkish 
identities and cultures in the ethnically heterogeneous provinces in ESA. In addition to laying 
the foundations for the Kurdish question of Turkey these unusual features of state policy have 
also engendered de-development in these lands by not only distorting but also forestalling 
economic development, which deprived the ESA economy from its capacity and potential for 
structural transformation.   
Underlying ESA’s peculiar form of underdevelopment as well as the Kurdish question of 
Turkey is the incessant political-national objective of constructing a strong Turkish nation-
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state and maintaining Turkey’s national unity and territorial integrity. Turkish governments 
throughout the history of the Turkish Republic have incessantly adopted these objectives. 
Resultantly, the identity and the collective rights of the Kurds have been negated. In order to 
foil the capacity of autonomous existence of the Kurds, de-development policies - albeit with 
varying methods - have been pursued by successive Turkish administrations in the years 
following the transition to multi-party politics in Turkey.  
A Summary of the Theoretical Foundations  
Thus far, this study has presented introductory synopses of the key theoretical debates on its 
central themes: Kurdish identity, the Kurdish question in Turkey, and regional development 
in ESA. When outlining these debates, the presentation followed an analogous format: an 
overview of the main differing perspectives, followed by an elucidation of my views on those 
theoretical positions. The unifying approach linking the theoretical choices consists of the 
endorsement by the thesis of a structural, historical and materialist position. The study has 
argued that the most apposite form of investigating any social process is one that is 
constituent of these three approaches. First, it seeks to ascertain structural causes of any given 
social process, as opposed to treating it as a natural or perennial entity or impulse. Second, it 
draws on the premise that to a large extent, these structural causes consist of, or stem from, 
the dynamics of material reproduction of societies. Third, it employs a historical method 
when analysing social processes. In other words, it utilises historically and geographically 
concrete data when examining and making generalisations concerning social processes.  
Moreover, the thesis has recurrently criticised essentialist and teleological interpretations of 
the concrete by abstract notions. The concrete, being multifaceted and largely indeterminate, 
should not be used selectively to reflect a priori theory, but as the locus for evaluating the 
relational and contingent nature of abstract categories and theoretical discernments, making it 
possible to revise and improve those categories and discernments. Lastly, this investigation 
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asserts the primacy of political-economic factors in accounting for both the Kurdish question 
in Turkey and the regional de-development in ESA, and, at the same time, recognises the 
operation of a diverse array of other factors, including history, culture, and violence, in 
bringing about these interrelated issues.    
1.4 Research Design, Methods and Sources 
This study made use of interviews and archival investigation. Obtaining geographically 
concrete historical and contemporary empirical data constituted the prerequisite of 
investigating the role and impact of economic development in the predominantly Kurdish 
populated regions of ESA on the rise and evolution of Turkey’s Kurdish question. Relatedly, 
the empirical research of this thesis consisted of three main phases explicated below. These 
stages took place consecutively, and the information attained in each stage was used to 
prepare the subsequent phases and triangulated with the information that had previously 
attained.  
Preliminary Stage of the Research: Surveying Existing Literature  
The initial phase involved the survey of the secondary literature available through two main 
types of repositories: first, physical libraries, in particular at the School of Oriental and 
African Studies (London), the British Library (London), the London School of Economics 
and Political Sciences (London) and the Institut Kurde (Paris); and, second, electronic 
sources. Accompanied by the information provided by international organisations – i.e. the 
EU, the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) 
– and official Turkish sources, namely, the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK), the data 
obtained hitherto was used to prepare a background chapter presenting a synopsis of the 
relevant research issues and setting the groundwork for the consecutive phase of the 
empirical work: fieldwork.  
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Exploratory Phase of the Research: Fieldwork 
The subsequent phase, which was essentially the exploratory stage, took place over a four 
month-long stay (March-June 2011) in ESA provinces of Diyarbakir, Urfa, Mardin, Van, and 
Gaziantep, besides Ankara and Istanbul, during the course of which 15 semi-structured 
interviews (listed in Appendix I) were conducted, additional sources were consulted and 
supplementary statistical data was obtained. The snowballing method
28
 was employed during 
my fieldwork. This method offers the opportunity to reach the most relevant information with 
least cost and time. One interviewee or document led to other interviewees, documents, and 
so forth. The primary aims of this part of the research consisted of collecting as much 
information as possible that would complement the previously acquired as well as make it 
feasible to identify relevant themes that had previously gone unnoticed. 
The main systemic procedure consisted of a series of semi-structured interviews with key 
informants: academics; senior members of public agencies dealing with development, 
economic or statistical matters; politicians; executives of chambers of commerce; Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) sources specialising in regional development in ESA; 
and the local agents of multilateral organisation. These interviews were conducted to attain 
detailed information regarding the historical and current trends in ESA of the following 
topics germane for this study: agricultural and industrial production; commerce and trade; 
credit and banking facilities; voluntary and involuntary migration; public and private 
investment; and agrarian and labour relations. The list of interviewees and the capacity under 
which they were interviewed is given in Appendix I. 
The interviews were semi-structured: a list of 8 to 12 questions was prepared prior to each 
interview in accordance with the interweee’s area of expertise. The interviews took between 
one and two hours, depending on the interviewees’ availability and the relevance of the 
                                                          
28
 Snowball sampling is set within the link-tracing sampling methodologies (Spreen, 1992) which benefit from 
ties of identified respondents or documents to provide the researcher with an ample set of potentially relevant 
information (Thomson, 1997). 
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information they provided. All of the individuals were informed in advance of the identity of 
the researcher, the objectives of the research project, the purpose of the interview and the 
conditions under which the information obtained might be used. Some of the interviews were 
tape-recorded; others were documented in my notebook, depending on the consent of the 
interviewee. In all cases, the recording or notes were transferred onto my laptop within 24 
hours. Content analysis methodology
29
 was used to analyse interviews.   
Overall, the interviews were more useful in obtaining or accessing sources related to the 
contemporary and/or historical trends of the above-mentioned themes of research, than in 
providing information about these trends. I was thus able to attain very beneficial and rich 
publications produced by or kept in the libraries of the following organisations that 
previously were not available to me:  
GAP (Administration Regional Directorate) (Urfa);  
Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgesi Belediyeleri Birliği (The Union of Southeastern Anatolia 
Region Municipalities, USARM) (Diyarbakır);  
Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey (Ankara); 
T.C Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı Müşteşarlığı (Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry 
State Planning Organisation) (Ankara); 
T.C Sanayi ve Ticaret Bakanlığı (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Industry and Trade) 
(Ankara); 
Diyarbakır Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası (Diyarbakir Chambers of Commerce and Industry);  
Gaziantep Sanayi Odasi (Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce) 
                                                          
29
 Content analysis denotes a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the 
manifest content of communication (Rubin & Babbie, 2009). It is a technique from a local text to its social 
context in an objectified form (Bauer, 2000). 
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Discourse analysis methodology
30
 was used to examine the data provided in these 
publications. All of the information was used both directly – as one of the basis for writing 
Chapters 4 and 5 – and indirectly – in the context of the preparation of the subsequent phase 
of the research. 
Moreover, these interviews and the collected secondary data that led to the following 
realisation that on economic and social phenomena in ESA – particularly industrial and 
agricultural production, commerce and trade, labour and agrarian relations, and voluntary and 
involuntary migration – there is a lack of longitudinal data and research. Nearly all of the 
existent data and analysis on economic and social activities and events in these territories 
covered the years after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic. There existed scant 
information on economic and social changes, structures and relations in Ottoman Kurdistan. 
Accordingly, I decided to collect data on social, economic and political structures, relations 
and changes in Ottoman Kurdistan, mainly by exploring the official British archival 
repositories. In addition, the thesis has also consulted the published Ottoman, Russian and 
German archival sources on Ottoman Kurdistan. 
Final Phase of the Research: Archival Investigation 
The final phase of the research took place over just under a year (October 2011- January 
2012) and was conducted in London. The archives of the United Kingdom Foreign Office 
(FO) on Kurdistan, either stored in the Public Record Office (PRO) at Kew, or published 
online on the House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (HCPP) website, was the first port of 
call for data. These archival sources consist of reports prepared by British consuls reporting 
regularly on events in Kurdistan in the years 1850-1945. In the absence of systematic official 
Ottoman records in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries (see Chapters 3 and 4), and the non-
                                                          
30
 This methodology denotes a deconstructive reading and interpretation of a problem or text (Powers, 2001). In 
this technique, analysts are interested in texts per se, rather than seeing them as capturing some reality that is 
supposed to lie behind the discourse (Gill, 2000). Thus, instead of conceiving the texts as a conduit to some 
other reality, discourse analysts are interested in the content and organisation of texts. 
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existence of any other long-drawn-out official foreign reports on events in Ottoman 
Kurdistan, this documentation, as rightly pointed out by McDowall, constitutes ‘possibly the 
single most important historical archive on Kurdistan’ (2000: xii). The deficiencies and 
strengths of each of the archival resources employed in this research are discussed in the 
subsequent Chapters.  
Naturally, a growing number of scholars researching the Kurds and Kurdistan have referred 
to the UK FO archives on Kurdistan. Nevertheless, thus far, almost all of these researchers 
have utilised these reports to analyse the political history of the Kurds and Kurdistan (Olson, 
1989; McDowall, 2000; O’Shea, 2004; Özoğlu, 2004; Koohi-Kamali, 2003). This study made 
particular but not sole use of the understudied information provided in these records 
concerning economic activities, relations and changes in the 19
th
 century and early 20
th
 
centuries in Ottoman Kurdistan. I have consulted the quantitative and qualitative data 
presented in the reports prepared by the British consuls or diplomats in the years 1857-1914 
on commerce, on manufacturing, on agrarian relations and production, and on social 
structures in Ottoman Kurdistan and bordering regions. For purposes of triangulation, the 
data in these reports have been studied comparatively, where pertinent and available, with the 
data provided in the Ottoman official statistics (i.e. Population and Agricultural Censuses) 
and/or the influential studies of important scholars, most notably, Vital Cuinet, Vedat Eldem, 
Şevket Pamuk, Donald Quataert, Suraiya Faroqhi, and Ahmet Tabakoğlu, who have 
contributed immensely to our understanding of Ottoman economic and social history. The 
information attained from the archival repositories was used directly in Chapter 3 and 4.    
Unless specified, the translations of all of the materials in foreign language employed in this 
study belong to me.   
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  Chapter 2 
The Formation of Ottoman Kurdistan: Social, Economic and Political Development in 
Ottoman Kurdistan before the 19th Century (1514-1799) 
 
2.1 Overview 
The pivotal events that materialised after the early sixteenth century played an immensely 
influential role in the foundation and progression of the social, economic and political 
structures in Ottoman Kurdistan and hastened the Kurds’ self-awareness as a distinct group. 
Three occurrences in particular facilitated these interrelated processes: the battle of Çaldıran 
in 1514, which determined the general pattern of political relations between the Ottoman state 
and the Kurdish periphery for about the next three hundred years. The maiden unified vision 
of Kurdish history presented in the Şerefname authored by Şeref Han (1543-1603), the 
famous mir of Bitlis, in 1595. The utopia of Kurdish unison vociferously advocated by the 
poet Ehmed-ê Khanî (1650-1706) in 1695 in his epic poem Mem û Zin. Khanî espoused 
Kurdish unity against the perceived suppression of the Kurds after the first official division of 
Kurdistan resulting from the Treaty of Zuhab (also known as Treaty of Qasr-i Shirin) in 1639 
between the Ottoman Empire and the Safavids (H. Bozarslan, 2008: 333-37; Özoğlu, 2004: 
21-40; McDowall, 2000: 25-36): 
I leave it to God’s wisdom 
The Kurds in this world’s state 
Why are they deprived of their rights? 
Why are they all doomed? 
See, from the Arabs to the Georgians 
Everything is Kurdish and, as with a citadel, 
The Turks and the Persians besiege them 
100 
 
From four sides at once. 
And they both make the Kurdish people 
Into a target for Fate’s arrow. 
After the battle of Çaldıran, with the exclusion of Kelhor, Erdelan, Baban, Şehrizur and 
Mukri, which had opted either to stay independent of both the Safavid and the Ottoman 
Empire or continued to recognise the former’ suzerainty (Özoğlu, 2004:49), the rest of the 
existing Kurdish principalities incorporated into the Ottoman Empire. The newly conquered 
province of Diyarbekir
31
 (1515) hosted all of the acquired Kurdish chiefdoms in return for 
their acknowledgement of Ottoman sovereignty. The formalisation of the Kurdish 
principalities occurred as a result of Sultan Selim I, when in returning from the battle of 
Çaldıran, on the advice of Idris Bitlisi32 (c.1455-1520), consented to gaining the support of 
the predominantly Sunni Kurdish chiefs and integrating the Kurdish principalities in Eastern 
Asia Minor.  
As per the formalisation of the Kurdish structures, autonomous Kurdish hükümets were 
formed and the terms and conditions of their independence were negotiated per se. Alongside 
these self-governing entities, two other administrative structures were instituted: Kurdish 
sancaks, governed by hereditary Kurdish rulers, and classical sancaks, which were centrally 
controlled by Ottoman officials appointed by the Ottoman central authorities (van 
Bruinessen, 1988; Celil, 1992; Özoğlu, 2004). As will be elaborated below, the number and 
boundaries of these Kurdish administrative units were in a constant state of flux due to the 
changing balances of power between the Kurdish rulers, central Ottoman government and 
local authorities in Ottoman Kurdistan. Ottoman rulers after the early sixteenth century also 
established nomadic peoples’ or tribal confederations, uluslar33, that were not subject to the 
                                                          
31
 In some of the Ottoman official documents, the province was also designated as Âmid.   
32
 Idris Bitlisi was the son of a respected Kurdish religious figure, Şeyh Hüssameddin Ali-ül Bitlisi. He was a 
political official in the region who had the confidence of both the Kurdish chiefs and Sultan Selim.   
33
 See Table 1.1 below. 
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jurisdiction of the above-mentioned Kurdish polities (İnalcık, 1994: 34-8; McDowall 2010: 
28-9).  
The battle of Çaldıran, moreover, revised the boundary between the Ottoman Empire and the 
Safavid Empire as the border relapsed to the line marked by Sultan Selim after the battle of 
1514 in Çaldıran, which is equidistant between Erzincan and Tabriz. This line attained 
official recognition with the signing of the Treaty of Zuhab (1693) and – despite disputes and 
invasions – it formally persisted until 1914. The battle of Çaldıran, the formalisation of the 
Kurdish principalities, and the Treaty of Zuhab rendered Ottoman Kurdistan to a zonal or 
border area between the two Empires, which had crucial political and economic implications 
for this region thereafter.  
The events that materialised in Kurdistan post-1514 were largely initiated by the imperial 
objectives of the Ottoman Empire. By the early sixteenth century, the Ottoman state had 
established itself in Western Anatolia and Thrace and from then on embarked on the project 
of conquering ESA. The predominantly Sunni Kurdish principalities were conceived as 
protectorates in the newly occupied territory against the disobedient Turcoman and Kurdish 
tribes and the Safavid rival.  
After conquering and formalising the Kurdish principalities, the Ottoman Empire had turned 
its attention further eastwards for territories such as Gilan and Shirvan, which were North 
Iranian centres of silk production. Consequently, the wars with the Safavid Empire began in 
1578 and persisted alternatingly until 1639. The war with the Habsburg Empire was also on-
going between 1593 and 1606. These wars, particularly the wars for Azarbaijan, Shirvan and 
Gilan, were highly destructive, not only for the Turkish military structure but also for the 
Ottoman finances, as after 1590, the Ottoman treasury suffered huge deficits (İnalcik, 1994: 
24).  
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Concomitantly, the penetration of the Ottoman Empire by the developed European countries 
by the use of trade had begun after 1580, which had devastating effects for the former. The 
‘financial impact on the [Ottoman Empire]…of cheap and plentiful silver from the West was 
immediate and catastrophic’ (Lewis, 1968: 29). To deal with the sudden and devastating flow 
of European silver, the Ottoman currency, akçe, was devalued in 1584-86 (Barkan, 1975: 12). 
The judgment to debase the Ottoman asper occasioned a monetary and financial crisis. Owing 
to this calamity, the sipahis, or the mounted soldiers attached to the central government, in 
order to cover their loss of income, raised the rates of taxes and created novel forms of 
taxation. This decision of the sipahis deepened the deprivation of the reaya – i.e. the 
dominated groups, Muslim or non-Muslim, outside the tax-exempt askeri (military or 
religious) ruling elite, engaged in economic activities and thus subject to taxes – and formed 
the socio-economic background to the Celali rebellions organised by the Muslim reaya in 
Anatolia (Faroqhi, 1994: 433-38).  
The rural populace in the Empire attempted to flee both the exactions of the Celali’ and those 
of the soldiers sent out to suppress them (Erder and Faroqhi, 1979: 323, Jennings, 1976: 39; 
Murphey, 1987: xix-xx). Most of the Anatolian towns by the middle of the seventeenth 
century experienced major difficulties. For instance, in the ‘1640s, compared to the 1570s 
and 1580s, Kayseri and Amasya had lost about one-half of their taxpayers’ (Faroqhi, 1994: 
439). The devaluation of the akçe also formed the basis of the uprising of the Janissaries, 
which were paid in the ‘new debased currency’ (ibid.: 433). Overall, the Ottoman Empire of 
the seventeenth century was no longer the ‘vital empire it had been in the sixteenth 
century…the Ottoman asper was replaced by the European currency; and the [Ottoman] 
economy entered the orbit of the European mercantilists’ (İnalcık, 1994: 25).  
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The diversion of the route of the world trade to the sea routes, the Capitulations
34
 granted by 
the Ottoman Sultan to the European countries and the adverse consequences of the trade 
between the Ottoman Empire and the European states for the former, had austere 
repercussions for the Ottoman economy and increased Ottoman dependence upon these 
powers after the seventeenth century. After the mid-seventeenth century, on account of the 
foundation of British and Dutch trade establishments in certain parts of Asia, world trade was 
altered to river transportation. This shift had negative effects for Ottoman trade, because most 
of the trade hitherto was carried out using land routes due to the existence of a ‘small number 
of navigable waterways’ in the Empire (Faroqhi, 1994: 483). Such a development had, 
however, put Ottoman Kurdistan in an advantageous strategic position for trade, as the only 
navigable waterways ‘in all of Anatolia, Syria and Iraq’ on a regular basis was the 
‘Euphrates-Tigris system’ (ibid.).  
The Treaty of Capitulation between Ottomans and France signed in 1744, granted the citizens 
of the latter country the right to buy, travel and be exempt from all forms of taxation. 
Subsequently, Austria, England, the Netherlands and, later on, Russia, signed alike Treaties 
with the Ottoman Empire. In virtue of these agreements, more foreign nationals became 
exempt from taxes that Ottoman citizens engaged in similar activities were obliged to pay 
(Fisher, 1959: 299-303).  As posited by Bruce McGowan, the value and content of trade 
between the European countries and the Ottoman Empire after the 1760s had unfavourable 
consequences for the Ottoman economy. The latter provided the former raw materials –
particularly cotton – while receiving finished products in return. The decline in trade of glass, 
soap, sugar, gunpowder and paper – which up until the mid-eighteenth century had been the 
engine of trade between the Ottoman Empire and the European countries – also played an 
influential role in the intensification of the adverse nature of the trade between these 
                                                          
34
 Capitulations were extraterritorial privileges granted by the Ottomans to subjects of foreign powers in 
commercial-economic and judicial areas. For detailed information, see İnalcık (1971: 1179-89).    
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dominions (McGowan 1994: 639). All in all, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had 
engendered the gradual and persistent disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and increased its 
penetration by the developed countries.   
2.2 Political Structures and Relations in Ottoman Kurdistan in the 16 - 18
th
 Centuries 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
As outlined in Chapter 1, the atypical autonomous administrative entities founded in Ottoman 
Kurdistan after the incorporation of the Kurdish principalities into the Ottoman Empire are 
commonly hypothesised to have given rise to a peculiar land holding regime that constituted 
formidable impediments to socio-economic development in ESA. In the ensuing part of this 
study, by analysing the nature and the evolution of the Kurdish polities in the Ottoman 
Empire as well as the economic revenues and resources of these structures during the 16 - 
18
th
 centuries, the study will attest the veracity of this regularly proposed and readily 
accepted proposition.    
Classical Ottoman Administration  
The Ottoman administrative system consisted of two components: the central government 
and the provincial administration. Dirlik
35
 is the Ottoman term for provincial administration 
and it designates the state revenues in a given locality allocated to officials, who were mostly 
military men. In the course of collecting those revenues from the Sultan’ subjects, the 
military official supervised on matters of cultivation and other economic activities as well as 
maintaining public order. The primary duty of the dirlik holders was to partake in the military 
operations or campaigns of the sultan, paying for their expenses from the proceeds of their 
dirlik.  
Moreover, the provincial government traditionally consisted of two centrally appointed 
authorities to administer the sancak: the sancakbeyi, who was a member of the askeri, and the 
kadı, who was a member of the ulema and represented the legal authority of the sultan. 
                                                          
35
 Some of the scholarship uses the term timar - which is the smallest dirlik grant - interchangeably with dirlik 
and thus the Ottoman provincial organisation has been titled dirlik or timar system. 
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Alongside, the sancakbeyi and the kadı, each sancak had also a mufti who interpreted Islamic 
law and via his fetvas stated his view on legal matters. The kadı had been an adept in 
religious law, specifically, Sharia law. 
 Kanunnames, that is the statute books that laid the kanun (sultan’ rules), were prepared 
separately for each sancak, and they legislated on matters of taxation, tolls, the duties and 
privileges of officials and criminal laws. Numerous sancaks comprised an eyalet, which was 
administered by a centrally appointed vali or beylerbeyi. The vali or beylerbeyi was 
hierarchically superior to the sancakbeyis in the sancaks, but except for military expeditions, 
the latter officials were responsible to the sultan and not to the vali or beylerbeyi.     
The Ottoman lands were divided into three categories: miri, state-owned lands; mülk, 
freehold ownership of land as opposed to state-owned land; and vakf, land granted for pious 
or charitable purposes, which remained or was revised at the sultan’s will. Income for the 
Ottoman state was attained solely from miri land, which had been apportioned or organised 
into three dirliks or administrative units: timar, zeamet and has. It is characteristic of studies 
on Ottoman history to classify dirliks in accordance with their yields: a dirlik with revenues 
up to 20,000 akçes was termed a timar; a zeamet was the title given to a dirlik with revenues 
from 20,000 to 100,000 akçes; and a dirlik with revenues above 100,000 akçes was entitled a 
has.  
The timar was given to the hierarchically lowest-ranking military personnel, sipahis, in 
exchange for their services for the state. Higher-ranking military personnel, subaşı, were 
granted with the zeamet. The sancakbeyi were granted with the largest dirliks, specifically, 
the has. The reaya was dispensed to a timar, a zeamet, or a has, and contingent on which of 
the three forms of dirliks the reaya were cultivating they paid their taxes to the sipahis, the 
subaşı or the sancakbeyi. Nevertheless, the cizye (poll tax), paid by the non-Muslims, was 
directly transferred to the treasury of the central government.  
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The provincial proceeds held in the reserve for the sultan were termed havass-ı humayun – 
i.e. imperial reserve. Customs revenues of the most important ports and yields of all mining 
operations were reserved for the sultan’s has. Furthermore, in exchange for the dirlik yields 
and based on their income sipahis and sancakbeyis had to sustain a particular number of 
cebelis (cavalrymen) and upon appeal had to serve in the sancakbeyi’s military campaigns. 
All of the above stated details regarding the basic features of the dirlik system were specified 
in the kanunnames. 
In the formalised Kurdish principalities though, administrative variations and peculiarities 
existed, which were attributable to two predominant factors. The first of these is the 
geopolitical feature of Kurdistan. Due to Kurdistan being located in a frontier region behind 
which there was the rival Safavid regions and state, the Kurdish elite of this region, especially 
in the early years of the incorporation of the Kurdish principalities into the Empire, were 
granted more autonomy than the sancakbeyis closer to the Ottoman centre. It is important to 
note here that such an administrative arrangement had not constituted a sui generis case: 
analogous provisions existed in other Ottoman borderlands. For instance, in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries the local families in Bosnia (kapitanes) had consolidated big timars and 
zeamets as hereditary prebends in their possession. Bosnia was the main defence region of the 
Empire against the Habsburgs and resultantly the Ottoman state often yielded to the pressure 
from these powerful families (İnalcık, 1994: 73-4). In addition, similar arrangements had 
existed in Turco-Mongol lands, such as North-Central Anatolia, where Ottoman rule had not 
been firmly established. Hence, it is not coincidental that in Amasya-Sivas-Tokat during the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries there existed the divani-malikane or ‘dual ownership’ land 
system as a compromise regime between ownership rights of the – mostly Turcoman – local 
hereditary lords and Ottoman state ownership of land wherein the former and the latter shared 
the surplus of the peasant production (İslamoğlu-İnan, 1994: 62-70).  
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The second factor for the existence of the unconventional administrative structures in 
Ottoman Kurdistan is the incessant struggle between the Ottoman central state and the 
Kurdish local elites; vying to establish and maintain political domination so as to extract 
larger shares of surpluses in the form of agricultural revenues. Accordingly, the magnitude 
and level of autonomy of the Kurdish principalities varied depending on the balances of 
power between the central state, provincial governor and the ruling families in a province 
(van Bruinessen, 1988: 13-28; Özoğlu, 2004: 52-63)  
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                   Map 5  
  Location of the Kurdish emirates in the 16th century 
                                          Source: van Bruinessen, 1988: 15.  
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Ottoman Administration in Kurdistan 
The Ottoman state, in contrast to the policies of the Aqquyunlu and the Safavid states prior to 
the sixteenth century, had initially aimed to govern Kurdistan by means of a dual policy. On 
the one hand, the Ottoman rulers in order to govern the fragmented Kurdish groups, 
introduced a policy of organising them into larger and more controllable administrative units 
– i.e. the all-encompassing province of Diyarbekir – above the tribal level and on the other, 
they reinforced and consolidated the traditional tribal Kurdish ruling stratum in order to attain 
their support. The quintessential example of the Ottoman policy in Kurdistan is the ferman 
(imperial decree) issued by the son of Sultan Selim I after his death, Süleyman I (1520-1566):   
 
[Kanuni Sultan Süleyman] gives to the Kurdish beys who, in his father Yavuz Sultan Selim’s 
times, opposed the Kızılbaş and who are currently serving the State (Devlet) with faith, and 
who joined specifically in the Serasker sultan Ibrahim Pasha’s Iran expedition with 
courage—both as a reward for their loyalty and courage, and their application and requests 
being taken into consideration—the provinces and fortresses that have been controlled by 
each of them as their yurtluk and ocaklık since past times along with the places that were 
given to them with separate imperial licences (berat); and their provinces, fortresses, cities, 
villages, and arable fields (mezraa) with all their harvests, under the condition of inheritance 
from father to son, are also given to them as their estate (temlik). There should never be any 
external aggression and conflict among them. This glorious order (emr-i celile) shall be 
obeyed; under no condition shall it be changed. In case of bey’s death, his province shall be 
given, as a whole, to his son, if there is only one. If there is more than one son, they (the sons) 
shall divide the province contingent upon mutual agreement among themselves. If they 
cannot reach any compromise, then whomever the Kurdistan beys decide to be the best 
choice shall succeed, and through private ownership (mülkiyet) he shall be the holder 
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(mutasarrıf) of the land forever. If the bey has no heir or relative, then his province shall not 
be given to anybody from outside. As a result of this consultation with the Kurdistan beys, 
the region shall be given to either the beys or beyzades [someone else from the beys family] 
suggested by the Kurdistan beys’ (Özoğlu, 2004: 53-4). 
An often quoted kanunname of the eyalet of Diyarbekir alluded to by Evliya Çelebi
36
 
(c.1611-1685), which is not dated but there is wide consensus in the relevant literature upon it 
being from the mid-sixteenth century, is commonly hypothesised to concretise the 
administrative peculiarities of the Kurdish principalities. Çelebi posits three different types of 
administrative units in Kurdistan. The first administrative category is the classical Ottoman 
sancaks. In these sancaks there existed timar, zeamet and has and they were governed 
directly by a centrally appointed sancakbeyi. The second category is the Kurdish sancaks. 
These sancaks were granted to the Kurdish rulers as yurtluk and ocaklık, which implicated 
that succession to office will remain within the ruling family. The sultan or the provincial 
governor could not oust the ruler of the Kurdish sancaks. The Kurdish sancaks like classical 
Ottoman sancaks, contained timar, zeamet and has, whose holders had the normal military 
obligations as those in the rest of the Ottoman Empire. The state did conduct fiscal surveys in 
these sancaks, which entails that a portion of their revenue was accrued to the central 
treasury. The third category is the Kurdish hükümets. In these administrative units, there were 
no timars and zeamets, and the taxes levied by their Kurdish rulers were not passed on to the 
central treasury. According to the above quoted kanunname, the only obligation of these 
hükümets was to partake in military expeditions.  
                                                          
36
 A diligent Ottoman traveller and author of Seyahatname, or Book of Travels; one of the most useful sources 
on the social, political, economic and cultural life of the Ottoman Empire in the 17
th
 century. During 1655-56, 
Çelebi visited Ottoman Kurdistan and took extensive notes on almost everything he saw, all of which are 
outlined in the fourth volume of the ten-volume of his masterpiece, Seyahatname. His records in Ottoman 
Kurdistan are particularly rich in detail on the military and administrative organisation of the provinces of 
Diyarbekir and Van, particularly on the relationship of the self-governing Kurdish polities with the central 
Ottoman state.  
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However, available official Ottoman documents suggest that there are incongruities between 
the administrative autonomy and privileges set out in the above quoted kanunname and 
ferman and the veracities of the administrative structures in Kurdistan. Below, via describing 
and assessing the various documented official data
 37
 on the administrative structures in 
Kurdistan between the early sixteenth and late eighteenth centuries, the study will trace the 
nature and evolution of the Kurdish polities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
37
 This study does make use of the Defters, which are the official Ottoman Administrative Registers, that are 
kept in the Topkapı Palace Archives, and the Diyarbekir Şer’iyye Sicilleri, which are detailed records of 
Ottoman courts containing information on imperial administrations, on affairs in towns and villages, and on 
taxes and taxation regulations, price regulations, the timar system, agreement between guilds, theft, murder and 
other crimes. 
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Table 2.1 Administrative division of the eyalet of Diyarbekir, 1527-1792 
                                           152738    154039   1578-8840    1626-3741     173342     174743  1785-9244 
Major emirates45 
Ardalan--------------------Not incorporated into the Ottoman Empire46--------------------- 
Hakkari--------------------Not incorporated into the Ottoman Empire---------------------- 
Imadiye                                   H    transferred to Iran and then to eyalet Van----------------                              
Bitlis                                        H     Y     transferred to eyalet Van-----------------------------                      
Hisnkeyf H     S             S               S   -- S            S 
Cezire (Bohtan) H     S H  H   -- H?         H? 
 
Minor emirates 
Sohran H     --47 -- --               --           --          -- 
Çemişgezek H --           --              S   --          --           S  
  *Mecengird (Mazgirt) --     Y           Y              Y   --          --           S 
  *Pertek                                  --     Y           Y              Y                --          --           S 
  *Sağman --     Y           Y              Y               --           --           S  
Eğil H     --          H  H --          H           S 
Palu H     --          H              --               H          --         H? 
Çermik H     S            --  Y S          S            S 
Hazzo H     --           -- H               --         --          -- 
Sasun H     S            S               -- --         --           S 
Zirqan H     --          H              -- --         --           S 
  *Gürdükan --    Y           H              --           --        --          -- 
  *Ataq H    Y           H              --                Y         Y          Y 
  *Tercil --    Y            S               H               H         H         H 
  *Mihrani --    Y            H              S                --          S          S 
Hizan H    S             S              transferred to eyalet Van-------------- 
Suveydi 
  *Hançük                                --     --           --              --                --        --         -- 
  *Genç                                    --     --           --              H                --         --        --  
  *Çapaqçur                             H    Y            Y               Y                --         --         S 
Süleymani 
  *Qulp --   Y            H               Y                 --         S          S 
  *Mifariqın                             --     --          --               Y                 H        H         H 
                                                          
38
 Defter no.5246, Topkapı Palace Archives in Kunt (1978: 130-31). 
39
 Unnamed Defter in van Bruinessen (1988: 18-19). 
40
 Defter Kamil Kepeci no.262 in Kunt (1978: 162-64). 
41
 Unnamed Defter from 1631-32 inYılmazçelik (1995:128). 
42
 Diyarbekir Şer’iyye Sicilleri, No.310:62-63 in ibid. 
43
 Diyarbekir Şer’iyye Sicilleri, No.313:174 in ibid 
44
 Diyarbekir Şer’iyye Sicilleri, No.352:25-27;No.313:30; No.626:1-32 in ibid.:129-30 
45
 List of Kurdish and non-Kurdish chiefdoms as well as nomadic sancaks in this table was adopted from van 
Bruinessen (1988: 18-19).  
46
 Information regarding new eyalets is attained from ibid. 
47
 Not mentioned in the document. 
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Sancaks that are not 
also Kurdish chiefdoms 
Amid                                        S       S           S              S                  S             S         S 
Mardin     S       S          --              --                --            S         S 
Arabkir                                     S    transferred to eyalet Sivas--------------------------------- 
Kığı                                           S    transferred to eyalet Erzurum----------------------------- 
Harput                                      S       S          S               S               --            --           S 
Ergani                                       S       S         --               S                S             S          S 
Siverek                                      S      S          S                S                S             S          S 
Ruha (Urfa)                              S       S          S                transferred to eyalet Raqqa---------- 
Bire                                           S       S          S                transferred to eyalet Halep or Raqqa 
Raqqa                                      --      --         --                made into eyalet Raqqa-------------- 
Suruc                                       --       S           S               transferred to eyalet Raqqa---------- 
Cammasa                                --       --          S                transferred to eyalet Raqqa---------         
Deyr ü Rahba                         --       --          S                transferred to eyalet Raqqa--------- 
Beni Rabi’a --       --         S                transferred to eyalet Raqqa--------- 
Mosul                                       S       --          S                made into eyalet Mosul------------- 
Ana ve Hit                               S       --          S                transferred to eyalet Raqqa---------- 
Habur --       --          S                transferred to eyalet Raqqa--------- 
Sincar H       --          S                transferred to eyalet Mosul--------- 
Aqçaqal’e --       --          S                transferred to eyalet Mosul--------- 
Nisibin                                    --       S            S  --    --         --           -- 
Si’ird                                       --        S           S Y    --         S             S 
Masyum u Tur                       --       --           H --               --         --            -- 
Hüsnru                                   --       --           H      --               --         --            -- 
Ahakis                                    --       --           --               Y  --         --             -- 
Zaho                                       --       --           --               --               --         --            -- 
Key: H= Hükümets, Y= Yurtluk ve Ocaklık, S= Classic Sancaks, -- = not mentioned in the document 
H?= not mentioned in the document but based other historical records dicussed in the thesis 
it is known to be a Hükümet. 
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As can be inferred from the summary of the administrative division of the eyalet of 
Diyarbekir above, in the early years of the incorporation or formalisation of the Kurdish 
principalities into the Ottoman Empire, the Kurdish administrative structures in these 
principalities were in a constant state of flux. The bulk of the Kurdish administrative bodies 
had evolved from initially being self-governing entities or hükümets in the sixteenth century 
to centrally governed classical Ottoman sancaks or semi-autonomous administrative 
organisations, yurtluks and ocaklıks – wherein the governing dirlik or timar system was in 
operation – in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  
An indication of this transformation is the increase in the official revenues of the beylerbeyis, 
or governor-general, of Diyarbekir in the seventeenth century when compared to their 
sixteenth century counterparts. İ. Metin Kunt in an extensive study of the Appointment 
Registers and Financial Registers of Dıyarbekir arrives at the following illuminating 
conclusion:  
‘[T]he political position of a seventeenth century governor-general is much stronger 
compared to his sixteenth century counterpart. The first and foremost obvious indication of 
this is supplied by the dimensions of Ömer Paşa’s [beylerbeyi of Diyarbekir] official income. 
In the sixteenth century, the official income allocated to a governor-general was in the 
neighbourhood of one million akçes. In contrast, Ömer Paşa’s income for the year 1670-71 in 
Diyarbekir exceeded sixteen million akçes. This increase in income cannot be explained 
solely as a result of inflation which emerged after the middle of the sixteenth century…the 
increase in the govenor’s income was more than three time greater than the rate of inflation’ 
(1981: 59). 
Congruently, the figures corroborated by the chancery clerk Ayn-ı Ali Efendi (Table 2.2) 
suggest that in the late-sixteenth or early-seventeenth centuries the has’ of the beylerbeyis of 
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the provinces of Diyarbekir, Van and Erzurum, when juxtaposed with the bordering 
provinces of Karaman, Rum and Zülkadriye, were higher.  
Table 2.2 The has’  of the beylerbeyis, late 16th or early 17th Century 
Provinces                                          Has’ of the beylerbeyis (in akçes)                            
Karaman                                            660,074 
Zülkadriye           628,450 
Rum           900,000 
Diyarbekir                                        1,200,000 
Van           1,132,000 
Erzurum           1,214,000 
 
Source: Cezar, 1986: 38. 
 
The detailed description of revenues and expenditures
48
 of Ömer Paşa’s annual accounts for 
1670-71 illustrate that the provincial ‘governor received a fee from all appointments within 
the province: all sancakbeyis, all dirlik holders, all central army troops stationed in 
Diyarbekir, and all guilds officials paid this fee, [which is] an excellent indication of the 
supreme power of governor in his province’ (Kunt, 1983: 92-3). The source of some of the 
incomes delineated in the annual accounts of the beylerbeyi of Diyarbekir in 1670-71 does 
shed light on the erosion of the autonomy enjoyed by Kurdish administrations. The incomes 
of Ömer Paşa were the appointment fees (tahviller) levied from timar and zeamet holders and 
fines (cerimes) that were imposed on the hükümets of Eğil, Palu and Hazzo (ibid.: 67). The 
provincial governor was acting within his jurisdiction with the collection of the former form 
of taxation, but the collection of the latter was an encroachment of the rights of the 
autonomous Kurdish rulers (van Bruinessen, 1988: 26). Such violations and interventions 
appear not to be atypical of the conduct of the centrally appointed governors or the Ottoman 
state in Kurdistan. In the early 1630s, Aziz Efendi in his Nasihatname, Treatise of counsel or 
advice addressed to the Sultan, outlined the incessant struggle between the Ottoman central 
                                                          
48
 For a detailed and itemised version of this annual accounts see: Kunt (1981). An English version of these 
accounts is given in pp.39-48.  
116 
 
state and the local elites, the corroding self-rule of the Kurdish administrations, and the 
provincial governor ousting Kurdish leaders and appointing outsiders instead. Accordingly, 
Aziz Efendi suggested that the autonomous rights of the relevant Kurdish rulers should be 
reinstated (Özoğlu, 2004: 59).  
Overall, the degree of autonomy the Kurdish principalities had in the early sixteenth century 
had gradually eroded and the majority of these Kurdish administrative structures had 
increasingly been dominated by and been very receptive to Ottoman demands. That said, 
despite the incessant struggle between the Kurdish local elites and the central state for 
political domination and control over the collection of the agricultural surplus, the Kurdish 
emirates reserved and conserved their infrastructure until the first half of the nineteenth 
century.  
2.3 The Economy and Demography of Ottoman Kurdistan in the 16
th
-18
th
 Centuries 
Studies on the socio-economic and political structures and developments in Ottoman 
Kurdistan are nominal, and the existing works on this region are commonly devoid of a 
comparative analysis of the demographic, social and economic features of this territory with 
the other domains of the Empire (Bois, 1966; Burkay, 2008 [1992]; Celil, 1992). This 
common lacuna in the literature on Ottoman Kurdistan constitutes a pivotal impediment for 
attesting and understanding, firstly, the relative social and economic importance of this 
borderland for the Ottoman Empire, and, secondly, the evolution of the social and economic 
structures in ESA. Such an omission is largely due to two interrelated issues: i) the presence 
of trivial demographic
49
 and economic primary data
50
 for Ottoman Kurdistan; and ii) the 
over-reliance of the aforementioned studies on the Travellers’ estimates and observations for 
                                                          
49
 The existence of minimal demographic information is attributable to the absence of a population census up 
until 1831 in the Ottoman Empire. 
50
 Because of the existence of minimal economic data on ESA, these regions of the Ottoman Empire have 
generally been excluded or left out of the studies on the economic history of Ottoman Anatolia. A prime 
example of this is the laborious work of Suraiya Faroqhi on trade, crafts and food production in Ottoman 
Anatolia between 1520-1650, which due to less comprehensive and scant nature of the documentation on 
Eastern Anatolia opts to focus the study on Western and Central Anatolia (1984:17-9).      
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demographic and economic data pertaining to the period between the sixteenth and eighteenth 
centuries. It is not feasible to base a comparative study on the annotations provided in these 
Traveller Books due to the existence of the descriptive information in these records and their 
being only one or two of these oft-quoted historical accounts
51
 dealing with any one epoch.  
Alternatively, by consulting studies on tahrirs and defter-i hakani
52
 of the sixteenth century
53
 
and the avariz
54
 tax registers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the thesis will 
identify the size and spatial distribution of the population of Ottoman Kurdistan and Ottoman 
Anatolia. Subsequently, based on the exploration of central treasury “budgets”55 and icmal56 
financial records, the study will analyse the provincial revenues and economic sources of 
these domains with the purpose of tracing the development and relative importance of the 
economic resources and local revenues of these territories for the general Ottoman economy. 
 
 
                                                          
51
 The often quoted and employed Traveller Books for the 16-18th centuries are as follows: D’Aramon (1864 
[1555]); Simeon (2013 [1612]); Tavernier (1677 [1630]); Çelebi, (1988 [1655]); and Niebuhr ( 1968 [1766]). 
52
 The ‘tahrir defters are, in nature, and often referred to, as tax survey registers. The tahrirs were recorded and 
kept in the defter-i hakani (imperial registers) in Istanbul’ (Demirci, 2009: 18). Tahrir registers ‘until the 
beginning of the seventeenth century were carried out every 30 or 40 years’ and they contain a ‘listing of the 
empire’s adult male population; the entry for each person states his father’s name, his legal status, the duties and 
privileges of his economic or social position, and the extent of his land. These registers also give much 
information regarding land use…and the estimated sources of revenue’ (Barkan, 1970: 163)  
53
 Not all surveys have survived; ‘in general two sets of surveys are available for most of Anatolia’ (İslamoğlu-
İnan, 1994: 25-6) and they form the basis of the demographic data below: one dating from the reign of 
Süleyman I and the other from the rule of Murat III (1574-1595). 
54
 The avariz was an emergency or irregular wartime tax paid in kind which had been converted into money in 
the course of the sixteenth century. During the first half of the seventeenth century, it became an annual tax. ‘In 
principle, though not always in practice, avariz taxpayers were taxed according to their ability to pay, and 
therefore officially recorded as “wealthy,” “middling” or “poor”. In addition, taxpayers were grouped into units 
known as avarizhane (tax house), all of which were assessed the same amount of money. A ‘tax house’ 
consisted of 2-15 households, and was kept small if the component households were considered wealthy, while 
in the case of the poor people, the number of the households were augmented’ (Faroqhi, 1994: 532).  
55
 The “budgets” in the 16th-18th centuries differed from their 20th century counterparts. Ottoman “budgets” pre-
Tanzimat was used as balance sheets for the revenues and expenditures of the Ottoman state already undertaken, 
often encompassing a full solar year or else lunar year. Due to Ottoman “budgets” during the 16-18th centuries 
recording revenues already collected and expenditures undertaken, they are conceived by Ottoman historians as 
‘a reliable index for the general condition of the economy’ (İnalcık, 1994: 78). 
56
 The icmal registers contained periodic financial summaries of the revenues and expenditures of the central 
Imperial Treasury and of the various provincial treasuries. They were used for verifying the veracity of internal 
accounting as well as simplifying and summarising a mass of information for final reporting to the Sultan in a 
synoptic form (Murphey, 1987: xvi). 
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Provincial Population Figures in the Tahrir and Avariz Registers 
The pioneering scholar of Ottoman demography, Ömer Lütfi Barkan, in his extensive 
research based on tahrirs claims that they are ‘most precious possesion of the Turkish 
archives of the surveys of population and taxable resources’ (Barkan, 1970: 163). Tahrirs of 
the sixteenth century, which at the time were used to obtain population and production 
figures in the Empire (Kunt, 1983: 15), are also construed by van Bruinessen to be ‘the best 
indications’ for a study of the populace of the province of Diyarbekir (1988: 32). 
Nevertheless, these scholars do also acknowledge the inadequate demographic information 
provided by the tahrirs, because tahrirs only distinguish between Muslim and non-Muslims 
(see Table 2.3 below). 
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Table 2.3 Distribution of the population of Turkey, 1520-1535 
                                                            Household57 
Provinces                                Muslim           Christian    Jewish                                Total 
Population 
Anatolia58        517,813              8,511        271                                   2,632,975 
Karaman59                               134,452              3,127        ----                                     687,895 
Zülkadiriye60    64,102    2,631        ----                                      333,665   
Diyarbekir61                            70,858               11,938       288                                      415,420     
Rum62     116,772             51,662      ----                                       842,170 
Arap63                                      113,358              914           ----                                      571,360 
Timar-holders 50,000                ----          ----                                      250,000 
      Total                                                                                                                       5,733,485 
İstanbul                                     46,000              25,000       ----                                     400,000 
Rumeli                                      194,958            862,707     ----                                   5,308,995 
Timar-holders                           50,000              ----           ----                                      250,000 
      Total                                                                                                                       5,958,995 
Total                     11,692,480 
Total Population (Including the population not entered in the Tax registers)         12 or 12.5 million 
Source: Barkan, 2000: 1412. 
The above-tabulated populace data are of sedentary societies and thus the calculations are not 
inclusive of nomads. The nomadic societies, which were divided by the Ottoman 
administration into two large confederations, Boz-Ulus (Turcomans) and Kara-Ulus (Kurds), 
constituted an integral part of Eastern Anatolia during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
(İnalcık 1994: 35-37; van Bruinessen, 1988: 35). The importance of tribal confederations is 
exhibited in Table 2.4 below with the recorded size of the nomadic societies and the taxation 
paid by these societies.  
 
 
                                                          
57
 Barkan, in his studies of the tahrirs employs the ‘coefficient of five’ (2000: 1411-12) to measure households 
or hane’s.  
58
 Western Asia Minor. 
59
 Liva: Konya, Beyşehri, Akşehir, Aksaray, Niğde, Kayseri and İçili. 
60
 Liva: Maraş and Kaza: Bozok and Kırşehir. 
61
 Liva: Amid, Mardin, Mosul, Sincar, Arapkir, Ergani, Çermik, Siverek, Kiği, Çemişkezek, Harput, Ruha 
(Urfa), Ana, Deyir and Rahbe and Kaza: Hisynkeyf. 
62
 Liva: Amasya, Çorum, Tokat, Karahisar, Djanik, Trabzon, Malatya, Divriği, Dirende, Kemah and Bayburt. 
63
 Liva: Damascus, Safed, Adjlin, Gaza, Jerusalem, Hama, Humus, Trablus, Ayintab, Birecik, Allepo, Adana, 
Uzeyir, Tarsus and Sis. 
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Table 2.4 Tribal confederations in Eastern Anatolia, 1540 
                                                 Household          Sheep                Total tax to be paid (akçe) 
Boz-Ulus                                   7,325                   1, 998,246            2 million 
Kara-Ulus                                   ---                        ---                      1 million 
Şam                                             ---                 ---      100,000 
Other scattered clans 
in the province of  
Diyarbekir                                 273                                                  14,806 
 
Source: İnalcık, 1994: 37. 
The population figures designated in the avariz registers are an important means of obtaining 
an understanding of the demographic patterns and changes in the post-sixteenth century 
Ottoman Empire. Demographic studies on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries have 
concentrated on the avariz registers, because the tahrir registers that were utilised to attain 
indication of the populace in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were seldom drawn up 
following the seventeenth century (McGowan, 1981: 113). The study below will report two 
different sets of demographic data of the tax-paying population in order to attain an 
understanding of the demographic patterns and changes between the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. Firstly, provincial avarız household data for the three Anatolian 
Ottoman zones – Eastern, Western, and Central Anatolia – based on a tax-farm register 
prepared in 1636. Secondly, avarız fiscal surveys for three Ottoman domains – Rumeli, 
Western Anatolia and Eastern Anatolia – for the years 1640-1786.  
Murphey (1987) based on tax-farm Register Maliyeden Müdevver 7075 collates information 
on the number of tax-paying houses in the different districts in Western and Eastern Anatolia. 
This document has a pivotal importance for attaining an idea of the size and proportional 
distribution of the population in Diyarbekir and other areas surveyed by the registrars. 
Register Maliyeden Müdevver 7075 was prepared in 1636 as a result of Sultan Murat IV 
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(1612-1640) ordering the preparation of a detailed report on the state of financial resources of 
Anatolia (Murphy, 1987: xiii).  
Table 2.5 Provincial Avarız Household Data, 1636 
Districts of Western Anatolia       Household        District of Central & Eastern Anatolia                 Household 
Hudavendigar                        8,964            Halep                                                         4,588 
Aydın                                     8,276            Sivas                                                           2,678.5 
Bolu 7,484            Karaman 2,616.5 
Menteşe 5,330            Diyarbekir                                                 2,331 
Suğla 4,962            Maraş 2,204 
Kütahya 4,152            Trablus-i Şam 1,699 
Saruhan 4,138            Erzurum 1,545.5 
Kastamonu 3,975            Trabzon 615 
Karesi 2,878            Adana 426 
Hamid 1,722            Rakka 300 
Ankara 1,458                
Biga 1,386 
Teke 1,333 
Karahisar-i Sahib 840 
Çankırı 702.5 
Sultan Önül 550 
Alaiyye 325 
Total                                      58,184.5        19,003.5 
Source: Murphey, 1987: 234. 
Moreover, McGowan based on a detailed study of ten avariz registers, which are 
hypothesised to ‘offer the best opportunity to follow demographic and other changes in a 
particular province’ (1981: 113), has produced a laborious comparative study of the populace 
data based on tax houses for Rumeli, Western Anatolia and Eastern/Central Anatolia during 
1640-1786. Below in Table 2.6 are the figures inferred from nine of the relevant registers 
surveyed by McGowan.   
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Table 2.6 Avarizhanes in four Ottoman zones, 1640-1786 
Date    Eastern/Central Anatolia64         Rumeli65         Western Anatolia66         Total       
                         
1640 27,773 (224)67              96,756 (159)           52,519  (275)            177,048 (658) 
1650 21,291 (220) 110,901 (220) ------                        132,192 (440) 
1662 33,280 (219)                103,100 (234)           50,384 (284)            186,764 (737) 
1677 18,822 (219)                92,274 (221)             51,292 (281)            162,388 (721) 
1688                30,759 (232)                53,122 (154)             41,689 (279)            125,570 (665) 
1698 18,015 (213)                46,498 (180)             34,700 (288)              99,213 (618) 
1718 18,490 (205) 44,426 (181)  30,373 (283)   93,289 (669) 
1755 11,975 (185) 43,345 (228)  26,360 (289)   81,680 (702) 
1786 12,967 (209) 43,455 (232)  22,561 (291)   78,983 (732)  
 
Source: McGowan, 1981: 118-20. 
 
The veracity and efficacy of the above demographic information extrapolated from tahrir and 
avariz registers have been questioned by certain studies. A critical analysis of the 
methodological and empirical issues raised in these scholarships are beyond the scope and 
subject-matter of this research and therefore the thesis will only offer a terse description of 
the postulated voids relevant for the scrutiny of the records cited above. Leila Erder contends 
that certain sections ‘of the population may disappear from the record as they transfer from 
taxable to exempt status’68, and due to the hane69 or household being the tax unit it is argued 
that ‘individuals or families can rarely be identified from one survey to the next’ (1975: 291). 
                                                          
64
 Sivas, Amasya, Çorum, Bozok, Canik, Arabkir, Divriği, Konya, Niğde, Beğşehri, Akşehir, Kayseri, Aksaray, 
Kırşehri, Içil, Adana, Trablus-i Şam, Şam-i Şerif, Haleb, Bire’tül Firat, Maraş, Malatya, Ayntab, Diyarbekir, 
Erzurum, Karahisar-i Şarki, Trabzon, Gönye.   
65
 Paşa, Vize, Çirmen, Köstendil, İsküb, Agriboz, Tirhala, Avlonya, Delvine, Selanik, Niğbolu, Silistre, Yanya, 
Ilbasan, Karli Eli, Inebahtı, Ohri, Pirzrin, Dukakin, Iskenderiye, Vidin, Mora, Kefe, Gelibolu, Ahur-i Edirne, 
Ahur-i Yanbolu, Ahur-i Zagora. 
66
 Aydın, Saruhan, Menteşe, Suğla, Hamideli, Karasi, Biga, Teke, Alaiye, Kütahya, Hüdavengir, Karahisar-i 
Sahib, Anagara, Sultanönü, Kengri, Boli, Kastamonu. 
67
 The figure between brackets is the number of judicial districts or kazas in each eyalet or province. 
68
 Information regarding individuals that were exempt from taxes, like the askeri ruling elite, ‘were often, 
though not always, excluded’ from the tax surveys (İslamoğlu-İnan, 1994: 27). 
69
 In order to attain estimates of the total population for Ottoman territories, one of the prevailing approaches – 
as evinced with the above cited population figures by  Barkan – have been to employ the household ‘coefficient’ 
or multiplier of five. However, neither Ottoman sources nor tax surveys contain any evidence concerning the 
actual size of the household. Resultantly, certain scholars have disputed the household coefficient or multiplier 
of five. For instance, a demographic study by Erder based on a survey of wide range of Ottoman tax and 
population registers, contends that the coefficient should be changed to ‘three or four’ (1975: 284-301). Hence, 
it is argued that the ‘Ottoman hane’ is ‘purely a fiscal convenience and is not geographically constant’ (İnalcık, 
2003: 28).     
69
 Western Asia Minor. 
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Additionally, as argued by Lajos Fekete, the tax is paid collectively in some areas, thereby 
making it impossible to calculate the population (1947: 299-328). For the purposes of this 
thesis, it suffices to state that the above summarised criticisms do not totally disrepute the aim 
ascribed by this study to the avariz and tahrir registers. That is, attaining indicators for 
determining the size, the proportional distribution and the evolution of the populace of 
Ottoman Anatolia and its neighbouring regions between the sixteenth and eighteenth 
centuries. Put differently, in the absence of Ottoman Censuses, the information in the tahrirs 
and the avariz tax surveys provide signifiers of demographic trends rather than unassailable 
and complete population figures.  
Provincial Revenues and Economic Resources of Ottoman Kurdistan   
The first official balance sheet of state revenues or treasury “budget” in 1527-28, takes 
account of the timar, vakf, mülk revenues and gives the total value of all revenues of the 
Ottoman Empire as 537.90 million akçes, which is equivalent to 9.7
70
 million of gold ducat. 
The state revenues consisted of 477 million, which constituted 89 per cent of the total 
revenue of the Empire (see Table 2.7).  
Table 2.7 Total revenue of the Ottoman Empire, 1527-28  
Sources of Revenue                               Value (in millions akçes) 
 
Imperial Hass                   277 
Other Hass and Timar distributed          200 
Vakf and Mülk properties   60 
 
Total                                                               537 
Source: İnalcık, 1994: 81. 
 
The actual purpose of these “budgets” was to determine whether surplus has been realised, 
thus for an efficient “budget” Ottoman statesman had anticipated a surplus after expenditures 
so that those in receipt of a salary from the sultan’s treasury would not have concerns about 
                                                          
70
 In 1528, one gold ducat was equivalent to 55 akçes (İnalcık, 1994:78).  
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their income (İnalcık, 1994: 77). When the revenues and expenditures of the province of 
Diyarbekir are compared with other Ottoman Anatolian regions (see Table 2.8 below), which 
today roughly constitute modern-day Turkey, it becomes evident that the latter areas were 
operating under a budget deficit whilst the former yielded surplus revenue. This is despite 
Diyarbekir having the third lowest population density out of the four compared provinces 
(see Table 2.3 above).  
Table 2.8 Balance of provincial revenues, 1527-28 (in million akçes) 
Province                       Revenue            Expenditure Balance 
Anadolu, Karaman, 
Rum and Zülkadriye     294.85   322.13    -27.28 
Diyarbekir                      21.46                   20.10                          +1.36 
                                                                            
Source: İnalcık, 1994: 83. 
 
Such a development was not unique to the “budget” of 1527-8, because more deficits were 
sustained from these regions – particularly Rumeli and Anadolu – in the later years of the 
sixteenth century as evidenced by the deficits incurred from the aforementioned provinces in 
the succeeding published “budget” of 1547-8. The expenditure of the central budget reached 
171,997,449 akçes in 1546 and 111,997,449 akçes in 1547. The revenue the central treasury 
received from the provinces of Anatolia and Rumeli in the same years was 135,402,022 akçes 
in 1546 and 94,543,349 akçes in 1547. Consequently, the deficits of 36,470,335 akçes and 
17,454,694 akçes were incurred. The surplus revenues deriving from the newly conquered 
provinces of Egypt, Syria, Diyarbekir and Baghdad’ covered these deficits (Sahillioğlu, 1970: 
239-40). The surplus revenue transferred from Diyarbekir to the central treasury had arisen 
from 1.36 million akçes in the previous “budget” to around 5 million akçes in the “budget” of 
1547-8 (Barkan, 2000: 891). In the only other published “budget” for the sixteenth century, 
the “budget” of 1567-68, the income revenues and expenditures for the province of 
Diyarbekir were not recorded in the form that it had been done with the latterly stated 
“budgets”.  
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The periodic irregularities and altered content of the “budgets” in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries make it highly difficult to systematically study the spatial sources of 
state revenues and expenditures during this period. Summary accounts of incomes and 
expenditures were not calculated for a long time in the seventeenth century. Hence, the 
“budget” of Tarhuncu (Grand Vizier 1652-3) possesses much importance and is generally 
looked upon as the first Ottoman budget of the seventeenth century (Sahillioğlu, 1970: 233). 
In addition, in the eighteenth century summary financial or budgetary records were not 
collected regularly. With the exclusion of a few “budgets” in the first decade of the 
eighteenth century, there existed no accounts or “budgets” in the subsequent thirty six years 
(Tabakoğlu, 1985: 22).  
More importantly for the purposes of this study, while sixteenth century “budgets” had 
registered revenues in accordance to their geographical origin, most of the published 
“budgets” in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries do not provide the geographical 
distribution of all the revenue sources. Ottoman accountants in the seventeenth century had 
begun to register revenues in accordance with the treasury offices
71
 in charge of their 
administration (Faroqhi, 1994: 539-40, Tabakoğlu, 1985: 21-25). The “budgets” during the 
two centuries after the sixteenth century mostly contained the total amount of income and 
expenditures of these treasury offices – see the published “budgets” for 1660-61, 1669-70 and 
1690-91(Barkan, 1955-56: 193-347). Therefore, detailed information concerning provincial 
incomes and expenditures, which are necessary for a comparative study of the different 
regions of the Empire, were minimal compared to the sixteenth century. Another 
commonality of the Ottoman “budgets” in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were that, 
unlike its sixteenth century counterparts, they contained information concerning the imperial 
                                                          
71
 For more information on the role, functions and evolution of the different treasury offices in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, see Tabakoğlu (1985: 33-69). 
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hass revenues, which consisted to great extent of mukataa
72
 (tax-farm) and cizye revenues, 
thus information regarding the dirlik or timar revenues had not been accounted for 
(Tabakoğlu, 1985: 22-25). 
These factors constitute insurmountable barriers to acquiring a complete analysis of all the 
provincial revenues and the fiscal or budgetary accounts of Ottoman domains in the 
seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. Nevertheless, as Ahmet Tabakoğlu posits in a 
trailblazing study of the Ottoman “budgets”, icmal and rüzname73 registers, provincial 
revenues in these two centuries – with the exclusion of Egypt – consisted of mukataa or tax-
farm revenues administered by the Baş Muhasabe (Muhasebe-i Evvel) branch of the Imperial 
Treasury (1985: 168-69). Therefore, in order to attain an understanding of the evolution of 
the provincial revenues during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this thesis will make 
use of the documented data on mukataa revenues of Ottoman provinces.  
One of the available official records from the seventeenth century is the aforementioned 
icmal accounts in the tax-farm register for 1636-7, Register M M 7075. This document gives 
an insight into the amount and sources of mukataa revenues in the early seventeenth century 
from the following regions and provinces of the Empire: ‘Western, Central, South-Central 
Anatolia (Anadolu, Zülkadriye, Karaman, Rum, Kastamonu and Bursa (Bolu))’; 
‘Southeastern Anatolian (Diyarbakir)’; ‘Eastern Anatolia (Erzurum)’; and ‘Northern Syria 
and parts of South-Central Anatolia (Aleppo)’ (Murphey, 1987: 220). 
 
                                                          
72
 In Ottoman fiscal practice, a mukataa had meant a source of revenue projected and entered into the register of 
the finance department, which included a host of revenue sources. Collection of such revenues had been farmed 
out under a specific tax-farm system to independent agents called mültezim or amils, or delegated to 
administrative officials such as the emins or voyvodas. 
73 Rüzname registers contained records of the day-by-day revenues and expenditures of the provincial treasuries 
and of various other government departments. For detailed information, see: Tabakoğlu (1985: 40-3) and Shaw 
(1969, 1-12). 
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Table 2.9 Provincial tax-farm revenues of Anatolia and the Coastal and Northern portions 
of Syria, early 17th century (in akçes)74 
Provinces                                          Amount 
Aleppo                                              24,106,727 
Zülkadriye                                        30,911,760 
Karaman                                           2,390,000 
Diyarbekir                                        25,019,750 
Rum                                                   3,063,000 
Damascus             15,382,000 
Erzurum                                           16,800,000 
Kastamonu 2,656,113 
Bursa (Bolu) 5,334,042 
Anadolu 12,399,400 
 
Source: Murphey, 1987: 220. 
 
The above given tax-farm revenues suggest that the provincial sources of income in ESA in 
the early-seventeenth century, when contrasted with the mukataa revenues of other Anatolian 
provinces, had attained a greater importance. Mukataa revenues in Diyarbekir alone had been 
almost equivalent to the mukataa revenues of the five bordering Anatolian regions, excluding 
Zülkadriye. The mukataa revenues in Erzurum had been triple the amount of revenues in the 
bordering Rum and Karaman province.  
When the available data on the principle provincial revenues of Diyarbekir and Erzurum 
(Table 2.10), the custom and production revenues/data (Maps 6-8), and the major export 
products from the Empire (Table 2.11) are juxtaposed, we can reasonably posit the following 
conclusion. The revenue base of the provincial revenues of Diyarbekir and Erzurum in the 
seventeenth century consisted of the mine and mineral manufacturing and trade, sheep 
breeding and sheep trade, textile production and the custom revenues attained from long-
distance trade passing from ESA. Concomitantly, as described in the preceding section, the 
gradual integration of the autonomous Kurdish emirates into the Ottoman administrative 
system in the seventeenth century facilitated the rise in the number of Kurdish emirates 
                                                          
74
 There had been a four-fold increase in the exchange equivalent for one gold piece in circulating silver akçe 
coins in the period between 1526 (1 altun=60 akçes) and 1636 (1 altun=240 akçes) (Murphey, 1987: xxi). 
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becoming receptive to Ottoman demands. This can also be identified as another factor in the 
growth of fiscal yields or revenues. As noted by Hakan Özoğlu, ‘although by the end of the 
seventeenth century there were autonomous Kurdish emirates, they were, for most part, 
integrated into the Ottoman administrative system by increasing state authority […] [B]ut the 
degree of autonomy they [Kurdish emirates] enjoyed was reduced to the point that a majority 
of the emirates became very responsive to Ottoman demands’ (2004: 59).  
Table 2.10 Principal revenues for the provinces of Diyarbekir and Erzurum, early 17th 
century (in akçes) 
Diyarbekir                  Erzurum 
Customs                                      6,021,950       
Sales Tax                            
on Cloths and  
Textile Production 551,800 
Sheep Tax 555,000 
Tax from Pastoral Peoples  
or Tribal Confederations  2,679,500 
Erzurum 
Customs                                       8,000,000 
Mines and Minerals 3,182,650 
Revenues from Salt Flats 84,252 
 
Source: Murphey, 1987: 226-32. 
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        Map 6 
             Mine and metal manufactures and trade in Anatolia, 16th and 17th Centuries 
                                                  Source: Faroqhi, 1984: 175. 
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                           Map 7 
                                   Trade in Anatolian sheep, 16th to 17th Centuries 
                                                     Source: Faroqhi, 1994: 497. 
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                                                                 Map 8 
               Location and revenues of Ottoman dye houses or boyahanes, late 16th century 
            Source: Faroqhi, 1984: 152. 
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Table 2.11 Principal English and French imports from the Levant, 1620-178975 
English Imports    1621-34      1663-69      1699-1701      1722-24 
(in thousands of pounds per year)                      
Raw Silk                                              73               172              219                  274 
Mohair Yarn      9                 45                32                    40 
Cotton and Cotton Yarn              25               28                25                    12      
Galls                                                     5                 58               13                     7 
French Imports    1700-2       1750-4         1785-9       
(in millions of livres per year)                      
Textile Materials 
    Silk     2,416            2,095          1,683 
    Cotton76                                          1,528             5,684   12,792 
    Mohair Yarn    639           1,835          1,437 
    Camel Hair                           137           914             1,021 
Galls77                                                 170           488             853 
Textile Manufacture                          385           1,715          2,430 
 
Source: Davis, 1970: 202-04. 
 
The sources of income in the provinces of Diyarbekir and Erzurum maintained their relative 
importance in the eighteenth century. As exhibited in the summarised mukataa revenues in 
the “budget” of 1706-07 in Table 2.12 below, the tax-farm or mukataa revenues of the 
province of Erzurum and Diyarbakir had been nearly equivalent to the total revenues of the 
three major Ottoman Anatolian provinces: Anadolu, Karaman and Sivas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
75
 Check the footnotes below for information regarding production Ottoman Kurdistan. 
76
 Much cotton was locally processed into yarns and cloth in the following localities in Ottoman Kurdistan: 
Ergani, Mardin and Diyarbekir. The red cotton cloth of Diyarbekir was very famous and in much demand 
abroad during the 17-18
th
 centuries. So much so that, according to the Tavernier, half of the population in the 
mid-17
th
 century had engaged in the production of this product and red Morocco leather. For more information, 
see: van Bruinessen (1988: 36-40). 
77
 All galls exported originated in Diyarbekir, Van and Mosul (Davis, 1970: 200-1; van Bruinessen, 1988: 40). 
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Table 2.12 Mukataa revenues, 1706-07  
Provinces                                           Amount (in million akçes) 
Anadolu 4.6 
Karaman 2.3 
Sivas 8.0 
Erzurum 13.9 
Trabzon 10.9 
Çıldır  2.4 
Aleppo  21.9 
Adana  13.8 
Maraş  4.9 
Rakka  9.6 
Damascus  1.6 
Sayda-Beirut  28.3 
Tripoli  41.7 
Diyarbekir  13.5 
Mosul  3.2 
Baghdad  4.4 
 
Source: Tabakoğlu, 1985: 170. 
Tabakoğlu (1985), by collating mukataa revenues found in various Ottoman fiscal 
documents, traces the progress of the revenues of the ten prominent mukataas in the Empire 
between the late seventeenth and the mid-eighteenth centuries (Table 2.13). The findings of 
this study demonstrate that the provincial sources of revenue originating from ESA were vital 
sources of income for the Ottoman economy. Mukataas from Erzurum and Diyarbekir were 
among the most protuberant sources of income for Ottoman Empire.  
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Table 2.13 Principle Mukataas, 1698/99-1748 (in million akçes) 
                                                                                  Years 
                                    1698-9        1700-1      1701-2     1706-7         1710-1    1716-7    1734-5       1748  
Sources 
Erzurum Customs  11.4         11.5         11.6        13.978          12.2        17.4        15.5        ----- 
Aleppo Revenues 20.9         20.2         20.1        21.9             19.2        23.5        23.4        22.5 
Rakka Mukataas 9.3            8.6            8.5          9.6             10.9        12.9        12.8        14.0 
Sayda-Beirut Mukataas  26.5        26.7          26.7       28.3              27.4        26.9        27.4        27.6  
Tripoli Mukataas            31.2        38.3          38.3       41.7              35.8        36.1        29.6         36.1 
Diyarbekir Voyvodalığı  10.1         13.3          9.2         13.579             9.5           9.3        10.3        10.5 
Gümüşhane hass’  10.0        10.1         -----       ------              9.5           9.6        -----        ----- 
Sakız&İzmir Customs    10.1         ------       12.8       ------           ------         -----       18.2        ----- 
Eflak cizye   17.0         ------       17.0       ------           ------         -----       22.2        ----- 
İstanbul Customs            39.8         ------       39.8      ------           ------         -----        57.3       ----- 
 
Source: Tabakoğlu, 1985: 173. 
When the scale and sources of revenue of the most prominent mukataa of the province of 
Diyarbekir (Diyarbekir Voyvodalığı80) in 1797-98 (Table 2.14) is studied in tandem with the 
principal revenues of this province in the early seventeenth century (Table 2.10) and the total 
mukataa revenues in the early-and-mid-eighteenth century (Tables 2.12-13), we can arrive at 
two interrelated results. The first is that in the late eighteenth century, Diyarbekir increased 
its mukataa revenues. The second is that this province preserved the manufacturing and trade 
revenues base of the province, as is evident with the revenues yielded from customs, dye 
houses and market dues.   
 
 
                                                          
78
 This is the whole revenue of the eyalet of Erzurum. 
79
 This is the whole revenue of the eyalet of Diyarbekir. 
80
 The term voyvodalık originates from a Slavic term: voyvoda. A voyvoda refers to a subcommander. During the 
sixteenth century, it was the title given to the civil governor of the Balkan states under the control of the 
Ottoman Empire. In the preceding centuries, the term had come to be used in northern Anatolia and Kurdistan 
for a class of officials who acted as intendants of tax farms. As a fiscal category voyvodalık denotes the 
stewardship of hass or sultan’ properties assigned to the administration of a voyvoda or, in other words, 
extensive lands administered as imperial estates under the supervision of state officials titled voyvoda. The 
voyvodalık as an eklâm (provincial bureau) was a provincial fiscal bureau that had the stewardship of a bulk of 
the state-designated wealth in a given province. Moreover, one of the primary duties of the Diyarbekir voyvoda 
was to administer the mukataa of the Diyarbekir Voyvodalığı. The mukataa of the Diyarbekir Voyvodalığı 
yielded the highest revenues in the province of Diyarbekir. In return for this service, the voyvodas attained an 
annual salary (Salzmann, 2003: 128-31).    
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Table 2.14 Revenues of the Diyarbekir Voyvodalığı, 1797-8 (in Kuruş81) 
Sources Amount                 Erzurum 
Customs (Gümrük)                    97490 
Dye House Dues (Boyahane)    35000 
Sales Tax (Damga) 33550                             
Ground Rent (Arsa) 34000 
Craftsmen’ Dues (İhtisab) 8344 
Total 208384 
Source: Başbakanlık Arşivi, Bab-ı Defteri Baş Muhasebesi, No: 6538 in Yılmazçelik, 1995: 
285. 
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 In the years 1690-1844, 1 kuruş equalled to 120 akçes or 40 paras (Pamuk, 1994: 967). 
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Chapter 3 
The Transformation of Ottoman Kurdistan: Underdevelopment in Ottoman Kurdistan 
in the Age of Centralisation, Westernisation and Crisis (1800-1914)  
 
3.1 Overview  
During the nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries, the economic penetration of 
Europe into the Ottoman Empire deepened, and the Ottoman state had increasingly 
diminished its relative international position as well as territorial possessions. Inevitably, 
these and other significant changes, which will be deliberated below, in the Ottoman social, 
economic and political life had major implications for the socio-economic and political 
structures and processes in Ottoman Kurdistan. In this introductory section, as background to 
the ensuing analysis of the social and economic manifestations in Ottoman Kurdistan, the 
thesis will briefly outline the pivotal events that surfaced in this region in the years prior to 
the First World War. 
The nineteenth century was a time of astounding change in Ottoman Kurdistan. In the first 
half of this century, the age-old Kurdish administrative structures established in the early 
sixteenth century foundered. The abolition of the Kurdish polities, which hitherto preserved 
their infrastructure despite intermittently being suppressed by the Ottoman state in the 
preceding three centuries, was a derivative of the re-centralisation and westernisation policies 
unleashed by the reforms of Sultan Mahmut II and continued by subsequent Ottoman 
reformers: the Tanzimat statesmen, Sultan Abdülhamid II (1842-1918) and the Young Turks.  
The centralist restructuring policies, alongside a series of other political and military goals 
elucidated below, aimed to eradicate the increasing powers of the local notables, who 
accumulated fiscal or landed power because of the experiment in delegating tax collection 
and the levying of troops to local elites during the eighteenth century Ottoman Empire. The 
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concentration of fiscal and landed wealth in the hands of the locally powerful elements had 
forced the central government to recognise their power and to confirm formally their status. 
Relatedly, although the Ottoman state oversaw their functions, in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, the strong Kurdish emirates were almost in complete control of their 
own internal affairs. Such changes, as described by McDowall, were not only witnessed in 
the ‘further flung areas of the empire; all over the Anatolia, let alone in Kurdistan, local 
derebeys (or ‘valley lords’), themselves theoretically holding military fiefs, turned their 
fiefdoms into hereditary holdings failing to submit the requisite taxes to the capital’ (2000: 
40) (See Map 9).  
This process enabled locally powerful groups, comparatively free from the supervision of the 
central authority, to respond to increasing opportunities of commodity production for long-
distance markets by carving out large estates for themselves and by escalating the 
exploitation of the dependent peasantry. The signing of the Sened-i İttifak in 1808 represented 
the zenith of local notables or ayan as the then Sultan, Selim III (1761-1808), was obliged to 
officially consent to devolution of state power to local potentates, among them the Kurdish 
notables, who derived their power from local sources.  
The successor of Sultan Selim III, Mahmut II, recognised that in order to rescue the 
ramshackle Empire from further demise or collapse he would have to reform its institutions 
and oust the unreceptive elements of government. The centralist reforms implemented by 
Mahmut II and the succeeding Ottoman rules entailed the suppression of the local notables all 
over the Empire and occasioned the destruction of the Kurdish emirates. Local Kurdish 
hereditary rulers were ejected and the Kurdish territories were brought under direct Ottoman 
control. In other words, the toppling of the Kurdish polities and the suppression of the fiscal 
and landed power of the Kurdish notables went hand in hand.   
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                         Map 9 
                      Provincial power-holders in Anatolia and the Balkans, 1790-1820 
    Source: Yaycıoğlu, 2012: 440. 
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Reşid Muhammad Pasha82, and Hafiz Mehmed Pasha, who replaced Muhammad Pasha in 
1836, played an active role in the eradication of Kurdish emirates (Jwaideh, 1961: 148-49, 
McDowall, 2000: 43-5). In 1834, Reşid Muhammad Pasha, formerly the Grand Vizier of 
Mahmud II and governor of Sivas at the time, mobilised a substantial army with the particular 
task of suppressing the Kurdish emirates. His initial target was the Kurdish ruler, Mir 
Muhammad of Rawanduz (1783-c.1840), who by the early 1830s established control and 
maintained a level of law and order that had been unknown for generations over a territory 
bounded by the Upper and Lower Zab Rivers, the Tigris and the Iranian border. As Rashid 
Muhammad Pasha entered Soran territory and approached the Rawanduz valley, forces from 
Mosul and Baghdad that were mobilised by the Vali of Baghdad, Ali Riza Pasha, and the Vali 
of Mosul, Muhammad Pasha Ince Bayrakdar, joined him. As a result, the powerful Pasha of 
Rawanduz was captured and removed to Istanbul.  
In addition to ousting Mir Muhammad in 1836, Reşid Pasha’ campaign in Ottoman Kurdistan 
succeeded to put an end to the revolt in Mardin which began in 1833, suppressed the 
rebellious Milli tribal confederation
83
 in Upper Mesopotamia, and subjugated the Sasun-
Motkan region within the same year (Jwaideh, 1961: 149-50). Yet, from the perspective of 
the Ottoman rulers, the most momentous achievement of this two-year campaign in Ottoman 
Kurdistan had been the suppression of the 300-year-old hükümets of Hani, Hazro, Ilicak and 
Silvan. Their inhabitants were burnt and their rulers were exiled (Aydin and Verheij, 2012: 
31-2).  
                                                          
82
 Reshid Muhammad Pasha, who was of Georgian origin, held the rank of Marshal of the East in the Ottoman 
Army (Jwaideh, 1961: 148). 
83
 The milli were a confederation of Kurdish aşirets, divided in two branches. The Timavizade branch living 
around Viranşehir and a second branch inhabiting between Resulayn and Mardin. Millis were largely semi-
nomads. The Timavizade also practiced agriculture.  Aşirets are in this study (i) are specified by their regional 
or, to be precise, the Middle Eastern context and their pastoral-nomadic character, determined by the necessity 
of transhumance and (ii) is predominantly a construction on the basis of common political and economic goal 
and thus it is different to the ‘tribe’, which denotes kinship ties/groups of hunter-gatherers or agriculturalists in 
African American, Asian or Oceanic environments, to the extent that common descent is somewhat fictive 
(Aydin and Verheij, 2012: 16, 26). 
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After the defeat of the Mir of Rawanduz, the last supreme chief to present a stern challenge to 
the centralist Ottoman reformers was the ruler of the Botan emirate, Bedirhan Bey (1802-
1868). Bedirhan Bey had succeeded to his principality in 1820-21.
84
 He was a member of the 
prominent Bedirhani family who descended from the ancient Azizan family mentioned in the 
Şerefname. The Bedirhani family enjoy a distinctive place in Kurdish history for producing 
numerous Kurdish nationalists after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, whom will be 
analysed below.    
The power accumulated by Bedirhan Bey during his rule had surpassed the authority of many 
of the authorities in the region (Özoğlu, 2004: 70). At the peak of his rule in the 1830s, an 
American traveller with the following words described his power: 
‘[Bedirhan Beys’ power] extend[ed] from the Persian line on the east to far into Mesopotamia 
on the west, and from the gates of Diarbekr to those of Mosul; and his fame was widespread 
[…] Every chief in Northern Koordistan came to make their respects to him […] Even the 
Hakkary Bey, higher in rank, and once more powerful than he’ (Jwaideh, 1961: 183).  
In virtue of his cooperation with the Ottoman authorities and owing to the influence he 
wielded in Kurdistan (McDowall, 2000: 45, Aydin and Verheij, 2012: 33), Bedirhan Bey 
avoided the suppressive actions of Rashid Pasha in this region during 1834-36.  
The relationship between Bedirhan Bey and the Ottoman state remained relatively peaceful 
until 1842. The Emir of Botan, however, was very disconcerted by the new centralist 
administrative arrangements of the Ottoman administration in the following five years and 
revolted against the Ottoman state in 1847. According to the new system, the Botan emirate 
would remain in Diyarbekir Province, but Cizre, a subdistrict in the Botan emirate and the 
seat of the Bedirhan administration, would be attached to Mosul. Although it was an arduous 
                                                          
84
 A controversy does exist about the exact year of Bedirhan’s coming to power; some of the sources suggest 
that the year ‘was 1821’ (Jwaideh, 1961: 176) or ‘about 1820’ (McDowall, 2000: 45), while others claim the 
period between1835-38 was the period he established himself as the emir of the emirate of Botan (Özoğlu, 
2004:70).  
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task, a heavily armed Ottoman military was successful in defeating the revolt. Bedirhan was 
captured and sent to Istanbul in 1847. Subsequently, the campaign was described in the 
official newspaper of the Ottoman state, Takvîm-i Vakayi, as ‘reconquering of Kurdistan’ 
(issue 345 in Kürdoloji Çalışmalar Grubu, 2011: 27), and a ‘Medal of Kurdistan’ was issued 
by the state to those who had fought against the Bedirhan Revolt (Özoğlu, 2004: 71). The 
official designation of the campaign neatly epitomises the rationale for suppressing the 
Kurdish polity in Botan and other Kurdish emirates. 
As part of the task of ‘reconquering’ Kurdistan, the Ottoman state established a new 
administrative unit and entitled it Kürdistan Eyaleti (Kürdistan Province). As it is evident in 
the irade (imperial order) cited below wherein the idea of creating the Kürdistan Eyaleti was 
explicated, this new administrative formation was formed with the aim of establishing direct 
control over Kurdistan, rather than recognising Kurdistan as a political entity. The imperial 
order of 1846 contains a letter from the office of Grand Vizier on 6 May 1846 that reads: 
‘The commander of the Anadolu army, illustrious Müşir Pasha, had some observations 
regarding the future of Kurdistan region, which was saved—perhaps reconquered—from 
brigands (eşkıya). To present the requirement to, and to request permission from, the Sultan, 
two days ago his excellency Serasker Pasha, Fethi Pasha, the above-mentioned Müşir Pasha, 
Nazır Efendi, and the undersecretary met in the grans vizier’s Residence (Bab-ı Ali). Müşir 
Pasha firstly stated that the village of Harput…although it is a suitable place to station the 
army, is peripheral to the headquarters of the army. On the other hand, Ahlat—which is 
located on the other shore of Lake Van, and has suitable weather and fertile soil, and is 
located at the centre of the Imperial Army (Ordu-yu Hümayun)—is, unlike Harput, close to 
the Iranian and Russian borders. Ahlat provides better transportation and logistical 
support and is located in the heart of Kurdistan, where the Kurds can be better 
controlled with the iron fist (pençe-i satvet), which proves to be necessary. Therefore, it is 
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suggested to the exalted Sultan that Ahlat should become the headquarters of the Anadolu 
army. The appropriate action should be taken pending the Sultan’s approval … 
The second point of Müşir Pasha related to the administrative structure of Kurdistan. 
According to the pasha, the Kurdistan region was conquered to provide security and order to 
the region. Diyarbakir province (eyalet) and Van, Muş, and Hakkari districts (sancak) and 
Cizre, Botan and Mardin sub-districts (kaza) should be united under the name of Eyalet-i 
Kürdistan.’85 
The Sultan approved the request in 1847, and for the first time in the history of the Ottoman 
Empire the term Kurdistan, which up until then used as geographical expression, was 
baptised to an administrative unit (Özoğlu, 2004: 61). Eyalet-i Kürdistan was short-lived, 
however. In the Devlet Salname of 1867, the name ‘Kürdistan’ was substituted by 
‘Diyarbakir’ (ibid.: 62).  
From the time of the defeat of Bedirhan Bey in 1847 to the outbreak of the Turco-Russian 
war of 1877-78, there had not been a powerful Kurdish ruler in the region. This power 
vacuum within the Kurdish society, originating from the eradication of the Kurdish emirates, 
led to rise of the religious sheikhs belonging to Naqshanbdi and Qadiriyya dervish orders, or 
tariqas, as they virtually were the only figures to mediate between tribal leaders. Capitalising 
on their religious prestige to act as intermediaries in inter-communal clashes, as well 
presenting themselves as defenders of the Islamic order, resulted with the sheikhs 
accumulating extreme economic and political power (van Bruinessen, 1992: 210-32).  
After the Turco-Russian war, Sheikh Ubeydullah (1831-1883) of the venerated Şemdinan86 
family had filled the political and military vacuum and assumed Kurdish leadership not only 
                                                          
85
 B.A., Mesail-i Mühimme, 1310 translated by and adopted from Özoğlu (2004:60-1). The bold italics belong 
to me. 
86
 The Şemdinan family were one of the greatest Naqshbandi families in Ottoman Kurdistan. Their prestige and 
popularity was due to the religious genealogy prior to the nineteenth century: the Şemdinans belonged to the 
Khallidiyya branch of the Naqshbandi tariqa, which unlike some of the rival Sufi orders at the time had firm 
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in Ottoman Kurdistan, but also in Iran. His political rule extended over a vast region that was 
formerly controlled by the Botan, Bahdidan, Hakkari and Ardalan tribal confederacies, so 
much so that the sheikh was described by Henry Trotter (1841-1919), British consul-general 
at Erzurum, in 1880 as ‘the most influential man in Eastern Kurdistan’.87 The following 
critical and depictive verses of the late nineteenth century Kurdish poet, Hacî Qadırê Koyî 
(1817-1897), is also testimony to the dominance, as well as negative ramifications, of 
Sheikhs and Sufi dervish orders in Ottoman Kurdistan after the fall of the emirates: 
Khanaqah and Sheikh and Tekke all
88
, 
What is their benefit, tell me, 
What is the benefit of teaching laziness, 
And collecting treasure and lands, 
They do not test them once, 
Understand, its poison nay opium, 
If you rub them [the Sheikhs] like gold, 
You will come to know whether they are highwaymen or guides, 
Don’t beg sheikhs and alike, 
No one gives sustenance to another, 
This one [The Sheikhs] is busy with symbolism, coyness and wishing, 
While the science of Europe has reached the impossible.
89
 
The influential revolt led by Sheikh Ubeydullah in 1880
90
 typified the rise of the sheikhs to 
supremacy in Ottoman Kurdish society. Assembling 220 tribal leaders and their supporters in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
commitment to Sunni Islam, and the origins of the family had been traced as back to Abd al Qadir Gilani, the 
twelfth-century mystic and saint who had been the founder of the Qadiriyya order. 
87
 Great Britain: Parliamentary Papers, Accounts and Papers (hereafter, A&P) (1881), [Paper no. C.2851], 
[Vol.361], p. 16. (Henceforth all of the citations from A&P will be in the latterly stated format: session / paper 
number / volume number/ page number). 
88
 Khanaqah and Tekke denote venues used for gathering of dervish orders. 
89
 Hacî Qadırê Koyî poem entitled ‘Udeba çak a’ written sometime in between 1895-1897 in Bajalan (2013: 10).  
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Şemdinan, Ubeydullah formed the ‘Kurdish Tribal League’. In 1880, Sheikh of Nehri 
invaded the northwestern territories of Persia, allegedly in the name of the Kurdish nation. In 
the message he sent to William Abbot, the British Consul-General in Tabriz, the sheikh 
outlines the purpose of this incursion with the following words: 
‘The Kurdish nation…is a people apart. Their religion is different, and their laws and customs 
are distinct…the Chiefs and Rulers of Kurdistan, whether Turkish or Persian subjects and 
inhabitants of Kurdistan, one and all are united and agreed that matters cannot be carried on 
in this way with the two Governments [Ottoman and Persian], and that necessarily something 
must be done, so that European Governments having understood the matter shall inquire into 
our state. We also are a nation apart. We want our affair to be in our own hands.’91  
As the phraseology of the epistle above exhibits, it was not merely in terms of religious 
leadership but also with regard to the explicit employment of nationalist discourse that this 
revolt diverged from preceding Kurdish upheavals. For this reason, the Ubeydullah revolts is 
conceived by some scholars such as Wadie Jwaideh, as the origin of Kurdish nationalist 
struggle. This viewpoint is, however, disputed by Özoğlu on the grounds that it was a ‘trans-
tribal revolt than a nationalist revolt’ motivated by Ubeydullah’s desire to be ‘the ruler of 
Greater Kurdistan’ (2004: 76). Regardless of whether Kurdish nationalism was the prime 
instigator of the sheikh and his supporters, the distinctive aspect of this rebellion was that it 
drew upon the bourgeoning discourse of nationalism to appropriate and promote his actions; 
a sign of the permeation of capitalism and western ideologies in Kurdistan. All the same, 
Sheikh Ubeydullah’ militias were defeated by the joint operation of Persian and Ottoman 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
90 The rebellion was organised partially in protest of the suppressive policies implemented by the Ottoman state 
as per its obligations under Article LXI of the Treaty of Berlin (1878): ‘the Sublime Porte undertakes to carry 
out, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces 
inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and Kurds’ (in Jwaideh, 
1961: 282). And in part as a reaction to the perceived cavalier treatment of some of the tribal chiefs in the 
villages located on Ottoman-Safavid border by the local Persian authorities that had close links with Sheikh 
Ubeydullah (McDowall, 2000: 53). 
91
 FO 371/953, Barclay to Gray, 3/01/1910. 
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armies and upon his return to the Ottoman territories in 1881 the Ottoman authorities 
captured Ubeydullah. The Ottoman state exiled him to Istanbul and then to Hijaz. Thereafter, 
until the end of the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman governors kept a close watch on Kurdistan 
and never allowed a strong Kurdish principality to emerge. Instead, particularly in the 
Hamidian period (1876-1909), the Sunni Kurdish aşiret or tribal forces were absorbed into 
the Ottoman military and the Kurdish nobility were largely resituated in Istanbul, where they 
could be controlled and manipulated.  
Kurdish tribal sections were organised by the Ottoman state under the Hamidiya Cavalry 
(1891). The Hamidiya were an irregular mounted and proxy force in Eastern Anatolia 
initially created by Sultan Abdülhamid II from selected Sunni Kurdish tribes to provide 
bulwark against the Russian threat and incorporate the Sunni Muslim Kurds – who had 
constituted the majority of the Hamidiya – into the Ottoman state system. Sultan Abdülhamid 
also established Aşiret Mektepleri (Tribal Schools) in order to indoctrinate the children of 
Kurdish tribal leaders who remained in Kurdistan.  
Inter-communal rifts and conflicts between the Kurds and the Armenians – which will be 
analysed in depth in the subsequent sections of this study – and between the Sunni Kurds and 
Alevi Kurds, reached its peak with the establishment of the Hamidiya force. The most notable 
example was the feud between the Alevi Khurmak and Sunni Jibrans. The former were a 
leading Alevi landowning family, while the latter were one of the strongest tribes of 
Kurdistan. The Jibrans had assassinated the Khurmak chief Ibrahim Talu in 1894 and his son 
12 years later (McDowall, 2000: 185). After the overthrow of the Abdülhamid regime by the 
CUP in 1908, the Hamidiya regiments were organised under the ‘Tribal Light Cavalry 
Regiments’. Despite the change in appellation, the purpose imputed to Tribal Cavalry 
Regiments remained unchanged (Burkay, 2008 [1992]: 399-411). 
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As can be inferred from the above events, the suppression of the long-standing Kurdish 
polities wrought not only years of war to Ottoman Kurdistan, but also prompted a power 
vacuum and, in turn, a reduction in law and order in most parts of ESA. Besides fostering the 
removal of the Kurdish administrative units, violent encounters between the Kurds and the 
Ottoman state all over Kurdistan, stripped the Kurds of their indigenous political structures, 
empowered the traditionalist elements within Kurdish society, and fuelled unprecedented 
inter-communal conflicts in this region. 
With the elimination of the Kurdish rulers and dissolution of the emirates, their constituent 
parts, tribal confederations and aşirets, became the most important political and social 
components in Kurdistan. Thus, rather paradoxically, in the wake of the modernisation 
reforms of the nineteenth century, a multitude of antagonistic Kurdish tribes were activated or 
empowered as political and social actors. Up to the second of half of the nineteenth century, 
in spite of their existence, tribal structures had a subsidiary position in power relations. After 
the Ottoman state’ policy of centralisation, however, according to the nineteenth century 
French traveller Ubicini, some ‘1,000 independent [tribal] entities’ (Celil, 1992: 121) 
replaced the few dozens of former autonomous or semi-autonomous Kurdish polities. In sum, 
modernisation policies gave birth to a period of immense insecurity in Ottoman Kurdistan 
and, ironically, deepened the feudalisation of Kurdish society.      
The centralist reforms of Mahmut II led also to the destruction of the Janissary corps in 1826, 
which in addition to being an act with a political purpose – i.e. the removal of military 
opposition to military reform – also had economic and social significance. As rightly noted 
by Quataert, ‘[t]he sultan’s actions in 1826 disarmed the urban guildsmen and eliminated the 
most powerful and best-organized advocates of protectionism. Thus, the 1826 event paved 
the way for the subsequent evolution of Ottoman economic liberalism’ (1994: 764). 
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The Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1838 signed between the Ottoman government and Britain 
was the next step. In accordance with this Convention, British traders were permitted to 
import goods into the Ottoman Empire upon the payment of a five per cent ad valorem duty. 
As for exports from the Empire, traders were allowed to export Ottoman goods upon payment 
of a twelve per cent charge. The signing of this Convention had marked the beginning of a 
major increase in trade between the Ottoman Empire and Europe. British exports to the 
Empire, for example, ‘increased from about one million pounds sterling in 1827 to over two 
and half million pound sterling in 1849; the British imports from the empire consisted of 
agricultural produce and livestock products, such as mohair, wool, cotton, sheep, carpets, 
opium, raisins and figs’ (Jafar, 1976: 49).  
The Convention of 1838 and the event of 1826 further integrated the Ottoman and European 
economies, and the 1839 and 1856 Reform edicts more closely aligned Middle Eastern 
polities with Western political structures as a result of the following major political-
administrative trends in the Tanzimat period (Jung and Piccoli, 2001: 40):  
1. the abolishment of the existing system of tax-farming and the creation of a monetised 
and rationalised system to levy taxes; 
2. the secularisation and formalisation of education and of the administration of justice; 
3. the functional differentiation of branches of government; 
4. an increasing division of the powers of government leading to the establishment of an 
Ottoman parliament and an Ottoman constitution; 
5. a differentiation of the means of physical force according to the separate realms of 
internal and external security; 
6. the introduction of a new system of provincial administration. 
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During the re-centralisation and westernisation period, the Ottoman Empire felt one of the 
greatest threats from its ambitious northern neighbour, Russia, which in 1828, after inflicting 
a series of military and political humiliations during the second half of the eighteenth 
century
92
, gained principalities as far as the Danube, and penetrated Eastern Anatolian as far 
as Erzurum in 1829. Kars, Erzurum and Bayazid were all returned to the Ottomans under the 
terms of the Treaty of Edirne (1829), but ‘the war had struck an entirely new note of danger 
[as] not only had the Ottoman Armenians assisted the Russian capture of Kars, but Muslim 
Kurdish tribes had also provided a regiment against the Sultan’ (McDowall, 2000: 39). Such 
threats from Russia and the novel alliances between the Kurds and the Russians had also been 
influential in informing the policies of the Hamidian period.       
At the beginning of the second half of the nineteenth century, the Crimean War (1853-56) 
broke out between the Ottomans and the Russians. The former, in order to meet its mounting 
military expenditures, contracted a number of loans with various Western European 
countries. The terms of these loans were very harmful to Ottoman finance and economy. In 
1854, the first of these loans of three million pounds sterling was set at a six per cent annual 
interest rate. In 1855, 1858, 1860, 1862, 1863, 1865 (two loans), 1869, 1870, 1871, 1872, 
1873, and 1874, new loans were contracted on similar terms to the one of 1854 (Lutsky, 
1969: 319). By 1874, the total sum of these loans was 212 million pounds sterling, of which 
the Ottoman government actually received only 120,480,000 pounds, that is, 56.8 per cent of 
the nominal value of these loans (ibid.). Sixteen years after the first loan in 1854, the 
Ottoman state found itself completely dependent on foreign loans, while debt servicing 
consumed one-third of its treasury income (Zürcher, 1994: 67-8). Increasing integration in the 
                                                          
92
 In 1769, Russian forces pushed across the Danube, occupying Bucharest and destroying an Ottoman army at 
Kartal in 1770. The subsequent year, Russia destroyed the Ottoman fleet, leaving the entire Eastern 
Mediterranean seaboard undefended. In 1774, it occupied Crimea, gaining access to the Black Sea. These 
mortifications were set out in the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, 1774. Although Russia withdrew from the Danube 
provinces and both parties recognised the independence of the Khanate of Crimea, it was clear that these two 
regions now fell within Russia’s orbit. Crimea was directly annexed in 1779 (McDowall, 2000:48).  
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capitalist world market, based on the disadvantageous terms of trade for the Ottoman 
economy and unsuccessful attempts to reform the financial administration of the Empire led 
to the fiscal crisis in 1870s.  
Following these turbulent events, the intra-Ottoman struggle between protectionists and pro-
free trade forces continued while, as accentuated by Quataert (1997: 762-65), the basic 
commitment of the Ottoman polity to integration with the European economy remained intact 
until the 1908 Young Turk Revolution. The Ottoman state accepted the Public Debt 
Administration in 1881, which assured Western investors that the integration process would 
ensue without risking their investments. The Public Debt Administration was established as a 
result of the negotiations following the Ottoman fiscal crisis in 1870s, when the Ottoman 
states ability to pay its international loans was in doubt. Hence, the Ottoman leadership had it 
to agree to the rescheduling of these debts and to the formation of the Debt Administration, 
which represented the European creditors, for their collection. Moreover, the 1908 Young 
Turk Revolution provided a different kind of reassurance to their European counterparts. The 
1908 Revolution entailed more than solely a reaction to the absolutism of Sultan Abdülhamid 
and territorial losses, because the emerging bureaucratic and military cadres launched their 
coup against a background of mounting social unrest: the taxpayers’ revolt and numerous 
labour strikes, among others, the 1908 strike at Ergani Copper Mine in Diyarbekir, and 
violence during the half-decade prior to the revolution.
93
 The Young Turks ‘seized power and 
prevented the spread of social revolution; thus, they circumscribed the kind of changes that 
would occur’ (ibid.: 1994: 765). However, in the years between the 1908 Young Turk 
Revolution and the First World War, the proponents of a protected ‘national economy’ finally 
triumphed over the advocates of free trade, a theme explored in-depth in the succeeding 
chapter.  
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 For an exploration of the labour disputes in this period, see: Yıldırım (2013) and Zürcher and Quataert (eds.) 
(1995).   
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3.2 Social Structures  
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the European provinces held the majority of the 
population but thereafter, as demonstrated by the Ottoman population figures tabulated in 
Table 3.1, the share of the European provinces gradually contracted. Owing to the rapid 
territorial losses in the last quarter of the century, the Balkans’ share of the total Ottoman 
population fell drastically, which gradually shifted the demographic centre of the Empire 
steadily towards Anatolia. For instance, during 1844-56, the Balkan lands contained forty 
three per cent of all Ottoman subjects (Table 3.1), whereas in the last census of the Empire in 
1906, the Ottoman government found that only twenty three per cent of its citizens resided in 
Europe: 4.9 of a total 20.9 million (Karpat, 1985: 35). 
Table 3.1 Ottoman population, 1844-1914 (in millions) 
Date                   Balkan             Anatolia          Total 
1844-56 15.5 10.7         35.4 
1867     18.5     12.8                40.0—with Egypt 
1872-74             14.8      9.4                   29.0—without Egypt 
                             40.0—with Egypt 
1897 5.6                   11.4                  29.0—without Egypt 
1906                                                                 20.9— without Egypt 
1914                   1.9     12.5                  21.0—without Egypt 
 
Source: Derived from Karpat, 1985: 109-14 and Quataert, 1994: 779. 
The majority of the Ottomans lived in the countryside and resultantly, rural dwellers 
constituted around 80 per cent of the total population. During the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, the relative urban-rural distribution changed. Between 1840 and 1913, 
the proportion of Ottoman urban dwellers had risen from seventeen to twenty two per cent 
(Quataert, 1994: 780-81, Issawi, 1980: 33-5). As argued by Quataert, the domestic market for 
Ottoman agriculture products increased commensurately and, to some extent, so did that of 
local manufacturers (1994: 781). 
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As the figures tabulated in Table 3.2 exhibit, during 1830-1912, Izmir and Istanbul increased 
in size. These port towns owed their demographic growth to the European trade. The 
expansion of the port communities in turn helps explain the expanding proportion of 
Ottomans living in the coasts. On the other hand, other cities, such as the predominantly 
Kurdish Diyarbekir in Anatolia and Edirne in Europe, as observed by Issawi (1980: 34-5) and 
Owen (1981: 24-5), respectively fell some 20 to 25 per cent over the same period owing to 
wars and/or secular shifts in trade route.  
A demographic development that is often undetected in the scholarships on urbanisation in 
the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century is that, with the exclusion of Diyarbekir, 
other cities in ESA, such as Bitlis, Muş, Erzurum, Urfa and Van, had increased their 
population more than other Eastern and Southeastern domains of Trabzon, Samsun and 
Adana (see Table 3.2). Additionally, populace figures for towns prepared by Vital Cuinet 
(1833-1896) based on Salnames
94
 and additional population estimates
95
 (Table 3.3), suggest 
that provinces in or on the borders of Ottoman Kurdistan, namely, Diyarbekir, Mamüratülaziz 
and Halep, when compared with other provinces in Anatolia, such as Adana, Trabzon, 
Kastamonu and Konya, had similar urban population densities during the late nineteenth 
century.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
94
 Salnames are state and provincial yearbooks published by the Ottoman State between the years 1847-1918. 
95
 Cuinet does not specify the sources of his figures, however, it is postulated that he has made use of a ‘wide 
variety of sources’: various ‘Ottoman Provincial Salnames’ and ‘population censuses’ for the year 1300’ (1881-
1893) (Behar, 2003: 45). 
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Table 3.2 Population of selected Ottoman towns, 1830-1912 (in thousands) 
Town/City                              1830s-40s               1890           1912 
Istanbul                                        375                     900            1,125 
Edirne                                          100                       87       83 
Izmir                                            110                      200             300 
Bursa                                              70                        76                 80 
Sivas                                               40                        43       60 
Adana           12   30                42 
Samsun                                            4                         11                25 
Trabzon                                         33                         35       50 
Erzurum                                        15                         39       43 
Diyarbekir                                     54                         35       38 
Urfa                                                50                         55       50 
Van                                                 20   30               30 
Bitlis  15              39               40 
Antep                                              20                         43               45 
Muş   7                27               27 
 
Source: Issawi, 1980: 34-5. 
Table 3.3 Population estimates of selected Ottoman towns, 1890 (in thousands) 
Provinces                         Population       
Adana                                       30                                                                                                
Konya                                      44             
Diyarbekir                               35                           
Van                                          30                                                                            
Erzurum                                  39                  
Mamüretülaziz                       101 
Halep                                       127   
Trabzon   35                       
Kastamonu                              15          
 
Source: Cuinet, 1890.                                                                         
                                                                                     
When compared with the minimal official demographic data in the pre-nineteenth century 
Ottoman Kurdistan, owing to the existence of the censuses from 1831 onwards, there is more 
information regarding the populace of this region of the Empire in the nineteenth century. 
The utility and veracity of the demographic details provided for Kurdistan in these official 
sources are highly questionable, however. The maiden 1831 ‘Census’ did not include 
principal provinces of Diyarbekir, Erzurum and Van (Behar, 1996: 23-5). Similarly, the 
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contemporaries had received the data in the Ottoman Census of 1844 – which has been 
habitually employed to attain estimates of the populace of this region in the early nineteenth 
century – with scepticism. For instance, in 1870, the British Consul John George Taylor 
reporting from the Consular District of Kurdistan, refers to the following deficiencies of the 
Census of 1844 and, alternatively, outlines the invaluable findings of his eight years long 
research in Kurdistan, which provide a comparatively more accurate and detailed 
demographic picture of this region:  
‘The data I give are merely the results of constant travel, careful inquiry, and research, noted 
day by day during an eight years’ residence in the vialets of Erzeroom and Diabekr, 
composing the Consular district of Koordistan…The imperfect Turkish Census of 1844, as 
quoted by M. V. Heuschling, an official of the Belgian Ministry of the Interior, in his 
“Empire de la Turquie”, published in 1860, gives, as the population for the district of 
Erzeroom, Diabekr, Kharput, 1,700,000 souls. From all I have been able to collect, the actual 
amount in 1868 was 2,314,000, namely— 
In the Erzeroom Vilayet… 1,230,700 
In the Diabekr Vilayet, including Kharput…1,083,000 
Divided into the following races and creeds: 
 
Table 3.4 The Ethnic and Religious Composition of Diyarbekir, Erzurum and Harput 
according to the Consul Taylor’s figures in 1868 (in thousands) 
Province/      Turks     Kurds   Christians  Jews   Yezidis   Qızılbaş  Arabs  Chechens     Terrek 
District                                                                               Kurds                                       Iman 
                                                                                                                                            (A Shiah Sect)         
Erzurum      272           357 411    1           2             158             ---          ---              29                                                         
Diyarbekir   30             391      108             1           8            12               118         16              ---                         
Kharput       140           100       130            ---        ---           30               ---           ---             --- 
Total          442          848     649           2        10          200            118        15             29 
Source: A&P, 1871, ‘Report on the Condition of Industrial Classes’ in Kurdistan)’, C.414, 
LXVIII, p. 794.96 
 
                                                          
96
 The table is part of the text cited above and ends the quote. 
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Official Ottoman statistics – as it is apparent with the data attained from the 1881/82-1893 
Census that is tabulated in Table 3.5 below – had classed Kurdish, Turkish and Arabic-
speaking Muslims together. Consequently, it is not always possible to extrapolate the 
proportional distribution of the different ethnic groups of the Muslim populace from the data 
provided in the official sources. Moreover, it is also not feasible to infer from the below 
summarised Ottoman censuses the figures of nomads and the individuals who are associates 
of the heterodox sects: Alevi (Qızılbaş) and Yezidi. In spite of these shortcomings, the data 
from the Ottoman Census of 1881/82-1893 does provide us with an estimate of the populace 
in Ottoman Kurdistan on the eve of the twentieth century.   
 Table  3.5 The ethno-religious composition of various provinces of Ottoman Kurdistan, 
Ottoman Census of 1881/82-1893  
Province            Muslim      Greek    Armenian   Bulgarian  Catholic   Jewish   Protestant   Other   Foreign 
                                            Orthodox                                                                                                      Nationals 
 
Diyarbekir        289,591      1,166          46,823      73          9,793        1,051     4,021           16,552        ---- 
 
                                                          Total Registered Population: 369,070 
 
Erzurum           445,548       3,356        101,138         ---          6,630     6          1,940            15             292 
 
                       Total Registered Population: 558,925 
 
Bitlis                167,054        ----            101,358       ----         4,948        ----         46                 ----           ---- 
 
                   Total Registered Population: 276,998 
 
Van                    59,412        3             60,448       ----             ----           ----        ----          ----             ---- 
 
                                                           Total Registered Population: 119,860 
                    
Elazığ                360,636         543           72,378       ----             1,915          2          4,371           54              ---- 
                                                           Total Registered Population: 381,346 
 
Source: Behar, 1996: 39-40. 
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Employment and Trade Data 
 
The aforementioned extensive research by Consul Taylor in Kurdistan also provides a unique 
compendium of the occupations and trades of the inhabitants in the three predominantly 
Kurdish Eastern provinces of the Empire during the late nineteenth century. According to the 
findings of the British consul (Table 3.6), the agriculturalists constituted, like in other parts of 
the Empire, the bulk of the labouring classes in this region. At the time, their labour formed 
‘more than one-half the sum derived from every source of taxation or impost’ in the 
provinces of Diyarbekir, Erzurum and Harput.
97
 Agriculturalists, in order of density, were 
followed by the pastorals, small traders, hand-loom workers (i.e. silk and/or cotton weavers), 
artisans (i.e. carpenters, masons, smiths, tanners and dyers), government employees, millers 
and Jewish pedlars.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
97
 A&P, 1871, ‘Report on the Condition of Industrial Classes’ in Kurdistan’, C.414, LXVIII, p. 809. 
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Table 3.6 Occupations and Trades of the inhabitants of Diyarbekir, Erzurum and Harput 
according to the Consul Taylor’s figures c.1860  
Occupation          Able-bodied Man           Working Adults            Remaining Members of  
                             exercising Trades            helping the same          Family, and Women and  
                                                                                                             Children                       
Hand-loom        11,700                              6,000              52,500 
Works 
 
Millers    4,300                500        21,000 
 
Artisans                         8,000                               2,000  38,000 
 
Jew Pedlars  2,000 ---  --- 
 
People in  
Government 
Employ                          7,000 ---  --- 
 
Mollas, proprietors,    19,000            ---                          98,000 
Shop-keepers, and  
Small traders  
 
Agriculturists            200,000                        200,000                                   800,000 
Pastorals 109,800            109,800   439,200 
Totals 365,500                       318,000    1,494,200 
Source: A&P, 1871, ‘Report on the Condition of Industrial Classes’ (in Kurdistan), C.414, 
LXVIII, p. 795. 
 
As rightly emphasised by Quataert, owing to the non-existence of an empire-wide ethno-
religious division of labour, ‘neither agriculture nor industry were confined to areas of 
Christian, or for that matter Muslim, demographic predominance’. Christians, Jews and 
Muslims were present in all sectors and classes, and social stratification in Ottoman society 
was devoid of a coincidence of social class and ethno-religious origin. Thus, despite 
nineteenth century contemporaries habitually ‘reserving diligence to the Christians and aloof 
indifference to Muslims, these stereotypes do not bear close scrutiny; instead, we find 
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enterprising Muslim and Christian cultivators and manufacturers everywhere’ (Quataert, 
1994: 783). Or, to put it somewhat differently, the oft-cited truism – particularly with regard 
to the Eastern provinces – that the Muslims were nomads or farmers whilst the Armenians 
were entrepreneurs or manufacturers, is misleading as it does not posit an accurate 
observation of the multifarious nature of the provincial and empire-wide economy and social 
classes.
98
 Consequently, in the Eastern quarters or elsewhere in the Empire, ‘we search in 
vain, if we seek religion (or ethnicity) as the key to Ottoman economic activity’ (ibid.).   
As cogently expounded by Hilmar Kaiser (1997), the origins of the ‘Ottoman ethnic division 
of labour’ hypothesis lies in the essay of a German journalist/propagandist, Alphons 
Sussnitzki, entitled ‘Zur Gliederung wirtschaftlicher Arbeit nach Nationalitäten in der 
Türkei’ (On the division of labour according to nationality in Turkey), published in Archiv für 
Wirtschaftsforschung im Orient in 1917. In brief, this essay has two main contentions 
regarding pre-First World War Ottoman Empire: i) professions were each largely dominated 
by members of one racial group; and ii) Armenian and Greeks, through usury and the 
exploitation of foreign imperialist protection, had abused Turkish tolerance and controlled 
nearly all trade and obstructed the development of other nationalities (Kaiser, 1997: 29-31).  
In other words, Sussnitzki’s analysis, as accentuated by Kaiser, ‘integrated a number of the 
familiar stereotypes: that Armenians were the political allies of Germany’s enemies and that 
they played a negative role within the Ottoman economy. Accordingly, the author stressed 
the basic convergence of Ottoman Turkish and German interests’ (ibid.: 32). In this study, 
following Quataert (1996, 1994) and Kaiser (1997), it will be argued that in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries Ottoman Empire, there was no ethno-religious division of 
labour, and the representative of all nations and religions were present in all sectors of 
employment and trade.  
                                                          
98
 For a critical exploration of this thesis, see: Kaiser (1997) and Quataert (1996).   
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3.3 Agriculture  
From its birth to its demise following the First World War, the Ottoman Empire had been an 
agrarian empire. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries ‘four-fifths’ of the 
Ottoman population lived on the land and drew some portion of their livelihoods from the 
soil (Eldem, 1970: 44). In an Empire where agriculture was the dominant form of economic 
activity, the control of the land as an important means of production can naturally be 
conceived as one of the most important factors affecting the relations of production, class 
structure, and the mechanisms of the articulation of the local structures with the larger 
structures. This explains why the role and influence of the Kurdish notables over agricultural 
land and surplus in the predominantly Kurdish provinces in ESA is commonly set as one of 
the central themes of enquiry by scholarships investigating socio-economic and political 
developments in this region.  
The prevailing view in these scholarly articles is that the centuries-long autonomy of the 
Kurdish rulers remained uninterrupted during the nineteenth century, despite the 
centralisation policies of the Ottoman state. As neatly summarised by Heper, common 
scholarly wisdom has held that ‘since the enactment of the Land Code in 1858, large tracts of 
land were concentrated in the hands of a few local notables, particularly in the east and 
southeast of Turkey, [who] have not been interested in increasing productivity in agriculture’ 
(2007: 5). Therefore, alongside transportation or communication barriers, which are 
discussed extensively in the subsequent section of this study, the unbroken autonomy of the 
‘disinterested’ Kurdish notables, as well as the pervasiveness of the lord-peasant bond, during 
and after the nineteenth century is generally accepted to have hindered the i) expansion of 
agricultural productivity and ii) economic development of this region. Owing to minimal 
industrial development during the Ottoman period, agricultural resources and productivity are 
the main source and measure of economic development. Below, by examining the evolution 
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of patterns of land ownership in Ottoman Kurdistan during 1800-1908, the correlation 
between patterns of land ownership, agricultural productivity and economic development in 
this region of the Empire will be explored.   
The Limitations of the 19
th
 Century Ottoman Land Statistics  
Prior to analysing the data pertaining to the land regime and agricultural activities in Ottoman 
Kurdistan, it is worth noting that during the nineteenth century land statistics and quantitative 
information regarding agricultural production, unlike the previous centuries, were irregularly 
and poorly recorded and kept. We are made aware of this lacuna in the below quoted consular 
report drafted in 1869 by the British consul, Consul William Gifford Palgrave (1826-1888), 
whose reports have often been utilised by the academic literature dealing with agriculture in 
Ottoman lands: 
‘Land statistics were formerly not ill-kept in the Ottoman Empire, and from what has been 
preserved of them in history and treatise, we are able to form tolerably clear idea of the 
conditions of land tenure, cultivation, proprietorship, serfage, and the like…in the anarchical 
condition of Constantinople during the troubled reigns of Seleen III and Mustapha IV (A.D. 
1789-1808), the State records of the Empire were ill-kept, perished, or were dispensed 
beyond recovery, and the reforms of Mahmood II and Abd-el Mejeed did little to fill up the 
gap. Even at present, though personal statistics receive some degree of attention, land 
statistics are neglected; what little is accurately kept remains unpublished.’99 Due to the 
aforementioned deficiencies and limitations of the Ottoman sources, the ensuing assessment 
of agriculture in nineteenth century Ottoman Kurdistan will largely be based on the data 
presented in the consular reports prepared by British diplomats who had regularly reported on 
events from different parts of Kurdistan from 1850s onwards. The data recorded in the British 
                                                          
99
A&P, 1870, ‘Report on Land Tenure in Eastern Turkey’, C.75, LXVII, p. 285.  
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consular report make it very valuable, and at times the only source of information for 
understanding manifestations in the sphere of agricultural in nineteenth century Ottoman 
Kurdistan. This said, the information in these reports rather than been treated as definite 
reflections of the agricultural patterns or trends in this region, will be taken as rough 
indicators of the actualities in this sphere. 
However, after the turn of the nineteenth century, Ottoman statistics regarding Ottoman 
agriculture became available. The Ottoman Agricultural Census of 1913 and 1914 for what 
comprises the present-day Turkey followed the maiden Ottoman Agricultural Census of 
1907/09. For the purposes of this study it is worth noting that the statistical information in 
these official documents, which generally constitute the quantitative basis of most studies and 
research regarding Ottoman agricultural productivity and economic development, do not 
provide a complete coverage of the predominantly Kurdish regions of the Empire. More 
precisely, the 1909 Census does not cover the Kars region. In addition to Kars, the census of 
1913 did not cover the areas of Ağrı, Erzincan, Erzurum, Hakkari, Muş and Siirt. The census 
of 1914 omitted, along with the latterly mentioned areas, Bingöl, Bitlis, Urfa and Van 
(Güran, 1997: xxi). In consequence, when comparatively studying the state of agricultural 
production and yields in Ottoman Kurdistan with those of the other regions of the Empire on 
the eve of the First World War the thesis will not solely rely on the findings of the latterly 
mentioned censuses, but will also make use of alternate studies or research of Ottoman 
Agriculture.  
Agriculture in Ottoman Kurdistan, 1830-1876 
As described above, the centralisation policies of the Ottoman state during and after the 
1830s had not only occasioned the obliteration of the semi-autonomous Kurdish 
administrative bodies, but had also resulted in the expropriation of large holdings of land that 
up until that point had been de facto properties of Kurdish notables. Contrary to what it is 
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habitually argued, the confiscation of large holdings of land from the Kurdish landed elite 
appears to have had unfavourable consequences for agricultural productivity in Kurdistan, 
and resulted in this region being relatively less affected by the world-market induced 
commercialisation of agriculture in the next four decades, predominantly because of two 
interrelated factors. The first of these factors is that after 1830s many of these confiscated 
lands were uncultivated owing to the neglect of these lands by the central state. The second 
factor is related to the inadequacies of the poverty-ridden peasants; with the absence of state 
support, peasants were not able to meet the demands of running the small estates/farms that 
they attained as result of the very partial distribution of land to small peasants after 1830.  
The initial consular reports prepared by the British consul, Consul Willam Richard Holmes 
(1822-1882), in Ottoman Kurdistan during the 1850s, track the latterly mentioned changes in 
the ownership of land and highlight the negative ramifications of the centralist policies of the 
central state on the agriculture of this Ottoman domain. The dates of these reports, 1857-58, 
is particularly important; coming nearly two decades after the confiscation of large land 
holding and on the eve of the Land Code of 1858. In 1857, in a consular report on the 
conditions of Kurdistan Consul Holmes, who at the time was based in the province of 
Diyarbekir, notes the following informative changes: 
‘The condition of the peasantry in general is extremely poor, and they seem on this account 
quite unable to cultivate the lands themselves. They therefore seek advances of money from 
the wealthier individuals of towns and villages...Land in this Pashalic [Kurdistan] can 
scarcely be said to have any value, as without artificial irrigation nothing can be produced, 
except wheat and barley, which are sown in the autumn or the very early spring. Formerly, 
the country was extensively irrigated, and covered with villages and cultivation, under the 
government of certain native Koordish families, who for years had ruled it... 
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Land in this Pashalic either belongs to the State...the Church, or to private individuals. That 
belonging to the State was acquired when the country was taken from Koordish Begs, by the 
confistication of their possessions...Of these three categories of land freehold property is 
always the most flourishing...whereas the Crown and Church lands, particularly the latter, 
continually deteoriate.’100  
In addition, in a survey on the land tenure in Kurdistan in 1858 on the eve of the Land Code 
of 1858 summarises the alterations that have taken place in this region of the Empire during 
the after the 1830s with the following words: 
‘I. What are the different kinds of tenure of land and in what proportion are they, 
respectively, in use in your district? 
About 20 years ago this part of Koordistan, which had previously been more nominally than 
really in the hands of the Turkish government, was wrested from the Koordish Beys, and the 
whole of the land, with the exception of some few parts the ownership of which was 
confirmed to its ancient proprietors, was confiscated to the Crown. Since then a portion has 
been sold and become private freehold property, a considerable portion is let as short leases 
of a year or two, a great deal has become Church property or “Vakouf”, but the greater part 
remains the property of the state and is waste and uncultivated… 
III. What is the condition of vakouf and other public lands as compared with that of freehold 
property?  
Every individual takes care of his own private property to the best of his ability but the 
vakouf and crown lands are entirely neglected…Consequently freehold property is usually in 
a much better condition than any public lands… 
XI. Are large estates or small holdings predominant, and what are the causes which most 
affect the distribution of land? 
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 A&P, 1857, ‘Commercial Report for Kurdistan’, 2285, XXXVIII, pp. 186-7. 
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Small holdings predominate.’101  
Erudite studies on the land tenure in the Ottoman Empire habitually hypothesise that the 
enactment of the Land Code of 1858 marked a watershed moment in agrarian relations and 
land ownership in the Empire. As universally agreed, the intended purpose of this code had 
been two-fold: a) the recognition of private ownership of land, and b) the demand by the 
central state that individuals possess a title deed to have legal use of miri land and thus to 
achieve complete registration; the state intended to survey all lands and give title deeds to 
those who controlled them. Scholars analysing the Land Code of 1858, nonetheless, have 
diverging views on its actual impacts. Some maintain the view that the code had been an 
instrument of the Ottoman government to reassert its fiscal domination over the peasantry 
(Baer, 1966; Jorgens, 2000). Others have insisted on its character as a facilitator that had 
transformed miri land into private property (Batatu, 1978). As outlined in Chapter 1, with 
regard to its implications on Ottoman Kurdistan, the latter view has been prevalent (Heper, 
20007; Pamuk, 2010 [1987]; Sönmez, 1992 [1990]).  
The code’s role in facilitating for large tracts of land to be concentrated in the hands of the 
local notables in Ottoman Kurdistan and resultantly not being able to interrupt the autonomy 
of the Kurdish notables is dubitable. As can be deduced from the centralist policies of the 
Ottoman state, by the mid-nineteenth century the central authorities had toppled all of the 
existing semi-autonomous Kurdish emirates one after another, and thereafter kept a close eye 
on Kurdistan with the aim of preventing the creation of new autonomous Kurdish polities and 
elite. The Ottoman state was successful in achieving this aim through employing a trinity of 
complementary and sequential policies:  
i) Establishing a supersized administrative entity, Eyalet-i Kürdistan, through which 
it had asserted direct control of this region;  
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 FO 78/1419, ‘Land Tenure in Kurdistan’, 1858, Reply by Consul Holmes to Questionnaire in Issawi, 1980: 
220. 
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ii) Suppressing any potential rivalry and demand for autonomy from the Kurdish 
notables, as evinced with the way it dealt with Sheikh Ubeydullah in the 1880s; 
iii)  Promoting small peasant production, since the peasant households were easier to 
tax than large landowners were, and the latter were more prone to posing political 
problems for the Ottoman state.  
The information provided by the British consular, Consul Palgrave, regarding the land tenure 
in the Asiatic provinces
102
 of the Ottoman Empire in 1870 offers quantitative data for 
doubting the role of the Land Code of 1858 in enabling the Kurdish notables and other 
landlords in these regions to retrieve large holdings of land. The date of this report, 1869, is 
vital: it is prepared three decades after the seizure of large land holdings, and just over a 
decade after the Land Code of 1858. The extensive survey conducted by Palgrave in 
Kurdistan, Anatolia, Syria and Iraq forms the basis of this survey.  
According to the measurements provided by Consul Palgrave, the Asiatic provinces had a 
total surface area of 1,219,762 square kilometers or 121,976,200 hectares – a hectare is 
equivalent to ‘2.5 English acres.’103Half of this land was considered as being unreclaimed and 
around two-thirds of it had comprised of forests and pastures; leaving as cultivable land a 
total of 50,740,083 acres or 21,662,000 hectares.
104
As can be concluded from the figures 
prepared by Consul Palgrave that are tabulated below (Table 3.7), of all the cultivable land 
seventy per cent had comprised of mülk or private property, around 25 per cent belonged to 
vakıfs (endowments) and the remaining five per cent had been miri or state land. Yet, around 
85 per cent of the private or mülk land around was under small holdings whilst the remaining 
15 per cent had been under large holdings. Around 75 per cent of all the cultivable land, that 
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 The report deals with the Land Tenure in the provinces of Kurdistan, Anatolia, Syria and Iraq. Hereafter, the 
term Asiatic provinces denotes these four regions.  
103
 A&P, 1870, ‘Report on Land Tenure in Eastern Turkey’, C.75, LXVII, p. 286. 
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 Ibid. 
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is, mülk, miri, vakıf lands, in these regions of the Ottoman Empire had been 50 acres or under 
and only about twenty per cent of it had comprised of estates exceeding 50 acres.    
Table 3.7 Land ownership and distribution in the Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman 
Empire c.1869 
                                                                                                         Acres   
Total superficies in question:                                           304,440,500                                 
       “Mubah” or unreclaimed land:        152,200,250 
        “Metrookah” or common, forest, and pasture:        101,480,167 
        Cultivated land:               50,740,083 
 
Of the cultivated land:            
        “Vakıfs” or endowment lands:             12,685,021 
        “Miri” or government property :                          2,537,004 
        “Mülk” or private property:                                    35,518,058 
 
Of Mülk or private property:                   
         Larger estates, cultivated by tenancy or by hired labour:       5,074,008 
         Small estates, cultivated some by their peasant owners, 
         some by “Muraba’s” [sharecroppers]:                                    30,444,050 
 
Of Vakf, Miri and Mülk property:                               
         Total of land divided into estates exceeding 50 acres,  
         whether State property, endowment, or private property;  
         and cultivated partly by tenancy, partly by hired labour:      12,685,020 
 
         Total of land divided into estates from 50 acres and under, 
         cultivated by the owners themselves, or by “Muraba’s”:         38,055,062 
 
Source: A&P, 1870, ‘Report on Land Tenure in Eastern Turkey’, C.75, LXVII, p. 286. 
                
Consul Palgrave’s assessment of the centralisation policies implemented during the Tanzimat 
era for the agriculture of the Asiatic provinces of the Empire is parallel to that of Consul 
Holmes delineated above. Palgrave contends that during this era as a result of the four main 
factors – i.e. i) sub-division of estates on land proprietorship; ii) overweight of excessive 
taxation on land and its produce; iii) official spoliation of land by the state for public works 
without any compensation for the landowners; and iv) the ‘forfeit of 10 per cent. ad valorem 
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by the State from any proprietor’ enacted by the Land Code of 1858105 – the agriculture of 
these region had in general suffered gravely:   
‘The agricultural or land conditions of Eastern Turkey before and after the “Tanzeemat” 
[Tanzimat] of the Sultans Mahmood II. and Abd-el-Mejeed [are] as follow: 
The tendency of the former period was to the security, permanence, and accumulation of land 
tenure; that of the latter to insecurity, change and disintegration. 
The tendency of the former period was to encourage agriculture, and to raise the value of 
land; that of the present, to discourage the former, and to depreciate the latter. 
The strength of the former period was in the permanence of large estates and numerous 
tenants; the weaknesses of the latter, in the multiplication of small estates and numerous 
landlords[…] That in such a state of things no advance, economic, social, moral, or 
intellectual, can be expected from the agricultural population, whether landlords or tenants, 
and that, none, in fact, exists; on the contrary, that cultivators and land are alike 
deteriorating.’106  
Agriculture in Ottoman Kurdistan during and after the Hamidian Era, 1876-1914  
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, however, there appears to be a significant rise in 
the concentration of the land controlled by certain sections of the Kurdish notables. More 
specifically, as the findings of the Ottoman Agricultural Census of 1909 suggest, 
Southeastern Anatolia – i.e. Diyarbekir, Bitlis and Van – had been second to the Adana 
region in terms of inequalities in the distribution of farm sizes within the below tabulated 
core regions107 of the Empire (Pamuk, 2010 [1987]: 98).  
 
                                                          
105
 A&P, 1870, ‘Report on Land Tenure in Eastern Turkey’, C.75, LXVII, p. 283. 
106
 Ibid.:287 
107
 Definitions of core regions as defined by Pamuk (2010[1987]: 96): Northern Greece (Salonica, Monastir), 
Thrace (Edirne), Western Anatolia and Marmara (Izmit, Biga, Hüdavendigar, Aydın (İzmir), Eastern Black 
Sea Coast (Trabzon), Central Anatolia (Kastamonu, Ankara, Konya, Sivas), Eastern Anatolia, Central Tier 
(Erzurum, Mamuretülaziz), Eastern Anatolia, Southern Tier (Diyarbakir, Bitlis, Van).   
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Table 3.8 Distribution of farm sizes c. 1900 in the core regions of the Empire 
Regions                  Distribution of farm sizes (% of farms)                     Average Farm 
                                                                                                                              Size (dönüms) 
                              Under 10 dönüms   10-50 dönüms   over 50 dönüms  
Northern Greece 
and Thrace                40         42   18                                21 
Western Anatolia/ 
Marmara     31         46   23                                35 
Eastern Black  
Sea                                 43         42   15                                18 
Adana      17         36   47                                77 
Central  
Anatolia     23         52   25                                35 
 
Eastern Anatolia 
Central Tier    41         41   18                                21 
Southern Tier    23         37   40                                58 
 
Source: Pamuk, 2010 [1987]: 96 
 
This change in land distribution and ownership in the Southern tier of Eastern Anatolia 
coincides with the policies implemented during the Hamidian period (1876-1909). As 
mentioned previously, in the course of this period the Kurdish tribal forces in Ottoman 
Kurdistan were absorbed into the Ottoman military and political structure with the dual 
purpose of securing the eastern frontier districts from the real and perceived threats from 
Russia and Iran and integrating Kurds into the Ottoman state system. Thus, within Ottoman 
Kurdistan the Hamidiya became a channel for the power relationships between the Sultan and 
the Kurdish rulers, operating as a tool for tribes to gain influence, and for the Sultan to extend 
imperial rule over this region of the Empire. The data from the late nineteenth century 
indicates that, particularly after the creation of the Hamidiya Cavalry (1891), the Kurdish 
religious and landed elite, with the active support of the Ottoman administration, attained vast 
amounts of land in ESA by the use of both economic and extra-economic means.  
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A case in point is the vast amount of power and land accumulated by the tribal chiefs and 
urban notables in Diyarbekir during the Hamidian era. The data passed on by Mark Sykes
108
 
(1879-1919) in Journeys in North Mesopotamia (1907), and the present-day studies by Ali 
Arslan (1992) and Joost Jongerden (2012), shed much valuable light on the aggrandisement 
of the politically co-opted elite in this province throughout and after the Hamidian period.   
In the initial years of his career as regimental leader, Milli Ibrahim Pasha (?-c.1908), Chief of 
the Milan confederation of tribes, had authority over a region extending from Viranşehir to 
Siverek, and Diyarbekir to Derik. At the peak of his power at the turn of the twentieth 
century, he had control over a much-extended region: the provinces of Diyarbekir, Mardin 
and Urfa. Relatedly, in 1902 following a visit by Milli Ibrahim to Sultan Abdülhamid II in 
Istanbul he was awarded the rank of Pasha (Brigadier-General), and all three of his sons, 
Abdulhamid, Halil, Mahmut and Temur, attained the rank of Kaymakam (Lieutenant 
Colonel). The power accumulated by Milli Ibrahim Pasha enabled him to establish advantage 
over the land and villages as well as controlling the trade routes in and out of the above-
mentioned regions (Jongerden, 2012: 63; Sykes, 1907: 383-86). Similarly, Arif Pirinççizade 
(1853-1909) a prominent notable in Diyarbekir, who was also the maternal uncle of Ziya 
Gökalp, had considerable wealth and power. After resigning from the Diyarbekir Gazette in 
1877 as a journalist, Pirinççizade had concentrated on agriculture and trade. By the turn of 
the century, he became a large landowner, possessing around thirty villages near Diyarbekir, 
and was elected to Parliament in 1908 as an independent candidate for the district of 
Diyarbekir (A. Arslan, 1992: 52; Jongerden, 2012: 66).  
                                                          
108
 Mark Sykes was an English traveller, officer, honorary attaché and Conservative Party politician and 
diplomacy adviser known best as the co-author of the Sykes-Picot agreement (16 May 1916), a secret agreement 
between the governments of the UK and France, with the assent of Russia, to divide the provinces of the 
Ottoman Empire into spheres of British and French control. Sykes traversed in the Asia Minor both during and 
after his post as the honorary attaché to the British Embassy in Constantinople, in the years 1905-07, but also in 
the later years of 1908-09 and 1913.  
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The state encouraged the aggrandisement of the acquiescent Kurdish elites in order to 
strengthen their position in the provinces in Southern and Central tiers of Eastern Anatolia 
vis-à-vis the Armenians who had occupied key positions in trade and business in certain 
quarters of these regions. For instance, in the province of Van during the late nineteenth 
century, Armenians held 80 per cent of the agriculture,  20 per cent of the livestock breeding 
and, out of the 50 moneylenders, 30 had also been Armenian (Issawi, 1980: 67). One of the 
common practices of the Ottoman authorities during this period was to settle in Armenian 
villages Hamidis, i.e. tribal Kurdish forces serving in the Sultan’s irregular force, who, as 
pointed out by the Russian vice-consul in Bitlis in 1902, with time became the owners of 
these villages:  
‘These men [Hamidis] enjoying the protection of the administration dispensed justice and 
handed out punishment and, advancing to the every-needy Armenians funds secured by 
livestock, horses, and crops, gradually became the owners of the village or Aghas, and the 
Armenians, performing all their work for them…were unable to  deliver themselves from the 
weight of their debts’ (ibid.).  
Concomitantly, the Kurdish notables with the backing of the Ottoman authorities employed 
economic means to increase their wealth and land as they bought land of the Armenian 
inhabitants. Thereafter, in return for payment in kind to the landowner, the Armenian 
peasants worked on the majority of these lands. In addition, the landowning Kurdish notables 
provided cash and grain to the peasants in ESA on advantageous terms, which were repaid in 
kind at harvest time. These loans were at the time known as selef. The selefdars or the lenders 
soon became wealthy, by taking the land of the defaulting debtors. Russian Vice-Consul in 
Van, Consul Termen, described the exploitative consequences of the selef during the early 
years of the twentieth century with the following words: 
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‘Thanks to this [selef] the whole village passes into the hands of the Kurds; the Armenians 
starting as miribe [maraba]—i.e. they receive from the Kurd seed and livestock for working 
the fields, giving in return half the crop—end up by losing their land and become simple 
laborers, i.e. the serfs of the Kurds’ (ibid.: 64) 
The selef was an important mechanism for the enrichment of the Kurdish elite. Based on the 
findings of the Archives of the Foreign Policy of Russia in 1908, Lazarev states the following 
telling cases:  
‘The Armenian village of Haskei, in valley of Muş [Bitlis vilayet], lost through the selef 208 
fields, 24 houses, and 6 mills, all of which had passed into the hands of the Kurdish selefdars. 
In the formerly prosperous village of Arench, in the kaza of Adilcevaz, out of the 115 houses 
only 70 remained in the hands of the local inhabitants; of these, however, only 55 were held 
in ownership, the other were being miribe [maraba]’. In the village of Marmuss (vilayet of 
Van) the Kurdish Bey seized all the land belonging to Armenian community and reduced the 
Armenian peasants to sharecroppers’ (ibid.). 
Agricultural Productivity Data 
The Ottoman Agricultural Censuses prepared in the early twentieth century enable us to 
obtain information regarding agricultural output in these years. Owing to the minimal amount 
of recorded production figures, however, agricultural taxes, namely, tithes (aşar) and animal 
taxes (ağnam), and the revenues attained from these taxes continued to form the main means 
of measuring agricultural output. As outlined in the introductory section of the 1909 Census, 
unlike the agricultural censuses of most other countries in the modern era, the Ottoman 
agricultural production levels were estimated first on basis of the tithe revenues and the 
cultivated areas were estimated afterwards (Güran, 1997: xxi). After the Tanzimat Decree of 
1838, tithes were fixed at one-tenth of the gross agricultural output. This was paid partly in 
kind in the earlier period with a larger proportion repaid in crude money later on in the 
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century. During the years of lower agricultural prices, the tax collectors routinely pressed for 
and received tax payments in cash. In addition, 10 per cent rate was likely to escalate to 15 
per cent, as it did in 1868, whenever the budgetary deficit of the state deepened. The practice 
of the tithe along with other forms of agrarian taxation, like the ağnam, meant that as much as 
a quarter of agricultural output was taxed (Pamuk, 2010 [1987]: 89). However, it is worth 
noting that agricultural tax revenues only provide rough and indirect indications of the 
agricultural output, as they are dependent on the state’s ability to tax and collect the taxes. 
Hence, the agricultural tax revenues cited below should be treated as rough indicators of 
output patterns. 
The volume of annual gross agricultural production in the Empire is estimated to have 
doubled between the early 1860s and the First World War (ibid.: 83). In 1914, according to 
an educated guess, agriculture is believed to have comprised 56 per cent of the Ottoman 
“national” income (Quataert, 1994: 845). Agricultural taxes had thus remained the most 
important source of imperial revenues. By the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, 
moreover, Anatolia had overtaken the European provinces by becoming the leading 
contributor of the agricultural taxes.  
In 1910, the Anatolian provinces had contributed 57 per cent of all the Ottoman tithes and 
animal taxes. The European provinces, which during the nineteenth century had contributed 
the bulk of the Ottoman agricultural taxes, provided 25 per cent of the total in 1910. Syria 
contributed 11 per cent, while Iraq yielded 6 per cent and Hejaz provided 3 per cent of all the 
agricultural tithes in the Empire. The available data regarding actual production are very 
similar to those suggested by the tithe data. Agricultural output statistics for 1913 suggest that 
the Anatolian provinces contained 55 per cent and the European provinces held 24 per cent of 
the total estimated value of Ottoman agricultural production (ibid.: 845-47).  
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The contribution of the Eastern Anatolia region to the Ottoman agricultural tax revenues in 
1910/11
109
, just before the Balkan War, had been around 8.5 per cent, and the population of 
this domain at the time had constituted just under 9 per cent of the Ottoman population 
(Eldem, 1970: 86-7). When the agricultural tax revenues of Eastern Anatolia region are 
compared with other Anatolian areas, the relative importance of the tax revenue contributions 
of this region witnesses a decline. In the face of forming the second most populated area of 
Anatolia, Eastern Anatolia had only been the fourth biggest contributor of the agricultural tax 
revenues in 1910 (see Table 3.9). Similar results also arise when the agricultural revenues of 
the year 1913/14 are comparatively analysed as is demonstrated with the figures tabulated in 
Table 3.10.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
109
 The value of agricultural tax revenues for 1910/11 is based on the figures attained from the statistics of the 
Ottoman Treasury Department or Maliye Nezareti Ihsaiyat Mecmualari for the years 1909-10, 1910-11 and 
1911/12, which are derived directly from Eldem (1970). 
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Table 3.9 Population and agricultural output measured by tax revenues of Anatolia, 1910 
Province/Region                   Population                   Revenue 
   (thousands)    (million kuruş) 
İstanbul,Çatalca 1134 60 
Hudavedigar, Karasi 
Izmit, Biga 2128                          1068 
Aydın (İzmir)            1703   806 
Ankara            1160   448 
Konya             1254   521 
Sivas            1197   361 
Adana   489   291 
Maraş, Antep   417   169 
Kastamonu, Bolu            1109   252 
Trabzon            1265   374 
Dıyarıbekir, Mamuretelaziz,  
Urfa            1036   413 
Van, Bitlis   693   184 
Erzurum   759   194 
 
Source: Eldem, 1970: 86-7. 
 
Table 3.10 Population and Agricultural Production Measured by Tax Revenues of the 
different regions of Anatolia, 1910/11 and 1913/14 
Areas/Regions110                    Population                                            Revenue 
   (thousands)                             (million kuruş) 
         1910/11      1913/14                       1910/11        1913/14        
Istanbul                     1134   1238  60   66 
Marmara                     2128            2204                            1068              1188 
Aegean Coast                     1703            1761                               806 942 
Central Anatolia         3611     3636                             1330   1749 
Mediterranean 
Region  906  937 460 487 
The Eastern  
Black Sea Coast 2374 2410                              626 688 
Eastern Anatolia 2488 2574 791 878 
 
Source: Eldem, 1970: 81. 
 
                                                          
110
 The areas/regions are defined according to the geographical distinctions employed by Eldem (1970): Central 
Anatolia (Ankara, Konya, Sivas), Eastern Anatolia (Erzurum, Mamuretülaziz, Diyarbakir, Urfa, Van, Bitlis), 
Istanbul (Istanbul and Çatalca), Aegean Coast (Aydın (İzmir)), Mediterranean Region (Adana, Hatay, Maraş, 
Antep), Marmara (Izmit, Biga, Hüdavendigar), Eastern Black Sea Coast (Trabzon, Kastamonu, Bolu). 
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The details outlined above elucidate the limitations and drawbacks of imputing agricultural 
productivity levels and land tenure in Ottoman Kurdistan to the ‘unbroken autonomy’ of the 
Kurdish notables. Since this linear explanation does not fully account for the implications of 
the following pivotal political events on the agricultural output and the forms of 
landownership in Ottoman Kurdistan during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: i) 
the suppression of the Ottoman Kurdish polities; ii) the confiscation of land from the Kurdish 
notables; and iii) the policies of the central state during the Hamidian era. Contrary to the 
commonly advocated correlation between the dominance of the Kurdish notables over land 
and agricultural unproductivity in Ottoman Kurdistan, the available data from the nineteenth 
century suggests that agricultural productivity in Kurdistan had begun to decline with the 
demise of the Kurdish emirates and expropriation by the Ottoman state of land owned by the 
Kurdish notables.  
Despite this deterioration, the recorded data from the early twentieth century on agricultural 
output levels of certain parts of Ottoman Kurdistan – i.e. Diyarbekir, Mamuretülaziz and Urfa 
– indicate that the agricultural output levels had been akin to provinces in Central Anatolian 
and the Eastern Black Sea Coast regions: Sivas, Kastamonu, Bolu, Trabzon, and Ankara (see 
Table 3.9). A reasonable explanatory factor for this development in the early twentieth 
century is that the aggrandisement of the politically receptive Kurdish notables during the 
Hamidian era enhanced agricultural productivity in these domains by dint of ownership of 
large estates and acceleration of the exploitation of the dependant peasantry.  
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3.4 Transportation  
As outlined in Chapter 1, the academic literature on the economic and social history of ESA, 
alongside the ‘unbroken autonomy’ of the Kurdish notables, frequently identify the absence 
of railroads and the expensive forms of transportation in these regions as playing a 
determinate role in the underdevelopment in these areas.  In other words, the transportation 
barriers are hypothesised to have ‘secluded’ ESA regions from the rest of the Ottoman 
Empire and the European markets throughout the nineteenth century and thereby delayed the 
destruction of the self-sufficient nature of the rural economies, the commercialisation of 
agriculture, and the rise of demand for imported manufacture.  
Nearly all of the scholarships on this region share the following interconnected claims made 
by Pamuk regarding transportation in Eastern Anatolia: 
‘Because of the absence of railroads until the early 1910s, agricultural produce of this region 
[Eastern Anatolia] could not be directed towards long-distance markets…In general, barriers 
posed by transportation costs isolated Eastern Anatolia from the rest of the Empire and the 
European markets throughout the [nineteenth] century…A limited amount of mohair 
constituted the major export commodity of the region during this period (2010 [1987]: 
97).’111  
The list of prices and profits pertaining to the wheat trade at Diyarbekir, Urfa, and Aleppo, 
summarised by the British consul in Kurdistan in 1866, is illustrative of the high prices of 
transportation referred to by Pamuk: 
Diyarbekir: 
 
One Quarter of Wheat at Erzurum           13s.6d. 
Expenses to Diyarbekir, 150 miles off       £1.4s. 
Selling Price at Diyarbekir                         £2 
Profit   2s.6d. 
 
                                                          
111
 Also cited in Sönmez (1992 [1990]: 79, 105). 
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Urfa: 
 
One Quarter of Wheat at Erzurum              13s.6d. 
Expenses to Urfa, 258 miles off                   £1.16s. 
Selling Price at Urfa                                     £3.12s.8d. 
Profit     £1.3s.2d. 
 
Aleppo: 
 
One Quarter of Wheat at Erzurum             13s.6d. 
Expenses to Aleppo, 120 miles off               £2.14s. 
Selling Price at Aleppo                                 £4.1s.9⅔d. 
Profit                                                             14s. 3⅔d.  
 
Source: A&P, 1867, ‘Commercial Report for Kurdistan’, 3938, LXVIII, p. 590 
 
However, expensive transportation costs were burdensome in almost all regions of the 
Empire throughout the nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries, to the extent that 
high carriage fees had made it unprofitable to carry bulk goods like grain, over anywhere but 
the shortest distances by land within the Empire. The effects of high transport costs in the 
nineteenth century were so severe that the British Consul General in Istanbul, Consul Alison, 
thought it ‘unbalance[d] Turkey’s trade, since most of its imports were light and valuable 
while its exports were bulky and cheap, and were also severely restricting the zone in which 
its profitable to grow exports crops’ (Issawi, 1980: 179). Strikingly, ‘the cost of transporting 
one tonne of wheat from central Anatolia to Istanbul in 1924 was $8.8 whereas it was only $5 
from New York to Istanbul; and, hence, it seemed more rational to feed the population of 
Istanbul from Iowa rather than Ankara and Konya and let the peasant vegetate in subsistence 
farming’ (Boratav, 1981: 165). The above data, explains to a certain extent why ‘75 per cent 
of all crops grown’ in Ottoman lands throughout the period 1800-1914 are estimated to have 
remained within the Empire (Quataert, 1994: 834). 
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Railroads  
The issue of high transportation costs in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century is 
attributable to the Empire arriving comparatively late to the railroad age. Up until 1859, not a 
single track was laid in any soil or area of the Empire. The first railway in the Ottoman 
Empire was built in 1859-60, between Chernavoda and Constanza, and was followed in 
1863-68 by the Varna-Rustchuk line. The Oriental Railway Company, found by Baron Hirsch 
in 1878, built the main European lines. This company built 1,312 kilometers (km) of railway 
lines, and by 1888 Istanbul was connected to Vienna. Other major railroad lines were the 
Salonica-Constantinople Junction Railway and the Salonica-Monastir Railway, both of which 
were completed at the turn of the twentieth century.  
As can be inferred from the above-described railway projects, the European provinces took 
the lead and by contrast, the Anatolian provinces in 1890 contained only 900 km of railroads 
whilst the Arab provinces contained none at all. In the second half of the nineteenth century, 
mainly after 1890, Ottoman territories acquired 7,500 km of track (Quataert, 1994: 804). The 
increase in Ottoman rail-laying activities in a sense coincided with that in many other 
countries, but was significantly more modest in scale. For instance, railway lines in the 
Habsburg Empire extended ‘to nearly 23,000 km by 1913, over three times the Ottoman 
level’, and former Ottoman territories in the Balkans, namely, the independent states of 
Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece, ‘together built about 8,000 km of track, or slightly 
more than in the empire itself’ (ibid.: 805). Some scholars have construed the relatively slow 
pace of rail-laying activities in the Empire during 1800-1914 as ‘a measure of low degree of 
development of the Ottoman Empire; in 1914, its 1,900, 000 square kilometers had only 
5,991 kilometers of railways’ (Issawi, 1980: 147).  
The exact share of all the amount of goods transported by the Ottoman railways during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries cannot be accurately deliberated since animal-back 
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traffic cannot be calculated with any certainty because of the scant research and records left 
behind by the transporters (Quataert, 1994: 812, 821). Nevertheless, below are estimate 
figures for goods and passengers transported on various Ottoman railways during 1891-1910, 
which have been prepared by Quataert (1994) based on the information provided by Hecker 
in 1914. As the Tables 3.11-12 below indicate, only after the turn of the century  
transportation of goods and people via Ottoman railways gained prominence, which is 
instructive of the limitations of explaining the ‘seclusion’ of the predominantly Kurdish 
provinces in ESA regions throughout the nineteenth century on the absence of the railroads.  
Table 3.11 Goods transported on various Ottoman railways (thousand tons) 
Line                              1891          1895          1900          1910                   
Ankara-Konya  --- 118       357  585 
Izmir-Konya                 --- ---       245  327 
Aydın                            ---               ---             ---              342 
Mersin-Adana              ---               ---             ---              130 
Damascus-Hama          ---               ---             ---               309 
Hejaz                             ---               ---             ---                66 
Baghdad                        ---               ---             ---                28 
 
Source: Quataert, 1994: 813. 
 
Table 3.12 Passengers transported on various Ottoman railways  
(Millions) 
Line                              1891          1895          1900          1910                   
Ankara-Konya  0.7 1.0       1.2  2.7 
Izmir-Konya                 --- 1.5       1.7       2.4 
Aydın                            ---               ---             ---              1.9 
Mersin-Adana              ---               ---             ---               0.3 
Damascus-Hama          ---               ---              0.2              0.7 
Hejaz                             ---               ---             ---               0.2 
Baghdad                        ---               ---             ---               0.01 
 
Source: Quataert, 1994: 813. 
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Overland Transport System 
During 1800-1910, the overland transport system—the roads, highways, wagons and 
caravans—was used for ‘one-half of all goods shipped overland in Anatolia and Syria’ 
(Quataert, 1994: 818). This was despite the shortcomings of the overland transport system 
owing to the poor quality and maintenance of the roads, which was largely due to the 
Ottoman central state allocating transportation too few resources throughout the nineteenth 
century (Issawi, 1980: 150; Owen, 1981: 246). In 1858, the British Consul of Kurdistan, 
Consul Holmes, described the poor maintenance of the Ottoman roads, and its repercussions 
on daily life and commerce within the Empire with following illuminating words:  
‘One of the greatest drawbacks to the advancement of civilisation and commerce in Turkey, 
is the want of properly constructed roads; and the Pashalic of Diabekir [Diyarbekir] is in no 
better condition in this respect, than the rest of the empire.’112  
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman state took extreme action with the 
hope of improving the poor quality of the roads in the Empire. In 1865, a law was enacted to 
oblige all males aged 16-65 to work four days a year on local roads or pay a substitute tax; 
however, even such compulsory measures had minimal effect on improving the roads in the 
Empire and resultantly in 1910, it was replaced by mandatory cash payments (Eldem, 1970: 
150; Issawi, 1980: 150). A British Consular report in 1878 summarises the severe conditions 
of the highways in the Empire, even after the enactment of this piece of legislation, by stating 
that the Beirut-Damascus road was the ‘only road in the whole of the Turkish Empire which 
is kept in good order’ (Issawi, 1980: 150). Furthermore, the overland transport system in 
Ottoman lands in the early years of the twentieth century does not appear to have improved. 
In 1904, the entire Ottoman Empire had only 24,000 km of roads, ‘three-quarters of these 
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A&P, 1857, 2285, ‘Commercial Report on Diabekir’, XXXVIII, pp. 184-85. 
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were within the borders of modern Turkey, poor in quality and badly maintained’ (Quataert, 
1994: 818).  
Animal-back transport was more common than wheeled transport in most areas, because 
Ottoman roads were suitable only to animal-back transport; shipment by wagon often 
damaged the transported goods. Hence, caravans provided most of the overland and non-
mechanised links within and between the different regions of the Empire (Issawi, 1980: 146, 
Quataert, 1994: 819). Alongside the shorter and more frequent routes of Alexandretta-
Diyarbekir and Diyarbekir-Erzurum (Quataert, 1994: 818) there also existed long caravan 
routes, with hans
113
 built at suitable intervals, the mains ones were (Issawi, 1980: 146): 
1. the Trabzon-Erzurum-Beyazıt route leading to Tabrız (Iran); 
2. the Samsum-Amasya-Zile-Tokat route to Sivas, at this point it bifurcated, one route 
passing via Kayseri and Cilician gates to Tarsus and the other to Deliklitaş, Harput 
and Diyarbekir, and thereafter to either Mosul, via Mardin, or Aleppo, through Urfa; 
3. the Izmir-Bolu-Tosya route, touching the second route at Amasya; 
4. the Bursa-Akşehir-Konya-Tarsus route leading to Syria. 
The actual volume of goods handled by caravans, which is difficult to measure, appears to be 
very substantial. As described by Quataert (1994: 817-19), in 1812, horses carried most of the 
goods from Salonica north towards the German lands and some 20,000 animals were used. In 
the mid-nineteenth century, caravans from Baghdad to Damascus were carrying Iraqi, Persian 
and Indian goods and in the reverse direction, Damascus sent local textiles as well as cloths 
from England and Germany. During the 1860s, the Tabriz-Erzurum-Trabzon caravans 
annually transported as much as 12,000 tons, requiring 48,000 pack animals. Moreover, in 
answer to a questionnaire of 1863, the British consul in Salonica stated that horses and mules 
transported most produce and that the ox-drawn carts had been used in the plains. Similarly, 
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 Han: housing’ merchant entrepôts and craftsmen’s shops, usually grounded around a courtyard and 
accessible by a single gate (Faroqhi, 1984: 343).  
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the Consuls in Izmir and Trabzon reported that camels carried the majority of transit trade, 
while horses and mules were used only for transporting lightweight produce to the cities 
(Issawi, 1980: 177).  
Sea Transport 
Whilst the overland transport system maintained its importance throughout the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, sea transport, sailing vessels and steamships, had also been 
increasing in number well into the late nineteenth century. In the early years of the nineteenth 
century, sea transport in the Empire had been very insignificant. For example, around 1800, it 
is reported that France – which was then the most important foreign trading partner of the 
Empire – had annually sent ‘150 ships’, and in ‘many areas’ of the Empire sea traffic is 
reported to have been ‘light’ (Quataert, 1994: 799). However, after the entrance of the 
steamships into Ottoman waters in the 1820s the volume of shipping had experienced a 
considerable rise (Table 3.13). The introduction of steam implicated a dramatic increase in 
the size of vessels. Ships calling at Trabzon averaged an ‘eightfold rise in size between 1830 
and 1888’, and ‘steamships calling at Istanbul in the 1830s ranged between 130 and 530 tons 
but in the late nineteenth century averaged over 1,250 tons’ (ibid:. 800). Steamship travel on 
the Euphrates and Tigris, which was navigable from Diyarbekir downwards to Mosul, 
Baghdad and the Persian Gulf, had begun in the late 1830s.  
Table 3.13 Shipping tonnage entering main Ottoman ports, 1830-1913 (thousand tons) 
Port                  1830          1860          1890           1913 
Basra 10 ---           100  400 
Beirut 40              400           600  1,700 
Istanbul ---               ---           800  4,000 
Izmir 100 600 1,600  2,200 
Trabzon  15              120  500  -----     
 
 Source: Issawi, 1980: 48. 
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Transportation in Ottoman Kurdistan 
The available official data regarding custom duties remittances collected by the Diyarbekir 
Gümrük
114
 (Custom House) indicates that up until early 1830s the trade routes located in 
Ottoman Kurdistan were frequently used for the movement of goods (Table 3.14). 
Information regarding the custom revenues of Diyarbekir has seen daylight as result of the 
extensive archival work on the tax-farm records of the provincial fiscal bureau, or Diyarbekir 
Voyvodalığı, by Yılmazçelik (1995). 
Table 3.14 Custom Revenues Collected by the Diyarbekir Voyvodalığı, 1797-1834 
Years                              Value (kuruş) 
1797-1798115 97490 
1804-1805116                   86505 
1805-1806117                   72248.5 
1822-1823118 86388 
1824-1825119 93847 
1833-1834120 36199 
 
 
It is worth noting here that the jurisdictional range of the province of Diyarbekir during 1780-
1845 had been such that it encompassed the vast majority of the Kurdish lands incorporated 
into the Ottoman Empire after 1514 (See Map 7 below). In the early decades of the 
nineteenth century, the province of Diyarbekir had in its jurisdictional boundaries vast areas 
of land; extending from Malatya to Mosul. During 1847-1867, as mentioned above, 
Diyarbekir was renamed Kürdistan Eyaleti and it comprised of parts of the provinces of Bitlis 
and Van. At the end of the nineteenth century, the province remained impressive in size, as it 
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embodied the following provinces in present-day Turkey: Batman, Elazığ, Mardin, Siirt, 
Şanlıurfa and Şırnak. Thus, up until the twentieth century, the bulk of the above-described 
overland trade routes situated in Ottoman Kurdistan were located in the provincial boundaries 
of Diyarbekir, which explains the importance of the custom revenue records kept by the 
voyvodas of this province for attaining an understanding of the trade to and from Ottoman 
Kurdistan. 
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                                                                Map 10 
             The jurisdictional boundaries of the province of Diyarberkir, 1700-1847 
                                           Source: Yılmazçelik, 1995: Appendix 6.  
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                                                                    Map 11 
                                      Transportation routes in Ottoman Kurdistan  
                                         Source: Yılmazçelik, 1995: Appendix 5.  
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The data consulted by this thesis also accentuates the following features of Diyarbekir, which 
is crucial to highlight in any investigation on transportation in this province: 
i) It was a meeting point for caravans from Samsun, Aleppo, Baghdad and 
Erzurum;
121
  
ii) It was a gateway for merchants entering the Empire from Iran and Dagestan 
heading towards Istanbul, Aleppo and Baghdad (Yılmazçelik, 1995: 314). 
In virtue of these attributes, the British consul in Kurdistan described Diyarbekir as ‘nearly 
equidistant west and east between the capital and Busreh, north and south between Erzeroom 
and Aleppo—[Diyarbekir] is admirably calculated for a great commercial central depôt.’122 
Throughout the nineteenth century, merchants from a wide range of other locations – Van, 
Manastır, Gümüşhane, Rakka – very frequently visited and stayed in the different hans of 
Diyarbekir (Yılmazçelik, 1995: 314-15). Information regarding the Ottoman hans123 provide 
a valuable source of information for transportation of goods and commerce – in particular for 
Anatolian cities that were linked by overland trade routes – because starting with the 
sixteenth century in the big hans of any of the urban business centres, merchants conducted 
negotiations that led to the formation of caravans (Faroqhi, 1984:51-3).    
Because of being located on an important crossing point for international and domestic trade, 
Diyarbekir – alongside, Aleppo, Bursa, Erzurum and Tokat – was one of the few provinces 
that had tax farms incorporating custom duties and other transportation related duties. 
Custom duties or resm-i gümrük were levied on all goods transported to and from Diyarbekir 
in accordance with the varying tariffs laid in the “Customs Tariff Book” (Gümrük Tarife 
Defterleri) (Yılmazçelik, 1995: 288).  
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When the custom revenues in 1833-34 are studied in conjunction with those of the preceding 
three decades (see Table 3.13), it becomes apparent that there had been a remarkable fall in 
the early years of the 1830s. The extensive historical details provided regarding Ottoman 
Kurdistan in the report from the British Consular District of Kurdistan in 1863, which 
hitherto has been overlooked by the existing scholarships on Ottoman Kurdistan, indicate that 
the sizeable reduction in the custom revenues in 1833-34 was a corollary of the military 
campaigns of Rashid Pasha against the Kurdish emirates: 
‘Though repeatedly taken and plundered; by Persians, Arabs, Saljooks [Seljuks], Tatars, 
Soofees [Sufis], and Turks it [Diyarbekir] always seems to have soon regained its riches and 
prosperity as history hardly records one of its many sieges and captures, without at the same 
time detailing the rich booty that fell a prey to the enemy. In more modern times its 
commercial activity does not seem to have sensibly diminished; and I cannot trace its 
real decline any further back than thirty years ago, immediately subsequent to Rasheed 
Pasha’s successful campaign against the Kurds in these regions. But from that time, as 
the merchants inform me, marked falling off took place and each succeeding year has 
been more unprofitable than the last.’124  
Other foreign officials based in Ottoman Kurdistan during the nineteenth century have made 
similar observations in relation to the negative repercussions of the military activities of the 
Ottoman states in this region. In 1835, a few years after Rasheed Pasha’s campaign 
commenced, the British Consul, James Brant, reports of two destructive results of the military 
assaults in Diyarbekir. The first of these relate to the demographic demolition: the number of 
houses found in the Diyarbekir town had reduced from ‘40,000’ to ‘8,000’, and the second 
devastation pertains to the ‘severe damage’ to the trade of Diyarbekir (Brant, 1836: 209-10). 
Correspondingly, the German Field Marshall, Helmuth Carl Bernhard von Moltke (1800-
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1891), who partook in the Ottoman army in Ottoman Kurdistan under Hafiz Pasha, makes 
parallel observations vis-à-vis the ramifications of the military campaigns to social and 
economic life in Hasankeyf and Cizre (Moltke, 1968: 251). The above relayed information 
not only oppugns the validity of postulate that the predominantly Kurdish regions of ESA 
was secluded from the local and foreign trade throughout the nineteenth century, but it also 
indicates that the military operations of the Ottoman state after the early 1830s in Ottoman 
Kurdistan created long-term constraints for the commerce of this Ottoman borderland.  
3.5 Commerce  
The commerce of Ottoman Kurdistan in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is an 
area awaiting systematic examination. The nominal documented data presently available on 
the commerce of this region, and the readily-accepted truism that EAS regions had 
throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries been ‘secluded’ from the rest of the 
Empire and the European markets, are two long-standing impediments to the materialisation 
of this intricate task. While the currently existing quantitative evidence on the commerce of 
Ottoman Kurdistan in no way enables a complete understanding or analysis of the nature and 
scale of the commercial activities in this domain, it nevertheless does equip us with valid 
grounds to doubt the prevailing static assessments regarding the trade of this region. The data 
surveyed by this investigation suggests that the trade of Ottoman Kurdistan during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had undergone decline, recovery and growth. These 
different trends in the trade of this frontier region appear to be very closely tied to political 
factors that surfaced in the years 1800-1914. Prior to analysing the commercial activities in 
Ottoman Kurdistan, it is apt to offer a terse description of the nature and limitations of the 
Ottoman trade statistics. 
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Limitations and Deficiencies of Ottoman Trade Statistics 
As the Consular reports written by British diplomats frequently remind us, accurate and 
regular Ottoman statistics regarding the trade of Ottoman Kurdistan during the nineteenth 
century were extremely uncommon. In 1857, the British Consul in Kurdistan, Consul 
Holmes, in one of the initial consular reports sent from the British Consulate in Kurdistan 
summarised the non-existence of clear-cut official trade data in the first half of the century 
with the following words:  
‘I found it utterly impossible to obtain any satisfactory details of imports and exports [of 
Diyarbekir], for the simple reason that no correct account of them exists. The Custom House 
is the only place where any sort of account is pretended to be kept, but as regards to exports, 
a considerable amount of the produce is sent from the province, without passing through the 
town, direct to Aleppo, where it pays duty, and as with regard to imports, no note is taken of 
that which arrives having already paid duty at Aleppo, little or nothing is known, event at the 
Custom House, as to the real amount of the trade of this place.’125  
Correspondingly, the consul in Erzurum, Sir Robert Alaxender Osborn Dalyell (1821-1886), 
just before leaving his post in the mid-1860s made the following informative remarks 
regarding commercial bookkeeping: 
‘Up to the period at which I left Erzeroom [Erzurum] it was impossible to get definite 
commercial information, no regular books being kept at the custom-house; but in 
consequence of late alterations of [the] system in the administration of the custom-houses of 
the Empire, it is now to a certain degree possible.’126 
All of the above stated lacunae regarding Ottoman trade records validate the following 
observation conveyed in 1870 by the then British Consul in Kurdistan, Consul Taylor, in a 
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consular report entitled the Conditions of the Industrial Classes in the Consular District of 
Kurdistan:  
‘In this country, statistics…and official returns are so negligently and loosely compiled as to 
render them perfectly useless for the purpose of judging of, or guiding the wealth of the 
nation.’127  
Deriving from the above assessment of Consul Taylor, one can conclude that the 
aforementioned limitations were not unique to trade statistics of Ottoman Kurdistan. As the 
findings of a range of scholarly studies (Eldem, 1970; Pamuk, 2010 [1987]; Quataert, 1994) 
that examined the existing Ottoman official statistics illustrate, Ottoman trade statistics for 
the nineteenth century had been minimal and deficient. For the purposes of this study, it is 
apposite to summarise the findings of these pivotal studies, since they elucidate the deficient 
nature of the official Ottoman trade statistics.  
No information is presently available from Ottoman sources regarding Ottoman foreign trade 
before 1878, with the exception of estimated custom revenues for each year, which are 
available from the budgets that were first prepared in the 1860s. The efficacy and veracity of 
the official Ottoman trade statistics for the years after 1878 is questionable, though, due to the 
following deficiencies identified by Pamuk (2010 [1987]: 153-54). Official Ottoman trade 
statistics until 1907 provided figures only for general trade; therefore, transit trade was not 
distinctively covered. The distinction between general and special trade is vital, argues 
Pamuk, since the transit trade through the Empire, which mostly consisted of European-
Persian trade, was far from insignificant, particularly in the late 1870s and 1880s. The lack of 
distinction between special and general trade between 1978 and 1907 engendered an ‘upward 
bias of the order of 3 to 5 per cent for imports and exports’ of the Ottoman Empire (ibid.: 
153).  
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The other deficiency of the Ottoman trade statistics post-1878 stem from the incomplete 
coverage of traded goods. Imports of arms and ammunition, agricultural and industrial 
machinery and all materials for railways and factory construction were not recorded in the 
official Ottoman statistics. Thus, Pamuk ascertains that ‘the exclusion of these items 
introduces a not insignificant amount of downward bias to the Ottoman imports for some 
years’ (ibid.). Lastly, the existent official Ottoman trade data for the years after 1878 present 
grave problems for establishing the country of distribution of Ottoman trade. Until 1910, ‘the 
destination/country of origin definition employed in the Ottoman statistics specified the 
country with which trade was conducted as that from which goods were directly received to 
or to which goods were directly sent’ (ibid.: 154). Therefore, whenever Ottoman trade with a 
country was carried out through ports of the third countries, it was not possible to determine 
the magnitude of Ottoman trade with that country on basis of Ottoman statistics.     
In addition, Eldem rightly points out that the varying political and administrative statuses or 
structures of the different provinces in the Empire, along with the inexperience’s of the state 
officials responsible for collating the statistical data, made it very difficult to generate 
uniform sets of statistical data for the whole of the Ottoman Empire (1970:13). These two 
problems identified by Eldem render a comparative study of the trade of Ottoman Kurdistan 
with other Ottoman regions for most part of the nineteenth century a near impossible task. 
Furthermore, as exemplified with the constantly changing borders of Diyarbekir, the 
administrative boundaries of ESA Ottoman provinces (i.e. Diyarbekir, Erzurum, Harput and 
Van) had been in a state of flux throughout the nineteenth century, making it highly difficult 
to track and undertake a longitudinal study of the trade of localities situated in Ottoman 
Kurdistan.  
Owing to the aforementioned drawbacks of the official Ottoman trade statistics, the ensuing 
assessment of the trade of Ottoman Kurdistan will mainly be based on the trade data 
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accumulated from the British Consular reports for this region penned in the second half of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These reports contain invaluable information 
regarding the local trade of the two predominantly Kurdish provinces in ESA, Diyarbekir and 
Erzurum. Where available the thesis will transmit data concerning other provinces in these 
regions—i.e. Van, Bitlis and Hakkari. Up until the 1880s, the trade figures for these three 
areas were either recorded under the trade data of the provinces of Erzurum and Diyarbekir or 
not recorded at all.    
In this section, a particular emphasis will be given to the trade reports drafted by Consul 
Taylor who, unlike his predecessor and successors, had the unique opportunity to study 
comparatively the Custom House archives of the provinces in ESA with those of the 
bordering provinces, such as Aleppo and Baghdad. Resultantly, he was able to attain a clearer 
picture of the state of the trade of Kurdistan:  
‘During my residence I had, under Vizirial orders, ample opportunities for examining the 
Custom-house archives, that establishment being then not formed but under the control of a 
paid officer under the Aleppo Nazir or Chief now, which enabled me to obtain a clearer view 
of local trade, whether native or British, than my predecessors had.’128  
The General Trends in Ottoman Trade 
Prior to analysing the trade of Ottoman Kurdistan, as background to the analysis of the 
commerce of this region in the nineteenth and early-twentieth century, based on the 
formulations or findings of Quataert (1994: 827-30), a brief description of the general trends 
in Ottoman trade during 1800-1914 will be presented. Until 1820, trade within the Ottoman 
Empire and with Russia was more important than that with Western and Central Europe. 
However, by the end of the century, Britain, France, Germany, Austria and Italy accounted 
for over three-quarters of total Ottoman international trade. Between 1780 and 1830, a period 
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of recovery and then growth had been experienced in international trade, Ottoman-European 
trade augmented at an annual rate below 1.5 per cent. After this period of recovery, foreign 
trade grew very swiftly between the early 1840s and 1870s. Imports and exports each 
annually increased at compound growth rates of 5.5 per cent, nearly doubling in each 
successive decade. For example, during the mid-1870s, exports were about 6 to 8 per cent of 
estimated Ottoman Gross National Product (GNP), about double the proportion of the 1840s. 
Stagnation followed boom in 1870s as fiscal crisis and government bankruptcy coupled with 
the famine and the Russo-Turkish War had hampered international trade. Between the late 
1870s and 1890s, imports and exports had increased at annual rates of 2.6 per cent or, in other 
words, half the rate of the three previous decades. However, within a decade after the 
international depression had ended (1906-7), Ottoman exports are reported to have risen by 
3.4 per cent as imports rose by 4.8 per cent. Subsequently, even in the face of major territorial 
losses suffered in the Balkans Wars, exports in 1913 equalled and imports surpassed, by 2.5 
per cent, the level of 1907.  
In 1914, perhaps one-quarter of total agricultural production was exported; exports overall 
formed nearly 14 per cent of the gross national product and the ratio of imports to GNP was 
around 18 per cent. Deriving from these developments, Quataert contends that, despite the 
relatively important and substantial changes in international trade in the nineteenth century, 
domestic commerce continued to surpass foreign trade and ‘foreign trade remained a minor 
factor in Ottoman economic life’ (1994: 830).  
Until c.1870s, textiles, in particular cotton, constituted the main form of imports to the 
Empire, but after the 1870s the relative share of the foodstuff imports gradually increased. By 
the end of the nineteenth century, wheat, flour, rice, sugar, coffee and tea formed ‘about one-
third’ of all imports (ibid.: 832). Yet, Ottoman agricultural products, such as cereals and 
animal products, constituted the bulk of the exported articles, usually around ‘90 per cent’ 
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(ibid.). After the 1860s, however, the nature of the exported items had diversified in virtue of 
variations of foreign demands from Ottoman lands. In the second half of the nineteenth 
century, significant quantities of opium, raw silk, raisins, wool, cotton, tobacco, hides and 
manufactured carpets as well as raw silk were exported.     
Table 3.15 Ottoman foreign trade, 1830-1913 (annual average, in millions of pounds 
sterling) 
Period f.o.b. exports c.i.f. imports 
1830s       4.2   5.1 
1840s                                                              6.0          6.9 
1850s                  9.8                              12.3 
1860s                15.4                              18.3 
1870s                18.6                               20.8 
1880s                15.5  16.0 
1890s                17.7  18.6 
1900s                                                              23.0  26.0 
1910-13                                                          27.3  38.6 
 
Source: Pamuk, 2010 [1987]: 149. 
Commerce of Ottoman Kurdistan 
The only currently available regularly recorded data of the commercial activities in Ottoman 
Kurdistan for the first half of the nineteenth century is the tax-farm accounts of the provincial 
fiscal bureau, or voyvodalık, of Diyarbekir. For reasons outlined in the section on 
Transportation in Ottoman Kurdistan, the records of Diyarbekir Voyvodalık is an important 
lens though which we are able to detect the commercial trends in Ottoman Kurdistan.    
As alluded to by Faroqhi, in the absence of regular and accurate data ‘for figures concerning 
the volume of urban economic activities and particularly of trade, our best and usually only 
guide consists of tax-farming accounts’ (1984: 16). However, as it can be concluded from the 
information provided in the introductory pages of this Chapter, after 1839, due to the 
centralist reforms in the Tanzimat era, the tax-farm system had been transformed. Therefore, 
the availability and utility of the tax-farms accounts after the third decade of the nineteenth 
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century is moot, which is why the study will only make use of tax-farm records up until the 
mid-1830s.  
Table 3.16 Revenues of the Diyarbekir Voyvodalığı, 1797-1834 (in kuruş) 
Years              Gümrük     Boyahane   Arsa     İhtisab       Damga     Others         Total   
                         (Customs)    (Dye           (Ground    (Craftsmen’  (Sales 
                                               House            Rent)        Dues)           Tax) 
                                               Dues)                                                         
1797-1798129   97490   35000 34000      8344        33550       ----             208384 
1804-1805130   86505        19726           23153    10742        30078       23121         193325 
1805-1806131   72248.5     21946           29868    12000        32519.5    12067.5      180798 
1822-1823132   86388   31515          37697      4090         8671   30000        198361 
1824-1825133   93847   39872          51198      9613         11854        8956          214440 
1833-1834134   36199     8483          ---- ----         10297        74063        129042 
 
 
As outlined in the preceding section, the year in which Rashid Pasha’s military venture in 
Ottoman Kurdistan (1833-34) commenced was identified by the contemporaries as the point 
at which the decades-long decline – which is believed by the contemporary observers to have 
lasted until the 1860s
135– in the commercial activities in this region begun. This observation 
is supported by the data attained from the records of the fiscal bureau of the paradigmatic 
Kurdish province of Diyarbekir summarised above. One of the first things we realise when 
we look at the figures tabulated in Table 3.16 is the vast decrease during the 1830s in the 
second most important source of revenue of the Diyarbekir Voyvodalık: Boyahane (Dye 
House) dues remittances. This drop is redolent of the fact that production of and trade in 
textiles was sorely affected by the military operations in this province. The other glaring fact 
is that there is no record of the Arsa (Ground Rent) levied from external goods kept in the 
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warehouses of Diyarbekir. According to archival research by Yılmazçelik, this void was 
because after the early 1830s this form of taxation was conjoined or ‘noted under the Gümrük 
[custom revenues]’ (1995: 288) by the voyvoda personnel. This change in the records 
reinforces the above-discussed drastic fall in Diyarbekir’s custom and trade revenues 
immediately after the military activities of the Ottoman state in Kurdistan in the early 1830s. 
Furthermore, Damga (Sales Taxes) intakes, when compared with the figures during 1797-
1806, witnessed a severe reduction. The concurrence of these negative fluctuations led the 
total revenue of the voyvodalık to decrease, when compared to the revenues of the selected 
years in the preceding three decades, by around half in 1833-34. After sixteen years of 
sporadic war in the different parts of ESA, the Ottoman state had been successful in 
suppressing the Kurdish emirates and the rebellions in Ottoman Kurdistan, but with 
tremendous negative repercussions for the economic activities in this region.  
The data pertaining to the commercial activities in Ottoman Kurdistan during the second half 
of the nineteenth century suggests that between the 1860s and early 1870s, with arrival of 
relative security to this domain, the commerce in this region witnessed a gradual revival. In 
1871, the British Consul in Kurdistan, based on his own previous trade reports and the 
archival research conducted in the relevant Custom Houses of the Empire, conveys the 
following information regarding the principal items of production and trade in the constituent 
sancaks of the consular district of Kurdistan during late-1850s and early 1870s: 
‘The important [foreign] trade that does actually exist…is in the hands of the residents native 
agents at Erzeroom[Erzurum], Diarbeker[Diyarbekir], and Kharput [Harput], whose 
principals have their head-quarters at Constantinople, Trebizond, or Aleppo… 
Local industries consist: 
At Erzeroom [Erzurum sancak], brass, iron, tin ware, and swords for home exports 
At Van, thick woollen stuffs used by the natives for trousers, cloaks, jackets, and leggings 
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At Bitlis, cotton cloths in lengths and pieces, died red, with madders and plain 
At Erzingan [Erzincan], fine bath cloths and Turkish towels of cotton, and stripped nankeens 
At Diabeker [Diyarbekir], silk in lengths, silk, and mixed silk and cotton… cotton piece 
goods of patters, woollen cloaks, and dyed moroccos of colours 
At Mardin, dyed moroccos of colours, woollen cloaks, shallees of mohair…and silver and 
gold jewellery 
At Deh and Eyruh, fine shallees, in different coloured stripes and colours, made of mohair… 
All of the above goods are largely exported to the interior provinces of Russia and 
Constantinople 
Local production are, in the northern districts, rye barley, wheat, and some mohair. In all the 
others the usual kind of grain, beside millet, Indian corn, sesame, castor oil seed, tobacco, 
hemp, flax and cotton. 
At and about Erzeroom: sheep and cattle exported to Syria, Egypt, and Constantinople; raw 
skins and entrails to Europe; jerked meat, soap, tallow, and bone ash. 
At Van: salt fish from the Lake, alkali, mohair, silk-worm seed from about that town and 
Hakkaree [Hakkari]. Sheep are largely exported to Syria and Egypt. Pack horses. 
At Bitlis: madders, wax, honey (most superior), and walnut oil. 
At Saert [Siirt] and Jezireh [Cizre]: mohair, wool, gall-nuts, wax, tallow, madders, scammony 
(oil made from the “pistachio terenbinthus”), goat hair, different from the fine mohair, coarse 
and rough for sackings. 
At Deyrsim [Dersim]: galls, valonea, acorn cups, all used in tanning. 
At Mardin and Diabeker: wool, silk, gall-nuts, raw skins, cotton, sheep, clarified butter, and 
camels exported to Syria and Kaiserieh [Kayseri]; horses… 
At Hini: first quality flour, equal to the best English, though at the half price. 
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Minerals: silver, copper, lead, tin, iron, and orpiment, fine yellow in flakes.’136  
In 1857, the consul in Kurdistan, Consul Holmes, estimates in tons the annual production and 
exports in the province of Diyarbekir as tabulated in Table 3.17 below. Although due to the 
meagre Custom House records in Diyarbekir during the 1850s the information given by 
Consul Holmes is limited, it nonetheless gives us an idea regarding the profile and scale of 
the exported and produced articles in the province of Diyarbekir in the mid-1850s.  
3.17 Annual Amount of the Produce of Diyarbekir Province 1855 (in tons) 
Articles      Amount                     Remarks 
Galls 441                     Chiefly exported 
Wool 441                                        “ 
Cotton                       404.5                      Consumed in local manufactures 
Rice             735                      Consumed and exported in equal quantities 
Madder Roots 184                      “ 
Gum 88                                 “ 
Antoof137 22                               Consumed in the local tanneries 
Sesame 250                             Consumed and exported in equal quantities 
Wax 7                                 Chiefly exported 
Goats-hair 51.5                                       “ 
Silk 7                                 Consumed in local manufactures 
Olive Oil 147                             Chiefly consumed 
Butter 294                             Consumed and exported in equal quantities 
Tallow 110                                        “ 
Tobacco   367.5                      Consumed 
Leather 112 
(pieces or skin) 
 
Source: A&P, 1857, ‘Commercial Report for Diarbekir’, 2285, XXXVIII, p. 196. 
 
In 1864, in a separate British consular report prepared by Consul Taylor, a distinctively in-
depth examination of the trade of the province of Diyarbekir for 1863 – which at the time was 
the central administrative unit of Eyalet-i Kürdistan – is given. According to the 72-page 
elaborate trade and agriculture dossier, Diyarbekir’s general trade in this year –including the 
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transit trade which was worth around £200,000
138
 – stood at £532,949. As it can be inferred 
from the trade figures tabulated in Appendix II, in 1863, the total value of the goods exported 
to foreign lands and interior (Ottoman) regions– after deducting the items that have been 
imported and re-exported – was £325,174. The aggregate value of goods imported from 
foreign countries and domestic regions totalled to £187,224.  
Unlike most consular reports for Kurdistan in the nineteenth century, Consul Taylor gives a 
comprehensive list of all the imported and exported articles with their sums (see Appendix 
II). In view of the details transmitted in this report, as well as the trade data provided in 
separate British Consular reports for Diyarbekir referred to below, it appears that the major 
export product of this province throughout the nineteenth century was not restricted to ‘a 
limited amount of mohair’. Alongside mohair; wool, cotton and galls, which from the 1860s 
onwards had been in demand by the foreign trading partners of the Ottoman Empire, 
constituted the greater part of Diyarbekir’s export trade in the 1860s and the early 1870s.  
In 1863, the amount of raw cotton, galls and wool exported had been higher than mohair. 
Additionally, when the values of wool and galls exported in 1863, tabulated in Appendix II, 
are analysed in conjunction with those exported in 1860, which are outlined in a separate 
consular report
139
, it becomes evident that there had been a considerable rise in the export of 
these two commodities.  
The amount of wool exported in Diyarbekir increased from £23,300 in 1860 to £74,999 in 
1863. Similarly, the total value of galls exported in Diyarbekir augmented from £8,000 in 
1860 to £34,893 in 1863. Exports of mohair, gall, and wool from Diyarbekir continued 
thereafter. Just the amount of these staple native products transported to England had been 
£50,000 in 1871.
140
 In a British consular report on Kurdistan’s trade in 1872, the consul in 
Kurdistan had reported that ‘the competitive demand for mohair, raw hides, and galls in 
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Jezireh, Saert, Mardin, and Diarbekir, raised the price of all those articles, and increased the 
annual aggregate amount hitherto exported to Europe.’141  
The export destinations of these products implicate the antithesis of the generally held 
postulation that ESA had been ‘isolated’ from the rest of the Empire and European markets 
throughout the nineteenth century. Goods produced in the Diyarbekir province were exported 
to a wide range of localities, from foreign countries to afar provinces in Northern and Central 
Anatolian, as well as all of the bordering provinces. For instance, the foreign exports of 
cotton, wool, galls and mohair in 1863, which amounted to over £185,000, constituted nearly 
half of all the trade of Diyarbekir. In the same year, the manufactures of Diyarbekir sent to 
Northern Turkey and Baghdad comprised the bulk of the interregional or interior exports.  
In addition, according to the export data provided by Consul Taylor in a subsequent report, a 
further £32,816 worth of manufactures from Diyarbekir had been exported in 1865-66.
142
 All 
of these figures are illustrative of the industrial capacity and importance of this province for 
particularly the Ottoman market.  
Based on the findings of Quataert in the seminal work Ottoman Manufacturing in the Age of 
the Industrial Revolution we learn that the use of British yarn in the textile manufacturing 
industry at the Diyarbekir province had overall ‘quadrupled or quintupled between the 1860s 
and late 1880s and, by mid-1890s, had doubled again’ (1993: 69). Contrary to the suggestions 
of the destruction of the manufacturing sector in the second half of the nineteenth century 
(Pamuk, 2010 [1987], Sönmez, 1992 [1990], Jafar, 1976, Burkay, 2008 [1992]), Quataert 
establishes that ‘aggregate textile production around Diyarbakir was stable, at c. 200,000 
pieces, between the 1860s and 1903’ (1993: 70). Accordingly, Quataert argues, ‘despite the 
loss of Diyarbekir’s international markets during the eighteenth century…the Diyarbekir 
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region continued as one of the most important Ottoman textile production centers’ in the 
nineteenth century (ibid.: 66).
143
  
The gradual revival witnessed in the trade of Diyarbekir during the 1860s was replicated in 
the province of Erzurum. The consul in Erzurum, Consul Dalyell, estimates the aggregate 
value of Erzurum’s trade in the years 1862-5 as £615,071.144 In 1871, according to Consul 
Taylor’s figures, Erzurum province’s total value of imports and exports was £515,000.145 Due 
to the dominance of subsistence agriculture and animal husbandry in Erzurum, cattle, sheep 
and goats, alongside native galls, mohair, wax and hides, had constituted the best part of the 
export trade of this province. Whilst manufactured goods, cotton and silk from Europe and 
other regions of the Empire dominated the imports to Erzurum.  
The available documented data on the trade between Erzurum and England tabulated below, 
as well as bearing witness to the expansion of trade in Erzurum in the 1860s and early 1870s, 
does also ascertain one of the important sources of this increase. During this period, the main 
articles of exports from Erzurum to England had consisted of native produce, such as skins, 
galls, mohair and dried entrails. Whereas imports from England to Erzurum composed of 
woollen and cotton yarns, silk threads, grey cloths, sheet iron, and tin in sheets, copper and 
tea.  
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3.18 Trade between the Province of Erzurum and England, 1863-71 (in sterling pounds) 
Year          Exports          Imports 
1863      8,000 135,000 
1865  100,000 176,000 
1866    47,500 100,500 
1867    40,000   95,000 
1868    60,000 120,000 
1871    96,000 215,000 
 
Source: A&P 1872 & 1873146  
The gradual revival and progression of commerce in Diyarbekir and Erzurum throughout the 
1860s and early 1870s was followed by stagnation and regression in the second half of the 
1870s. Alongside the fiscal crisis and government bankruptcy in 1875 and the famine in the 
1880s, the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78) and the Sheikh Ubeydullah Revolt (1880), both of 
which took place in the borders of or in close proximity to Erzurum and Diyarbekir, severely 
hampered production and trade in these provinces between c.1875 and 1890.  
In 1886, the acting consul of Kurdistan, George Pollard Devey, described the negative 
ramifications of the political instabilities in this region for manufacturing and commerce in 
Kurdistan with the following words:   
‘Some industries have altogether died out, as that of swords and dagger making. The 
manufactures of cotton, woollen, and silken stuff is much less than in former years […] There 
can be no doubt that the death blow to Erzeroum[’s] trade and industry was the war of 1877-
78, followed by three years of famine, since this period trade has remained at the lowest 
point.’147  
The British Consul at Diyarbekir, Thomas Boyajian, in the same report transmits the 
following bleak manifestations: 
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‘During the period from 1880-85, as compared with the preceding 15 years, export trade has, 
with the exception of opium, diminished. Imports have increased in volume but decreased 30 
per cent. in value […] This town in former years could reckon 1,500 silk and cotton looms, 
and carried trade with the remotest parts of the empire […] The value of silk alone 
manufactured in 1865 was £35,000, that of 1884 £7,500[…] In the absence of trade returns of 
former years, I am not in a position to state precisely the difference of exports of the period 
1880-85 as compared with the 15 previous years, but the following table of one or two of the 
chief items of export will suffice to prove the statement : 
 Value 1860 Value 1884 
  £ £ 
Mohair 65,450                      14,500 
Wool   23,300           14,200 
Galls    8,000    1,900 
Total  96,750            30,600 
Source: A&P, 1886, C.4715, XXI.231, p.796’148 
Although the nonexistence of trade records for Diyarbekir and Erzurum make it impossible to 
estimate the exact nature of the decrease in the export trade, we nevertheless are able to attain 
an idea of the nature of the deterioration by juxtaposing the trade data from the early 1880s 
with that of the previous two decades. The trade figures tabulated in Tables 3.19-20 below 
are in harmony with the dismal state of the Eastern Anatolian economy relayed by the British 
Consuls cited above.  
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3.19 Imports and exports of Erzurum, 1871-1884 (in sterling pounds) 
Year Import Export                  Total 
1871149 300,000  215,000150          515,000 
1883151 356,160    83,560              439,720 
1884152 268,570    99,070              367,640 
 
Source: A&P 1872, 1884 & 1884-85 
3.20 Imports and exports of Diyarbekir, 1863-1884 (in sterling pounds) 
Year Import Export Total 
1863153 187,224  325,174           512,398 
1883154 129,850  118,150              248,000 
1884155 132,980  108,838              241,818 
 
Source: FO 195/799 &A&P 1884 & 1884-85 
The relatively abundant quantitative data
156
 after 1890 on Ottoman Kurdistan’s trade 
regularly transmitted in the Commercial Reports prepared by the British consuls based in 
Diyarbekir and Erzurum – some of which have been tabulated below – specifies that 
commercial activities in these provinces had recorded an impressive recovery during 1890-
1914. In more concrete terms, the paradigmatic Kurdish province of Diyarbekir  and the 
                                                          
149
 A&P, 1872, C.637, LVIII, p. 1347.  
150
 Export figures of only items exported to Europe and the interior regions, not including Persia and Russia. 
151
 A&P, 1884, C.4106, LXXXI, p. 1411. 
152
 A&P, 1884-5, C.4526, LXXIX, p. 1929. 
153
 FO 195/799, Taylor at Diarbekir, 13/07/1864, pp. 63, 77, 74, 79. 
154
 A&P, 1884, C.4106, LXXXI, p. 1411. 
155
 A&P, 1884-5, C.4526, LXXIX, p. 1940. 
156 Tables 3.21-22 express the trade balance in ESA during 1891-1913 in nominal terms. This limitation is due 
to the existent and prevalent Consumer Price Index (CPI) – which used to calculate inflation and thus enumerate 
real (inflation-adjusted) growth – employed to understand and analyse price trends in the Ottoman Empire is 
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province of Erzurum in 1913, when compared with that of 1891, had witnessed a near 
fourfold increase in nominal terms (see Table 3.21).  
3.21 Imports and exports of Diyarbekir, 1890-1913 (in sterling pounds) 
Year Import Export               Total 
1891157 151,184 145,282  296,466  
1893158         169,885 193,338  363,167 
1895159         216,636 179,181  395,817 
1897160         287,000 275,000  562,000 
1908161 436,560 445,049  881,609 
1909162         478,500 510,000  988,500 
1912163         648,000 455,400  1,103,400 
1913164         693,960 503,300             1,197,260    
 
Source: A&P. 
 
3.22 Imports and exports of Erzurum, 1890-1913 (in sterling pounds) 
Year Import Export                Total 
1891165         294,400 202,950  497,350         
1892166 230,015 209,300  439,315 
1893167         231,690 164,700  396,390 
1895168  194,110           157,300  351,410  
1897169         214,030 167,660  381,690 
1912170         639,200 303,750  942,950 
1913171         650,250 360,700  1,010,950 
 
Source: A&P. 
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Based on the details provided in the Commerce Reports cited above it becomes apparent that 
around 40 per cent of all the items exported from Diyarbekir during 1890-1913 had consisted 
of wool, silk, mohair, valonia oak and hides that had been sent to foreign countries. The 
remainder had consisted of industrial products and agricultural produce, such as butter, rice, 
sheep’s and camels, which had been exported to various regions of the Empire. The trade 
data for the province of Erzurum in the same period indicates that the bulk of all the trade had 
been with interior domains and had consisted of commodities and agricultural produce 
similar to that in Diyarbekir.  
Although the level of inter-regional trade in native goods had varied in these provinces, it 
nonetheless had been a very important component of the trade of provinces in and around 
Ottoman Kurdistan during 1890-1913. Quataert deriving from the trade data attained for 
Diyarbekir, Harput and Mosul – all of which had been constituent parts of the central 
province of Diyarbekir in the early nineteenth century – during the 1890s arrives at the 
following revealing conclusion:  
‘In some cases, the value of a district’s inter-regional trade in goods of Ottoman origins 
vastly exceeded the value of its exports to foreign countries. At Mosul, in some years, the 
ratios were nearly three and four to one. During a typical year in the 1890s, Diyarbekir, 
Harput and Mosul together inter-regionally sent goods worth more than one million pound 
sterling…(Total Ottoman exports abroad during the 1890s averaged 18 million pound 
sterling)’ (1994: 837). 
All of the data presented above is indicative of the vibrant atmosphere and positive 
fluctuations in the spheres of commerce and production in Ottoman Kurdistan and bordering 
regions after 1890. Moreover, contrary to the prevalent static conceptions of the commerce in 
predominantly Kurdish provinces in ESA, the information above, despite the lack of 
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longitudinal data, draws a picture of constant flux in manufacturing and commerce in 
Ottoman Kurdistan in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.   
3.6 Population Income Levels 
In regard to the general income levels in Ottoman Kurdistan, we are able to attain an idea 
from the comparative study of the income levels in the different parts of the Empire 
undertaken by Eldem (1970) based on the income data available in the official Ottoman 
sources from the first decade of the twentieth century (302-08). According to the results of 
this study, in 1907, there were discernible regional disparities in the levels of income, 
particularly between the Anatolian and European provinces. This income disparity is 
illustrated by the graph below that specifies the estimate levels of income per person in the 
different areas of the Empire. The levels of income in the bulk of the latter provinces were 
nearly double those of the former provinces, which constitute the chunk of present-day 
Turkey.  
When we comparatively analyse the income levels given for the Anatolian provinces it 
becomes apparent that with the exclusion of the Adana region, the overall majority of the 
Anatolian region, i.e. provinces in North, Central and the predominantly Kurdish Eastern 
Anatolia, were not too dissimilar. As the income levels per head in the great majority of the 
latterly mentioned Anatolian regions were estimated at 600-700 kuruş and a minority of the 
Anatolian provinces, like Konya, the income levels had been approximated at 700-800 kuruş.   
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                     Map 12 
              Income per person in 1907 in the Ottoman Empire as measured in kuruş.  
 Source: Eldem, 1970: 306.  
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   Chapter 4 
The Deformation of Ottoman Kurdistan and Bordering Regions: De-development in 
ESA from the First World War until the 1980 Coup (1914-1980)   
 
4.1. Overview  
The mass violence that accompanied the formation of nation-states in Europe during the 
nineteenth century erupted in the Ottoman Empire in the first two decades of the twentieth 
century. The succession of wars and revolutions, ferociously crushed rebellions, forced 
population exchanges and deportations, as well as ethnocide, massacres and genocide only 
partially concluded in 1923 with the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne. It was not enough to 
have redrawn territorial boundaries, since the sustenance of the nation-state necessitated the 
consolidation of the social, economic and political foundations of modern Turkey that was 
born out of the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. This chapter assesses the economic, political 
and social ramifications of the profound changes that have taken place on the eve of and 
during the eight decades following the establishment of the Republic in the predominantly 
Kurdish populated regions of ESA. 
The signing of the Turco-German Treaty of Alliance
172
 on 2 August 1914 opened a new 
chapter in Ottoman history. In virtue of this secret pact, the Ottoman Empire joined the 
Central Powers to form the Triple Alliance, namely, Austria-Hungary, Germany and the 
Ottoman Empire. As part of her unavoidable commitment to prepare for war, on 29 October 
1914, the Ottoman navy, without a formal declaration of war, shelled the Russian Black Sea 
ports of Odessa, Sebastopol, Novorossisk and Feodosia. Within a week of this pre-emptive 
bombardment, the Entente Powers comprising of Britain, France and Russia declared war on 
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the Ottoman Empire and from 5 November on, the Empire was officially at war with the 
Triple Entente powers (Keegan, 1998:217).  
During the First World War, the Eastern borderlands of the Ottoman Empire were a major 
theatre of operations between the Ottoman Empire and Russia as well as being the epicentre 
of Turkish-nationalist demographic engineering programs implemented by the Young Turk 
regime on account of short-term war exigencies and long-term ideological objectives 
explored below. As consequence, the War plunged Ottoman Kurdistan into greater chaos than 
at any time since perhaps the Battle of Çaldıran (1514) with austere and long-lasting social, 
economic and political implications. The Great War not only changed the social and 
economic fabric of the ethnically diverse Eastern and Southeastern Ottoman provinces, it also 
had a deleterious impact on the economic developments witnessed in Ottoman Kurdistan 
between 1890 and 1913. The events that had taken place in the build-up to and during the 
War, moreover, had crucial implications for the pre-history of Turkey’s Kurdish question, 
and the radicalisation of the then nascent Kurdish national movement. As exemplified by the 
occurrence of the influential Bitlis, Barzan and Baban revolts, which were organised in 1914 
with the demand of regional autonomy for Ottoman Kurdistan.  
The escalation in the political activities of the Ottoman Kurds was inextricably linked to the 
suppressive policies implemented by CUP government after the 1908 Young Turk 
Revolution. Once the CUP leadership was directly confronted with secessionism, European 
intervention (e.g. annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Habsburg Empire in October 
1908) and the counterrevolutionary activities of a diverse group of anti-CUP forces (i.e. the 
short-lived counterrevolution of April 1909); they steered away from political pluralism and 
consequently reneged on one of the main promises with which they had come to power in 
1908: re-establishing a constitutional order in an “ideal” fashion by giving freedom of 
expression to all the ethnic groups in the Empire (Karpat, 2001: 349-50). 
211 
 
In other words, the Turkist proclivities of the CUP
173
, which had been in existence since 1902 
(Hanioğlu, 2001:295-302), had gained momentum because of the Young Turks regime 
experiencing exogenous and endogenous threats to its rule. A quintessential example of this 
is the following incisive and unequivocal conceptualisation of an ideal society outlined by 
one of influential members of the Central Committee of the CUP, Dr. Mehmed Nazım (1872-
1926), in a letter to Zionist leaders in November 1908:  
‘The Committee of Progress and Union wants centralization and a Turkish monopoly of 
power. It wants no nationalities in Turkey. It does not want Turkey to become a new Austria 
[-Hungary]. It wants a unified Turkish nation-state with Turkish schools, a Turkish 
administration, [and] a Turkish legal system’ (ibid.: 260).  
Despite pan-Turkism not becoming a defining feature of the Ottoman state identity until after 
the coup d’état of January 1913, in the wake of the counterrevolution of April 1909, the CUP 
began to implement in a piecemeal fashion nationalistic and centralist policies
174
, which 
instigated the indiscriminate suppression of a range of non-Turkish Ottoman citizens, 
including the Ottoman Kurds (Jwaideh, 1961: 295-7). A case in point is the Law of 
Association (1909) that forbade the formation of associations that had an ethnic basis or 
national name (Ahmad, 1969: 61-2). With the enactment of this legislation, the leadership of 
the Kurdish organisations, which hitherto were in alliance with the Young Turks in 
opposition to the Hamidian regime during the preparatory years of the 1908 Revolution, were 
forced to swallow the bitter pill of betrayal. 
Ironically, one of the first organisations to be proscribed in 1909 was the maiden Kurdish 
political society, Kurdistan Taali ve Terakki Cemiyeti (The Society for the Rise and Progress 
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of Kurdistan) (1908) which had up until then supported the 1908 Revolution (Elphinston, 
1946: 94). The two founding leaders of this society, Amin Ali Bedirhan and Şerif Paşa were 
condemned to death and had to flee the country. Amin Ali’s eldest son, Sürreya Bedirhan, 
who had resumed the publication of the initial and influential Kurdish nationalist journal 
Kurdistan (1898-1909) after returning to Istanbul in 1908, had also shared the same destiny 
as his father and had it to seek refuge in 1909. Similarly, the newly established Kurdish 
cultural and educational organisations, like Kurd Nashri Ma’arif Cemiyeti (Society for the 
Propagation of Kurdish Education), had also been forced to suspend their activities (Jwaideh, 
1961: 297-99).  
The implementation of the unanticipated authoritarian policies by the Young Turks, as well 
as the ideas of nationalism that had gained prominence throughout the Empire percolating 
into Ottoman Kurdish minds, severely deteriorated the relationship between the CUP 
government and its Kurdish subjects. In May 1912, numerous Kurdish organisations joined 
forces and convened the first Kurdish General Assembly, which unanimously agreed to 
create a Kurdish political party to defend the rights of the Ottoman Kurds (Celil, 1992: 202).  
The conflictual ties between the Young Turk regime and the Kurds reached its lowest ebb 
immediately after the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 primarily because in the wake of the 
calamitous defeats – which resulted with the loss of the richest and most advanced core areas 
of the empire (Macedonia, Albania and Thrace) – the CUP government had endorsed three 
highly controversial policies: a) the implementation of the agonising 20% rise in the profits 
tax (temettü vergisi) paid by the merchants and artisans; b) the doubling of the Custom dues; 
and c) the rise in the ağnam tax. These much-reviled policies had been the last straw in the 
worsening relationship between the Ottoman state and its Kurdish subjects as they set in 
motion Kurdish uprisings all over Ottoman Kurdistan. Sixteen consecutive Kurdish revolts 
had taken place all over Kurdistan between 1913 and 1914. These rebellions culminated in 
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the major rebellions led by the leaders of the Kurdish principalities in Bitlis, Barzan and 
Baban on the eve of the First World War with clear nationalist demands, including the rights 
to regional autonomy (Celil, 1992: 201-16, Burkay, 2008 [1992]: 457-69).  
The outbreak of the War, however, interjected the contestations of the Kurdish nationalist 
movement. This was due to two successive events orchestrated by the ruling CUP, which 
after the January 1913 coup d’état regained complete control of internal political affairs 
(Zürcher, 1994: 15-6). The first is the genocide of the Armenians (1915-16), which marked a 
new shift, pushing many Kurdish tribes and a considerable number of urban notables and 
religious sheikhs into alliance with the Ottoman authorities (H. Bozarslan, 2008: 337). The 
other is the forced deportation of a substantial number of Kurds from their ancestral homes 
subsequent to the massacre and expulsion of the Armenians in 1916.  
In sum, the pro-Muslim and Turkist sentiments of the Ottoman rulers intensified during the 
Balkan Wars, and reached its peak with the eruption of the First World War. This was largely 
a consequence of the humiliating defeats endured during the former war, the heightened 
existential fears, as well as the corresponding imperative to save the Ottoman state, from the 
CUP leadership at the onset of the latter war.  
The successive defeats in the Balkan Wars resulted not only in the mortifying loss of almost 
all the remaining European provinces, but also in the humiliating forced expulsion of the 
Balkan Muslims. By 1914, the Ottoman rulers, having seen the Empire shrink from 
approximately 3,000,000 sq. km. in 1800 to 1,300,000 sq. km., dreaded the imminent loss of 
the Empire’s entire territory with the fear-provoking possibility that the reform agreement of 
February 1914 signed by the Russians would be implemented. According to this agreement, 
Armenians were to partake on an equal basis in the local administration of the six Eastern 
provinces (i.e. Erzurum, Van, Bitlis, Mamuretülaziz, Diyarbakir and Sivas) where they were 
living in dense concentration. The parties involved in the negotiation of this reform 
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agreement conceived this as a building block for the creation of an independent Armenian 
state (Akçam, 2012: xvii-xviii).  
4.2 The Collapse of the Empire, Rise of the ‘National Economy’ and the Implementation 
of Nationalist Population Policies 
The above summarised events and eventualities constituted the basis of the ideological shifts 
among the late Ottoman political elite from pan-Ottomanism to pan-Islamism and, later, to 
pan-Turkism. The swing to pan-Turkism or Turkish nationalism at around the same time as 
the outbreak of the First World War had entailed a dialectical process; involving not only 
destructive social engineering and economic policies targeting the non-Turkish citizens of the 
Empire, but the nationalist reorganisation of the Ottoman lands.
175
 In other words, during and 
immediately after the War, CUP’s nationalist demographic policies aimed at homogenising 
the multi-ethnic landscape of the Empire, which mainly targeted the Armenians and the 
Kurds in the ethnically heterogeneous Eastern provinces
176
, concurred with the radical 
reforms that laid the groundwork for Turkish capitalism and the unitary Turkish nation state 
that ascended from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire.  
This helps to explain the jubilation of the nationalist cadres of the CUP at the outbreak of the 
War; as exhibited with the following words from an article penned by a leading Young Turk 
journalist, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın (1875-1957), published in the party organ of the CUP, 
Tanin, under the headline of ‘The Awaited Day’: 
‘[The war] had come like a stroke of good fortune upon the Turkish people, who had been 
certain of their own debility. The day had finally come…the Turks would make an historical 
reckoning with those…whom they had hitherto unable to do so.’177  
                                                          
175
 For detailed analysis of the nature and implications of the nationalist spatial policies in the late-Ottoman era 
and the Republican era of the Turkish Republic in Eastern Anatolia, see: Jongerden (2007); Ülker (2005) and 
Öktem (2004).  
176
 The CUP also targeted other communities like the Christian Syriacs during this period. For a detailed study 
of the policies towards other Christian communities in Eastern Anatolia, see: Gaunt (2006).   
177
 Tanin, ‘The Awaited Day’, 14/11/1914.  
215 
 
With the anticipation that a Europe at war would not be able to enforce its will on the 
Ottoman rulers, the CUP implemented far-reaching administrative reforms once the war 
began. The Ottoman Porte between 1908 and 1914 had already designed some of these 
restructurings but they could not pass as law because of the vetoes of the European 
embassies. The European diplomats perceived these measures as an infringement of the 
‘treaty rights of the foreigners’, since these blocked reforms had aimed to annul the regime of 
Capitulations (Ahmad, 1993: 40-1). In 1914, the much-loathed Capitulations were 
unilaterally abrogated, which facilitated the Porte to raise tariffs on imported goods, and the 
tasks of both the Public Debt Administration and the Ottoman Bank were overturned, 
enabling the Porte for the first time to undertake a monetary policy in printing paper money.  
After 1913, more importantly, the CUP abandoned the English liberal model of economic 
development modelled on the laissez-faire liberalism and began to embrace the economic 
model of ‘national economy’ centred on the ideas of the German economist Friedrich List. 
This shift in policy enabled the Unionists to combine the principle of state control over the 
economy with preferential treatment towards the Turkish/Muslim bourgeoisie.  
List, in brief, contended that the liberal theories of the British economists Adam Smith and 
David Ricardo suited the national interest of England because of her industrialised economy 
and imperialist policies, but the model of development advocated by these economists could 
not be universalised. According to List, if laissez-faire liberal ideas are adopted by countries 
that do not have the large-scale industries akin to that of England, they would end up being 
reliant on England (List, 1856).  
One of the prominent theoreticians of the CUP, Ziya Gökalp, paraphrased these concerns in 
the early 1920s. Gökalp maintained that the ‘Manchester economics is not at all a 
cosmopolitan doctrine, it is nothing but the national economics of England which stands for 
big industry and, thus, derives only benefit from the freedom of exchange abroad and suffers 
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no loss from it’ (Gökalp, 1959: 307). Deriving from this premise, Gökalp argued that if 
countries that do not have the industrial base and scale of England implement the ideas of the 
Manchester school they would inevitably become ‘economic slaves to industrialized nations 
like England’ (Gökalp, 1968: 123).   
For List, the ability of states to engender productive power enables them to participate in 
world trade on a ‘value-adding’ basis: through producing goods that represent relatively high 
levels of skills and command relatively high prices on international markets. The lack of 
productive power in an economy dooms a country to importing goods of higher value than 
those it exports, leading to debt and underdevelopment: 
‘The causes of wealth are quite a different thing from wealth itself. An individual may 
possess wealth, that is to say, exchangeable values; but if he is not able to produce more 
values than he consumes, he will be impoverished. An individual may be poor, but if he can 
produce more than he consumes, he may grow rich (List, 1856: 208). 
Relatedly, the CUP with the purpose of nurturing the indigenous industry undertook 
fundamental economic measures (Toprak, 1982: 25-33). One of the core aims of these 
policies was the creation of the Turkish/Muslim bourgeoisie to supplant the existing non-
Muslim/Turkish-commercial class, which was content with the role of being the commercial 
intermediaries in an Empire that served as a market for Europe’s industry. The historian 
Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935), who alongside the sociologist Gökalp had laid the theoretical 
foundations of the ideological shift to Turkish nationalism (Karpat, 2006: 374-407), believed 
that the fostering of the Turkish national bourgeoisie was an existential prerequisite for the 
‘national economy’ (milli iktisad) that would sustain a Turkish nation state, as manifested in 
the following postulation by Akçura:  
‘The foundation of the contemporary states is the bourgeoisie; the modern prosperous states 
came into existence on the shoulders of the artisan, merchants and banker bourgeoisie. The 
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Turkish national awakening can be a platform for a Turkish bourgeoisie in the Ottoman state 
and if natural growth of the Turkish bourgeoisie continues without damage of interruption, 
we can guarantee the solid ascendancy of the Ottoman state.’ 178 
In 1914, with the intention of developing national production, the CUP government enacted 
the Law for the Encouragement of Industry (Teşvik-i Sanayi Kanunu). The following year, 
under tutelage of the CUP, the Muslim businessman founded the Tradesman’s Association in 
order to take the domestic market under their control. In 1916, the Lower House of Ottoman 
Empire, namely, the House of Deputies of the Ottoman Empire (Meclis-i Mebusan), 
approved a customs law and ruled that all trade related business should be conducted in 
Turkish (Ahmad, 1993:39-46; Barlas, 1998:78-9).  
However, the repercussions of the First World War and the project of building a ‘national 
economy’, which concealed a Turkist agenda that was entirely a novel feature in Ottoman 
history, were double-edged. Ethnocide, forced migration and the demolition of moveable and 
immovable property had become the destructive components of the policies implemented in 
the Ottoman Empire during the War. The examples of the recorded atrocities committed in 
the initial stages of the First World War sheds much light on the devastations it had wrought 
to Ottoman Kurdistan and neighbouring Ottoman regions. For instance, when the Russian 
armies infiltrated beyond Doğubeyazıt-Alaşkirt region in Northern Kurdistan in December 
1914, it is reported that only ‘one-tenth’ of the predominantly Kurdish population of the area 
survived the vehemence of the Armenian units, some of whom were ex-Ottoman citizens, 
attached to the Russian Army (Jwaideh, 1961: 363). In January 1915, when the Ottoman 
Army moved to capture Urumiya and Tabriz, most Armenians and Assyrians had fled in 
panic as the Russian armies stationed in Iranian Azarbaijan had at the time retired 
northwards. The Christian population who remained in these and surrounding areas was 
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subjected to acts of savagery at the hands of the Turkish troops and Kurdish auxiliary forces 
(McDowall, 2000:103).  
The Armenian Genocide of 1915 and the Forced Deportation of Ottoman Kurds in 
1916: A Social and Economic Catastrophe  
Based on an archival study of the deportation orders issued by the CUP government, Fuat 
Dündar discerns that the deportation of the Ottoman Armenians had commenced in February 
1915. The ‘fifth and final stage of the deportations’ is said to have begun after the leader of 
the CUP, Talat Pasha, on June 21, 1915, ordered the deportation of ‘all Armenians without 
exception’ who lived in ten provinces of the Eastern and Southeastern regions of the Empire, 
including Diyarbakır, Sivas and Mamuretülaziz (Dündar, 2011: 281-83). Within a year or so 
after the initiation of forced deportation of the Armenian from their ancestral homelands, 
according to a report of a United Nations human right subcommission, ‘at least one million’ 
Armenians perished (Hovannisian, 1999: 15).
 
 
The removal and the subsequent destruction of the Ottoman Armenians had severe social and 
economic consequences.
179Prior to 1916, The CUP’s ‘national economy’ targeted mainly the 
Armenian and the Greek communities in the Empire, and after 1916, it targeted the Kurds. 
The Ottoman Interior Ministry, in a circular on 2 November 1915, confessed to the 
occurrence of ‘an economic vacuum arising from the transportation of Armenian 
craftsmen.’180 Owing to the fact that the bulk of the Armenians, like the Ottoman Kurds, lived 
in the Eastern provinces, the largest destruction was meted out to this region. A French report 
from Diyarbekir observed that ‘the mass exodus of Christians, most of whom were artisans 
and merchants, had created a major economic crisis in this region’ (Tachjian, 2004: 206). 
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After the forced expulsion and massacre of the Armenians, the CUP had designed and 
implemented a range of forced deportation policies targeting the Kurds. The settlement 
politics of the CUP entailed on the one hand, the deportation of Kurds from their homelands 
for resettlement in Central and Western Anatolia in accordance with the ‘5 per cent rule’: 
ensuring that the Kurds constituted no more than 5 per cent of the total population in their 
new places of settlement. And, on the other hand, settlement of Muslim immigrants, or 
muhacir, from lost territories, such as, Albanian Muslims, Bosnian Muslims and Bulgarian 
Turks, in Eastern Anatolia, where they were not allowed to constitute more than 10 per cent 
of the local population (Akçam, 2012: 43-50; Jongerden, 2007: 178-79).    
The mass forced deportation of the Ottoman Kurds
181
 began with the following order issued, 
subsequent to the deportation of the Armenians, on 2 May 1916 by the then Minister of the 
Interior, Mehmed Talat, to the governor of Diyarbekir: 
‘It is absolutely not allowable to send the Kurdish refugees to southern regions such as Urfa 
or Zor. Because they would either Arabize or preserve their nationality there and remain a 
useless and harmful element, the envisioned would not be accomplished and therefore the 
deportation and settlement of these refugees needs to carried out as follows. 
- Turkish refugees and the turkified city dwellers need to be deported to the Urfa, 
Maraş, and Anteb regions and settled there. 
- To prevent the Kurdish refugees from continuing their tribal life and their 
nationality wherever they have been deported, the chieftains need to be separated 
from the common people by all means, and all influential personalities and leaders 
need to be sent separately to the provinces of Konya and Kastamonu, and to the 
districts of Niğde and Kayseri. 
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- The sick, the elderly, lonely and deprived women and children who are unable to 
travel will be settled and supported in Maden town and Ergani and Behremaz 
counties, to be dispersed in Turkish villages and among Turks.’182  
Orders with similar contents were also sent to the provinces of Sivas, Mamuretülaziz and 
Erzurum and to the provincial districts of Urfa, Maraş and Antep on 4 May 1916 (Akçam, 
2012: 45-6). Another telegram sent to the province of Mosul on 6 May even listed each step 
of the policy of forced deportation of the Kurds: 
‘ (1) In order to reform the Kurdish element and transform it into a constructive entity it is 
obligatory to immediately displace and send then to the assigned places in Anatolia 
mentioned below; (2) The areas of resettlement are: the provinces of Konya, Ankara, and 
Kastamonu, and the provincial districts of Niğde, Kayseri, Kütahya, Eskişehir, Amasya, and 
Tokat; (3) In the place of resettlements the sheikhs, leaders and mullahs will be separated 
from the rest of the tribe and sent to different districts, either before or after the [other] 
member [of the tribe], in other words, to places from which they will be unable to maintain 
relations with the other members.’183  
The statistical data prepared by the Ministry of the Economy indicate that there were ‘well 
over a million’ Kurdish refugees and deportees in this period (Üngör, 2011: 117). Figures 
pertaining to the actual number of Kurdish deportations are non-existent, however. The 
common consensus in scholarly studies on this issue is that approximately 700,000 Kurds 
were forced to flee their homelands; around half of whom are reported to have perished 
before reaching their various destinations (Jwaideh, 1961: 369; Safrastian, 1948: 76). 
As briefly mentioned above, the deportation policy was a dual-track policy; along with the 
forced deportation of the Ottoman Kurds from their native lands, the CUP had ordered the 
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settlement of non-Kurdish Muslims who had fled from the lost Ottoman territories in Kurdish 
lands. As evinced, for instance, in the following instructions sent by the İAMM in 21 May 
1916 to the province of Mamuretülaziz: 
‘The Turkish refugees who surpass the province’s absorptive capacity will be sent to the 
areas of Urfa, Zor [Der Zor], Maraş and Ayıntab via the Ergani-Diyarbekır, Siverek route, 
while the Kurdish refugees will be sent to Kayseri, Yozgat, Ankara and Canik via Malatya-
Sivas-Tokat, and then via the route Malatya-Darende-Şarız-Aziziye.’184   
Despite the scarcity of data concerning the settlements of non-Kurdish Muslim settlers, the 
existent official records regarding the non-Kurdish Muslim settlers reveals that they resided 
in and worked on the ‘abandoned properties’ (emvâl-ı metrûke185) left behind by the 
Armenians and the Kurds. The precise number of the confiscated properties is not known, 
however, since Turkish state officials allege that the registers of the 33 Abandoned Properties 
Commission (Emvâl-ı Metruke Komisyonu) are ‘lost’ (Üngör and Polatel, 2011: 72).  
In 1924, an important report written by a research commission chaired by a leading CUP 
member, Cavid Bey, concluded that the new proprietors of the ‘abandoned properties’, who 
had possession of these properties as a result of ‘extraordinary permissions’, lacked 
‘economic education’ and resultantly wasted the wealth thorough ‘squander and 
dissipation.’186 This important report not only validates that Turkish and/or Turkophone 
migrants possessed the confiscated properties of the Armenians and the Kurds in the Eastern 
and Southeastern provinces, but it also indicates that these appropriated properties were not 
put to efficient use by their new occupiers. Thus, dispossession of land and properties, as well 
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as resulting in the pauperisation of the Armenians and the Kurds, had burdensome negative 
repercussions for regional productivity and prosperity.  
Overall, by the end of the war the Ottoman economy shrunk by around 50 per cent and its 
GDP fell by 40 per cent. The destruction caused by the war in the different sectors of the 
Ottoman economy are succinctly summarised by the following figures pertaining to the 
declines experienced during the war: mineral production fell by 80 per cent, coal production 
by 75 per cent, cotton textiles by 50 per cent, wheat production by 40, and sheep and goat by 
40 per cent (Eldem, 1970: 73-9).  
Life for the population in Ottoman Kurdistan that had survived the War had been reduced to 
abject misery and destitution as famine and bacterial diseases like typhus and typhoid, took 
their toll. Due to the destruction of the Eastern economy during the course of the First World 
War, the famine that began at the end of 1917 struck the Eastern and Southeastern provinces 
more acutely than elsewhere in the Empire (McDowall, 2000:108-09).  
4.3 From the Mudros Armistice of 1918 to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 
Istanbul signed the Mudros Armistice on 30 October 1918. Owing to the defeat of the 
Ottoman forces in Mesopotamia and Syria in the period leading up to the Mudros Armistice, 
it was unavoidable that the map of the Middle East would be redrawn; with inevitable 
spillover effects for Ottoman Kurdish lands. The details of the Anglo-French plan for the 
Middle East, the Sykes-Picot Agreement (May 1916), which had been exposed by the 
Bolsheviks a month after the October Revolution (1917), revealed how the Allied victors 
proposed to redraw the map of the Middle East. This agreement projected that most of 
Anatolia be taken from Ottoman control and the Russian Empire be rewarded with the 
Eastern provinces and the Straits, Greece with the region around Izmir and Italy with South-
West Anatolia (Fisher, 1959: 369-70). After the October Revolution, however, the Soviets 
had stated their opposition to this imperialist plan, and the void created by their withdrawal 
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was proposed to be filled by the British by endowing to Britain as ‘zones of influence’ the 
‘Cossack territories, the territory of the Caucasus, Armenia, Georgia, and Kurdistan’ 
(McDowall, 2000: 115).  
This decision triggered the Ottoman and British scramble for Kurdistan. For the former the 
key objective was to preserve what remained of the Empire, and the loss of the strategic and 
naturally rich eastern provinces would have been a major setback. For Britain the issue of 
Kurdistan had been secondary to the main territories she had been interested in, namely, 
Mesopotamia (Iraq) and Syria, but it unavoidably partook in the decision making process 
regarding the future of Kurdistan because of its strategic position in Mesopotamia. The 
following words of Arnold Wilson in 1919, Acting Civil Commissioner in Baghdad, deftly 
summarises the objectives of Britain: 
‘The whole basis of our action as regards Kurds should be in my opinion the assurance of a 
satisfactory boundary to Mesopotamia. Such a boundary cannot possibly be secured, I 
imagine, in the plains, but must be found in the Kurdish mountains […] [and that] entails a 
tribal policy.’187 
With the latterly mentioned apprehension concerning the Eastern provinces in Ottoman 
minds, the recognition of the Kurdish claims appeared prudent to the Ottoman statesmen in 
order to dissuade the Kurds from making common cause with the Armenians. Accordingly, 
both components of the (dual) state power that emerged in the years between the end of the 
First World War and the establishment of the Turkish Republic – i.e. the palace-backed 
government in Istanbul and the new government led by Mustafa Kemal in Ankara – 
acknowledged the previously suppressed demands of the Kurds. The Amasya Protocol, a 
document signed in 1919 at a time of accord between the Istanbul government and founders 
of the Ankara Assembly and later the Turkish Republic, testifies that both of these 
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constituents had recognised that the Kurds would be granted ethnic and cultural rights in 
order to warrant their free development (Yeğen, 2011: 68).  
In a public interview held immediately before the proclamation of the Turkish Republic 
Mustafa Kemal stated: 
‘In accordance with our constitution, a kind of local autonomy is to be granted. Hence, 
provinces inhabited by the Kurds will rule themselves autonomously […] 
The Grand National Assembly of Turkey is composed of the deputies of both Kurds and 
Turks and these two peoples have unified their interests and fates’ (ibid.). 
Besides these assurances, Mustafa Kemal making Islam the linch-pin of the Kemalist struggle 
against the ‘Christian invaders’, promising to conserve the caliphate and pledging to liberate 
the province of Mosul from British occupation, played a determinate role in persuading the 
mainstream Kurdish leaders to coalesce with Ankara during the War of Independence (1919-
22) (H. Bozarslan, 2008: 338; McDowall, 2000: 187).  
This collaboration, however, had been threatened by the Kurdish uprisings that began in 
Dersim and spread to various other parts of Ottoman Kurdistan between 1921 and 1922 by 
Kurdish notables who were discontent and fearful of Ankara’s headship. Colonel Alfred 
Rawlinson (1867-1934), a British liaison officer in Anatolia, conveying the general 
perception and attitude of the Kurds vis-à-vis the Ankara government in one of the Foreign 
Office Memorandums in 1922, notes the following observations that sheds much light on the 
growing disgruntlement of the Kurds towards the end of the War of Independence:  
‘the Kurds are left enormously in the majority in the eastern districts of Anatolia and all 
Turkish posts there being very weakly held at the mercy of the local Kurds…the principal 
Kurdish chiefs are entirely dissatisfied…and extremely antagonistic towards Turks.’188  
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Despite these conflicts, the Kurds were unable to create a unified and effective opposition, 
because of their inability to develop a cohesive idea of Kurdish identity owing to being 
fragmented by tribal and religious allegiances as well as by language and socio-economic 
activity. This disunity amongst Kurds had been evident with the differing approaches to the 
question of Kurdish autonomy on the eve and during the War of Independence. 
At the onset of the War of Independence, the Kurdish national movement that had organised 
around Kurdish societies re-emerged. The official representative, Şerif Paşa, of the most 
influential Kurdish society, Kürd Teali Cemiyeti (Society for Kurdish Advancement) (1918), 
started negotiations with the Armenian delegate, Bughos Nubar, for the Paris Peace 
Conference (1919-1920) to assure the independence of the two countries. The negotiations 
concluded with a Kurdo-Armenian accord. In a joint declaration on 20 November 1919, both 
parties affirmed that they agreed on an independent Kurdistan and Armenia, only to be 
rejected by a sizeable section of Kurdish leaders because of their bitter memories with the 
Armenian troops and their willingness to ally with Ankara due to the promises made by 
Mustafa Kemal. The majority in Armenia who were in favour of the Armenian case for six 
eastern provinces also opposed this accord (Jwaideh, 1961: 376-78).  
The only major Kurdish revolt against the Kemalists during the War of Independence had 
been the Koçgiri revolt, which took place in 1921 in the predominantly Alevi Dersim area. 
This revolt had endangered the Kemalist-Kurdish alliance as the rebel leaders had the 
following demands: 
i) Acceptance by Ankara of Kurdish autonomy as agreed by Istanbul as per the 
Sevres Treaty;    
ii) The release of Kurdish prisoners in Elaziz (Elazığ), Erzincan, Malatya and Sivas; 
iii) The withdrawal of all Turkish officials from areas with a Kurdish majority;  
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iv) The withdrawal of all Turkish forces from the Koçgiri region in West Dersim, 
which because of lying west of the Euphrates had been excluded from the area 
formally designated at Sevres as part of an autonomous Kurdistan.  
Aside from being badly organised, the revolt had not been able to mobilise sufficient support 
from the Sunni Kurds since they perceived it as an Alevi uprising. Predictably, the Turkish 
forces defeated it by April 1921 (Olson, 1989, 26-33).  
On account of the successful War of Independence, the Sevres Treaty (10 August 1920) was 
superseded by the Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923). This new Treaty carved up Kurdistan 
and annulled the possibility of its independence and autonomy. The only protection it offered 
to the Kurds was the safeguarding of their linguistic rights under Article 39: 
‘No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any language in 
private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at 
public meetings. Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities 
shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own 
language before the courts’ (McDowall, 2000:142). 
4.4 Society, Economics and Politics in the Republican People’s Party Era (1923-1950) 
 
Consolidation of the ‘National Economy’ and the ‘Reform’ of the East (1923-1929) 
With the proclamation of the Turkish Republic (29 October 1923) the aforementioned 
Kemalist-Kurdish alliance collapsed, and many Kurdish notables followed the path of the 
Alevi Kurdish rebels in Dersim. This rupture stemmed largely from three principal factors. 
First, after the Armistice in October 1923, Turkish nationalism had become Turkey’s official 
and hegemonic ideology. This new ideology conceived national and linguistic differences as 
existential threats to the Turkish Republic and for that reason ruthlessly repressed them. 
Second, the promises made by Mustafa Kemal to the Kurds before 1923 were reneged on 
with the foundation of the Republic. After the proclamation of the Turkish Republic the 
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existence of the Kurdish identity was negated, the caliphate was abolished (3 March 1924) 
and the vilayet of Mosul in southern Kurdistan was not liberated from British occupation as 
promised under the National Pact (Misak-ı Milli) in 1920.  
Third, the Lausanne conference produced a major problem: the future of the vilayet of Mosul. 
Kemalists were alarmed by the apparent willingness of Britain to offer the Kurds in Mosul a 
certain degree of local autonomy during the Lausanne negotiations, because of the possible 
spillover effects of such a Kurdish polity for the Kurds on north of the border.
189
 In other 
words, the Turkish officials were fretful that an autonomous Kurdish political entity would 
foster autonomist tendencies amongst the Kurds living in Turkey; in the same way that the 
successful revolt led by Ismail Agha Simko in 1920 established a short lived independent 
Kurdish state in eastern Kurdistan (Arfa, 1966: 48-64, Koohi-Kamali, 2003: 66-83, 
McDowall, 2000: 141-42).  
The predominantly Kurdish ESA were the only domains in Turkey not to be turkified at the 
inception of the Turkish Republic; therefore, in the eyes of the Kemalist rulers these 
territories were areas wherein potential secessionist threats could originate. The perceived 
risk of Kurdish self-rule by the Republican rulers informed the discriminatory Kurdish 
policies during the single-party period (1923-1945), which led to neglect and further 
peripheralisation of these primarily Kurdish regions of the new Turkish nation-state, a theme 
explored below. This perhaps explains why the alteration in the Kemalist attitude towards the 
Kurds had overlapped with the Lausanne Conference, which was held in two sessions, from 
20 November 1922 to 4 February 1923 and then from 23 April until 24 July 1923.  
The Izmir Economic Congress 
The major change of policy vis-à-vis the Kurds took place at the Izmir Economic Congress 
(17 February-4 March 1923). This Congress convened during the interval in the deliberations 
                                                          
189 See Mustafa Kemal’s (Atatürk) Speeches in Eskişehir and İzmit in 1923 in Perinçek (1993: 94-6). 
228 
 
of the Lausanne Conference, with the attendance of 1,135 delegates (İnan, 1972: 12) mostly 
from the dominant classes, i.e. big landowners and the merchant bourgeoisie, as well as from 
the labouring classes (Boratav, 1982: 14-8). When Mustafa Kemal’s speech to this Congress 
was published all references to the Kurds had been excised
190
 (McDowall, 2000: 191), which 
implied a fundamental shift in the policies of Ankara towards the Kurds in Turkey. 
Such an alteration was not adversative to the purpose and principles of the 1923 Congress of 
Economics, as this Congress espoused to consolidate the foundations of the Turkish ‘national 
economy’ envisioned and set out by the CUP during the First World War as the basic strategy 
of the new Turkish nation-state. The principles adopted in the Izmir Economic Congress 
pertained to the preparation of: a property regime, an institutional structure required for the 
operation of a modern market economy, and special incentives designed for the enrichment 
and development of the indigenous bourgeoisie. Specifically, the Congress decided to 
encourage domestic production, prohibit the import of luxury goods, and permit foreign 
direct investment if the investors refrained from seeking political concessions. Other 
important decisions included the abolishment of the tithe and its replacement with a tax on 
soil produce, establishing an industrial bank, which would provide credit to the industrialists, 
and adoption of the Law for the Encouragement of Industry (Boratav; 1982; Toprak, 1983, 
Yalman, 2009).  
After this Congress, and throughout the Republican era (1923-1950), one of the central 
objectives of the Kemalists was, in the words of an official report of the ruling Republican 
Peoples Party’ General Secretariat in 1939-40, to ‘dismantle the territorial unity of Kurds’ 
and ‘Turkify the Eastern population’ (Bulut, 1998: 185-89). The rulers of Republican Turkey 
did not hold back from openly propagating their plans for the Kurds in Turkey. Quintessential 
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examples of this are the exchanges the Foreign Minister of the Turkish Republic, Tevfik 
Rüştü Aras (1883-1972), had with the foreign diplomats in 1926-27.  
Aras, in 1926, stated to the British administrator of Iraq, Sir Henry Dobbs (1871-1934), that 
the central governors of Turkey were ‘determined to clear out the Kurds of their valleys, the 
richest part of Turkey to-day, and settle Turkish peasants there’, and averred that ‘the Kurds 
would for many generations incapable of self-government’191. Consequently, the forthright 
Foreign Minister made plain to the representatives of the international community that the 
Kemalist governors of the Turkish Republic were adamant to forcibly displace the Kurds 
from their ancestral lands, and encumber any form of Kurdish self-determination or polity. In 
1927, the Turkish Foreign Minister had in the presence of Sir George Clerk (1874-1951), the 
British Ambassador to Turkey, reiterated similar policy objectives based on social Darwinian 
premises: 
‘They [Kurds] will die out, economically unfitted for the struggle for life in competition with 
the more advanced and cultured Turk, who will be settled in the Kurdish districts. After all 
there are less than 500,000 Kurds in Turkey to-day, of whom as many as can will emigrate 
into Persia and Iraq, while the rest will simply undergo the elimination of the unfit.’192  
In order to ensure the ‘elimination’ of the so-called ‘economically unfit’ Kurds, moreover, 
Fevzi Çakmak (1876-1950), the first Chief of the General Staff of the Republic of Turkey and 
an architect of the Kurdish policy of the Turkish state during the Republican era, had around 
the same time argued that the predominantly Kurdish provinces of Turkey should deliberately 
be kept underdeveloped. Marshall Çakmak suspected that ‘economic development and wealth 
would accelerate the level of consciousness and thus lead to the development of nationalism 
among the Kurds’ (A. H. Kılıç, 1998: 97). Put differently, the influential Marshall maintained 
that in order to nullify the probability of the existence of a Kurdish polity it is necessary to 
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forestall social and economic development in areas predominantly populated by Kurds, 
namely, ESA. Thus, the denial of economic opportunity for Kurds, which could potentially 
provide the economic base of an indigenous Kurdish state, was construed as the best possible 
shield against the ostensible separatist threat, as well as increasing the strength and viability 
of the Turkish state.  
The avowals by the two senior figures of the RPP government indicate that since the 
foundation of the Turkish Republic the Kemalists sought to procure the densification and 
power of the dominant ethnic group, the Turks, at the expense of the Kurds in ESA; with the 
anticipation that the latter will gradually extinguish or become a powerless ethnic entity. The 
cornerstones of this strategy were threefold: a) the forced deportation of the Kurds from their 
native lands; b) the assimilation of the Kurds into the Turkish identity; and c) the 
underdevelopment of the areas predominantly inhabited by the Kurds.  
The Republican rulers aim of ‘turkifying’ the heterogeneous Eastern provinces and, in turn, 
extinguishing the Kurdish identity or rendering the Kurds a feeble entity had played a 
determinate role in the creation of a chaotic atmosphere in the predominantly Kurdish 
southeast of Turkey in the early years of the Turkish Republic. During the first two decades 
of the Republic, there were twenty-seven Kurdish revolts, and only one out of the eighteen 
Turkish military expeditions during the years 1924-38 transpired outside of Kurdistan. Three 
of these revolts, namely, the Şeyh Said revolt (1925), the Ararat revolt (1930) and the Dersim 
revolt (1936-38), had a distinctive influence on the evolution of the RPP regime and its 
Kurdish policy. 
Şeyh Said Revolt and the 1925 Reform Plan  
The Şeyh Said revolt had taken place against the backdrop of increasing hostility between the 
Kurds and the Kemalist state largely due to the contested decisions taken by the latter 
between 1923 and 1924. During the election of the new Grand National Assembly in the 
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summer of 1923, Kurdish deputies were denied the right to return to their constituencies and 
candidates selected by the government replaced them. In the same year, the Kemalists had 
also abolished the caliphate, which was interpreted by the Sunni Kurds as an attack on their 
collective and religious identity. Furthermore, in March 1924, despite Article 39 in the Treaty 
of Lausanne, the Turkish state had officially prohibited the use of Kurdish in schools and law 
courts and insisted on the use of Turkish in official domains – traditional Kurdish clothing 
and music were also banned.  
The 1925 revolt, led by a Kurdish religious dignitary, the Naqshbandi Sheikh Mehmed Said 
of Piran
193
 (1865-1925), was initially organised with the aim of establishing an independent 
Kurdistan by the leadership of the Azadi (Freedom) Committee composed of Kurdish 
intellectuals and officers who had been arrested in September 1924 after the failed mutiny 
attempt. The Şeyh Said uprising truly threatened the Kemalist state to the extent that Ankara 
mobilised 52,000 soldiers, spent around a third of its annual budget, proclaimed martial law 
in almost all of the predominantly Kurdish provinces and negotiated with the French 
authorities to gain use of the southern railways in order to supress it. These measures by the 
Turkish were not to no avail as the revolt was crushed in spring 1925 at the gates of 
Diyarbekir (renamed Diyarbakır) (Olson, 1989: 91-127; McDowall, 2000: 192-96; H. 
Bozarslan, 2008:339-41).   
Subsequent to the Şeyh Said revolt, Atatürk, on 8 September 1925, authorised the creation of 
the Reform Council for the East (Şark İslahat Encümanı)194 in order to devise concrete policy 
prescriptions to deal once and for all with any potential separatist threat from the Kurdish 
society. Pursuant to this, on 24 September 1925 a special report entitled the Şark İslahat 
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Raporu (Report for Reform in the East) was prepared and presented to the Turkish Assembly. 
This secret report, which saw daylight as a result of a series of official reports published by 
Mehmet Bayrak (1993, 1994) in the 1990s, made the following critical recommendations:  
i) Preventing the Kurdish political and social elite from reviving as a ruling class; 
ii) Clearing persons, families, and their relatives whose residence ‘in the east the 
government deems inappropriate’; 
iii) Reuniting and governing all of the provinces located on the East bank of the 
Euphrates River via the military administrative unit of ‘Inspectorates-General’195 
by martial law for an unspecified period of time; 
iv) Emphatically prohibiting the use ‘of all non-Turkish languages’ and the 
‘employment of the Kurds in even secondary offices’;  
v) Allocation of seven million Turkish Lira (TL) in order to finance the settlement 
and the livelihoods of the Turkish refugees and transportation of the Kurds 
(Bayrak, 1993: 481-89). 
Consequently, a series of deportation laws were implemented between 1925 and 1927 
actuating the recommendations in this report. On 10 December 1925, the ruling RPP 
government led by Prime Minister İsmet İnönü had passed law number 675, titled ‘Law on 
Migrants, Refugees, and Tribes Who Leave Their Local Settlements Without Permission’. On 
31 May 1926, the government enacted the ‘Settlement Law’. This piece of legislation 
permitted the Interior Ministry to identify: 
(i) ‘Individuals who do not fall under Turkish culture, those of infected with syphilis, 
persons suffering from leprosy and their families, and those convicted of murder 
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except for political and military crimes, anarchists, spies, gypsies, and those who 
have been expelled from the country’ (the appendix to this law considered the 
‘Pomaks, Bosniaks, and Tatars’ in the Turkish culture);  
(ii)  ‘Migratory tribes in the country and all the nomads’, with the aim of ‘transporting 
[them] to suitable and available places’ (Üngör, 2011: 138).     
This was not the last of deportation orders. The RPP government on 10 June 1927 passed the 
‘Law Regarding the Transportation of Certain Persons from Eastern Regions to the Western 
Regions’. This new deportation law was akin to the expulsion orders of 1915-6. In the words 
of the British Ambassador Sir George Clerk, it empowered the government to ‘transport from 
the Eastern Vilayets an indefinite number of Kurds or other elements…the Government has 
already begun to apply to the Kurdish elements…the policy which so successfully disposed 
of the Armenian Minority in 1915.’196 Despite the lack of factual data according to the figures 
cited by contemporary Kurdish authors, from 1925 to 1928 more than 500,000 people 
deported of whom some 200,000 were estimated to have perished in the abovementioned 
provinces (Bedirkhan, 1958: 52-3).  
The Law on the Maintenance of Order 1925-29 
The 1925 Revolt was a catalyst for more than the suppression of the Kurdish national 
movement as it led to the implementation on 4 March 1925 of an extraordinary law entitled 
The Law on the Maintenance of Order (Takrir-i Sükün Kanunu), which remained in force 
until March 1929. The Law on the Maintenance of Order marked the end of political 
pluralism and free press in Turkey. This piece of legislation was used within the first few 
months of its enactment by the Republican government to outlaw the opposition party, 
Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Progressive Republican Party), and the only publications 
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not banned were the government publication, Hakimiyet-i Milliye (National Sovereignty), as 
well as the pro-establishment national paper, Cumhuriyet (Republic).  
The Law on the Maintenance of Order empowered the government to enact a wide range of 
legislations in order to attain a top-down transformation of society according to the Western 
model, which the Kemalist perceived as the universal model of civilisation and progress as 
well as a precondition for economic progress (Ahmad, 1993: 79-93; McDowall, 2000: 198-
202; Zürcher, 1994: 179-84). The direct and indirect effects of these new acts, which will be 
elucidated below, are commonly held in the literature on the initial years of the Turkish 
Republic to have stimulated modernisation and capitalist development in Turkey (Ahmad, 
1993; Z. Aydın, 1986; Hershlag, 1968; Issawi, 1980). In other words, despite the economic 
restrictions agreed to as per the economic concessions appended to the Lausanne Treaty
197
, 
the new acts implemented during the lifetime of the Law on the Maintenance of Order are 
commonly thought to have instigated important socio-economic changes. These pivotal 
developments were the fostering of the indigenous capitalist class, the nurturing of a legal 
and institutional structure that provided the conditions for capital accumulation, and the 
transformation of society in accordance with norms of the idealised Western civilisation. 
During the period between the enactment and repealment of the Law on the Maintenance of 
Order, the Gregorian calendar was adopted (1 January 1926). Within the same year, the 
Islamic code of law, sharia, was annulled. Subsequently, the government introduced a civil 
code patterned on the Swiss Civil Code, followed by a Penal Code based on the Penal Code 
of Mussolini’s Italy, and a Commercial Code centred largely on the German and Italian codes 
(Ahmad, 1993: 79-80, Issawi, 1980: 367).  
According to the 1927 Census, Turkey had 65,245 industrial enterprises, the overwhelming 
majority of which had been small workshops. The enterprises with more than five workers 
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constituted only 8.94 per cent of these registered industrial firms (Hershlag, 1968: 54; 
Zürcher, 1994: 204). Relatedly, in 1927, the state implemented the Law for the 
Encouragement of Industry. This new piece of legislation made state lands available to 
entrepreneurs, exempted many essential materials from import duties and reduced freight 
charges and taxes. One of the indicators of the impact of this Law during the 1920s is the fact 
that out of the 1,473 industrial enterprises which reaped the benefits of the Law in 1932, only 
342 had been established before 1923 (Hershlag, 1968: 54-5, Thornburg, 1949: 24-5).  
In 1928, the Kemalist state replaced the Arabic script with the Latin in the writing of Turkish 
(Ahmad, 1993: 80-2). In addition, after the mid-1920s, for purposes of accelerating economic 
development and maintaining political control, the Turkish state had set as one of its central 
aims the task of modernising transportation. In accordance with this objective, the state 
nationalised the foreign concessions in this sector and embarked on the development of an 
extensive transport network in order to cover the country with a dense network of railways 
and roads, stretching to the distant regions of Anatolia. Railway projects in particular 
absorbed high state investments during the first decade of the Republic. Eight hundred km of 
track were laid between 1923 and 1929, and in 1929, another 800 km were under 
construction (Barlas, 1998:89-92, Hershlag, 1968: 231-36; Rivkin, 1965: 63-4).  
In order to overcome one of the main drawbacks of the nascent national industrial enterprises, 
that is, adequate initial capital, great importance was imputed to banking facilities, in 
particular to the İş Bankası (Business Bank) established in August 1924 (Ahmad, 1993: 96; 
Hershlag, 1968: 56-7). Its nominal capital was raised in 1927 to 4 million TL. The short and 
long-term deposits held in this Bank increased from 8,061,377 TL in 1925 to 43,839,567 TL 
in 1929 (Hershlag, 1968: 56). 
The role of the Ziraat Bankası (Agricultural Bank, established in 1889) underwent 
magnification by the Kemalist state after 1924 to granting of loans, purchase and sale of 
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agricultural produce, purchase of land, participation in companies dealing with agriculture 
and dealing with the materials needed by the peasants. The augmentation in the role and 
capabilities of this Bank in the early years of the Republic was uneven and not attuned to the 
actual needs of the peasantry, since it did not overcome the overreliance of the peasantry on 
the usurers and big landowners (Z. Aydın, 1986: 31-7; Hershlag, 1968: 48-9).  
 In line with the newly defined roles, there had been an increase in the outstanding credit limit 
of this Bank: from 53% of the paid-up capital during the War of Independence to over 100% 
after 1924. Resultantly, a drastic rise in the level of loans handled by this Bank: from 928,000 
TL in 1922 to 25,880,000 TL in 1929 (Hershlag, 1968: 48-9). Such expansions are believed 
to have played an influential role in the recovery and development of the agriculture in 
Turkey after the mid-1920s (Issawi, 1980: 367). The main beneficiaries of the thrust of 
agricultural policies between 1923 and 1929 were, however, the large commercial producers 
of exportable cash crops, concentrated in the Aegean and Mediterranean regions (Margulies 
and Yıldızoğlu, 1987: 273). 
Uneven Post-War Recovery  
Between 1923 and 1929, the Turkish economy recovered, and by 1929, it appeared to have 
regained its pre-war level. For instance, per capita GDP in 1923 was 40 per cent below its 
1914 level, but by the end of the 1920s, it had attained the levels prevailing prior to the First 
World War (Pamuk, 2008: 276-77). Besides, as illustrated by Table 4.1 below, when 
compared to the pre-war Ottoman levels, considerable developments had taken place in the 
sphere of education and in transport. 
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Table 4.1 Indicators of development, 1913-1928 
Year                                                                             1913           1923          1928          
Population (millions) 17  13 13.8 
 
Foreign Trade (million dollars)                                               179 137 202 
 
GDP per capita (1948 prices Turkish Lira)  … 254 330 
 
Agricultural Production (millions of liras 1940 prices) …   1,522           2,254 
 
Industrial production (millions of liras 1948 prices)  … 421 662 
 
Wheat (million tons) 3.4 1.0 1.9 
 
Tobacco (thousand tons) 49 45 50 
 
Cotton (thousand tons) 30 44 51 
 
Coal (million tons) 0.8 0.6 1.3 
 
Refined Sugar (thousand tons) … …              4.3 
 
Cement (thousand tons) …              …              59 
 
Electricity (million kWh)  20               40 90 
 
Railways (thousand kilometers)   3.6 4.1 4.8 
 
Students in schools (thousands) … 359 517  
 
 
Source: Issawi, 1980: 368. 
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However, the predominantly Kurdish provinces
198
 in ESA (Beyazıt, Bitlis, Diyarbekir, Elaziz 
(Elazığ), Erzincan, Hakkari, Kars, Malatya, Mardin, Siirt, Urfa and Van), which in 1927 were 
home to around a quarter (14.6%) of the general population of Turkey (13,660,275
199
), did 
not develop in parallel with the rest of the country. These regions had been the least affected 
quarters by the post-war recovery witnessed in the Turkish Republic between the years of 
1923 and 1929. Despite the aforementioned transport infrastructure projects, by 1930 there 
were no railroads constructed in these provinces.
200
 In 1927, only 900 of the 14,000 schools 
in Turkey were located in these domains.
201
 In the whole of ESA, furthermore, by 1930 there 
was only one bank, namely, the Elaziz İktisat Bankası, established in 1929, which had a 
nominal capital of 50,000 TL.
202
 Thus, obtaining loans were virtually impossible.  
According to the official data from 1927, when compared with the nine designated 
agricultural districts in Turkey, each of which was composed of 5-9 provinces, the districts 
comprising of the predominantly Kurdish provinces in ESA, i.e. districts five and six, 
contained the least amount of agricultural tools and machinery. Only 119,665 out of 
1,413,509 of the necessary agricultural tools and machinery were to be found in the provinces 
located in these regions.
203
  
In the late 1920s, as evinced by the following figures demonstrative of the calamitous 
imbalance between the unproductive and productive sectors in the predominantly Kurdish 
towns in 1927, the productive sector in these provinces had been in a dismal state:  
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45,863 soldiers (this figure is solely of the soldiers stationed in these in this region and 
therefore it is not inclusive of the armies mobilised to deal with specific military tasks in the 
region) and 1,841 magistrates as against 25,327 merchants, 32,496 artisans and workers and 
21,095 in various other unclassified professions. This was at a time when 1,400,209 active 
people were unemployed in this region, which accounted for over 16 per cent of the total 
number of unemployed people in Turkey.
204
  
Although there are no official regional trade statistics to cite, the following report from the 
British consul in Trabzon in June 1926 indicates that the trade in the mid-1920s in the 
Kurdish provinces was a shadow of what it had been during the First World War: 
 ‘Travellers report having seen great numbers of Kurds with their families and cattle being 
driven along Erzurum-Erzinjan [Erzincan] road presumably bound for Angora [Ankara] and 
Western Anatolia. Whole villages are deserted, and trade is at a standstill over a large 
area.’205 
The policy of deporting the Kurdish political and the economic elite, moreover, adversely 
affected the trade and wealth creation in this region of Turkey, as revealed by the following 
observation of a British traveller in the summer of 1929: 
‘One of the main weapons employed was the deportation of the rich and powerful Kurdish 
families…in the process they have lost all their belongings, and there is not, so I was told, a 
single wealthy or powerful Kurd in Turkish Kurdistan to-day.’206 
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The Great Depression, Etatism and the Resettlement of Kurds (1929-1939) 
The year 1929 was a critical year for the Turkish Republic. On the one hand, the economic 
restrictions agreed to in the Lausanne Treaty ended. On the other, the negative impacts of the 
world economic crisis began to be felt by Turkey, and the Kemalist regime were, yet again, 
facing a rapidly growing Kurdish resistance led by the pro-self-rule Khoybun (Independence) 
Committee. By the autumn of 1929, Khoybun had dominated an area from Ararat as far south 
as Khushab, south of Van, and pressed for Kurdish autonomy. Within a year or so, by means 
of massive military expeditions, in close alliance with Iran, the Ararat rising was supressed 
by the Kemalist forces (Alakom, 1998; van Bruinessen, 1992: 376-393). Whereas the 
negative ramifications of the 1929 Great Depression had kept aggravating. 
The initial effects of the economic crisis were to be seen in the fall in the prices of 
agricultural produce: the principal source of income of the population of Turkey and the 
lion’s share of Turkish exports. Agriculture was by far the largest sector, it accounted for 
approximately half of the GDP and employed three-fourths of the labour force (Pamuk, 2008: 
279). For example, compared to 1925, agricultural prices in 1932 and 1933 fell by one-third, 
and, in turn, the value of exports declined vastly. Turkey had received over 1 million TL for 
around 14 thousand tons of wheat exported in 1926. In 1931, it was in receipt of the same 
amount for almost 26 thousand tons (Barlas, 1998: 81).  
The year 1929 saw the greatest deficit, amounting to 101 million TL, with imports at 256 
million TL and exports at 155 million TL (Hershlag, 1968: 66). The economic situation in 
Turkey worsened with a corresponding depreciation of the Turkish lira against the sterling 
pound (Ahmad, 1993: 96-7; Zürcher, 1994:205). Consequently, the cost of paying public debt 
rose very sharply to the extent that the state was forced to suspend payments to foreign 
creditors in 1930 (Ahmad, 1993: 96). 
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Turkey’s reaction to the Great Depression was similar to that of America and Western 
European countries. It implemented protectionist trade policy and increased government 
activity in the sphere of economy. This was done with the aim stabilising the economy and 
strengthening the national industry, a target set in the 1920s but the implementation of which 
thus far proved slow due to the economic restrictions appended to the Lausanne Treaty. 
Accordingly, between 1929 and 1931, the state ratified a wide range of measures in order to 
attain stability and promote the indigenous industry. A new tariff policy, Tariff Regulation of 
1929, came into effect at the beginning of the Depression in order to protect the local 
industry. This policy was followed by the introduction of foreign exchange controls in 
December 1929, after a very high demand for foreign currency for large imports in that year. 
It was this excess in demand that initiated the abovementioned depreciation of the Turkish 
lira. In addition, a system of import quotas and restrictions on the import of certain 
commodities were implemented by the Turkish state as of November 1931 (Hershlag, 1968: 
66-7).       
Etatist Turkey 
Despite the steps towards implementing ètatist policies when the Great Depression took its 
toll on the Turkish economy, it was not until the third congress of the RPP (10-18 May 1931) 
that the ruling Party formally adopted ètatism
207
 (devletçilik) as a new economic policy and 
made it one of the pillars of Kemalist ideology (Boratav, 1982: 59-60). Ètatism in this study 
will denote the direct intervention by the state in the economic life of capitalist society, by 
way of nationalisation, by the administration of prices, and control of wages, as well as social 
welfare legislation. After its official adoption at the RPP Congress, ètatism, along with the 
other five principles or ‘arrows’ (i.e. Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Secularism and 
                                                          
207
 For detailed and differing interpretations of Etatism in Turkey, see: Boratav (1982); Hale (1981: 53-85) and 
Hershlag (1968: 61-122).    
242 
 
Revolutionarism) adopted at the same Congress, was officially inscribed as Article 2 of the 
Turkish Constitution in 1937.  
In the party programme of the RRP, moreover, ètatism was described with the following 
words: 
‘Although considering private work and activity a basic idea, it is one of our main principles 
to interest the State activity in matters where the general and vital interests of the nation are 
in question, especially in the economic field, in order to lead the nation and the country to 
prosperity in as short time as possible.’208  
The central feature of this new economic policy was to protect and strengthen the national 
private sector by assisting and carrying out economic ventures that the private sector was 
unable and/or unwilling to carry out (Ahmad, 1994: 100; Hershlag, 1986: 73). With this aim 
in mind, the Five-Year economic plan was drawn up in 1933. The anonymous authors of this 
plan had stated that the top priority for Turkey had to be nationalistic industrialisation: 
‘Despite the political and economic disagreements between them, the powerful industrial 
countries are essentially in agreement in reducing agricultural countries to a status of primary 
producers and in dominating their internal markets. To this end, they will eventually use their 
political influence to prevent the present movement in the agricultural countries. Some 
agricultural countries may accept this situation in return for minimal concessions. This 
reality, in particular, drives us to establish the industry we need without any delay’ (Boratav, 
1981: 186-87). 
Consequently, the Five-Year Plan, which was approved by the Government on January 9, 
1934, aimed at establishing twenty industrial plants, with a special focus on setting up import 
substituting industries in textiles, sugar, cement, paper and mining (İnan, 1972: 15; Tezel, 
1982: 141). As outlined in Table 4.2 below, almost all of these plants were to be located in 
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Central and Western Anatolia. Only two factories had been situated in ESA (i.e. the textile 
factories in Iğdır and Malatya), which is considered to be one of the main drawbacks of the 
Five-Year Plan (Küçük, 1978: 248-49). 
With Soviet technical assistance and loans of 8 million dollars, the first quinquennial plan 
had been launched in May 1934, and between 1934 and 1938, it was put into operation. The 
loan attained from the Soviet Union covered a small portion of the total investments, which 
stood at around 100 million TL by 1938 (Hale, 1981:56; Hershlag, 1968:81). In order to 
finance and control the operation of the projects in the Five-Year Plan important agencies 
were established during the 1930s.  
The state bank, Sümerbank, which replaced the Türkiye Sanayi Kredi Bankası (Bank for 
Industry) and the Devlet Sanayi Ofisi (State Industry Office) in June 1933, became a pivotal 
institution in the field of industrialisation throughout the Five-Year Plan. It took on the role of 
planning and establishing new enterprises, operating state-owned factories, and carrying out 
banking functions (Barlas, 1998:96; Boratav, 1982:197-98; Hale, 1981: 57). A second state 
agency, Etibank, was established in 1935, with the development of mining as its main 
function. The law that had established Etibank, moreover, attributed a wide range of roles to 
this bank; from the purchase and sale of mines of minerals to establishing or participating in 
the foundation of trade organisation in the mining sector and dealing with all kinds of 
banking transactions (Hershlag, 1968: 92-3; Hale, 1981: 57). Hence, both organisations, 
which acted as state-owned holding companies with banking functions, unified investment 
and financing activities.  
The number of large private firms benefitting from the Law for Encouragement of Industry 
reached 1,397 in 1935. The investment in these establishments rose from 63 million TL in 
1935 to around 266 million TL in 1939. At the same time the value of net output in these 
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enterprises rose from 104 million TL in 1935 to 266 million TL in 1939 (Hershlag, 1968: 
106). 
Table 4.2 Industrial plants established under the Five-Year Plan 
Industry  Type/Location 
Chemical  Artificial Silk (Gemlik) 
Semicoke (Zonguldak) 
Attar of roses (Isparta) 
Sulphuric Acid (Izmit) 
Superphosphates (Izmit) 
Chlorine and caustic Soda (Izmit)   
Cotton Textiles 
 
Yarn and Cotton Fabric:  
Bakırköy, Kayseri, Ereğli, Nazilli and Malatya 
Yarn: 
Iğdır 
Earthenware  
 
Ceramics (Kütahya) 
Glass and bottles (Paşabahçe-Istanbul) 
Hemp Kastamonu 
Iron  Karabük 
Paper and Cellulose İzmit 
Sponge  Bodrum 
Sulphur  Keçiborlu 
Worsted Bursa 
 
The state had also intervened in the agricultural sector during the 1930s. A case in point is the 
action taken by the state in 1932 to rescue the farmers from plummeting world prices
209
 by 
authorising the Agricultural Bank to regulate prices via building up and selling off stocks of 
wheat – a duty transferred in 1938 to the newly established Office for Soil Products (Toprak 
Mahsulleri Ofisi, TMO) (Ahmad, 1993:98;  Zürcher, 1994: 207). Moreover, during the ètatist 
period, the state had also taken the following noteworthy measures to support and encourage 
agriculture: increasing and promoting agricultural credit, setting up research and training 
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schemes, forming small irrigation programmes, reducing rail transport rates by 50-75 per 
cent, and importing machinery and modern implements (Margulies and Yıldızoğlu, 1987: 
274-75; Tezel, 1982: 284-315; Thornburg, 1949: 43-75).  
As it can be inferred from the overview of the ètatist decade above, significant developments 
had taken place in this brief period. It is estimated that GDP and GDP per capita grew at 
average annual rates of 5.4 and 3.1 per cent respectively during the 1930s (Pamuk, 2008: 
278). Moreover, during the ètatist period the process of industrialisation was accelerated and 
resultantly the share of industry in the GNP grew from 10 per cent in 1927 to 16 per cent in 
1938 (Yerasimos, 1987: 90). This is despite the stagnation or decline in wages, and the 
severely deteriorating working conditions on account of the implementation of a Labour Law 
in 1934, which forbade forming unions and partaking in strikes as well as lockouts (Boratav, 
1981: 169; Yerasimos, 1987: 100; Ahmad, 1998: 99).       
During the ètatist period a massive expansion of cultivated land was also witnessed as the 
total amount of cropped area, which amounted to 4.86 per cent of total area in 1927, reached 
12.25 per cent in 1940 (Margulies and Yıldızoğlu, 1987: 274). Relatedly, agricultural output 
is estimated to have increased by 50-70 per cent during the 1930s (Pamuk, 2008: 279). 
Relatively significant developments were also recorded in the sphere of education and 
transportation (see Table 4.3). In the course of the same period foreign trade recovered, too, 
in spite of the fact that over 80 per cent of Turkey’s trade was conducted under bilateral 
agreements, around 50 per cent of which in the years before the Second World War was with 
Germany and her allies (Hershlag, 1986: 115-17; Tezel, 1982: 124-34).  
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Table 4.3 Indicators of development, 1933-1938 
Year                                                                             1933           1938                
Population (millions) 15.5  17.2  
 
Foreign Trade (million dollars)                                               83 234  
 
GDP per capita (1948 prices Turkish Lira)  370 474  
 
Agricultural Production (millions of liras 1940 prices)        2,490   3,791            
 
Industrial production (millions of liras 1948 prices) 1,019 1,423  
 
Wheat (million tons) 2.3 3.6  
 
Tobacco (thousand tons) 36 68  
 
Cotton (thousand tons) 40 64  
 
Coal (million tons) 1.9 2.6  
 
Refined Sugar (thousand tons) 65.1 42.5               
 
Cement (thousand tons) 143              287               
 
Electricity (million kWh)  152              312  
 
Railways (thousand kilometers)   6.1  7.2  
 
Students in schools (thousands) 657 944   
 
Source: Issawi, 1980: 368 
 
 
1934 Settlement Act: Third Wave of Kurdish Deportations 
The influence of Nazi Germany in the 1930s had not been limited to trade, because the RPP 
government had embarked on social engineering policies that at the time had currency in 
Germany. Put differently, during the 1930s the RPP government implemented ètatist policies 
in conjunction with nationalist population policies, which is a dark feature of the 1930s that is 
often glossed over, if not ignored, by the economic historians analysing this period (Hershlag, 
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1986; Rivkin, 1965; Thornburg, 1949). The operation of the practical expression of ètatism, 
the Five-Year Plan, had coincided with the implementation of the draconian 1934 Settlement 
Act
210
 (Law No. 2510), which facilitated the third wave of deportation of Kurds from ESA 
and was a contributory factor in the upsurge of socio-economic problems and political 
turbulence in this region, as exhibited with the Dersim Uprising (1936-38). The execution of 
this new Settlement Act hindered the overwhelmingly Kurdish provinces in ESA from 
reaping the aforementioned benefits of ètatism in Turkey. 
For purposes of tracing the evolution of the population policies targeting the Kurds and 
making sense of the causality of the 1934 Settlement Act, it is worth remarking that this piece 
of legislation was ratified a few years after the Turkish Foreign Minister, Aras, had informed 
the British representatives to the League of Nations in Geneva in November 1930 of the 
‘possibility of a future intense Turkish colonization in order to smother the Kurds in a 
considerable mass of Turkish population’.211 On the day when this new Settlement Act came 
into force, 14 June 1934, the points raised by the then Interior Minister, Şükrü Kaya, in the 
deliberations of this law in the Turkish Assembly made crystal clear that what had been 
alluded to by Aras as a possibility was now set as a project of demographic engineering by 
the Kemalist state.  
During this parliamentary debate the Interior Minister not only espoused the task of the RPP 
government to be to ‘render the Turk the master of the soil’ in the East, but also stated that 
‘there are around two million pure Turks abroad in our near environs. It is somewhat 
mandatory for them to come to the homeland in a piecemeal fashion…It is then our 
obligation to settle them in accordance with the social and economic principles necessitated 
by the science of settlement’ (Üngör, 2011: 149). Kaya, during these discussions did also 
express the ethno-territorialist nationalist nature of the new Settlement Act in the most plain 
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way possible: ‘This law will create a country speaking with one language, thinking in the 
same way and sharing the same sentiment’ (Ülker, 2008: 5).  
Notwithstanding the relatively meticulous nature of the 1934 Settlement Act
212
, the new 
Settlement Act was directly modelled after the abovementioned deportation orders and laws. 
In other words, this new Settlement Act akin to the deportation decrees and laws put into 
effect over the past two decades had intended to assist: a) the deportation and assimilation of 
the Kurds, and b) the resettlement of the non-Kurdish Muslim settlers. The latter included 
migrants from the lost Ottoman territories and Turkish peasants that had been relocated from 
most densely populated areas of the country, like the Eastern Black Sea littoral.
213
  
In order to determine the criteria for the identification and the selection of the deportees and 
the settlers, the first article of the new Settlement Act stated that ‘the Ministry of Interior is 
assigned the power to correct…the distribution and location of the populace in Turkey in 
accord with affiliation to Turkish culture’.214 In the 1920s and 1930s, the Kurds in Turkey, as 
exemplified with the 1926 Deportation Law, were commonly described by the Kemalist 
statesman as ‘people who do not share the Turkish culture’ or as a ‘tribal populace that do not 
speak Turkish’ and so were one of the main targets of this law.  
Pursuant to the criteria outlined in Article 1, in Article 2 of the 1934 Settlement Act, under 
the rubric of ‘Settlement Regions’ Turkey was divided into three zones (Articles 12, 13 and 
14
215
):  
Zone 1: Localities in which it was deemed desirable to increase the density of the culturally 
Turkish population or set aside for ‘populations who share the Turkish culture’. 
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 For differing and detailed accounts and discussions of the 1934 Settlement Act, see: Beşikçi (1991); 
Kökdemir (1952); Jongerden (2007) and Üngör (2011).   
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 The Report on Reform in the East of September 1925 had authorised the resettlement of the inhabitants of 
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Zone 2: Regions for the ‘relocation and resettlement of population which are to be 
assimilated into the Turkish culture’.  
Zone 3: Areas, which for ‘spatial, sanitary, economic, cultural, political, military and 
security’ needed to be evacuated, and settlement forbidden.216 
Under the provisions of this law, the Turkish state was vested with full powers to:  
a) settle immigrants of Turkish origin or culture in Zone 1, which as outlined in Article 12 
was synonymous with the eastern provinces;  
b) forcibly deport Kurds to Zone 2, which for the most part were Turkish areas in the western 
regions of Turkey, where they were never to form more than 10 per cent of the local 
population and had to stay a minimum of ten years in their new homes;  
c) prohibit the re-settlement of non-Turkish speakers in Zone 3, that is, localities where there 
was previously active Kurdish opposition to the Turkish state and vicinities where there were 
railways, highways, transit roads and natural resources in Southeast Turkey.
217
  
In order to attain the aim resettling Kurds in Zone 2 areas, Article 9 of this the new Act 
authorised the resettlement of ‘nomads, who do not share the Turkish culture, by dispersing 
them to Turkish towns and villages.’218 The subsequent Article specified that the Ministry of 
Interior ‘disperse tribal members, who were Turkish subjects and who were not affiliated to 
the Turkish culture, to Zone 2’, and, furthermore, laid down that all the properties belonging 
to the tribesmen be surrendered to the state, which would redistribute it to various settlers.
219
 
The measures outlined in these two articles were analogous to the procedures delineated in 
the previous deportation laws that aimed to diminish the size and influence of the Kurds in 
ESA by breaking up the Kurdish society, by deporting their leaders and by dragooning the 
members of the Kurdish society into the Turkish culture. To this end, during the 1930s 
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Kemalist social engineers prepared confidential reports about the Kurdish tribes in the 
Eastern provinces in which they scrutinised the relationship of these tribes with the Turkish 
state (i.e. whether they were ‘loyal’ or ‘disloyal’), as well as their relationship with each 
other. These reports were augmented in the 1970s, and published in book form in 2000 
(Aşiret Raporları, 2000).     
Judging from the appraisals outlined in a report presented to the ruling RPP’s General 
Secretariat in 1939-40, the 1934 Settlement Act, aside from the administrative glitches, was 
commended and seen as an effective instrument of ‘assimilation and internal colonisation’ 
and ‘dismantling the territorial unity of the Kurds’ by the Republican rulers of Turkey. The 
report is, moreover, a testament to the Kemalist zeal for nationalist homogenisation during 
the 1930s. The anonymous author of this document not only called for the continuation of 
‘widespread’ deportation of the Kurds, but also vociferously argued for the furtherance of 
settling Turks ‘in their [the minorities] richest and most fertile villages at a rate of at least 50 
per cent [of the local population]’. In order to ‘Turkify’ successfully the Eastern provinces it 
was deemed necessary to complement ‘deportation measure’ with ‘incorporeal measures’ or, 
in other words, assimilative cultural policies. The expansion of formal education and the 
construction of a modern transportation system in this region were seen as the ‘backbones’ of 
assimilation or ‘Turkification’ (Bulut, 1998: 185-99).  
The demographic repercussions of the new Settlement Act were significant. Based on the 
recorded deportation figures in the official sources, throughout the 1930s the total number of 
Kurdish deported to the Western provinces was 25,381 people in 5074 households. Despite 
the lack of detailed and firm factual information regarding the total number of settlers in 
ESA, based on existent official counts for the provinces of Diyarbekir and Elazığ, it is known 
that from 1928 to 1938 at least 1988 households were sent to the Diyarbekir province, and 
another 2143 households were expected to the settle there in 1938. In addition, from 1932 on, 
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1571 households were settled in the neighbouring province of Elazığ. Almost all of the non-
Kurdish Muslim settlers from Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia and Syria were peasants, and 
they settled rural areas (Üngör, 2011: 162). 
The dual-track policy of settling non-Kurdish migrants and deporting Kurds in the 1930s, 
however, further deepened the socio-economic and political problems from which the Eastern 
provinces had been suffering from since the First World War. In the 1930s, owing to poor 
planning by the state, and inefficient use of land by its new occupiers, the settlement of the 
migrants in the rural areas of ESA had negative implications for the agricultural productivity 
in these regions, which, in turn, had inauspicious consequences for the well-being of the 
settlers toiling on the land allocated to them. In an internal report in 1935 Prime Minister, 
İsmet İnönü confesses to the existence of these issues with the succeeding informative 
remarks: 
‘There have been efforts to settle immigrants from everywhere. A population of about fifteen 
hundred work on every fertile and water-rich terrain. There are three groups of immigrants 
with a gap between them of three to five years…Almost all of them complain to government 
officials about their conditions…The people are needy, destitute, the fields have not yet been 
productive. The pastureland has been distributed poorly.’220  
A year later, under the instructions of Atatürk, then Economic Minister Celal Bayar had 
embarked on an expedition to survey the state of the economy in the Eastern provinces. At 
the end of this mission, Bayar prepared a secret report wherein the seasoned state official 
bewailed the collapse of the economy in ESA and described the underdeveloped nature of the 
Eastern economy in the most unequivocal form possible: ‘this is an entirely primitive 
economy without markets and production beyond what is necessary for personal use’ (Bayar, 
2006: 69). At this point, in order to understand the level of regression that befell these 
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regions, it is worth going back about forty years and comparing the bleak picture painted by 
Bayar with that of the vibrant ESA between 1890 and 1910. These regions had gone from 
inter-regionally sending goods worth more than one million pound sterling in a typical year in 
1890s to self-sufficient domains in the late 1930s.   
Moreover, since the Kurdish tribe was, in the last analysis, a site of reproduction of Kurdish 
identity, the Republican rulers, as part of their policy of rendering the Kurds a feeble ethnic 
entity, aimed to liquidate tribal structures by means of relocating the Kurdish kinfolks. The 
policy of resettling the Kurdish tribes in the 1930s, which, in the words of the contemporary 
British consular Thomas Henry Matthews (1869-1941), had been conducted by the RPP 
government ‘in a manner which resembled the operation against Armenians in 1915’221, 
wrought more disorder and destruction to ESA. A prime example of this is the events that had 
been staged in the latter part of the 1930s in the defiant Dersim region, which since the 1921 
rebellion had remained tranquil.  
The 1936-8 Dersim Uprising started after the Tunceli Law of 1935 (Law No. 2884). This 
legislation aimed at the removal of this ‘abscess’ by forcibly deporting the Kurdish Alevi 
population and replacing it with a Turkish population. As early as 1926, in a report prepared 
by the Ministry of Interior for the Turkish Assembly, Dersim had been described ‘as an 
abscess on the Turkish Republic which must be removed, for the sake of the country’s well-
being’ (Beşikçi, 1991: 29).  
The Dersim rebellion was led by Kurdish intellectuals such as Dr. Nurî Dersimî (1893-
1973)
222
 and the Alevi dignitary, Seyid Rıza (1863-1937), who, after the commencement of 
the military operation in the spring of 1937, alongside other chieftains in the region pleaded 
with the Secretary-General of the League of Nations in a letter sent on 20 November 1937 
with the following words: 
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‘The tyrannies of the Turkish government against human rights and the Kurdish nation, of 
which the ethnic and national existence has been recognised by diplomatic conferences and 
by international conventions, are incompatible with the essence and entirety of the inspiring 
and liberating principles of your organisation…In order for the League of Nations to be able 
to take various apposite measures to prevent the continuation of these tyrannies and the total 
extermination of the Kurdish nation, it needs,…to infiltrate the thoroughness of these 
tragedies. To that we will reply: it suffices to send onto our soil and international commission 
of inquiry.’223   
But the people of Dersim – which as a result of the Tunceli Law of 1935 was redesignated as 
a province, to be known by the Turkish name Tunceli – were never to receive any external 
assistance against the resolute Kemalist military offensive, which continued until Dersim was 
occupied in 1938. The contemporaries estimated that by the end of 1938 some 40,000 Kurds 
perished in this province (Rambout, 1947: 39). The Tunceli Law, which was originally to last 
till 1 January 1940, remained in force until 1 January 1947. The ramifications of this law are 
deftly summarised by a report sent by Osman Mete, special correspondent for the Turkish 
daily Son Posta, who visited Dersim in 1948: 
‘I went to Tunc Eli, the old Dersim. The place was desolate. Tax collectors and policemen are 
still the only state officials the people have ever seen. I tried to meet the people, to get to 
know their way of life, their spirit. But unfortunately very little remains from the period 
before the revolt. There are no more artisans, no more culture, no more trade. I met 
unoccupied people whose life now seem to revolve around a flock of hundred goats…There 
are no schools, no doctors. The people don’t know what “medicine” means. If you speak to 
them of the government, they translate it immediately as tax collector and policemen. We 
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give the people of Dersim nothing; we only take. We have no right to carry on treating them 
like this’ (Kendal, 1982: 72).  
The Second World War and the end of the Republican Era  
During the Second World War, all of Turkey’s neighbours either were at war or occupied by 
one or other of the belligerents. Turkey succeeded in not participating actively in the war 
though was faced with the constant risk of invasion. Thus, full-scale mobilisation was 
maintained throughout the war. The maintenance of an army of more than one million placed 
massive strains on the economy. Under these circumstances, ètatism was gradually pushed 
aside. 
In the course of the Second World War, Turkey’s GDP declined by 35 per cent and the wheat 
output dropped by more than 50 per cent (Pamuk, 2008: 280). Concomitantly, per capita 
income fell by around a quarter. On account of financing defence expenditure via monetary 
expansion the RPP government encouraged inflation, which, in turn, triggered hardship for 
large segments of society: the cost-of-living index rose from 100 in 1939 to 350 in 1945 
(Issawi, 1980: 369). The implementation of the 1940 National Defence Law (Milli Koruma 
Kanunu), through which the government could confiscate ‘idle economic resources’, and the 
1942 Wealth Levy (Varlık Vergisi), which was applied in a disproportionate and confiscatory 
manner on non-Muslims and ethnic minorities (Robinson, 1963: 122), only rubbed more salt 
into wounds of an impoverished nation.   
The defeat of Germany and the non-renewal of the Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union 
after the war
224
 pushed Turkey towards the United States. In accordance with its long-term 
objectives the US wanted Turkey to be a part of the US-dominated world order that was in 
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the making, and to act as a bulwark against Soviet expansion in the Cold War era, as outlined 
by the following US National Security Council statement in 1949: 
‘Turkey’s independence and the maintenance of her status as a buffer against expansion of 
the Soviet Union into the Mediterranean and the Middle East is of critical importance to the 
Security of the US.’ (Yalman, 2009: 183)   
In light of the strategic importance imputed to Turkey, she was permitted to benefit from the 
military assistance provided as part of the Truman Doctrine, which stipulated that US would 
help defend ‘free nations’ whose existence were threatened by foreign forces or by radical 
minorities inside their borders. Additionally, Turkey was allowed to take advantage of the 
economic aid granted by the Economic Recovery Plan (ERP), better known as the Marshal 
Plan, even though Turkey had not been actively involved in the Second World War.  
However, if the strategic significance of Turkey was a determinate factor in shaping US-
Turkish relations in the post war era, another was the imposition of a specific role to the 
Turkish economy by the US within the context of the Marshal Plan outlined below: 
‘Turkey’s primary role in the recovery program will be to augment its production of essential 
commodities in conformity with European and world requirements…Since Turkey is 
predominantly an agricultural country in its economy and in its exports, the anticipated gains 
in agricultural output will be of greater importance to the recovery program as whole than 
increases in industrial output.’ (ibid.: 182) 
Relatedly, after the Second World War, the quandary facing ruling politicians in Turkey was 
how to reconcile post-war adjustment (i.e. re-integrating the Turkish economy into the world 
economy in agreement with the liberalisation of international trade relations as espoused by 
the architects of the new world order) with industrialisation (i.e. maintaining the objective of 
nationalistic industrialisation which was the sine qua non of the ‘national economy’ and 
national development). Therefore, in the post-war years, the restructuring of the political, 
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economic and legal architecture of Turkey necessitated by the intensified incorporation of 
Turkey into the world capitalist system created thorny predicaments for the governors of the 
Turkish Republic in all realms of government.  
Despite the two world wars and the Great Depression, per capita levels of production and 
income in Turkey were 30-40 per cent higher at the end of the Republican era in 1950 than 
the levels on the eve of the First World War (Pamuk, 2008: 280). Per capita income in 
Turkey in 1950 was at ‘US$ 1,620 constant or inflation adjusted’, which ‘was equal to 24 per 
cent of the per capita income capita of the high-income countries and 188 per cent of 
developing countries’ of Asia, Africa and Latin America (ibid.: 270). In addition, Turkey’s 
GDP growth rate between 1929 and 1950 was 83 per cent – relatively high when compared, 
for example, with other developing countries such as India, Egypt, Yugoslavia and Greece for 
the same period: 21, 59, 30 and -12 per cent, respectively (Tezel, 1982: 450).  
However, when the focus of development economics is shifted from GDP per capita to a 
more comprehensive measure in the form of human development index (HDI)
225
, a less 
remarkable picture emerges. That is to say, when the HDI of Turkey in 1913 and 1950 are 
compared with those of the other developing countries with similar levels of GDP in Eastern 
Europe, Latin America and East Asia, it becomes apparent that Turkey’s human development 
measures had been lagging behind developing countries with similar levels of income (see 
Table 4.4 below).  
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Table 4.4 Changes in the human development index, 1913-1950 
Country                     1913                        1950 
Western Europe        0.580                       0.707 
North America          0.643                       0.774 
Japan             0.466                    0.676 
China             n.a.                          0.225 
India                          0.143               0.247 
Africa                        n.a.               0.271 
Greece                       0.625 
Russia                        0.345                       0.694 
Bulgaria         0.403                       0.607 
Argentina            0.511                    0.526 
Mexico            0.270                    0.484 
Brazil             0.249                    0.448 
South Korea            n.a.                    0.459 
Malaysia            n.a.                          0.407 
Thailand            0.388                    0.603 
Indonesia n.a.                          0.337 
Tunisia            n.a.                    0.303 
Iran                            n.a.                    0.331 
Egypt                          n.a.                    0.291 
Nigeria                       n.a.                    0.194 
Turkey                       0.190                    0.382 
 
Source: Pamuk, 2008: 272 
Note: Regional or continental averages are measured by the population of the individual 
countries. The maximum possible improvement in HDI is 1-(HDI in 1950). 
 
The comparatively feeble performance of Turkey in HDI is considered a by-product of two 
central issues that have haunted its development since 1923. The first is the large regional 
disparities between the predominantly Kurdish ESA and the rest of the country. The second is 
the gender inequalities – i.e. Turkey falling behind developing countries with analogous 
levels of income in indices aiming to measure gender equality and the socio-economic 
development of women (Pamuk, 2008: 272-73). 
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The available data
226
 on living standards demonstrate that from the promulgation of the 
Republic up to the end of RPP rule, the improvements in living conditions in the ESA 
provinces had been considerably inferior to that of the other parts of Turkey, as exhibited 
with the figures tabulated in Table 4.5 below. 
Table 4.5 Indicators of regional differences in living standards, 1923-1950 
Regions/    Population          7+ Literacy Rate            The number        The number        The number  
Provinces                                                                       of doctors          of land vehicles    of radios 
                                                                                        per 100,000        per 10,000    per 10,000 
                                                                                        population     population    population 
                       1950              1927  1950  Changes in         1950 (1)        1950 (2)       1950  
                                                                 1927-50 as  
                       (1,000)            %        %          % 
Istanbul,  1,180 45 73     +28 316 64 981 
Ankara,  
Izmir 
 
Adana,           2,637            12     47       +35                 56                    26 272 
Bursa     
 
Western        7,322            10     38       +28 24  9                        115 
Provinces (3) 
Eastern          9,341 6      23       +17                 15                       6     53 
Provinces (4) 
Key:  
(1) The number of doctors is inclusive of dentists, and the figures are attained from the  
statistics for the year 1953 
(2) Land vehicles comprise of automobiles, lorries, buses and jeeps 
(3) Zonguldak, Bolu, Eskişehir, Konya, Hatay and the provinces to the   
      West of these provinces, excluding Istanbul, Ankara, Adana, Izmir and Bursa 
(4) Provinces to the east of Hatay, Zonguldak, Bolu, Eskişehir and Konya  
 
Source: Tezel, 1982: 461. 
The policies implemented during these 27 years did not narrow, but deepened the gulf 
between ESA and the rest of Turkey. In concrete terms, the difference in the literacy rates 
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between the Western provinces (excluding Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa and Adana) and the 
Eastern provinces (to the east of Hatay, Zonguldak, Bolu, Eskişehir and Konya) went up from 
4 per cent in 1927 to 15 per cent in by 1950 (Tezel, 1982: 460-61). Similarly, regional 
disparities in industrial development had further widened in the RPP period (1923-1950). It is 
worth remembering here that changes in the regional distribution of industry reflect both the 
character and the results of the development programs conducted under the Republicans. 
Industrialisation, throughout the RPP era, was not only considered to be the dominant 
technological economic force with the potential of reshaping the socio-economic and political 
structures in the country but also was conceived as the precondition for regional and national 
development.  
In 1927, 17.8 per cent of the industrial enterprises in Turkey were located in ESA. In 1939, 
this figure dropped sharply to 8 per cent. By 1955, only 7.7 per cent of the industrial 
enterprises in the country were based in these regions. In contrast, the percentage of the 
industrial enterprises situated in the Western Aegean region augmented from 17.9 per cent in 
1939 to 19.8 per cent in 1995. Likewise, the proportion of industrial firms sited in the 
Northwestern Marmara region increased from 29.6 per cent in 1939 to 47.8 per cent in 1955. 
The comparatively low level of industrialisation witnessed in ESA provinces made 
agriculture virtually the sole source of income. 
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Table 4.6 The regional distribution of industrial enterprises, 1927-1955 
Region      1927(1)      1939(2)             1955 
                              No.         %                 No.          %               No.         % 
 
Marmara         19,170 29.6 581 51.0 1,961      47.8 
 
Aegean            11,550 17.9 232 20.0 812         19.8 
 
Central  
Anatolia          10,220        15.8   83   8.0 488          10.9 
 
Eastern 
Black Sea           7,947 12.3   73          6.0              280   6.8 
 
Eastern & 
Southeastern 
Anatolia  11,448  17.8   96          8.0  316    7.7 
Notes: 
(1) Figures include the small industrial enterprises 
(2) Only includes industrial enterprises benefitting from the 1927 Law for 
Encouragement of Industry 
Source: Serin, 1963: 147.  
 
The findings of a study in 1949 by the then Director General of Central Statistical Office, 
Şefik Bilkur, indicates that disparities between the ESA regions and the rest of Turkey also 
widened in the agricultural sector. Irrespective of the estimated 30 per cent increase in 
national per capita agricultural income between 1935 and 1943, the agricultural income of the 
rural populace in ESA was found to be less than half of the national average agricultural 
income in 1943. More specifically, 34 TL per hectare was verified by the abovementioned 
research as Turkey’s average agricultural income per capita in 1943, the agricultural income 
per head was at its lowest level in ESA where the income per hectare was 16 TL and reached 
its highest point in the Western Aegean region where it rose to 51 TL. The ‘remaining 
regions [of Turkey] were situated between these two limits’ (Bilkur, 1949: 11). 
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4.5 Transition to a Turbulent Democracy and ‘Incorporation’ of ESA (1950-1980) 
 
Economic Integration of the Kurdish Region and the Revival of the Kurdish Aghas and 
Sheikhs during the Democrat Party decade (1950-1960) 
On 14 May 1950, the first democratic elections in the history of the Turkish Republic took 
place. The electorate inflicted a humiliating defeat to the RPP, giving the Republicans only 
39.5 per cent of the overall votes whilst their rivals the Democrat Party (DP) – which was 
officially established on 7 January 1946 – received 52.7 per cent of the votes. In the new 
Assembly, DP had 408 seats against RPP’s 69. The 1950 elections had taken place five years 
after “National Chief” President İsmet İnönü’s famous speech of 19 May 1945 in which he 
indicated that the time was ripe to move in the direction of democracy.  
The judgment to do away with the single-party regime had been taken in light of significant 
domestic and international factors. On the home front, the different social classes became 
highly disillusioned with the single-party regime. Owing to the wartime inflation, taxes and 
confiscations, as well as the controversial decisions taken since the proclamation of the 
Turkish Republic, disfranchisement amongst the peasants and other sections of the labouring 
masses reached a critical level. Therefore, in order to prevent a social explosion, the multi-
party electoral regime was seen as a viable option to channel public discontent.  
Moreover, the Turkish bourgeoisie became increasingly apprehensive of authoritarian rule 
and lobbied for political pluralism. Despite the substantial benefits of the policies 
implemented during the RPP era, the multi-party system was regarded by the bourgeoisie as a 
safety net against dependency on a single party. The root causes of this anxiety were the 
Wealth Levy of 1942 and the Land Distribution Law of 1945, which the RPP wanted to 
implement in order to regain its waning public support. International factors were also 
influential in shaping the political architecture in Turkey after the Second World War. The 
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post-war adjustment policies designed by the US as the dominant world power entailed 
adhering to a liberal economic model and political system, which necessitated a shift from the 
one-party dictatorship.
227
   
The transition to multi-party rule, however, did not lead to a qualitative shift in the Kurdish 
policies of the Turkish state, principally because the Democrat Party government (1950-60) 
did not sufficiently detach itself from the hegemonic Kemalist ideology and failed to deal 
with the legacy of RPP rule in the ESA provinces. During the decade in which the DP was in 
power, not a single implementation and/or crime from the RPP era was debated, let alone 
punished. This is unsurprising considering that the four defecting RPP deputies who launched 
the DP when the government pushed for the Land Distribution Law in 1945, in spite of their 
steadfast opposition, were long standing Kemalists
228
.  
Their loyalty to Kemalism was reaffirmed when establishing the DP with the adoption of the 
‘six arrows’ of Kemalism, albeit declaring that they would not intransigently practice them 
but would interpret them according to the needs of the Republic. Indeed, they did not 
dogmatically pursue the ‘six arrows’. In harmony with the advice of ERP, from its inception 
the DP government, headed by Menderes, replaced ètatism with liberal free-market 
economics and substituted the industry-oriented model of development for the agriculture-led 
model at a time when agriculture continued to be the dominant sector. In 1950, agriculture 
accounted for 54 per cent of the GDP and its share of total employment was 80 per cent 
(Pamuk, 2008: 268-9). The DP also gave an end to the dichotomy of state versus the 
traditional institutions, which had been a major source of the frustration amongst those who 
opposed the top-down Western-centric modernisation policies implemented during the 
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 For a detailed account of the transitional years, 1945-50, see: Karpat (1959) and Lewis (1968). 
228
 The four seasoned ex-Republican politicians who founded the DP were Celal Bayar (1883-1986), the banker 
and confidant of Mustafa Kemal; Adnan Menderes (1899-1961), a prominent landowner from the Aegean 
region; Fuad Köprülü (1890-1966), a historian and a professor of Turcology; and Refik Koraltan (1889-1974), a 
veteran bureaucrat. 
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Republican era. In other words, the DP pragmatically accommodated traditional institutions, 
structures and ways of life. 
Incorporation of the Kurdish Elite 
The Democrat Party government allowed the bulk of the Kurdish deportees, including the 
tribal chieftains and religious figures, to return, and, in turn, akin to the policies of Sultan 
Abdulhamid, it incorporated the traditional Kurdish elite into the Turkish political system. 
Despite the suppressive measures during the single-party period, the old landowning elite (be 
it aghas, large landed families or sheiks) still held title to the lands in their ancestral 
provinces, as the new Civil Code in 1926 confirmed private land from the Ottoman period. 
The most notable example of the DP co-opting the traditional elite was the promotion of 
Abdülmelik Fırat229 (1934-2009), the grandson of Şeyh Said, to the prestigious position of 
deputy of the National Assembly. Thus, the agriculture-led development strategy during the 
Democrat decade marked the beginning of two interrelated processes: the economic 
incorporation of the Kurdish region into the Turkish economy, and the co-opting of the old 
Kurdish elite into the Turkish political life. As an offshoot of these changes, a new breed of 
Kurdish propertied elite developed. Unlike their predecessors, the new elite repudiated their 
Kurdish origin, and exploited their relationship with the peasants not as a means to semi-
independence from the centre as in the Ottoman times but in order to become more closely 
integrated members of the Turkish ruling class.   
Agriculture-led Growth  
The strong emphasis placed on agriculture enabled the agricultural output to more than 
double from 1947, at the time when pre-war levels of production were already attained, 
through 1953 (Pamuk, 2008: 281). This increase was largely due to the drastic enlargement of 
the acreage under cultivation – from 14.5 million hectares in 1948 to 22.5 million in 1956, far 
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 For a biography of Abdülmelik Fırat, see: Kaya (2005). 
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exceeding the population growth (Zürcher, 1994: 235) – and the rapid commercialisation of 
agriculture.
230
 These developments in agriculture were engendered by the following three 
complementary government policies: a) providing cheap credit to large landowners; b) 
distribution of state-owned lands and open communal pastures to peasants with scarce or no 
land; and c) the maintenance of high prices for agricultural products through TMO, the 
government-buying agency. 
The DP government used Marshall Plan aid
231
 to subsidise the importation of agricultural 
machinery, particularly tractors, whose number soared from 1,756 to 43,727 in the years 
1948-56 (Margulies and Yıldızoğlu, 1987: 281). The Menderes-led administration began to 
distribute about 1.8 million hectares of land to around 360,000 families between 1947 and 
1962, but as few as 8,600 were taken from private landlords; nearly all lands distributed 
belonged to the state and were already in use for grazing (Aktan, 1966: 325). Agricultural 
producers also immensely benefitted from the high world market demand for wheat and other 
export commodities, in virtue of American stockpiling programmes during the Korean War 
(25 June 1950-25 June 1953) (Hansen, 1991: 338-44).  
Pauperisation of the Kurdish Peasants, Aggrandisement of the Landlords  
The distribution of land and the extensive use of agricultural machinery, however, did not 
lead to improvements in the living condition of the peasants, because, as the Kurdish novelist 
Yaşar Kemal recounted, ‘the peasant was again share-cropping on the lands distributed by 
the government; he provided the land, the ağa provided the tractor.’232 A significant number 
of peasants, who acquired land, were forced to sell off their lands to the tractor-owning ağas 
or large landowners because of not being able to fund the hiring costs. This process increased 
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 For a detailed analysis of the commercialisation of agriculture during this period, see: Margulies and 
Yıldızoğlu (1987: 269-92). 
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 Between 1950 and 1962, $831.8 million in total grants was tendered by the U.S. economic assistance, and 
when we include loans and sales under PL 480 programs involving soft currency payments by the US during 
this period, the total amount of US economic assistance amounted to $1,615.9 million (Rivkin, 1965: 97).   
232
 Cumhuriyet, 23/06/1955 (Yaşar Kemal’s italic)  
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the number of landless peasants, as well as triggering migration to local towns and/or large 
metropolis in Western Turkey. The proportion of landless peasant families in Turkey 
increased from 5.9 per cent to 30.7 per cent between 1950 and 1960, and the annual rate of 
urban population growth during 1950-55 stood at 55.6 per cent in Turkey (Sönmez, 1992 
[1990]: 144-45). As a result, the gradual mechanisation of agriculture that commenced in the 
1950s further intensified social differentiation in the countryside and accelerated rural 
migration into towns (Karpat, 1973: 58).     
The rise in the number of landless peasant families between 1950 and 1960 in the 
predominantly Kurdish provinces far exceeded the national average (see Table 4.7). This was 
largely predicated on the more extensive use of agricultural machinery in ESA, to the extent 
that small and tenant farmers with plots that could not afford tractors would hire them from 
the large landowners in return for a proportion of their crop (Beşikçi, 1992[1969]: 195-8; 
McDowall, 2000: 398-9).  
Table 4.7 Landless peasant families in ESA, 1950-1968  
       1950      1962-68  
                                 (%)                           (%) 
Turkey                     5.9 30.7 
Urfa 36.7 55.0 
Diyarbakir              37.1 47.0 
Bingöl                     20.0 40.0 
Mardin                   11.8 40.9 
Siirt                        12.0 42.0 
Van 20.0 37.5 
Tunceli                  22.7 37.0 
Elazığ                     12.0 32.0 
Ağrı                        10.7 36.1 
Erzincan                10.7 38.0 
Erzurum    6.0 32.0 
Kars                         8.0 23.0 
Adıyaman                 ** 34.0 
Source: Sönmez, 1992 [1990]:144.  
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The increase in seizures and purchases of land by the landowning class concurred with the 
raising of the upper limit of land ownership from 500 dönüms, as specified by the 1945 Land 
Distribution Act, to 5000 dönüms by the National Assembly in 1950. These developments 
resulted in the Kurdish ağas or prominent landowning families accumulating more land as 
well as reducing the lands available for distribution. Consequently, the overwhelmingly 
Kurdish provinces in ESA constituted one of the important exclusions to the owner-cultivated 
smallholdings, which had been the predominant unit of agrarian production in Turkey during 
the Democrat period, as observed by Hershlag in the 1960s: 
‘The present land tenure system can be roughly classified into four major categories: 1) old 
feudal land ownership devoid of modernisation—in the south-east; 2) the modern 
management type of large absentee ownership, under wage-relations—in the west and north-
east; 3) small and medium ownership, with a growing tendency towards large ownership—in 
central Anatolia and in the Adana region; and, 4) small, fractioned and poor villages, the 
chief reservoir of rural wage-earners. The total number of families was estimated in the early 
1960s at 3 million. Of these, 2 million were full land-owners, mainly of mushroom units, 
while another 1 million were partial owners, share-croppers, tenants and landless’ (1968: 
209). 
According to the first modern agricultural census in Turkey, Agricultural Census of 1950, 1.5 
families owned 25 per cent of the total cultivable land; the remaining 98.5 per cent owned 75 
per cent of cultivable land. Additionally, 72.6 per cent of all holdings were owner-cultivated, 
and a further 21.5 per cent were partly owned. The findings of the Agricultural Census of 
1963 suggest that owner-cultivated smallholdings persisted to be the main form of land 
tenure, since 68.7 per cent of all the holdings were 5 hectares or under and 85.3 per cent of all 
land was under owner cultivation.
233
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 Derived from Istanbul İktisadi ve Ticari İlimler Akademisi (1973: 47-8).  
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However, data pertaining to nine of the fourteen predominantly Kurdish provinces in ESA 
collated in the Autumn Survey of 1952, which uniquely gives a detailed statistical data 
concerning land distribution amongst families, demonstrated the dominance of family-owned 
large holdings in this area. Two per cent of families in these provinces owned 30.5 per cent of 
the total cultivable land, while 59.5 per cent of the families owned only 18.6 per cent of the 
cultivable land. The findings of the 1960 The Village Inventory Studies of the Ministry of 
Village Affairs, which cover 56 of the then total 67 provinces of Turkey, certify that 
concentration of land in the hands of large Kurdish landowners continued throughout the 
Democrat decade, as increasingly more villages became the private property of aghas or 
prominent landowning families. For example, in Urfa, out of the total 664 villages, 51 were 
owned by aghas, 72 by wealthy landowning families. In Diyarbakir out of the 663 villages, 
70 were owned by rich landowning families, and in the province of Siirt 11 aghas and 21 
families owned in total 32 villages (Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 142).   
These villages operated as political fiefdoms of one of the rival mainstream parties, 
depending on the partisan affiliations of the landowning class. The incorporation and 
aggrandisement of the landed elite during the 1950s fostered an axis of mutual reliance 
between the political parties in Ankara and the Kurdish landed elites that yielded a block of 
votes. The much-sought-after communal votes were exchanged for top positions in the 
regional parties. When DP came to power in 1950 a significant share of its votes in the ESA 
provinces were from the wealthy landowning families or large tribes, as a result of which the 
following leading members of these tribes and families attained seats in the National 
Assembly: Edip Altınakar (Sürgücüzâde tribe-Diyarbakır), Mustafa Ekinci (Seydan tribe-
Lice), and Mehmet Tevfik Bucak (Bucak tribe-Siverek).  
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The ‘49’ers Incident’ and the End of the ‘Period of Silence’ 
In contrast, a section of the well-educated children of this traditional rural class along with 
other Kurdish students from less affluent backgrounds constituted the nucleus of the new 
generation of Kurdish organic intellectuals who played a focal role in the public debate of the 
Eastern Question: the socio-economic underdevelopment in ESA. In the late 1950s, Kurdish 
university students from prominent landowning families, like, Yusuf Azizoğlu (1917-1970), 
alongside their peers from less well-off backgrounds, such as, Musa Anter (1920-1992), who 
were handpicked by state officials and sent to university in order to be made into ‘good 
Turkish citizens’, spearheaded an alternative and progressive movement.  
This movement centred on raising awareness and promoting the socio-economic development 
of the neglected Kurdish provinces. Despite avoiding an explicit campaign demanding 
national rights for the Kurds and concentrating on socio-economic issues, for instance 
tackling drought and encouraging government investment, they could not evade the 
suppressive measures of the DP government. Soon after its birth in 1959, the activities of this 
movement were halted. 
The Kurdish rebellion that had surfaced across the border in northern Iraq with the return 
from exile of the influential Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani (1903-1979) after the 
Iraqi Revolution in July 1958 played a significant role in the government clampdown of this 
movement. Turkish state officials were fretful that it might incite Kurds in Turkey to take 
similar forms of action (Tan, 2010: 323-34). On 17 June 1959, 49 leading Kurdish 
intellectuals, including the two mentioned above, were arrested. President Bayar and Prime 
Minister Menderes wanted the 49 hanged, but the prospect of hostile international reaction 
made them renege on their decision. The ‘49’ers episode’ let the Kurdish genie out of the 
bottle, and the two decades of silence that had followed the 1936-8 Dersim rebellion came to 
an end (Ekinci, 2011: 60-6).            
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In Ankara and Istanbul, alongside the small but highly active Kurdish intellectuals, there 
were a growing number of migrant Kurdish workers, who became members of the new 
expanding urban proletariat of Turkey. As briefly alluded to above, a sizeable segment of the 
landless Kurdish peasants in ESA sought employment in one of the local towns, and, if not 
successful at their first port of call, they moved to industrial cities mainly in Western Turkey. 
In 6 of the 14 predominantly Kurdish provinces the annual rate of urban population growth 
during 1955-60 surpassed the national average of 49.2%: Elazığ (62.4%); Siirt (76.4%); Van 
(49.6%); Erzincan (87.7%); Hakkari (64.4%) and Tunceli (50.9) (Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 145). 
And of those migrants who moved beyond local towns, around 41 per cent went to Istanbul, 
18 per cent to Ankara, 15 per cent to Adana and 4 per cent to Izmir (McDowall, 2000: 401). 
Eventually the migratory process made the Kurdish question a perceptible reality for people 
living in Ankara and Istanbul, hundreds of miles away from the predominantly Kurdish 
provinces. 
The movement from the countryside to towns and cities was not sui generis to the Kurdish 
provinces, as the 1950s witnessed mass migration from the rural to urban areas all over 
Turkey. Over a million people had left the countryside and by the end of the decade, the 
major cities were growing by 10 per cent a year (Zürcher, 1994: 237). Surplus labour began 
to flock to the cities, where employment was more readily found (Karpat, 1973: 191). The 
economic boom years of the DP government ended in 1953; the ensuing deteriorating 
economic conditions were a major push factor for rural-to-urban migration.  
Crisis of Agriculture-led Growth 
With the end of the Korean War, international demand decreased and prices of export 
commodities began to decline. Economic growth fell from the average rate of 13 per cent per 
annum in the ‘golden years’ (1950-1953) of the Democrat decade to 9.5 in 1954, and as a 
result the trade deficit in 1955 was eight times that of 1950 (Ahmad, 1977: 135). These years 
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were followed by years of spiralling inflation (1956-9). During these years, prices rose 
around 18 per cent a year (Boratav, 1969: 186), because, regardless of slackening 
international demand and decline in prices of export commodities, the DP government 
continued with investment programmes and initiated a large price support programme for 
wheat, financed by increases in the money supply (Pamuk, 2008: 282;  Hershlag, 1968: 146). 
In 1958, Western foreign allies announced that they would ‘rescue’ the Turkish economy and 
Menderes government by agreeing to provide Ankara with a loan of $359 million and the 
consolidation of the $400 million debt (Hershlag, 1968: 147). The OECD and IMF-backed 
economic programme introduced in August 1958 imposed certain ‘stabilising measures’, the 
most significant of which was the de facto devaluation of the lira from TL 2.80 to TL 9,025 
to the dollar (ibid.). 
The deteriorating economic situation combined with Menderes’ increasingly authoritarian 
style of government, to the extent that in his 21 September 1958 Izmir speech he openly 
threatened ‘an end to democracy’ and brought the country to the brink of chaos. The trend 
towards totalitarianism by the government representatives was based on the fear of being 
toppled, which was instilled by the January 1958 rumours of a military conspiracy and 
aggravated because of the July 1958 revolution in neighbouring Iraq as well as the rising 
popular unrest at home. The robust anti-government demonstrations – some of which were 
encouraged by the RPP – towards the end of the 1950s severely undermined government 
authority. The most resilient popular movements were the student rallies and large street 
demonstration on 28 April 1960 – first in Istanbul and then in Ankara – which continued 
virtually uninterrupted until the military takeover by the thirty-eight officers of the self-
proclaimed National Unity Committee (NUC), on 27 May 1960.
234
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The 1960 Coup 
The coup involved more than a change of government. On the very day of the military 
takeover, the NUC, headed by the former commander-in-chief of the land forces, Cemal 
Gürses, set up a commission under the leadership of then the rector of Istanbul University, 
Professor Sıddık Sami Onar, to rewrite the constitution and provide recommendations for the 
restructuring of Turkey’s institutions. The junta’s decision to engage five distinguished law 
professors from Istanbul University, who on 28 May 1960 through their initial report justified 
the coup on the basis that the DP had governed unconstitutionally, enabled it to portray the 27 
May movement as more than a mere coup: as ‘a revolution of the intellectuals’ (Ahmad, 
2008: 240). 
On 12 June 1960, the NUC set up an interim government legalised by the professors with a 
provisional constitution enabling the NUC to rule until a new parliament had been elected. 
Undoubtedly the most important enactment of the interim government, which had governed 
the country until the first RPP and JP coalition government (10 November 1961- 30 May 
1962), was the 1961 constitution. The new constitution signalled NUC’s readiness to return 
to a civilian rule, albeit under the guardianship of the military, and demonstrated its proclivity 
to incorporate large segments of the population into the political system and the domestic 
market through liberal constitutional readjustments and institutional reorientations. 
The 1961 Constitution  
The 1961 Constitution brought about further developed the existing quasi-parliamentary 
system by introducing a bi-cameral parliament, with a lower house (National Assembly) 
elected by proportional representation, and an upper house (Republican Senate), consisting of 
150 members, some elected and others appointed by the president. Both chambers constituted 
the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT). The new Constitution as well as separating 
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the executive from the judiciary did also create the Constitutional Court, which vetted the 
legislations of the parliament.  
Furthermore, the novel Constitution established two central state institutions, namely, Milli 
Güvenlik Kurulu (National Security Council, NSC) and the SPO. For the first time in the 
history of the Republic, Article 3 of the 1961 Constitution gave the military a constitutional 
role by setting up the NSC, which was composed of the chief of the general staff, 
representatives of the armed forces and government minister. The NSC’s function was to 
assist the cabinet on matters vaguely defined as ‘national security’, which encompassed 
virtually all issues pertinent to running the state, and in March 1962 an additional bill 
increased the powers of this body by permitting it to interfere in the deliberations of the 
cabinet. Thus, the military was made the custodian and partner of the new regime.  
Having recognised that Democrats’ aversion for drawing up and applying long-term plans of 
economic development had played a pivotal role in the economic downturn in the late 1950s 
(Hale, 1981: 117, Pamuk, 2008: 283), Article 129 of the new Constitution stipulated the 
establishment of the SPO
235
 so as to initiate the development of the country on a planned 
basis. In other words, the coup denoted a shift from free market economics approach to a 
planned economy. Accordingly, four consecutive Five-Year economic development plans 
were designed by the SPO (1963-67, 1968-72, 1973-77, and 1979-1983
236
). 
Long Period of Import Substituted Industrialisation (1963-1979) 
The economic policies of the military rule and the civilian rule that followed in the 1960s and 
1970s aimed, primarily, at the protection of the domestic market and industrialisation through 
import substitution (ISI). In order to achieve the ISI objectives, governments made abundant 
use of a restrictive trade regime, investments by State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) and 
subsidised credit.  
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 The SPO was in charge of proposing and implementing plans for economic, social, and cultural development 
under a High Planning Council. 
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 The fourth Five-Year Plan was delayed by the foreign exchange crisis of 1977-79 (Hansen, 1991: 352). 
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Akin to the ètatist period during the long period of import substitution, not only were SEEs 
imputed a central role in attaining set economic goals, but the public and the private sector 
were also seen as complementary and not mutually exclusive or antagonistic components of 
the Turkish economy (Barkey, 1990). The private sector, moreover, was provided with a 
wide range of state incentives in order to enhance capabilities. For instance, private 
manufacturing and distribution companies, in addition to being provided with cheap inputs 
produced by the SEEs, were also permitted to borrow from the Treasury at much lower rates 
than inflation (Aydin, 2005: 37). Resultantly, by the 1980s, large corporations, big family 
holdings and banks were in far stronger positions than at the beginning of the 1960s (Pamuk, 
2008: 283).  
In order to safeguard the enlargement of the domestic market for the sustainability of the ISI, 
large segments of the society were incorporated into the internal market by means of the 
fundamental rights and freedoms granted under the 1961 Constitution. The new liberal 
Constitution vowed freedoms of thought, expression, association and publication, and 
promised social economic rights and the freedom to work. Trade unions were granted the 
right to strike and partake in collective bargaining, and the dominated classes even 
established a political party, Türkiye İşçi Partisi (Workers’ Party of Turkey, WPT).    
Systematic Denial of the Kurds  
The interim government led by the NUC, in juxtaposition to the liberal dispensations granted 
by the 1961 Constitution, gave an end to the political overtures of the 1950s and adopted the 
suppressive Kurdish policies reminiscent of the RPP era. Turkey’s Kurdish policy of the 1960 
coup was philistinely expressed in the following words of the new national chief, General 
Gürsel, which he uttered standing on an American tank in the overwhelmingly Kurdish city 
of Diyarbakir: 'There are no Kurds in this country. Whoever says he is a Kurd, I will spit in 
his face' (Muller, 1990: 177).  
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The disclosure in 2008 of a special report, titled ‘The Principles of the State Development 
Programmes in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia’, prepared in 1961 by the SPO under the 
instructions of the NUC, revealed details of the policy prescriptions authorised by the new 
guardians of the Republic for the predominantly Kurdish provinces. A working group within 
the SPO, namely the ‘East Group’, which had toured the region on 8, 10, and 16 February 
1961, drew up this report in early 1961. The junta-sanctioned ‘East Report’ comprised of 
three core policy recommendations in order to ‘fill the power vacuum [left by the state and] 
occupied by separatists, ağas and sheiks’ and give an end to the previously witnessed 
‘separatist activities’ threatening the ‘unitary structure’ of the country.  
First, ‘transforming the existing social structure’ in ESA by ‘assimilating those who feel they 
are Kurdish’. Pursuant to this aim, a set of complementing tools of assimilation was advised 
by the ‘East Group’: a) wide circulation of existing and/or novel ‘sociological and 
anthropological research’ which posit that Kurds are of Turkish stock; b) ‘cultural 
propaganda’ on radio; and c) building more schools in the region in order to train 
‘missionaries’ to spread the Turkish language and culture. 
Second, ‘changing the population structure’ in this region by procuring the ‘densification of 
Turks’ so that they could gradually ‘outweigh those who feel they are Kurds’. The numerical 
dominance of the hegemonic nation in this region could be achieved, the report argued, by 
means of transferring the ‘excess Turkish population in the Black Sea littoral’, settling Turks 
migrating from overseas and by giving ‘economic incentives to those who feel they are Kurds 
to move’ where ‘the sons of the Turks’ are predominant. Lastly, ‘increasing the income of the 
region and appropriately redistributing it’ in order to overcome the ‘neglect of the region by 
previous governments’ and end the ‘endurance of the backward social structures’.237 This 
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 This secret report was kept in the personal archives of the veteran statesman Bülent Ecevit (1925-2006) who 
received this report when serving as the Minister of Work in the first RPP and JP government. The report came 
to light in the process of preparing Ecevit’s biographical documentary by two influential journalists in Turkey, 
Can Dündar and Rıdvan Akar. For an extensive version of this report, see: Dündar and Akar (2008).  
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shift in policy with regard to augmenting public investment in the predominantly Kurdish 
regions of Turkey was advised by the ‘East Group’ with the objective of earning the loyalty 
of the Kurds who thus far were neglected by the state.    
The interim government led by the NUC and the successive civilian governments actuated 
the assimilationist recommendations put forward in this report. In the early 1960s, as 
sanctioned by Law No. 1587 (1960), Kurdish place names were systematically changed into 
Turkish ones, and Turkish radio stations were set up in order to propagate the ideas set out in 
the East Report as well as discouraging listening to broadcasts in Kurdish from neighbouring 
countries (Nezan, 1993: 65). Additional measures taken by the state involved granting the 
registrars the right to refuse to record Kurdish names on birth certificates as well as 
establishing increasingly more regional boarding schools in the overwhelmingly Kurdish 
ESA with the specific aim of assimilating Kurds (McDowall, 2000: 405). By the end of 
1960s, of 70 boarding schools in Turkey, 60 were located in ESA (Beşikçi, 1992 [1969]: 551-
53).  
On the other hand, the other two policies advocated by the ‘East Group’ were either not 
adopted or not thoroughly implemented by governments that came to power after 1961 in 
light of the changing circumstances and/or priorities of the Turkish state. The ambitious task 
of gradually ‘turkifying’ ESA did not materialise, as the envisioned dual-track policy of 
resettling Turks in these regions and deporting Kurds from these regions through economic 
incentives had not been put into effect. The Forced Settlement Law No. 105 appended to the 
Settlement Law No. 2510 on 19 October 1960
238
 by the interim government in order to deport 
55 of the 485 most prominent Kurds detained immediately after the coup, was annulled on 18 
October 1962
239
 by the second coalition government which comprised of the RPP, New 
Turkey Party (NTP) and Republican Peasants’ Nation Party (RPNP). With the 
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 Resmi Gazete, Issue No.10638, 25/11/1960. 
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 Resmi Gazete, Issue No.11239, 23/11/1962. 
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implementation of the First Five-Year Plan in 1963, the Turkish state prioritised the policy of 
‘absorbing’ the region over that of ‘dismembering’ it, espoused by the former Republican 
rulers, and thus the assimilationist programmes summarised above were preferred to the 
previously implemented social engineering policies advocated by the ‘East Group’ in a 
relatively mild form.   
Restoration of the Status Quo Ante and the Failed Promise of Land Reform 
The annulment of the Forced Settlement Law of No. 105, moreover, permitted the deported 
ağas to return to their old place of residence and reinstated all their land and property 
(Ahmad, 1977: 216-17). Accordingly, the state restored the order existing before the coup in 
the Eastern and Southeastern provinces. Despite the recurrent theme in the official rhetoric of 
the successive governments in the 1960s and 1970s of the need to ‘break up the backward 
structure’ in ESA (Yeğen, 2011: 71), the ‘feudal land ownership devoid of modernisation in 
the south-east’ existent at the beginning of the 1960s remained intact in the ensuing two 
decades. The failure to implement the much needed root and branch land reform implicated 
the endurance of the traditional land tenure patterns and agrarian relations. 
The junta’s promise of land reform in 1960 like the promises of the various elected 
governments of 1961-9 succeeding it failed to materialise (Ahmad, 1977: 276-78). It was not 
until June 1973, during the period of semi-military rule, that a new land reform was passed, 
which in May 1977 the Constitutional Court nullified. In the lifetime of this law, as little as 
23,000 hectares of land was distributed to 1,200 peasant families (Hale, 1981: 185-86). Thus, 
the landed property of the large landowning families remained virtually untouched. In 1980, 
8 per cent of the families in ESA owned over 50 per cent of the cultivable land, while 80 per 
cent of the families were evenly matched between those holding up to 5 hectares and those 
who were landless (McDowall, 1997: 243).  
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The continuity in the concentration of land in the hands of wealthy landlords during the 
1960s and 1970s was, furthermore, an indication of the preservation of the alliance built in 
the 1950s between the co-opted traditional (tribal/religious) landed Kurdish elite and the 
Turkish state. The collaboration between these two parties had openly manifested itself with 
the harsh measures authorised by the state to suppress the occasional peasant revolts that took 
place in the 1970s. When the peasants occupied the land belonging to the agha and demanded 
that it be redistributed they were on each occasion confronted by the military who would not 
shy away from using heavy-handed tactics to remove them and give the land back to the 
owner (Nezan, 1980: 91).  
The Kurdish peasant actions in the 1970s came about against the backdrop of a period of 
political mobilisation spearheaded by the previously mentioned mass demonstrations in 1967: 
‘Eastern Meetings’ (Beşikçi, 1992). By 1969 one of most important left wing Kurdish groups, 
the Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları (Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths, RECH), was 
formed. The RECH provided the kernel for a large number of other revolutionary Kurdish 
groups, including the PKK.
240
 Alongside economic concerns, political factors, like the 
aforementioned regeneration of the Kurdish revolt in Iraq after the 1958 coup, and the 
development of a robust left-wing movement in Turkey, which by advocating social justice 
and equality became a point of attraction for the Kurds, had a tremendous effect on revival of 
Kurdish activism in the 1960s and the 1970s Turkey. Consequently, from 1960s on, the 
conservation of the state-landed Kurdish elite’s alliance was grounded on the shared objective 
of maintaining the prevailing economic and political order increasingly opposed by large 
segments of the Kurdish society in Turkey.  
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 For an expanded study of the influence of the RECH on the establishment of PKK, see: Marcus (2007: 21-
30). 
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Intensification of Regional Inequalities and Massive Underdevelopment of the Kurdish 
Region 
One of the factors fuelling the disillusionment and dissent of the Kurds in this period was the 
immense underdevelopment of the largely Kurdish ESA. Relatedly, the programs of the 
1965, the 1969 and the 1970 administrations contained pledges to undertake ‘special 
measures’ in an attempt to overcome the socio-economic disparities between regions and 
encourage the development of the ‘Eastern regions’ (Yeğen, 1999: 163-67). Yet, as outlined 
in the program of the 1969 administration, the aim of the ‘special measures’ was not to 
‘initiate the formation of privileged regions, but to forge integration’ (Yeğen, 1999: 164). Put 
differently, as rightly pointed out by Yeğen, the overarching aim of the ‘special measures’ 
was to incorporate the ESA provinces in accord with the requirements and necessities of the 
domestic market, and not to privilege or prioritise the exigent needs of these lagging and 
long-neglected provinces (1999:164). Hence, in the 1960s and the 1970s, despite the main 
economic development strategy centred on ISI successfully bringing about significant 
economic growth, the underdevelopment of the predominantly Kurdish Eastern and 
Southeastern provinces deepened.  
When the period of planned import substitution of 1961-63 to 1977-79, is compared to that of 
the Democrat decades of 1951-53 to 1961-63, the GDP growth rate increased from 4.9 per 
cent to 6.4 per cent, with an equally robust increase in the Gross National Income (GNI) 
growth rate from 4.4 per cent to 6.3 per cent. In addition, GDP growth per capita increased 
from 2.1 per cent to 3.9 per cent, with GNI growth per capita income increasing from 1.6 per 
cent to 3.8 per cent. Thus, the growth of per capita income more than doubled, which 
compared well with that of the industrialised and developing countries. The average growth 
of GNP per capita for the period 1960-77, as set by the World Bank, for middle-income 
279 
 
countries was 3.6 per cent, for industrialised countries 3.4 per cent, and for low-income 
countries 1.4 per cent (Hansen, 1991: 354).  
Even with this impressive economic performance, the socio-economic disparities between 
different geographic zones inherited from previous decades intensified during 1960-80, to the 
detriment of ESA, as conceded by the SPO in 1979: 
‘Ever since the 1st Plan [First Five-Year Plan] the issue of regional imbalances have been 
addressed and within all three of the [Five-Year] Plans a range of policies have been 
designated to overcome this issue. Despite all efforts and policies, regional imbalances have 
exacerbated….With the exclusion of the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions in all of 
the other regions the share of national income have been similar to the share of total 
population’ (SPO, 1979: 75). 
Throughout the long period of planned import substitution, the national income share of the 
17 Eastern and Southeastern provinces continually decreased: in 1965, it was 10.39 per cent, 
in 1975, it reduced to 9.56 per cent and by 1979, it further dropped to 8.17 per cent (USARM, 
2009: 18). This persistent decline in the national income share of these provinces was in spite 
of the constant increase in their proportion of the total population during the 1960s and 1970, 
as demonstrated by the census figures tabulated in Table 4.8 below. 
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Table 4.8 Population of ESA, 1950-1970 
     
Population                       1950                     1960          1970 
General                    20,947,188           27,754,820           35,605,176 
 
Eastern and  
Southeastern            
Anatolia                              3,528,932              4,713,101   6,178,964  
Eastern and  
Southeastern 
Anatolia’ Share 
In Turkey (%) 16.8 17.0 17.3 
Source: Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 259. 
 
Thus, income disparities between the ESA provinces and the rest of the country did not 
reduce in the heyday of the period of planned import substitution, that is, the years before the 
first oil shock of 1973-74
241
, and persisted until the end of this period because of the 
incessant decrease in the national income share of the former provinces.  
Derisory Public and Private Investment 
A significant causal factor for the perseverance of the regional income disparities between the 
ESA and the rest of the country was the relatively low and inadequate level of public and 
private investment in the latter domains during the long period of planned import substitution, 
which was nowhere near enough to counterbalance the past years of neglect and massive 
underdevelopment. It is worth noting that state investment during 1960-80 is estimated to 
have constituted more than 50 per cent of the overall investment in Turkey (Aydin, 2005: 35). 
Despite the SPO designating the whole ESA as ‘Priority Development Regions’ (PDRs) as of 
1968, between the First Five-Year Plan and the Fourth Five-Year Plan, public investment in 
the provinces situated in this part of country decreased by 40 per cent. In total 40 provinces 
were classified as PDRs, that is, provinces in need of extra investment and incentives: all 18 
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 The first oil shock quadrupled the price of oil in the international market further deteriorated the balance of 
trade and balance of payments deficit of an oil-dependent Turkish economy; a natural predicament for a rapidly 
industrialising economy that was not export-orientated (Hale, 1981: 203-6; Zürcher, 1994: 280-81).  
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of the provinces in ESA, plus 22 other provinces located in the Black Sea littoral and Central 
Anatolia. The share of public investment for ESA provinces in the four consecutive Five-
Year Plans was as follows, respectively: 11.85, 11.90, 7.11 and 7.20 (Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 
158). The share of public investment in the Western Marmara region, on the other hand, 
increased from 11.70 per cent in the First Five-Year Plan to 15.70 per cent in the Fourth Five-
Year Plan (ibid.).  
From 1962-63 to 1974-78, private investment in Turkey increased from 8.8 per cent to 11.2 
per cent (Hansen, 1991: 369), but private sector investment in ESA provinces remained 
nominal, owing in part to the comparatively little effort put in by the state to encourage 
private investment in this area. From 1968, in order to encourage private investment in the 
PDRs, the SPO introduced state-sanctioned incentive schemes, which involved exemption 
from financial tax and stamp duty. Albeit the provinces in ESA accounting for almost half of 
all the PDRs in Turkey, only 5.8 per cent of the total 5918 incentives approved by the state 
during 1968-1980 were for these provinces (Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 188).  
Unbalanced Sectoral Distribution of Public Investment  
The other factors fuelling the disparities between ESA and the rest of Turkey during the long 
period of planned import substitution emanated from the following two perennial features of 
public investment in these regions: a) unbalanced sectoral distribution and b) prioritisation of 
the needs of the industrialised western economic centres over that of the primary and 
immediate requirements of ESA. The heavy investments in the energy and mining sector, 
which, with the exclusion of the Third Five-Year Plan, constituted the main part of the public 
investment in the four quinquennial plans in East and South-East Turkey, exemplify both of 
these aspects (see table 4.9). As it will be explicated below, very little, if any at all, of the 
production in the energy and mining sector was locally used. These minerals were exported 
overseas and to other areas in Turkey. The earnings from these were retained mainly by the 
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Turkish state as well as the private sector based outside of ESA. In consequence, the region 
has had very little benefit from the flow of its resources, as these potential investments were 
not available for its further development.     
Table 4.9 Sectoral distribution of the public investment in ESA, 1963-1983 
 Sectors                  I. F.Y.P242            II. F.Y. P.               III. F. Y. P.                     IV. F.Y.P 
                                    %                     %                              %                                   % 
Energy                  24.1                 40.0                      16.0                            19.8 
Mining                    9.6            6.0                        4.0                            11.8 
Agriculture          13.2 14.6                       9.4                       8.4 
Manufacturing 
Industry  8.0                   11.0      27.4                     23.2 
Transport              11.2  7.3                     13.6                       8.0 
Education             17.0                   11.8                     15.0                     11.3 
Health 5.0 3.0     2.9                       2.5 
Other                    11.9 6.3                     11.7                      15.0   
 
Source: Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 158. 
During 1965-75, one of the major investment projects in ESA was the 900 Megawatts (MW) 
Keban Dam scheme on the Upper Euphrates, which opened in 1975 (Hale, 1981: 205). 
Within the first five years, the Keban hydroelectric power plant was generating 504 MW of 
electricity (i.e. 56 per cent of its total generation capacity), 400 MW of which was transmitted 
to Western Turkey. When the Keban hydroelectric power plant operated at its full capacity, it 
had the potential of generating a quarter of the total electricity produced in Turkey in 1980 
(Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 157-160). Six other hydroelectric power schemes in ESA provinces 
that received large amounts of government investment during and after the Second Five-Year 
Plan were Elazığ-Hazar II, Van-Engil, Van-Erçiş, Elazığ-Hazar, Mardin-Cağ-Cağ and Kars-
Kiği. 
Between 1960 and 1980, the other main area of public investment in ESA was Turkey’s 
largest and one of the world’s richest chrome mines situated in the Eastern province of 
Elazığ: Güleman chromite (chromium ore) deposits operated by the state-owned Etibank 
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 Five-Year Plan (F.Y.P) 
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(Sönmez, 1992 [1990]:160). Chrome ore production statistics indicate that Turkey’s chrome 
output was 22,183,406 tons between 1942 and 1979 (Engin et al, 1982: 1), 30 per cent of 
which was produced in the Güleman area, and the remainder came from a number of smaller 
mines in various different parts of Turkey: Bursa, Eskişehir, Fethiye and Antalya (ibid.). 
Since the 1960s, chrome exports from the Güleman mines accounted for the greatest foreign 
exchange earnings among Turkey’s mining exports (Europa, 2003: 1142). For instance, in 
1967, chrome exports from the Güleman area were worth $7.2 million and in 1972, it 
increased to $17.5 million (Jafar, 1976: 68). Yet little chrome was processed locally; almost 
the entire chrome output was exported (Europa, 2003: 1142).  
Moreover, the Second Five-Year Plan (1968-72) included projects to enhance the production 
of copper, zinc and lead mined in Elazığ by Etibank. The set output targets were as follows: 
a) augmenting the output of Elazığ’s Ergani copper mines to 1,200,000 tons/year; b) 
increasing lead production to 8,000 tons/year; and c) expanding zinc production to 6,000 
tons/year (Jafar, 1976: 68-9). Systematic or longitudinal statistical data on the actual amount 
and value of production and/or exports for zinc, lead and copper production in Elazığ in the 
1960s and 1970s are hard to come by. Nevertheless, the available data from 1969 indicates 
that production of blister copper (or raw copper) by Etibank in the country’s oldest copper 
mine, Ergani copper mines, amounted to around 24,000 tons, 16,000 tons of which were 
exported to the USA, United Kingdom and West Germany. These exports were worth $17 
million in foreign currencies (Europa, 2002: 1130). 
The petroleum sector had been the other main beneficiary of public investment during the 
period of planned import substitution (Aytar, 1992: 62-8). Petroleum in Turkey was 
discovered in 1950 in ESA, and all successive discoveries have been in these domains 
(Europa, 2002: 1130). Thus, provinces located in ESA were the sole producers of petroleum 
during the 1960s and the 1970s. From the mid-1950s to early 1970s, owing in part to the state 
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investment, there was a noticeable increase in petroleum production: from 178,000 tons in 
1955 to 3,500,000 tons in 1973 (ibid.). Between 1955 and 1972, production of petroleum is 
estimated to be worth $27 million (Jafar, 1976: 68). Up until 1980, it maintained the same 
level of production as 1973 (Europa, 2002: 1130). The great majority of the petroleum 
production was exported, since only 6 per cent of the total petrol refining capacity was 
located in ESA in the 1970s, and the proceeds attained from the petroleum exports were 
‘seldom re-cycled into the Region’s [ESA] economy’ (Jafar, 1976: 68).   
In juxtaposition to the sizable state investment in the energy and mining sector in ESA, there 
was comparatively little and insufficient investment in the manufacturing industry, especially 
in the first two Five-Year Plans, considering the exceptionally low level of industrial 
development witnessed in this area during the Republican and the Democrat era. As a result, 
the stunted industrialisation of ESA deepened in the Planned Period. 
Stunted Industrial and Agricultural Development  
Even in the face of the value added by the manufacturing industry precipitously increasing 
from 6,636 million TL in 1963 to 148,014 million TL in 1977 (Hale, 1981: 197), Eastern and 
Southeastern provinces share of the value added in manufacturing decreased from 7.8 per 
cent in 1968 to 4.0 per cent in 1974 (SPO, 1979: 75). It is worth noting that the SPO’s 
calculations of the share of value added in manufacturing for these provinces take into 
account the crude oil output in the Batman Refinery
243
. In 1968, 34.3 per cent, and in 1974, 
42.3 per cent, of the total share of valued added in manufacturing in ESA was generated by 
the Batman Refinery (ibid.). The Batman Refinery accounting for the bulk of the valued 
added in manufacturing generated by these provinces is indicative of the dismal state of the 
manufacturing industry in ESA.  
                                                          
243 Batman refinery is the first refinery built in Turkey in 1955 with a capacity of 330.000 tons/year. Due to 
increasing demand, the capacity of the refinery was increased by Debottlenecking Project to 580.000 tons/year 
in 1960. Crude oil processing capacity of Batman refinery, which was continuously being upgraded with 
modernisation studies, reached 1.1 million tons/year with commissioning of a new crude unit in 1972.  
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According to the 1978 data tabulated in Table 4.10 below, the share of manufacturing 
industry in the GDP of ESA regions was 10.5 per cent, while agriculture accounted for nearly 
half of the regions GDP. Whereas in the Western Marmara region manufacturing industry 
accounted for 33.7 per cent of this regions GDP, and agriculture contribution to the regions 
GDP was a mere 7.9 per cent. Therefore, ESA continued to be a predominantly agrarian 
region in the 1960s and 1970s.  
Table 4.10 Sectoral breakdown of GDP in ESA and the Marmara Region, 1978 
                                ESA                                Marmara 
                                                                                         Region 
 Sectors                    (%)                                                    (%) 
Agriculture    46.2         7.9      
Manufacturing 
Industry   10.5                              33.7    
Construction    6.4                                 4.5     
Trade     7.0                               20.0    
Transport    6.6                                 9.4     
State Services   12.6          7.7      
Others    10.7               16.8          
 
Source: Sönmez, 2012: 351. 
During the period of planned import substitution, agricultural productivity rates in ESA 
witnessed a downward slide. In 1960-62, the ESA provinces accounted for 17.01 per cent of 
the total cultivated area and 17.10 per cent of the total crops produced in Turkey. In 1978-80, 
despite the share of these provinces in the total cultivated land rising to 19.89 per cent, the 
share of these provinces in the total crops produced decreased to 14.61 per cent (Sönmez, 
1992 [1990]: 164). The decrease in output is believed to be inextricably linked to two region-
wide issues: i) the inefficient irrigation system deprived of modernisation, and ii) the limited 
availability and use of chemical fertilisers (ibid.: 162-63). 
During 1965-79, because of the stunted growth of agriculture and industry, with the 
exception of Diyarbakir and Bingöl, the GDP share of all the ESA provinces descended. Out 
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of the overall 67 provinces, the 17 Eastern and Southeastern provinces, with a few 
exemptions, were the lowest ranked provinces in the national GDP rankings. 
Table 4.11 The GDP share and rankings of the ESA provinces, 1965 and 1979. 
                       1965                                                      1979                                       
Provinces             Share (%)       Ranking                         Share (%)      Ranking                                 
Kars 1.20 18                0.70               40 
Urfa                         1.14 21                0.58               47 
Erzurum                  1.10 22                0.98               24 
Elazığ                      0.95 30                0.87               31 
Malatya                    0.88                 36                                      0.68               41 
Diyarbakır               0.78                 43                                      0.83               34 
Siirt  0.75                 45                0.63               51 
Mardin                     0.72                 47                                      0.58               46 
Erzincan  0.56                 49                                      0.40               54 
Van                           0.51                 52                                      0.58               55 
Adıyaman                0.42                  57                                      0.41               53 
Ağrı                          0.35                  61                                      0.33               61 
Muş                          0.33                  63                                      0.32               62 
Bitlis                         0.23                  47                                      0.20               64 
Tunceli                     0.18                  65                                      0.16               66 
Bingöl                       0.16                  66                                      0.18               65 
Hakkari                    0.13                  67                                      0.11               67  
 
Source: Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 90. 
 
In each of the successive four Five-Year Plans, the investment in education decreased (see 
Table 4.9). Therefore, the low level of literacy and schooling inherited from Republican era 
could not be overcome in the Planned Period. Illiteracy and non-schooling rates of 
individuals aged six and above remained far above the national average in almost all of the 
provinces in ESA in 1985 (see Table 4.12). Inadequate state investment in education, coupled 
with formal education being in a language foreign to the majority of the inhabitants in this 
region, played a pivotal role in the persistence of low level of literacy in the predominantly 
Kurdish ESA in the two decades after the single-party era. In other words, unlike other 
regions of Turkey, large sections of the populace of these regions were taught to read and 
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write in a language other than their native language, Kurdish, which unsurprisingly 
constituted additional linguistic or literacy barriers.    
 Table 4.12 Literacy and educational attainment data for ESA for individuals aged 6 and 
above, 1985 
 Provinces Population Aged     Illiteracy Rate             Non-schooling Rate 
                                   6+              
Adıyaman    341,248                        38.2 60.5 
Ağrı      326,893                        43.7 64.5  
Bingöl    190,508                        42.2 63.2 
Bitlis    231,520   45.5 70.2 
Diyarbakır    739,419   47.7 65.8 
Elazığ                   408,607   31.0 50.0 
Erzincan 257,212           23.7            41.6 
Erzurum 703,872                        30.4 49.9 
Hakkari               138,266                         54.3 69.5 
Kars 592,916  28.9 51.5 
Malatya  559,586 27.7 47.2 
Mardin 502,747 52.0 70.3 
Muş                      260,757               44.6 65.4 
Siirt 398,505 48.3  68.3 
Tunceli                126,248     30.2 50.8 
Şanlıurfa              627,269 52.0 68.7 
Van                      416,891                        49.2                            68.6                                                      
  
Turkey            43,112,337                         22.5                          40.9 
Source: Sönmez, 1992 [1990]: 263. 
 
In summary, the preconditions for economic development in ESA, that is, adequate public 
investment oriented towards the exigent needs of these long-neglected regions, land reform 
and the resultant removal of the ağa class, as well as the introduction of Kurdish-medium 
formal education, could not be implemented because all of these measures were antithetical 
to the Turkish state’ policy of controlling the overwhelmingly Kurdish regions. Thus, the 
transition from a one-party autocracy to a multiparty political system, which was temporarily 
suspended by military intervention in 1960-61 and 1971-73, did not lead to a qualitative 
alteration in the Turkish state’s perception of and preoccupation with the Kurdish question; 
largely because none of the regimes post-1950 sufficiently de-Kemalised or dealt with the 
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legacy of the Young Turk rule. Resultantly, by the end of the 1970s Turkey remained locked 
in contradictions created by the Kemalist shibboleths on the Kurdish issue and the 
predominantly Kurdish provinces in massive underdevelopment borne of state negligence and 
paranoia.   
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                                                           Chapter 5  
Turkey’s Kurdish Question in the Era of Neoliberalism:  From the 1980 Coup to the   
AKP’s Kurdish Overture (1980-2010s) 
5.1 Overview 
In the late 1970s, Turkey found itself in one of the gravest political and economic crises since 
the establishment of the Republic; prompting a military coup and the authoritarian 
implementation of a structural adjustment programme as well as a shift to export-led growth 
from 1980 on. In other words, in the wake of the economic crisis and political turmoil of the 
late 1970s, Turkey abandoned the ISI policies and instead adopted the neoliberal strategy 
focussed on the long-term objectives of export-oriented trade, development strategy based on 
the neoclassical principle of comparative advantages, and a more market-directed system of 
resource allocation. After a brief overview of the pivotal events in the late 1970s, this chapter 
will evaluate the implications of the political economy of post-1980 Turkey on the Kurdish 
policy of the Turkish state and the socio-economic issues in the predominantly Kurdish ESA.   
Turkey had a persistent balance of payment and balance of trade deficit throughout the 1960s 
and the 1970s as a result of Turkey’s ISI giving birth to new labour-intensive industries 
which were not only heavily dependent on foreign subsidies
244
, manufacturing inputs and 
technology, but also not export-oriented
245
 (Keyder, 1987: 165-196). Put differently, 
increasing import bills coupled with meagre exports led to rapidly increasing trade deficits 
that had to be financed by foreign funds. The decline in the profits of the SEEs during the 
1970s, resulting from the mismanagement of these state-owned enterprises by fragile and 
                                                          
244
 Foreign subsidies in the form of aids and loans, particularly from the US. After the Second World War the 
Turkish state was able to persuade the US, supranational organisations and the funding agencies that the 
development of capitalism in Turkey should be subsidised externally largely because of the geostrategic 
importance of Turkey, as discussed in the previous chapter. Relatedly, between 1960 and 1974 American loans 
and aid constituted the principal mode of covering the trade deficit as it covered ‘about one-third’ of the deficit 
up until 1974 (Keyder, 1987:180). From 1970 on, however, workers’ remittances from Europe gained 
prominence: remittances ‘peaked in 1974 with a total of $1.426 million’ (Zürcher, 1994: 280).     
245
 The export sector’s share in ‘GDP averaged less than 4 per cent during the 1970s, and about two-thirds of 
these revenues came from the traditional export crops’ (Pamuk, 2008: 284).  
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short-lived political coalitions with short-term horizons (Richards and Waterbury, 2008: 218-
19) and the oil crises (1973-4 and 1979-80) only exacerbated the difficulties. As a result, the 
strategy of ensuring satisfactory profits for industrialists while also creating and sustaining an 
internal market resulted with a dismal failure.     
In less than a decade Turkey’s debt grew almost five-fold: increasing from $3.3 billion in 
1973 to $15.3 billion by 1980. Since rising budgetary deficits were met with monetary 
expansion, inflation jumped to 90 per cent in 1979 (Pamuk, 2008: 285). The second oil price 
shock in 1979-80, which depleted one-third of foreign reserves of the Central Bank, 
compounded the problems in the country. Oil for industry and electricity generating became 
increasingly limited, so much so that by 1979 power cuts of up to five hours a day were the 
rule, even in winter (Zürcher, 1994: 281). Unemployment rose officially from 600,000 in 
1967 to 1.5 million in 1977, though the unofficial figures was much higher as each year only 
40 per cent of new entrants to the labour market could find employment (McDowall, 
2000:411). Moreover, the number of days lost to strikes rose from 323,220 in 1970 to 
2,217,347 in 1979 (Işıklı, 1987: 325). The economic crisis fuelled political instability as 
increasingly more people, especially the youth, were being disenfranchised by the existing 
system. Economic crisis, combined with political instability and violence, brought Turkey to 
the verge of civil war. 
Radical left-wing groups, which were driven underground when the political left was 
proscribed after the 1971 military coup
246
, clashed with extremist right-wing groups, most 
notably Idealist Hearths or Grey Wolves: the youth organisation of the Nationalist Action 
Party, a constituent member of the National Front coalition governments
247
. The latter were 
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 After the coup, one of the top priorities of the generals was the ‘restoration of law and order’, and that meant 
the elimination of the political left, which was seen as a threat to the status quo, and all of it organisations such 
as the TIP, Dev-Genç (The Federation of the Revolutionary Youth of Turkey) and DISK (Confederation of 
Revolutionary Workers’ Unions).  
247
 There were two successive National Front coalition governments. The First National Front governed the 
country from 31 March 1975 until 5 June 1977 and composed of four parties: JP, National Salvation Party, 
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given unhampered freedom and protection to act as vigilantes against their ideological 
rivals
248
 (Ahmad, 2008: 250-54). The number of victims of these clashes arose rapidly from 
around 230 in 1977 to between 1200 and 1500 in 1979 (Zürcher, 1994: 276). Thus in the 
second half of 1970s political violence plagued Turkey.  
In addition to university campuses and the shanties of Ankara and Istanbul, Eastern and 
Southeastern provinces that were overwhelmingly Kurdish and/or ethnically mixed, like 
Maraş and Malatya, became the focus for these conflicts. By the end of 1978, 20 to 30 were 
being killed daily in these provinces. The Grey Wolves organised pogroms against Kurdish 
and Turkish Alevis, who generally supported the political left. There was a major outbreak of 
violence in Malatya in April 1978. In December of the same year, the Maraş massacre 
occurred wherein, according to official reports, the Grey Wolves left 109 people dead and 
seriously wounded 176 individuals as well as destroying 500 shops and houses. The victims 
were largely Alevi Kurdish slum-dwellers (McDowall, 2000: 412-13). The political turmoil 
in these regions was in part due to the Turkish nationalist shibboleths on the Kurdish question 
advocated by the National Front coalition governments, which openly articulated ‘the need to 
Turkicize these [Kurdish] inalienable regions of the Turkish nation’ (Kendal, 1993: 86). And 
in part due to politically co-opted ağas who feared the social and economic challenge of the 
leftists.  
The draconian measures of particularly the Second National Front coalition government in 
ESA were so brutal and indefensible that on 31 December 1977 Demirel, the leader of the 
coalition government, failed to win the vote of confidence when twelve JP deputies who had 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Reliance Party and the Nationalist Action Party (NAP). The NAP had two of its three deputies in the cabinet, 
thereby legitimising its far-right ideology. After the elections in 5 June 1977, Ecevit’s RPP formed a minority 
government, but he failed to win a vote of confidence on 3 July. As a result, the Second National Front 
government was formed and it was in power between 21 July 1977 and 31 December 1977.  
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 As noted by Zürcher ‘[t]he struggle between right and left was an unequal one. During the ‘Nationalist Front’ 
governments of 1974-7, the police and the security forces had become the exclusive preserves of [Alparslan] 
Türkeş’s NAP, and even under Ecevit’s government of 1978-79, they remained infiltrated by right-wing 
extremists who shielded and protected the Grey Wolves’ (1994: 276). 
292 
 
resigned voted against the government on account of the ongoing violence and oppression 
against the Kurds in these provinces (Ahmad, 2008:253). The Second National Front 
coalition government was succeeded by a RPP government led by Ecevit from January 1978, 
which immediately responded to the disorder in ESA by putting the whole of these regions 
under martial law. It is in this political climate that the Ankara University student Abdullah 
Öcalan founded the PKK in November 1978, with the aim of establishing a socialist 
Kurdistan. 
After taking office, the other important step taken by Ecevit’s government was to begin 
negotiations for new credits with the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD. Owing to the 
radical ‘austerity measures’ demanded by the creditors, the talks dragged on. Turkey finally 
bowed to the impositions of the creditors and in July 1979, an agreement was reached which 
would release $1.8 billion in new credits, dependent on the Turkish government executing 
reform packages including: cutting government expenditure; cutting subsidies; abolishing 
import and export controls; and freeing interest rates. This agreement put the RPP 
government in a perturbed position, as it neither gave an end to the downhill slide of the 
economy nor did it the curb the mounting political unrest (Schick and Tonak, 1987: 351-52).  
After suffering a humiliating defeat at the by-election of 19 October 1979, Ecevit resigned. 
Following his resignation, a JP minority government took office on 12 November.  
On 24 January 1980, the new government announced a new stabilisation programme akin to 
the reform packages announced by the preceding government. The architects and advocates 
of neoliberalism, however, alleged the 24 January programme, to be a turning point in the 
history of Turkey, since they conceived it to be more than a standard stabilisation programme 
on account of it seeking to attain structural adjustment by changing the development strategy 
that Turkey hitherto followed (World Bank, 1983). In other words, the IMF-inspired 24 
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January measures were emblematic of Turkey’s full embracement of the neoliberal 
development strategy.  
The new programme involved, among others, the following critical measures: greater 
liberalisation of the trade and payments regime; a devaluation of the lira against the dollar by 
33 per cent and the limitation of multiple exchange rate practices; increased competition for 
SEEs and abolition of most government subsidies; promotion of foreign investment; 
additional promotional measures for exports; and draft legislation for tax reform (OECD, 
1980: 25). Income policies in the form of restraints on union activities, collective agreement 
and wage freezes were also on the agenda (Hansen, 1991:383). The task of overseeing this 
programme was given to the US-trained under-secretary for economic affairs in charge of 
planning, Turgut Özal (1927-1993).  
By the spring of 1980 it became apparent, however, that there was widespread opposition to 
what was depicted as the ‘Chilean solution’ – named after the policies General Pinochet had 
launched in Chile after the coup again President Allende. The inexhaustible activities of the 
left and the unions, particularly DİSK, made it impossible for Özal to execute the neoliberal 
economic package. Resultantly, the rulers of Turkey opted for the ‘Chilean solution’, as in 12 
September 1980 the self-styled military guardians of the Republic staged a coup and took 
power again. The rising tides of political unrest in addition to the failure of Demirel’s 
coalition to implement economic liberalisation policies were major factors in convincing the 
generals to act on 12 September 1980. The military regime that came to power endorsed the 
neoliberal economic policies and made a point of keeping Özal in the government, as the 
deputy prime minister in charge of economic affairs. Özal thereafter became a towering 
figure in Turkish politics. During 1983-1987, he became the Prime Minister of Turkey and 
was later elected Turkey’s eighth President (1989-1993).   
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5.2 Authoritarian Neoliberal Restructuring of Turkey and the Emergence of the Armed 
Conflict between the PKK and the Turkish State 
After the coup of 1980, the suppression of the Kurdish identity intensified and the regional 
inequalities between the predominantly Kurdish ESA and the rest of Turkey persisted. Two 
interrelated issues that came to dominate Turkey’s agenda as the years wore on, were the 
rights of the Kurdish people and the massive underdevelopment of the overwhelmingly 
Kurdish ESA.  
The authoritarian neoliberal restructuring of Turkey during the military regime (1980-83) and 
the transition period to multi-party politics under Özal’s Motherland Party government 
(1983-87) put into place a stringent regime in the ESA provinces, revitalised the policy of 
denying the existence of the Kurds in Turkey and neglected the sector on which the 
predominantly rural Kurdish regions was heavily dependent: agriculture. The most 
detrimental change for the agricultural sector as a result of the neoliberal economic reforms 
was the virtual eradication of subsidies and price support programmes after 1980, which 
combined with the trends in the international market to create a severe deterioration in the 
sectoral terms of trade.  
Intersectoral terms of trade ‘turned against agriculture by more than 40 per cent until 1987’ 
and the agricultural sector ‘showed the lowest rates of output increase during the post-war 
era, averaging only 1 per cent per year from 1980’ (Pamuk, 2008: 288). Moreover, Boratav, 
commenting on the fate of farmers growing crops that are found in the predominantly 
Kurdish South-East, i.e. cotton and tobacco, points out that ‘for these two commodities, the 
rapid depreciation of the Turkish lira during the 1980s has been beneficial to the exporters, 
but not to the farmer’ (1990: 215). Consequently, peasant farmers were faced with ‘increased 
and even extreme indebtedness to cover costs’ (ibid.: 217). The conditions of the labourers 
employed in sectors other than agriculture were no better, as real wages during the same 
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period dwindled by as much as 34 per cent (Pamuk, 2008: 288). Strikes were declared illegal 
and a Supreme Arbitration Board was set up to settle all pending collective agreements and 
issued guidelines for future agreements – this Board was only abolished in April 1987 
(Hansen: 1991: 386-87). This in part explains why the Turkish capitalism as a whole was 
prepared and willing to trade off the economic and political problems of this period for 
‘restricted democracy, ideological hegemony, and a disciplined labour force’ (Keyder, 1987: 
225).         
The reticence of the rulers of Turkey to leave behind policies of forcible assimilation based 
on a mono-ethnic conception of the nation state compounded the problems experienced by 
the Kurds, as well as sharpening the Kurdish question of Turkey. After the military 
intervention, ‘two-thirds of the Turkish army’ were deployed in ESA (McDowall, 2000: 414). 
The authoritarian 1982 Constitution did not only strengthen the power of the president –
giving him the right to disband the Assembly and to rule by decree – and reduce the 
Assembly to a single chamber, but it also, under Article 14, restricted the freedoms of 
individuals and organisations and prohibited political struggles based upon language, race, 
class and sect. Alongside targeting Marxists and Islamists, this provision was directed at the 
activities of the Kurdish nationalist. 
More importantly, in October 1983, the military government introduced Law 2931 
proscribing the use of Kurdish. By 1986, under Law 1587, 2,842 out of 3,542 villages in 
Adıyaman, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Urfa, Mardin and Siirt had been renamed in Turkish to 
obliterate the Kurdish identity (McDowall, 2000:425). The PKK insurgency was one of the 
alleged causal factors stirring the reassertion of state authority in the 1980 coup, but it was 
not until 1984 that the PKK armed struggle commenced in earnest. 
In October 1984, the PKK followed up its initial August attack first by killing three members 
of a unit in charge of guarding the President Kenan Evren at Yüksekova, and then 
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ambuscading and killing eight soldiers in Çukurca, Hakkari. The PKK’s methods were 
violent, and those perceived as cooperating with the state, including the government-
sponsored Village Guard militia, ağas, civilian state employees such as teachers, were 
specifically targeted.  
In April 1985, the Village Law was revised to allow for the maintenance of the state-
sponsored militia employed to fight the PKK: Village Guards.
249
 The Village Guards were 
reminiscent of the Hamidiya Cavalry of the late 19
th
 century analysed in Chapter 3. As with 
the Hamidiya, the Turkish state was quite willing to make use of Kurdish tribes and to work 
in close cooperation with its local intercessors, the ağas, to attain the manpower for the 
guards; individual village guards did not necessarily receive their salary since the ağas 
collected the wages of the guards on the state payroll.
250
 Analogous to the Hamidiya chiefs, a 
section of the ağas manipulated their position to dispossess the weak or minority groups in 
ESA. Under the banner of Islam, the dominant tribal chieftains forcibly drove Assyrian and 
Yezidi villagers from their land in Mardin; others did the same to Alevi villagers near Maraş 
(ibid: 422). In 1985, Turkey recruited 62,000 village guards to fight the PKK (Sarıhan, 2013: 
94).      
In juxtaposition to clans affiliated with the Right, the Far Right or in conflict with the PKK, 
voluntarily offering village guards to the state, the state also obliged the rural Kurdish 
community to provide volunteers to prove their loyalty. If villages failed to come up with 
volunteers for the Guards, they would risk being perceived as PKK adherents. Thus, the 
Kurdish villagers were stuck between a rock and a hard place since they could become 
village guards and chance being attacked by the PKK, or refuse and risk becoming victims of 
state security operation. 
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 For detailed exploration of the Village Guards, see: Aytar (1992).  
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 As reported by McDowall, ‘in autumn 1992 Sadun Seylan, chief of the Alan tribe in Van, who owned 26 
villages, fielded 500 village guards, a force he could increase six-fold if necessary. For these 500 men, Seylan 
received $115,000 monthly’ (2000: 422). 
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In July 1987, under Decree 285 (Olağanüstü Hal Bölge Valiliği İhdası Hakkında 285 Sayılı 
Kanun Hükmünde Kararname)
 251
, a governor-general was appointed over the eight 
overwhelmingly Kurdish provinces in ESA (Bingöl, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Hakkari, Mardin, 
Siirt, Tunceli and Van) in which a State of Emergency (OHAL) was declared. Thereafter, the 
regime and the region came be identified as the OHAL, up until its annulment in November 
2002. The governor-general was given the task of coordinating the different bodies fighting 
against the PKK guerrillas, the army, gendarmerie, police and village guards. He was 
equipped with a wide range of powers, including the forced evacuation of villages and 
pasturage where it was deemed necessary. By the end of 1989, the number of forcibly 
evacuated hamlets and villages had reached around 400 (McDowall, 2000: 426) and, as will 
be demonstrated below, many more followed the same in fate in the 1990s.  
5.3 Gradual Democratisation Efforts and the Timid Politics of Recognition  
After the referendum of 6 September 1987 on the question of whether to permit the old 
mainstream politicians/parties proscribed under the 1982 Constitution to take part in politics, 
which resulted in the restoration of the political rights of the veteran politicians, the transition 
to a more open and competitive political system had begun. The seasoned leaders Demirel, 
Ecevit, Necmettin Erbakan and Türkeş, and the representatives of the bourgeoning working 
class movement outside of the Assembly, which culminated into 1989 “Spring Actions” 
partaken by around a million workers (Özuğurlu, 2006: 273), albeit for dissimilar ends,   
instigated a vociferous criticism of the aforementioned repression of wages, deterioration of 
income distribution and significant rise in corruption and embezzlement, all of which came to 
be considered a direct legacy of the Özal era (Öniş, 2004).  
In response Özal reverted to the short-term ‘deceptive populist policies’ of his predecessors 
(Boratav, 2003:169) at a time when the economy was sluggish with very low growth rates: 
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 The Decree 285 was published in Resmi Gazete on 14 July 1987, Issue no. 19517, and came into force on 19 
July 1987.  
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the growth rates plummeted from 4.6 per cent between 1981-85 (Hansen, 1991:390) to 2.1 
per cent in 1989 (Yeldan, 2006: 49). After 1987, public sector wages, salaries, and 
agricultural incomes saw an increase (ibid.: 49-50). Real wages ‘almost doubled from their 
decade-low point in 1987 until 1990’ (Pamuk, 2008: 289). In addition, as result of the scheme 
of high support prices for agricultural producers Özal poured around $2 billion into the 
countryside (Waldner, 1995: 39). Such policies sharply increased the budget deficit from 10.1 
per cent of GDP in 1990 to 12.1 per cent in 1993 and also renewed inflation, which jumped 
from 30 per cent in 1983 to 60 per cent in the years 1989-93 (Yeldan, 2006: 50). In 1989, 
partially to help finance the deficit and in part to attract short-term capital inflows or hot 
money, Özal fully liberalised the capital account and eradicated the obstacles to international 
capital inflows, which made the Turkish economy extremely vulnerable to sudden outflows 
of international capital and external shocks in the 1990s (Pamuk, 2008: 289).       
From 1989 onwards, the ANAP government in unison with President Özal embarked on 
further constitutional reforms. In April 1989, a number of amendments were announced, the 
most crucial being a decrease (from 15 days to 24 hours) in the length of time individuals 
could remain in police custody without being charged. A year later, Özal gave hints of a new 
Kurdish policy at the meeting of the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association 
(Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği, TÜSİAD), which perhaps is indicative of the 
existing dissatisafaction and the influence TÜSİAD wielded over the Kurdish issue. In this 
meeting he made public that the government was ‘engaged in a quest for a serious model for 
solving the Kurdish problem in a manner that goes beyong the police measures’ (Gunter, 
2011:88). In early 1991, the cabinet introduced a package of constitutional restructurings 
which in part dealt with the political system (direct presidential elections, lowering the voting 
age to 18, enlargement of the Assembly), but partly dealt with human rights (Zürcher, 1994: 
305). 
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Pursuant to this, at the government’s requests, the Turkish Assembly revoked the 1983 ban 
on speaking Kurdish in public and annulled Articles 141, 142 and 163, which proscribed 
politics on the basis of class and/or religion as proscribed by the Penal Code. The latter 
amendment led to, among other things, the repealing of the ban on the DİSK trade union 
confederation after 11 years. The reforms undertaken in 1991 constituted a quintessential 
example of the inextricable link the Kurdish question has to the democratisation of Turkey. 
Demirel, who became Prime Minister in the 1991 elections, extended the liberal 
dispensations in relation to the Kurdish issue of Turkey, as in a historic speech in Diyarbakır 
he declared that Turkey recognised ‘the Kurdish reality’. In the meantime, President Özal 
was trying to sway the opinion of the bureaucrats and the public alike to support a PKK 
amnesty (Yeğen, 2011: 74). Overall, the early 1990s led to the abandonment of the hitherto 
dominant state discourse that the Kurdish question was devoid of an ethnic dimension. 
The causality for the shift in the Turkish state’s perception of the Kurdish issue and its 
methods of engaging with the question should be sought in the increasing discontent of the 
Turkish and Kurdish masses with the conventional nationalist arguments employed by the 
successive governments owing to damaging consequences of the clashes between the PKK 
and the armed forces. By the early 1990s, the militarised conflict not only attained a serious 
dimension as it claimed around 2,500 lives, but it also made it extremely difficult for the state 
to cling to denial politics in relations to the Kurdish identity.  
The first major blow to the orthodox Kemalist position came with the 1991 election results, 
which relayed the growing dissatisfaction of the masses in Turkey. In alliance with the SHP, 
the pro-Kurdish People’s HEP, founded in 1990, won 22 seats in Parliament. By 1990, a 
qualitative transformation had also taken place in the nature of the Kurdish discontent, as for 
first time since 1984, families of the PKK martyrs dared to collect the corpses for burial from 
the Turkish authorities and organised public funerals in which popular resentment against the 
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states’ Kurdish policy was exhibited. On 20 March 1990, 10,000 Kurds took to the streets in 
Cizre (Siirt) and the state imposed a curfew on 11 towns in Mardin and Siirt (McDowall, 
2000: 427).    
In sum, the modification in the Kurdish policy of the Turkish state was necessitated by the 
untenable nature of the Turkish nationalist dogmas on the Kurdish question. The politics of 
recognition was brief though, as after the early 1990s the Turkish state insisted on drawing 
the wrong conclusion from the right premises. In other words, the state acknowledged the 
existence of the Kurds, but reconceptualised the Kurdish question as a question of ‘separatist 
terror’.   
The Politics of Oppression and the Fourth Wave of Kurdish Deportations  
The Turkish state revisited the politics of coercion with regard to the Kurdish question 
between 1993 and 1999. Having recognised the ethnic dimension of the Kurdish issue the 
state now portrayed the conflict as an ethnic Kurdish rebellion with divisive aims that 
required military measures. As a result, during these years the Kurdish issue sunk 
increasingly into the grip of securitisation. A bloody and relentless war was waged against 
the PKK guerrillas and the public who were perceived to sympathise with them. According to 
Turkish official figures, out of 31,000 Turkish Security Forces, civilians and PKK guerrillas 
who lost their lives during the first period of conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state 
(1984-1999), 27,410 died between 1992 and 1999 (Sarıhan, 2013: 94). 
Ostensibly as part of its bid to crush the PKK by routing its networks of support in the 
Kurdish countryside, the Turkish state forcibly evacuated more villages in ESA on a 
temporary and permanent basis. These deportations were outlined in a leaked February 1993 
memo, which deals with the methods of solving the Kurdish issue, from President Özal to 
Prime Minister Demirel: 
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‘Starting with the most troubled zones, village and hamlets in the mountains of the region 
should be gradually evacuated…[and] resettled in the Western parts of the country according 
to a careful plan…Security forces should immediately move in and establish complete control 
in such areas…To prevent the locals’ [from] return[ing] to the region, the building of a large 
number of dams in appropriate places is an alternative’ (K. Yıldız, 2005: 79).  
Analogous to the preceding three waves of deportations, the states alleged aim for mass 
forced evacuations – i.e. having overall control of ‘troubled zones’ – is only partially true 
because a closer inspection of the patterns of forced deportations or evacuation exhibits a 
multifarious collection of aims alongside confronting the PKK’s support base in the Kurdish 
countryside. As observed by Kerim Yıldız, the Executive Director of the London-based 
Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP)
252
 who has closely monitored the internal 
displacement policies of the Turkish states, ‘[v]illages and other settlements were routinely 
‘cleansed’ of their civilian Kurdish inhabitants, often as a form of collective punishment for 
refusal to join the state-sponsored civilian militia, the Village Guard’(K. Yıldız, 2005: 77). In 
1995, the Turkish Human Rights Association (İnsan Hakları Derneği, İHD) published an 
important survey in relation to those displaced by these evictions. Overall, over 90 per cent of 
the evacuees confirmed they had come under direct pressure from the Turkish security forces 
to leave their homelands and 88.7 per cent believed they were targeted solely because they 
were Kurds (İHD, 1995).    
The mass internal displacement or forced deportation policies
253
, as openly stated by Özal in 
the memo quoted above, were implemented in accordance with the long-term and wider 
strategy of banishing the Kurds from their ancestral homelands by the construction of dams, 
which is an integral part of GAP. A fact-finding mission by KHRP and the University of 
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 KHRP is an independent human rights organisation founded in London in 1992. It has been involved in 
influential fact-finding missions as well as publishing extensively on the issue of forced internal displacement in 
Turkey, see: KHRP (1996, 2002 and 2004).   
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 For an overview, monitoring and specific case studies, other than the ones listed above, of this scheme, see: 
Human Rights Watch/Helsinki Watch (1994).  
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Galway, Ireland, in August 2004 found that this project would displace many thousands of 
local people; the pending İlusu Dam project alone would have 78,000 individuals forcibly 
displaced (KHRP, 2005).           
Moreover, the security forces aimed to change the social and economic fabric of the 
predominantly Kurdish ESA by blazing houses, pastures and forests, slaughtering livestock 
and denying the villagers the opportunity to recover their possessions (Göç-Der, 2004). 
Hence, the wealth and lands accumulated by the Kurds in these regions were directly targeted 
with tragic social and economic consequences. According to a report by the National 
Assembly, of 5,000 settlement units that existed prior to 1985, 3,848 were evacuated by 
1999. It is estimated that around 3 million people were displaced during this period (K. 
Yıldız, 2005: 78). Disagreements exist with regard to the amount of those forcibly displaced, 
however, as the findings of a relatively recent research by the Hacetepe University, Ankara, 
suggest that between 950,000 and 1,200,000 were compulsorily deported (HÜNEE, 2006). 
Because of such discrepancies, it is reasonable to assume that at least 1 million people were 
unwillingly removed from their homelands.   
Mass village evacuations were multi-faceted processes and involved more than the professed 
aim of combatting the PKK. They formed part of the Turkish states’ enduring desire to break 
up the Kurdish communities in the predominantly Kurdish ESA provinces and consolidate 
control in Kurdish heartlands. In addition, disseminating the Kurdish population would not 
only advance the longstanding goal of assimilating Kurds into the dominant Turkish culture 
and attenuating the Kurdish identity, but it would also exasperate calls for autonomy. 
Political rights of the Kurdish citizens were systematically violated. Two pro-Kurdish parties, 
HEP and the Democratic Party (Demokrasi Partisi, DEP) were banned by the Supreme Court 
in 1993 and 1994. In the latter year, parliamentary immunity for eight Kurdish deputies was 
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revoked; four of whom, Leyla Zana, Hatip Dicle, Orhan Doğan and Selim Sadak, were 
arrested and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. Other DEP leaders fled to Europe.  
Another longstanding and preferred tool of assimilation employed by the Turkish state in the 
1990s was state funded boarding schools in the predominantly Kurdish regions. As before, 
these schools were set up in overwhelmingly Kurdish regions with the purpose of educating 
Kurdish pupils away from their families and outside of their normal cultural contexts. 
According to the figures provided by the Ministry of National Education, of 299 boarding 
schools 155 are located in ESA provinces. 
5.4 A New Phase in the Kurdish Questions Post-1999: The End of the First Period of 
Conflict 
The late 1990s marked a shift in the Turkish state’s Kurdish policies. A policy of recognition 
and engagement was substituted for that of securitisation and suppression on account of four 
pivotal developments: a) the erosion of the hoary claims in relation to alleged separatist ideals 
of Kurds; b) the growing frustration of the important institutions and circles in Turkey with 
both the prevailing perception of the Kurdish question and the methods of dealing with the 
issue; c) the capture of the PKK leader Öcalan; and d) Turkey’s candidacy for European 
Union (EU) membership. 
The 1990s were the most problematic period in the post-Second World War era for Turkey. 
Özal’s decision to fully liberalise the capital account and abolish the barriers in the way of 
international capital inflows in 1989 exposed the country to sudden outflows of capital and 
external shocks, which led to the crises of 1991, 1994, 1998 and 2000-1. Concurrently, 
public-sector deficits widened in the 1990s and it was a period of very high inflation – 
jumping to 100 per cent in 1994 and remaining above 50 per cent each year through to 2001 
(Pamuk, 2008: 289-90). In spite of the GDP per capita continuing to rise during the era of 
economic liberalisation, it was still at a lower rate than the former period: GDP per capita in 
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the years 1980-2005 grew at a pace of 1.9 per cent whilst during 1950-80 it was 2.6 per cent 
(ibid.: 267).  
There were two major factors for the persistence of public debt during the 1990s. The first of 
was the ‘deceptive populist policies’ implemented by Özal after 1987. The second was the 
costly war waged against the PKK on which the Turkish state spent some $2 billion per 
annum during 1984-1999 (Faucompret and Konings, 2008: 168). In addition to the large 
fiscal burden of this conflict, the conventional methods of engaging with the Kurdish 
question were increasingly viewed as a barrier to Turkey flourishing economically and 
socially by the dominating classes in Turkey. Growing discomfort in Turkish business circles 
initiated gradual but adamant calls for alternative means of addressing the Kurdish question.     
In 1995, the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (Türkiye Odalar ve 
Borsalar Birliği, TOBB) published the results of a controversial survey254 prepared by 
Professor Doğu Ergil, a political science professor at Ankara University, which exposed three 
principal factors regarding the Kurdish issue that were hidden from the public view. First, 61 
per cent of those polled favoured amelioration of the cultural, political and economic rights of 
the Kurds (Ergil, 2009: 52) and only 9.4 per cent preferred secession (ibid.: 54), thus 
falsifying the hitherto propagated assessment by the state officials that the conflict was 
motivated solely by secessionist or separatist objectives. Second, Kurdish identity was more 
widespread than the portrayal of the Turkish state officials, since 90.8 per cent of those 
surveyed identified themselves as Kurdish (ibid.: 38). Third, based on these and other 
findings, one important and uncomfortable conclusion of this survey was that the ‘PKK was 
not the cause, but a product of the Eastern Question’ (ibid.: 54). The publication of the 
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 The survey, entitled Doğu Sorunu: Teşhisler ve Tespitler, consisted of interviews with 1,256 people in three 
predominantly Kurdish Southeastern provinces (Batman, Diyarbakir and Mardin), and three provinces in 
various different of Turkey to which Kurds migrated (Adana, Antalya and Mersin). For the complete findings of 
this research, and other studies by Prof. Ergil on the Kurdish Question, see Ergil (2009).   
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findings and conclusions of this investigation caused uproar and a court case was filed against 
Prof. Ergil from which he was later acquitted.   
TOBB’s research was followed by another contentious and influential report by TÜSİAD. In 
January 1997, TÜSİAD commissioned a report, authored by the prominent constitutional 
lawyer, Bülent Tanur. It called for an end to the to the NSC in its present form as well as 
suggesting the removal of all barriers on the Kurdish language, for freedom of Kurdish 
expression – including the freedom to form political parties that could represent Kurdish 
concerns – and for cultural freedom in relation to the naming of places and persons 
(TÜSİAD, 1997). TÜSİAD’ report indicated that the business circles in Turkey were growing 
ever more wary of the mechanisms employed to resolve the conflict and thus demanded an 
alternative, liberal approach to the Kurdish question, the foundations for which were provided 
by the capture of Öcalan and the decision from the EU Summit in Helsinki in 1999.       
PKK leader Öcalan was apprehended in Kenya in February 1999 and was flown to Turkey to 
stand trial, where he was convicted of treason and sentenced to death on 29 June 1999. The 
capture of Öcalan brought, albeit temporarily, the armed conflict between the PKK and the 
Turkish state to an end, since following his capture and imprisonment he declared a ceasefire, 
asked for the withdrawal of the PKK guerrillas from the bases in Turkey and reneged on the 
PKK’s initial objective of establishing an independent Kurdistan.  
In December of the same year, the European Council (EC) declared Turkey a candidate for 
membership of the EU. This decision was conditional on Turkey making satisfactory 
progress with meeting the EU’s Copenhagen political criteria, which explicitly included: ‘the 
stability of institution guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for 
and protection of minorities’ (EC, Conclusions of the Presidency, Copenhagen, 1993: para. 7 
A (iii)). The pressures and prospects of EU conditionality spurred the then existing coalition 
government – the constituent parties of which were Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol 
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Parti, DSP), NAP and ANAP – to implement immediate reforms in the field of minority 
rights. The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) that came to 
power in 2002, particularly, in its heyday of reforms from 2002 to 2004 continued these 
reforms. 
On 3 October 2001, in accordance with the ‘National Programme for Adopting the Acquis 
Communautaire’255 , the coalition government led by Ecevit adopted a series of thirty-four 
amendments to the 1982 Constitution, which removed prohibitions on the use of languages 
other than Turkish. These amendments paved the way for the AKP government to introduce a 
sequence of harmonisation laws implemented in order to align the legal situation in Turkey 
with those of the EU standards. Resultantly, numerous restrictions on freedom of expression 
and association, which were despised by Kurds, were abolished.  New legislations 
implemented by the AKP permitted limited broadcasting in Kurdish in 2002 – the state-run 
television channel TRT began broadcasting in Kurdish for 30 minutes per week – and in 2004 
allowed private schools to offer Kurdish language courses. Moreover, yet again following the 
previous coalition government, the AKP government completed the gradual lifting of OHAL 
in November 2002. Within the same year, the National Assembly abolished capital 
punishment, sparing the life of Öcalan in the process. All of these important steps raised 
hopes that the protracted and brutal conflict with the PKK might at last be entering a more 
peaceful and productive phase.  
5.5 The Second Period of Conflict and the AKP’s Kurdish Overture 
The hopes of a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish question in Turkey, however, came to an 
abrupt end in the first half of the 2000s. The proclamation of the hitherto de facto Kurdish 
                                                          
255
Assistance for candidate countries is determined by the accession process and the need for candidate 
countries to harmonise with the EU. Their legislation needs to be aligned with the acquis communautaire, the 
substantial body of administrative, economic, environment and social EU law. The accession partnership has set 
out the road map for the alignment process and progress is monitored annual in the Regular Report which 
reviews the process chapter by chapter.  
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polity in Iraq (established in 1991) after the collapse of the Saddam regime by the US-led 
invasion of 2003, the cessation of the reforms pertaining to the Kurds in Turkey, and the PKK 
revoking the ceasefire observed since 1999 on grounds of ongoing state military operations 
against the guerrillas, were all influential in preventing a peaceful conclusion to this long-
simmering question of Turkey. These successive events reignited the tinderbox of 
nationalism.  
Akin to the Kurds across the border, it was argued that Kurds in Turkey are preoccupied with 
secessionist aims harboured by the US and the EU. In 2004, in response to European 
Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso’s call ‘to ensure both cultural and political rights 
for the Kurdish people of Turkey’, General İlker Başbuğ, the then commander of Turkish 
Land Forces, claimed the following: 
‘nobody can demand or expect Turkey to make collective arrangements for a certain ethnic 
group in the political arena, outside of the cultural arena, that would endanger the nation-state 
structure as well as the unitary state structure’ (Yeğen, 2011: 77).  
Başbuğ’s statement in a sense signified the beginning of the end of the liberal overtures in 
relation to Kurds, as from 2004 up until late 2009, the politics of rapprochement and reform 
halted (Faucompret and Konings, 2009: 167-70; Bahcheli and Noel, 2011: 108-114). The 
politics of securitisation and discrimination was revisited.   
One of the other influential reasons for the politics of reform losing ground is linked to the 
uncertainty concerning the EU’s effectiveness as an instigator of reforms with regard to the 
Kurdish question in the years after the formal accession process in 2005. The EU made an 
important positive start in 1998 by amenably naming the Kurdish issue and citing its 
resolution as a requirement to Turkey’s attainment of EU membership, as evinced in the 
European Commission’s 1998 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession:  
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‘A civil, non-military solution must be found to the situation in south-eastern Turkey, 
particularly since many of the violations of civil and political rights observed in the country 
are connected to in one way or other with this issue’ (European Commission, Regular Report 
on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession, 1998: 53).  
As time wore on, however, references to Kurds in EU documentation have become 
increasingly more subdued, and the European Commission has promoted the expansion of 
individual rights rather than collective rights for the Kurds and abstained from promoting an 
explicit political solution for the Kurdish question. This becomes evident when we compare 
the European Commission’s analysis in relation to the Kurdish question cited above with 
those that are more recent. For example, in the 2005 Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards 
Accession, the European Commission shares the following oblique observations with regard 
to the Kurdish question: 
‘Turkey continues to adopt a restrictive approach to minorities and cultural rights. Although 
there is a growing consensus on the need to address the economic, cultural and social 
development of the Southeast, little concrete progress has been made and the security 
situation has worsened’ (ibid., 2005: 42).  
A similar restrained tone and analysis is pursued in succeeding European Commission 
Reports (see ibid., 2006: 22-3; ibid., 2007: 23-4; ibid., 2008: 25-6 and ibid., 2009: 30-1). As 
noted by Nathalie Tocci, ‘EU actors have paid only sporadic attention to the Kurdish 
question’ and ‘have become far less outspoken on Kurdish collective and territorial rights’ 
(2006: 135).  
However, by far the most important illustration of Turkey’s shift in relation to the Kurdish 
question was the judgment that the foundation of a Kurdish political entity in the form of the 
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq would incite the perceived secessionist desires 
of the Kurds in Turkey, as unequivocally argued by Başbuğ:  
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‘[the KRG] brought a political, legal, military and psychological power to the Kurds of the 
region…this situation may create a new model of belonging for a segment of our 
citizenry’.256  
In a similar vein, on 2 November 2008, the then Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdoğan, subsequent 
to refusing to shake the hands of elected deputies of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society 
Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DPT), declared in the predominantly Kurdish province of 
Hakkari that those who opposed the motto ‘one nation, one flag, one motherland, one state’ 
should leave the country.
257
 
This hostile outburst by Erdoğan did not repress long-held collective sentiments of the Kurds; 
if anything, it prompted Kurds in the ESA to support the pro-Kurdish DTP in the local 
elections of 29 March 2009 and contributed to AKP’s relatively poor performance among 
Kurdish electorates in the predominantly Kurdish regions. The victor in the ESA was by a 
clear margin the DTP, which increased its share of votes and attained a majority of the 
mayoralties in these regions, whilst AKP support decreased by more than 15 per cent. The 
haemorrhaging of Kurdish votes in the local elections automatically raised grave doubts 
concerning whether the AKP could retain its 2007 electorate support among the Kurdish 
voters in the general election of 2011.  
Such fears of the AKP as well as the relentless misgivings and resistance of the Kurds against 
the revisited politics of securitisation in relation to the Kurdish question led the governing 
party to devise judiciously a Kurdish reform agenda around the notion of individual rights 
and general minority rights instead of Kurdish collective rights. In the summer of 2009, 
Prime Minister Erdoğan unveiled a ‘Kurdish Overture’, which later came to be retitled as the 
‘Democratisation Overture’ and then redesignated as a ‘National Unity Project’, that heralded 
                                                          
256
 Todays Zaman, ‘Başbuğ Rules out any Ethnic Rights in the Political Field’, 12/04/2008. 
257
 Todays Zaman, ‘ Erdoğan comments rattles Kurds in Diyarbakir’, 2/11/2008. 
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a new approach and process. At the time of writing this thesis, the full extent of this overture 
remains unclear and the process is still ongoing.            
5.6 The Economic Balance Sheet of ESA in the Era of Neoliberal Capitalism 
As the assessments in this study regarding the regional aspects of socio-economic 
development have thus far demonstrated, the predominantly Kurdish ESA have been the least 
developed regions of the Turkish Republic. Neoliberal policies implemented since 1980 have 
not been able to overcome the persistent and large regional inequalities between these two 
regions and the rest of the country, as ESA continued to be most disadvantaged areas of 
Turkey post-1980.  
During 1993-2001, the average GNP per capita in these regions was about one-third of the 
country’s average (TESEV, 2006: 14). A relatively more comprehensive picture of regional 
disparities can be addressed by using the UNDP human development indicators of GDP per 
capita at PPP, life expectancy, adult literacy and combined school enrolment ratios for the 
year 2000, shown in Table 5.1. Out of the 20 least developed provinces, with exclusion of 
Yozgat and Gümüşhane, 18 were located in ESA. In other words, by 2000, unlike any other 
region of Turkey, 85 per cent of the ESA provinces constituted the most underdeveloped 
cities of Turkey. Resultantly, the two predominantly Kurdish regions were the only parts of 
the country which had an average HDI below that of Turkey’s average. 
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Table 5.1 Human Development Index, 2000 
20 Provinces 
with Lowest 
20 Rankings 
in HDI 
Life 
expectancy at 
birth (years)  
Adult 
Literacy rate 
14+ (%) 
Combined 
first-second 
gross 
enrolment 
ratio (%) 
 
Real GDP per 
capita  
(PPP$) 
Human 
Development 
Index (HDI) 
value 
Şırnak 57.7 62.3            70.6   1816 0.56 
Muş                    62                         67.3            58.3 1587 0.57 
Ağrı                    60.4 67.4            57.6 1803 0.57 
Bitlis   59.9      71.8                    53.1        1932          0.58 
Bingöl   59.5      72.4        65.5                     2331          0.60     
Hakkari  60.7      67.5        75.8         2445                   0.61 
Van   63.7      66.6        68.2                     2447          0.61 
Şanlıurfa  64.0      65.7                     63.2                     2847          0.61 
Iğdır   60.3                      73.2                     83.7                     2556                    0.63 
Siirt  63.5 65.8             76.5 3062 0.64 
Mardin               66.2 67.6             70.4 2519          0.64 
Batman               63.1                      67.4 77.3 3410                    0.64 
Kars 60.3                      81.2                     80.4 2882                    0.64 
Adıyaman           63.1                      77.0                     76.9 2736                    0.65 
Erzincan             59.9                      86.4                      65.1                    3348  0.65 
Ardahan             60.3                       83                        89.5                    2315                     0.65 
Erzurum             62.3                       82.6                     70.1 3178           0.66 
Yozgat                 64.7                      84.8                     64.6 2736                     0.66 
Diyarbakır 68.1                       67.0                     70.5 3701                     0.67 
Gümüşhane        64.7  85.3                58.8 3263                     0.67 
 
REGIONS 
Aegan- 
Marmara             70.4 89.9   92.2 7820 0.79 
Mediterranean   65.8 87.3   84.1 5545 0.74 
Central  
Anatolia  64.6     87.4                    79.9                       5328                     0.72 
Black Sea  65.9     85.5                    83.2                       4940                     0.72 
East- 
Southeast 
Anatolia 62.8     73.8                  73.9                       3024                     0.64 
 
TURKEY  65.8                      83.5                  82.2                       5194                     0.72 
      
Source: UNDP Human Development Report of Turkey, 2004. 
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‘Emerging Euro Tiger’ and the Perseverance of Regional Disparities 
Following the 2001 crisis Turkey enjoyed a period of rapid economic growth and increasing 
financial profits amidst the global upswing, which led the World Bank Country Director, 
Andrew Vorking, in 2005 to euphemistically declare the country as an ‘emerging Euro 
Tiger’. Turkey’s rise to ‘emerging Euro Tiger’ status has not narrowed the persistent regional 
inequalities in the country, however. In 2005, as in 1995, out of the 35 OECD member 
countries, Turkey had the highest Gini index of GDP per capita or, put differently, it 
displayed the greatest regional disparities in GDP per capita (OECD, 2009: 91).  
Figure 5.1 Comparison of regional disparities in OECD countries (Gini Index for GDP per 
capita), 1995-2005 
 
Note: The Gini index looks at not only the regions with the highest and the lowest values but also at the 
differences among all regions. It ranges between 0 and 1; the higher the value, the larger the regional 
disparities. 
Source: OECD, 2009: 91. 
 
Before analysing the regional socio-economic disparities in any further depth, a brief 
overview of the general economic development in the 2000s is apposite. On account of the 
2000-1 crisis, Turkey for the 18
th
 time sought the assistance of the IMF. In 2001, the DSP-
NAP-ANAP coalition government invited Kemal Derviş to leave his post at the World Bank 
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and take up the job of Economy Minister. Under IMF supervision, Derviş developed a 
programmed centred on fiscal discipline and large budget surpluses. The Turkish economy 
has since witnessed a notable recovery. After falling by 9.5 per cent in 2001, Turkey’s GDP 
increased by about 35 per cent during the next four years. By the end of 2005, annual 
inflation fell to less than 8 per cent, a level not seen since 1960s (Pamuk, 2008: 291). Thus, 
the recovery that began under the fragile coalition government, was continued by the single 
party majority government of the AKP from late 2002 onwards, as can be deduced when the 
figures tabulated below for the compound annual average growth rate of GDP in the years 
2002-2011 (5%) are compared to that of years 1989-1995 (4%) and 1996-2001 (1%) (See, 
Figure 5.2). Needless to say, the generally favourable international economic environment, 
with low interest rates for developing countries, also helped.    
Figure 5.2 Compound annual average growth rate of GDP (%), 1970-2011258 
 
 
Source: Calculated from World Bank, World Development Indicators: 2014a 
                                                          
258 In Figure 5.2, the thesis employed compound annual average growth rate of GDP for the years 1970-2011 in 
order to enable a comparative understanding of annual average growth rates before and during the neoliberal era 
in Turkey. Moreover, the longitudinal data provided in this graph was preferred because it facilitates an 
understanding of the growth performance of the Turkish economy at economic turning points such as the 
structural adjustment programme 1980, the liberalisation of capital accounts in 1989, and the post-2001 crisis 
restructuring.   
 
0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6%
1970-1979
1980-1988
1989-1995
1996-2001
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Turkey’s public sector debt decreased from 74 per cent of GDP in 2001 to 38 of GDP in 
2010. While the Turkish economy has been growing steadily, private debt and living 
standards have increased significantly: private sector debt increased from 15.1 per cent of 
GDP in 2001 to 47.1 per cent of GDP in 2010 (World Bank, World Development Indicators: 
2014b). The GDP per capita increased from the level of US$ 5,952 in 2002 to US$ 7,834 in 
2010 (see Figure 5.3). 
Figure 5.3 Turkey’s GDP per capita (Constant 2005 US$), 1970-2011  
 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators: 2014c 
 
 
It is worth noting that Turkey’s noteworthy economic performance in the 2000s was 
however, accompanied by a continuously mounting current account deficit (see Figure 5.4). 
As commented on by the OECD, Turkey’s account deficit in this period reached 
‘unprecedented levels’: in 2010 the country’s deficit widened to just under 10 per cent of 
GDP (9.8 per cent), nearly 70 per cent more than what it had been in the 1990s (on average 
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3.10 per cent of GDP) (OECD, 2012: Figure 1.1). By 2012, Turkey had the world’s third-
largest current account deficit. 
Turkey's high deficit reflects structural issues related to the country’s heavy dependence on 
imported intermediate inputs and energy
259
, which constitutes the bulk of the deficit
260
, low 
saving rates, and trade composition (Clark et al., 2012). In particular, Turkish exports in 
textiles, steel, automotive and other manufactures, which fuelled the rise in exports from less 
than $3 billion in 1980 to $70 billion, or 20 per cent of GDP, by 2005 (Pamuk, 2008: 291), 
are heavily dependent on imported industrial inputs (USARM , 2009: 11-2). As a result, 
exports and imports tend to move hand in hand making it difficult for Turkey to rely on 
exports to lower its current account deficit.  
Figure 5.4 Turkey’s current account balance as % of GDP, 1980-2011 
 
 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database: 2014. 
                                                          
259
 Turkey’s oil import dependency rate rose from 84.8 per cent in 1990 to 93.3 per cent in 2012, and its natural 
gas import dependency rate increased from 93.9 per cent in 1990 to 98.6 per cent in 2012 (International Energy 
Agency (IEA), 2014: 447). Iran was the ‘largest supply source of crude oil with 39% of the 2012 total, followed 
by Iraq (19%), Saudi Arabia (15%) and Russia (11%). In 2012, refined product imports came from Russia 
(19%), Italy (12%), Greece (9%) and India (8%)’ (ibid: 453). In 2012, ‘Russia was Turkey’s largest [natural 
gas] supplier, representing 58% of total imports followed by Iran (18%), Algeria (9%) and Azerbaijan (7%)’ 
(ibid: 459). 
260
 According to official figures, Turkey paid about $54 billion in 2011 and $55.9 billion dollars in 2013 for 
energy imports, thus 56 per cent of Turkey’s current account deficit in the latter year had stemmed from 
payments it made for energy imports (Hazar, 2013: 1). For an in-depth and longitudinal study of Turkey’s 
current account deficit and the importance of energy imports, see Bildirici and Kayıkcı (2012: 83-93). 
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Before considering other features of the Turkish economy, owing to the fact that energy 
imports constitute the greater part of the current account deficit of Turkey, it is apt to 
elaborate on Turkey’s energy woes. Energy-related issues have come to occupy increasingly 
the agenda of the Turkish Republic in the neoliberal phase of Turkish capitalism with the 
adoption of the export-oriented industrialisation strategy and the resultant ever-growing 
energy demands of Turkey
261
. So much so that, Turkey’s reapproachment with the KRG 
governing the hydrocarbon-rich Iraqi-Kurdistan
262
 – alongside the traditional Turkish foreign 
policy of expanding its regional political influence, and America’s encouragement of cordial 
relations between Turkey and Erbil – is based on Turkey’s large energy demands and its need 
for KRG’s hydrocarbon reserves (Charountaki, 2012: 194-202). In 2010, the then Prime 
Minster of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, validated this in a speech wherein he avowed that 
Turkey ‘will build a very solid bridge in bilateral relations between Iraq and Turkey and 
between the Kurdistan Region and Turkey especially. We [Erdoğan and the President of the 
KRG Masoud Barzani] will be in touch. The two countries also engage in economic 
cooperation. We will act together on energy and infrastructure’ (ibid.: 199). Turkey sees the 
KRG and Iraq as an important part of the solution to its energy woes. Ankara wants to 
decrease its dependence on Russian and Iran, long unreliable energy suppliers that the US 
and EU sanctions are making more so. Iraq and its Kurdistan region are one way out of the 
bind.  
                                                          
261
 Turkey’s oil demand rose from 447 thousand barrels per day (kb/d) in 1990 to 670 (kb/d) in 2012, and its 
natural gas demand increased from 3.468 cubic meter per year (mcm/y) in 1990 to 45.254 in 2012 (mcm/y) 
(IEA, 2014: 447). 
262 With ‘23 rigs drilling exploration wells in mid-2012 (more than double the number from early-2011), the 
KRG area is now one of the most intensive areas for oil and gas exploration in the world, reflecting high 
expectations of significant discoveries in the heavily folded and faulted subsurface of the northern Zagros 
foldbelt. The regional government has awarded around 50 contracts with international companies to explore for 
and produce oil, and has stated its ambition to raise the region’s production to 1[million barrels per day] mb/d 
by 2015, based on existing discoveries, and to 2 mb/d by 2019, based on existing and expected discoveries.’ 
(IEA, 2012:60). 
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According to a 2012 IEA report, Iraq will play a pivotal role in world oil markets in the 
coming decades and could produce up to 8.3 million barrels a day in 2035, but only if ‘a 
resolution of differences over governance of the hydrocarbon sector…opens up the 
possibility for substantial growth also from the north of Iraq.’ (IEA, 2012: 83). The Maps of 
oil and gas infrastructures below not only exhibit the pivotal role of the ESA regions for 
meeting Turkey’s energy requirements they also reveal the importance of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan 
Crude Oil Pipeline
263
 for satisfying this demand, which carries a total maximum annual 
capacity of 1.4 (mb/d) (IEA, 2014: 455).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
263
 Kirkuk-Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline ‘runs from Kirkuk, Iraq, to the Ceyhan Oil Terminal on the 
Mediterranean Sea and has been active since 1976. A second pipeline parallel to the first was commissioned in 
1987... In September 2012, Iraq and Turkey agreed to extend the carriage of Iraqi crude oil import through the 
pipeline by 15 years. In 2011, this pipeline brought 163.3 mb of crude oil from Iraq to Turkey.’ (IEA, 2014: 
455). 
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                                               Map 13  
                                   Oil Infrastructure of Turkey (Source: IEA, 2014: 449) 
 
 
                                                                     Map 14 
                                   Gas Infrastructure of Turkey (Source: IEA, 2014: 450) 
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As well as the current account deficit, unemployment remained high throughout the 2000s 
(Yeldan, 2009: 146-56). Unemployment in a country hailed as the ‘emerging Euro Tiger’ 
rose from 6.5 per cent in 2000 to 10.7 per cent by the end of 2010 (Eurostat, 2014). In 2010, 
Turkey’s employment rate was 46.3 per cent, much lower than the crises-ridden euro-area 
average of 64.1 per cent (ibid.). In addition, despite the rise in the GDP per capita witnessed 
in the 2000s, the major income gap between the poor and rich persisted.  
The income of the richest 10 per cent of people in the mid-2000s was, on average across the 
OECD countries, nearly nine times of the poorest 10% (OECD, 2008: 3). In Turkey, the 
richest 10 per cent in the mid-2000s had incomes of more than 17 times those of the poorest 
10 per cent, and, in Mexico, the ratio was 25:1 (ibid.). This trend appears to have continued in 
the latter part of the 2000s, since, according to the OECD data pertaining to the late-2000s, 
Turkey had the third highest Gini index for GDP per capita (see Table 5.2).   
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Table 5.2 Income inequality league 
from low to high inequality in OECD Countries, Late-2000s 
Country                             Gini Coefficent  
Slovenia                    0.24 
Slovak Republic            0.25 
Denmark             0.25 
Norway                                        0.25 
Czech Republic                           0.26 
Sweden                                        0.26 
Finland                                         0.26 
Austria                                         0.26 
Belgium                                       0.27 
Luxemburg                                  0.27 
Switzerland                                 0.28 
Iceland                                         0.28 
France                                          0.29 
Netherland                                  0.29 
Germany                                      0.30 
Ireland                                          0.30 
Spain                                             0.31 
OECD                                           0.31 
Estonia                                          0.31 
Poland                                           0.31 
Korea                                             0.32 
Canada                                           0.32 
Greece                                            0.32 
Japan                                               0.33 
New Zealand                                  0.33 
Austria                                            0.34 
Italy                                                 0.34 
United Kingdom                             0.34 
Portugal                                           0.36 
Israel                  0.37 
United States                                   0.38 
Turkey                       0.41 
Mexico                        0.48 
Chile                                   0.50 
 
Source: OECD, 2011: 67. 
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 As briefly raised above, previously existing socio-economic regional disparities persisted 
throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century, as exhibited by the persistence of the 
long-standing large discrepancies between the predominantly Kurdish ESA provinces and the 
rest of the country. In May 2003, the SPO published the results of a study, entitled İllerin ve 
Bölgelerin Sosyo-Ekonomik Sıralaması Araştıması (Researching the Socio-Economic 
Development Ranking of Provinces and Regions), shedding more factual and detailed light 
on the enduring regional divergences in Turkey pre-and-post-2001 crisis. 
In brief, this research, using the SPO’ Socio-Economic Development Index (SDI), ranked 
provinces and regions in accordance with their level of social and economic development 
from 1 to 5: ‘1st level developed provinces’ being the most developed and ‘5th level 
developed provinces’ being the least developed cities. The SDI is employed to measure the 
social and economic development level of provinces based upon 58 socio-economic 
variables, including employment, education, health, infrastructure, manufacturing and 
construction
264
. Unlike any other region in Turkey, all of the provinces in ESA, with the 
exclusion of Malatya and Elazığ, were ranked as 4th or 5th level developed provinces (see 
Map 15). In parallel with the latest country report for Turkey prepared by UNDP quoted 
above, 17 (out of the total 21) provinces in ESA constituted the least developed domains in 
Turkey (SPO, 2003: 56).  
With the country average at 0, the Marmara region at 1.7 was the most developed region. The 
Aegean and Central Anatolia region were the next developed regions at 0.48, followed by the 
Mediterranean region at 0.02. The Black Sea region was just below the national average at -
0.51, while Southeastern Anatolia and Eastern Anatolian regions fell far below the Turkey’s 
average at -1.01 and -1.16 respectively (SPO, 2003: 78). Moreover, as pointed out by the 
SPO, when the findings of this study are compared with that of 1996, it becomes apparent 
                                                          
264
 For a full list of the variables, see: SPO (2003: 45). 
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that virtually nothing had changed regarding the socio-economic levels or rankings of the 
seven main regions in Turkey, as displayed in Table 5.3. Thus at the peak of the armed 
conflict in 1996 and four years into the ceasefire in 2003, the predominantly Kurdish ESA 
could not rid itself from the shackles of being of the most underdeveloped regions of the 
country.  
Table 5.3 Socio-economic development index, 1996 and 2003 
                                              1996                                            2003 
 Region                            SDI Index             SDI Index 
Marmara  1.69  1.70 
Aegean  0.50  0.48 
Central Anatolia  0.46  0.48 
Mediterranean Region     0.6    0.2 
Black Sea Region                -0.54 -0.51 
Southeastern Anatolia -1.03 -1.01 
Eastern Anatolia  -1.13 -1.16 
 
Source: SPO, 2003: 78. 
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  Map 15 
             Categorisation of Provinces According to the Socio-Economic Development Index 
                                        Source: SPO, 2003: 72. 
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Between 2001 and 2010, TÜİK, without any explanation, ceased to produce statistics 
pertaining to the regional distribution of the national income, thus the actual magnitude of 
spatial income disparities in the 2000s was not made public. In January 2010, however, it 
gave an end to this practice by only publishing the national income data for 2004-06. The 
long awaited figures revealed that: a) the national income share of the ESA regions which 
host 15 per cent of the total population of Turkey, typically decreased, and b) the ESA had 
the lowest average per capita income in the country.  
During the era of economic liberalisation in Turkey, analogous to the preceding ISI period, 
the predominantly Kurdish ESA witnessed an incessant decrease in their fraction of national 
income. In 1979, these regions accounted for 8.2 per cent of the national income, in 2001, 
this figure fell to 7.7 per cent, and by 2004-06, it further reduced to 6.9 per cent (Sönmez, 
2012: 122). Consequently, by 2006, the national income share of the 21 provinces located in 
this part of Turkey was less than half of their share of the total population. It is worth noting 
that this was at a time when Turkey’s national income recorded a swift and remarkable 
growth from $181 billion in 2002 to $400 billion dollars in 2006 (USARM, 2009: 13). 
The ESA regions had the lowest per capita income in the country, as the average income in 
these regions was around 54 per cent less than Turkey’s average and, more strikingly, 
approximately 70 per cent less than that of Istanbul’s (see Table 5.4) (Sönmez, 2012: 123). It 
would be fair to say that neither the cessation of the militarised conflict between the PKK and 
the Turkish state between 1999 and 2004 nor the significant economic growth of the 
‘emerging Tiger’ post-2001 crisis were efficiently utilised to remedy the economic 
underdevelopment of the ESA. Resultantly, Turkey could not shake off the notoriety of being 
the OECD member state with the highest level of regional income disparities in the mid-
2000s (see Figure 5.1.)    
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Table 5.4 Average per capita income, 2006 
Region Average Income (US$) 
Istanbul 10.352 
Southeastern and  
Eastern Anatolia   3.017 
Turkey                                 6.684 
 
Source: TÜİK figures in Sönmez, 2012: 123. 
 
Another indicator of the increasing poverty in the predominantly Kurdish provinces in the 
ESA, and the persistence of the regional income variations between the regions and the rest 
of the country, is the comparatively high rate of Green Card holders in these areas in the late-
2000s. The Green Card (Yeşil Kart) Programme, initially set up in 1992 and replaced in 2011 
with a General Health Insurance System, was a non-contributory health programme that 
ensured the provision of health services to individuals whose family earned less than 1/3 of 
the minimum wage.  In 2008, according to the data obtained by the USARM from the Health 
Ministry, the total number of Green Card holders in Turkey was 9,362,249, just under half of 
whom (4,290,996) lived in the ESA. While in the 21 ESA provinces Green Card holders 
accounted for 38.4 per cent of the regional population, in the remaining 60 provinces this 
figure was 8.5 per cent, as demonstrated in Table 5.5.  
Table 5.5 Green Card Holders in Turkey, 2008 
Region                          Population       Green Card                   Average 
                                                                  Holders                    Green Card 
                                                                                                       Holders % 
21 Southeastern and    11 186 951       4 290 996                          38.4 
Eastern Anatolia    
60 Provinces  59 399 305   5 071 253 8.5 
Turkey                          70 586 256       9 362 249                           13.3 
 
Source: Ministry of Health figures cited in USARM, 2009: 27. 
 
The massive underdevelopment of ESA and the consequential persistence of regional 
disparities between these regions and the rest of the country are inextricably linked to three 
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principal factors. First, the regression of agriculture in the predominantly agrarian ESA 
regions emanating from the negative repercussions of the armed conflict between the PKK 
and the Turkish state as well as the economic liberalisation policies implemented after 1980. 
Second, the derisory and relatively low level of public and private investments in ESA, which 
is nowhere near enough to counterbalance the long-standing underdevelopment and/or to 
minimise the destruction of the war in these domains. The third factor is the top-down 
developmentalist policies and vision of the Turkish state in relation to these regions that has 
thus far resulted in it paying minimal attention to the actual and urgent needs of the local 
populace in ESA.    
Armed Conflict and Economic Liberalisation: Stunted Development 
As discussed extensively in the preceding chapters, owing to the relatively low level of 
industrialisation in ESA during the years after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, 
these regions were heavily dependent on agriculture. For instance, by 1988, according to a 
survey by the SPO, there were only 41,411 workers in all of the manufacturing 
establishments in the two regions. Of these, 30,777 (74.32 per cent) were in public 
manufacturing enterprises and only 10,634 (25.68 per cent) in private establishments (Kutbay 
& Çınar, 1989: Table 5).  
It is apt to point out here that the above cited workforce figures collated by the SPO, albeit 
demonstrating the very low level of industrialisation in ESA, does not account for informal 
employment in ESA, making it extremely difficult to ascertain the precise extent of 
employment in the non-agricultural sectors in these domains. This statistical lacuna was not 
unique to ESA: TÜİK in the 1988 Household Labour Force Survey (HLFS) officially 
articulated the informal sector concept for the first time, and, as elaborated below, it was only 
after 2001 that TÜİK defined and researched the informal sector in line with the 
internationally recognised standards (Bulutay and Taş, 2004: 6-7; Kan and Tansel, 2014: 2-
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4). Thus, up until the 2000s, data limitations and heterogeneity have constituted major 
barriers to measuring informality (TÜSİAD, 2006: 44-53).  
Keith Hart (1973) coined the term informal sector to designate self-employment, casual 
labour and small enterprise activities of the reserve army of urban unemployed and 
underemployed. The maiden internationally agreed definition was adopted at the 15
th
 
International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) in 1993. According to this definition, 
the informal sector denotes employment and production that take place in unincorporated 
small or unregistered enterprises (e.g. less than five employees) (International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), 1993). In the ensuing years, this enterprise-based definition was 
criticised for failing to capture the increasing variety of informal employment forms, in 
particular marginal micro-scale informal activities, which are often unreported by individuals 
(Hussmans, 2005). Resultantly, in 2003, a broader informality specification relating to an 
employment-based concept, namely, informal employment, was adopted at the 17
th
 ICLS. 
Informal employment referred to all employment arrangements that leave individuals without 
social protection through their work, whether or not the economic units they operate or work 
for are formal enterprises, informal enterprises or households (ILO, 2003). This study 
concurs with this broader definition and hence employs the notion of informality to refer to 
‘all forms of… employment without contracts (i.e. covered by labour legislation), worker 
benefits or social protection – both inside and outside informal enterprises.’ (Chen, 2005: 7). 
 In Turkey, although informality has been an issue for a long time, the size of the informal 
economy has grown rapidly since the 1980s. The development paradigm centred on a state-
led import substitution regime had reached its limits by the 1970s and was unable to engender 
sufficient regular employment (Pamuk, 2003). Additionally, the 1980 coup d’état 
dramatically shifted the balance between employers and employees (Öngen, 2003). Real 
wages declined by 40 per cent between 1980 and 1988 period (Özar & Ercan, 2004). As the 
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economy was liberalised under a series of structural adjustment programs, employers were 
able to informalise employment relations furthermore (Boratav et al 2000; Ercan, 2004). 
From 1990 to 2003, the share of informal employment in non-agricultural employment 
increased from 25 per cent to 31.5 per cent, accounting for 47 per cent of job growth outside 
of agriculture (Erdem, 2004: 104). Informality is particularly widespread in small enterprises 
with low productivity and unqualified labour, but larger enterprises also engage in 
underreporting in order to save on labour costs and to avoid taxes and regulatory 
responsibilities (Peker, 1996). 
Data on the unincorporated and tax related characters of the informal sector are not included 
in any of the HLFS’s in Turkey in the years prior to 2000 (Bulutay, 2004: 7). Relatedly, 
based on the findings of the HLFS’s in Turkey after 2000 – which are employed by ILO265 on 
informality – we are able to attain an approximate picture of this phenomenon. Based on the 
HLFS’s for the years 2002-09, informal employment in Turkey is discerned to account ‘for a 
little bit more than 50% of total employment during the years 2002-2005 and it went down to 
less than 50% in the period 2006-2009’ (ILO, 2010: 9). During the years 2000-09, 
informality in the agricultural sector was around 90 per cent, while informal employment 
labour in the non-agricultural sector was around 30 per cent (ibid). These figures exhibit 
clearly the prevalence and persistence of the informal sector not only in Turkey, but also, 
more importantly for the purposes of this reaserch, they highlight the importance of 
informality for the predominantly agrarian economy of the ESA regions.   
The climate of violence, mass evacuations of villages and hamlets in ESA coupled with the 
aforementioned unfavourable conditions for the agricultural sector in Turkey in the neoliberal 
era – i.e. repression of agricultural incomes, decrease in agricultural subsidies and the sectoral 
terms of trade turning against agriculture – had detrimental results for the cultivation of crops 
                                                          
265
 The 2009 HLFS in Turkey is employed in one most the most detailed studies on informality in 47 countries, 
see: ILO and WIEGO (2013).  
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and raising of livestock in these predominantly agrarian regions. In the first half of the 
twentieth century, agriculture accounted for just over 80 per cent of employment and more 
than 50 per cent of the GDP in Turkey; in the early-2000s this stood at 35 per cent and 10 per 
cent respectively (Pamuk, 2008: 292). More specifically, in 1970, stock rearing, the single 
most important activity in ESA, accounted for 12.3 per cent of Turkey’s GNP, whilst in 1997 
it had dwindled to 2.2 per cent (McDowall, 2000: 448). Alongside the neglect of the 
agricultural sector by the successive governments of the 1980s and the 1990s, village 
evictions and the prohibitions on grazing in the summer pastures in the ESA, particularly in 
the 1990s, played a decisive role in the sharp decline of agricultural output in these regions.  
In 1994 alone, the agricultural loss of ESA, on account of the escalating violence, the mass 
evacuations of villages and hamlets, was estimated to be $350 million. In the province of 
Diyarbakir it was estimated that livestock numbers were reduced by 50 per cent, stock rearing 
by 30 per cent and forested area by 60 per cent (ibid.: 440). In the 1990s, the contributions of 
the 21 ESA provinces to the national GDP continued to fall. In 1991, these areas accounted 
for around 6.40 per cent of Turkey’s GDP and in 1995; this figure fell to 5.70 per cent, whilst 
by 2000 it dwindled to approximately 5.50 per cent (USARM, 2009: 18). Thus, the 
contributions of the two regions to the country’s GDP diminished from 8.54 per cent at the 
dawn of the neoliberal era in Turkey in 1979 to 5.50 per cent two decades later. By the 
beginning of the twenty first century ESA, which accounted for 15 per cent of Turkey’s 
population, contributed less than 6 per cent to the country’s GDP.  
According to the findings of a report published by the pro-Islamist Fazilet Party (Virtue 
Party) in June 1999, the armed conflict combined with the austerity policies of the 
consecutive governments after 1980 severely decreased the average income in ESA: ‘in 
western regions of Turkey the per capita income is $4,000-$5,000, while in the east and south 
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east it is only $600-$900.’266 Concomitant to the relatively low level of income, individuals in 
the Eastern and Southeastern provinces have very low levels of savings and credit use. In 
2000, average per capita bank deposits in Turkey were around TRL
267
 200 (million), in the 
Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia it was approximately TRL 70 (million). Likewise, in the 
same year, average per capita bank credits in the country were about TL 400 (million), while 
in the South-East it stood at TL 120 (million) (TESEV, 2006: 46).  
The remarkable economic growth witnessed in the post-2001 crisis years does not appear to 
have triggered an increase in personal savings and the availability of bank credit in these 
regions. In 2005, according to the figures of The Association of Banks of Turkey (Türkiye 
Bankalar Birliği, TBB), bank loans provided to individuals and enterprises in ESA 
constituted a mere 3.1 per cent of the total bank loans in Turkey, and per capita bank deposits 
in all 21 provinces in this quarter of Anatolia was far below the national average of TRY 
3207 (Sönmez, 2012: 219). Although the volume of both deposits and credit are in ESA 
compared to the rest of Turkey (see Table 5.6), the ratio of credit to deposit in certain 
provinces in these regions, such as Tunceli and Elazığ, is higher than the national average, 
which is an indication of a higher level of indebtedness in these areas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
266
 Turkish Daily News, 4/06/1999. 
267
 The Old Turkish Lira (TRL) was replaced with the New Turkish Lira (TRY) on 1 January, 2005. One TRY is 
equivalent to 1000000 TRL. 
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Table 5.6 Bank Deposits and Credits, 2005 
 Provinces per capita Bank Deposits  per capita Bank Credits 
                                (YTL)                 (YTL) 
Adıyaman      392    508 
Ağrı        197   146 
Bingöl      422  276 
Bitlis      227  175 
Diyarbakır      429  341 
Elazığ                  1.106    471 
Erzincan                 942  495 
Erzurum   543  404 
Hakkari                  233  133 
Kars    548  481 
Malatya     764  495 
Mardin    299  227 
Muş                         198  121 
Siirt     294  241 
Tunceli                 1.485  508 
Şanlıurfa                  303  255 
Van                          296                                                  301  
TURKEY       3.207      1.751                 
 
Source: TBB figures in Sönmez, 2012: 218. 
 
Paltry Public and Private Investments  
The insufficient and relatively low public and private investment in ESA, far from 
minimising the negative repercussions of the armed conflict and the austerity measures of the 
IMF-inspired economic programmes, played a pivotal role in the persistence of the long-
standing large socio-economic disparities between the these regions and the rest of country in 
the neoliberal era. In spite of the continuance of the state-sanctioned incentive scheme of 
Priority Development Regions (PDRs) Programmes introduced in 1968, discussed in Chapter 
4, private investment in the predominantly Kurdish ESA provinces remained trivial in the 
years of high levels of armed conflict (1992-99) as well as in the period of relative 
tranquillity (1999-2004). In the years 1995-2004, ESA had the lowest and third bottommost 
average proportions of subsidised investments respectively, as displayed in Table 5.7. 
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Table 5.7 The regional breakdowns of subsidised investments in Turkey, 1995-2004 
Regions                          Average Shares of Subsidised Investment  
                                                                           % 
Marmara   42 
Central Anatolia 12.7 
Aegean                                                           11.8  
Mediterranean                                              12.6 
Southeastern Anatolia                                     8.9 
Black Sea   5.3 
Eastern Anatolia                                              2.4  
Multiregional    4.4 
 
Source: TESEV, 2006: 45. 
 
On 29 January 2004, Law 5068 was approved in order to augment private investment by 
offering additional financial incentives to employers and investors. The AKP governments 
aim to bolster investment from the private sector through a wide range of incentives, which 
included, among other things, investment credits, tax relief, postponement of the Value 
Added Tax (VAT) and assistance with energy-related issues, appears to have primarily 
benefited the parts of the country that are more industrialised and better equipped with 
infrastructure facilities. In 2006, only 5.78 per cent of the subsidised investments went to 
ESA regions, and more strikingly, the combined subsidised investment in the years 2002-06 
for the 21 ESA provinces was lower than that of the province of Bursa. Bursa’ share of 
subsidised investment in 2002-2006 stood at 4.45 per cent whilst the combined shares of the 
cities in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia were 4.44 per cent (USARM , 2009: 35-6). 
An important research commissioned by TESEV-UNDP- The Open Society Foundation 
(OSIAF) in the early 2000s explored, among other things, the reasons as to why 
entrepreneurs in Turkey were historically reluctant to invest in these regions. They found that 
along with the armed conflict, the inadequate public sector investment in the South-East 
played a decisive role in dissuading representatives of the private sector to invest in these 
regions. Members of TOBB who partook in this study stated that their enduring hesitance to 
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invest in ESA was ‘in part due to the security reasons’ and partly because of ‘problems 
pertaining to the recruitment of a well-equipped labour force as well as the lack of sufficient 
infrastructure in these regions’ emanating from years of scarce state investment. Without the 
removal of these substantial obstacles, business executives argued that state-induced 
incentives would play a ‘minimal role’ in enthusing private sector investment in these lagging 
regions (TESEV, 2006: 19).   
Indeed, public investments, or lack of them, have been a major problem in ESA, more 
noticeably in the 1990s. From 1990 to 2001, ESA received on average TRL 3000 million 
public investment per capita, while the remaining five regions of Turkey attained TRL 8000 
million public investment per capita (ibid.: 28). Similarly, in the years 2002-2007, the 
halcyon days of the Turkish economy following the 2001 crisis and prior to the global crisis 
of 2008 under the stewardship of AKP, the total amount of government expenditure in the 
ESA regions ranked the lowest among all seven regions of Turkey (see Table 5.9). In 
addition, unlike the other region that performed below Turkey’s average in SPO’ Socio-
Economic Development Index (i.e. the Black Sea region), in ESA public expenditure per 
person was below the national average, as demonstrated by Table 5.9. In other words, with 
the exception of these predominantly Kurdish regions, other lagging regions received 
preferential treatment in the sphere of public investment, so much so that the Black Sea 
region had the second highest per capita public investment in the country (see Table 5.9).  
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Table 5.8 Regional comparisons of public investments per capita, 2002-2007 
(in %) 
Regions                                         
                                                                         %   
Central Anatolia  1.83 
Black Sea                                               1.73 
Marmara                                               1.64 
Mediterranean                                                1.57 
TURKEY                                                 1.57 
Eastern Anatolia                                     1.50 
Aegean                                                  1.26 
Southeastern Anatolia                         1.23 
 
Source: USARM, 2009: 65. 
 
In terms of the sectoral distribution of the public investment in these regions, we see that very 
little has changed from the ISI period. State expenditure in these regions continues to be 
driven by exogenous factors, and minimal financial attention is imputed to the exigent local 
needs of the populace in the ESA provinces. From 2002 to 2007, the biggest beneficiary of 
public investments in ESA was the energy sector (see Table 5.10), which, on account of the 
lack of industrialisation in these regions and the low level of employment opportunities 
generated, has nominal value or use to these regions. In 2006, 69 per cent of the electricity 
generated in ESA was used outside of these regions, yet, only 17 per cent of this energy was 
locally consumed (USARM, 2009: 43). 
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Table 5.9 Sectoral distribution of public investment in ESA, 2002-2007 (in %) 
Sector                                         
                                                                     % 
Energy                                                         19 
Agriculture                                                  17 
Health                                                          14 
Education                                                     14 
Communications                                           8 
Housing                                                         3  
Mining                                                           3 
Tourism                                                        0.9 
Miscellaneous                                               22 
 
Source: USARM, 2009: 65. 
 
In spite of the infrastructural deficiencies in ESA, which prevent the local population 
enjoying the necessities of modern day life and hinder private sector investment in these 
regions, only 8 per cent of the state expenditure in these regions was spent on 
communication. In addition, the total public expenditure on health and education (28 per 
cent) in these regions was not substantially different to that of the combined investments in 
the energy and mining sectors (22 per cent), which to an extent explains the reason behind the 
large and persistent socio-economic disparities between ESA and the rest of the country.  
The lack of attention to the local needs of these regions is by no means unique to the above 
covered five years, because state planning and investments in these regions in the neoliberal 
era, parallel to previous periods in Turkey, have largely been in disregard of the socio-
economic needs and demands of the their people. The two operational codes of the state 
programmes and funds in these regions have thus far been political control as well as 
orientation towards meeting the requirements of the economic demands of the rest of Turkey, 
particularly the ever-growing energy needs of the country. Both of these conventional facets 
of the Turkish state policy in the predominantly Kurdish and naturally rich ESA are 
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embedded in the socio-economic engineering project born at around the same time as the 
arrival of neo-liberal policies in Turkey: GAP. 
GAP: A Paradigmatic case of Developmentalism from Above  
GAP at present comprises of 13 massive irrigation and energy projects and 22 dams including 
the Atatürk Dam, the sixth largest of its kind in the world. It covers an area of about 75,358 
square kilometers, which represents 9.7 per cent of the total area of Turkey, spread over nine 
Southeastern provinces: Adıyaman, Batman, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Kilis, Mardin, Siirt, 
Şanlıurfa, Şırnak. The GAP region’ total population is around 6.1 million, which constitutes 
just under 10 per cent of the total population.  
The origins of the GAP go back to a plan of the Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (Devlet 
Su İşleri-DSI) on hydraulic energy and irrigation, which was prepared in 1977. By the second 
half of the 1980s, the Kurdish insurgency, as well as the increasing regional disparities 
between the South-East and the rest of Turkey, shifted the emphasis of the GAP to ‘integrated 
regional development’ that aimed not only to efficiently utilise the water and energy 
resources, but also to address the socio-economic underdevelopment and poverty in this 
region. A new plan, the GAP Master Plan (1989), was prepared and a bureaucratic 
reorganisation was decreed which resulted in the establishment of the GAP Regional 
Development Administration (GAP-RDA). The GAP-RDA defined the objectives of GAP as: 
a) generation of hydroelectric power; b) developing regional agriculture through irrigation; c) 
development of a regional agro-industrial base; and d) providing better social services, 
education and employment to control migration and attract qualified individuals to the area 
(GAP, Master Plan, 1990).  
The low financial realisation (40%) and the limited economic impact of the GAP led to the 
1998 decision of the Council of Ministers to revise the Master Plan. GAP-RDA was assigned 
with the task and to ensure its completion by latest 2010. Accordingly, a new regional 
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development plan was devised in co-operation with the UNDP. This novel plan incorporated 
the newly adopted principle of sustainable human development and resultantly pursued the 
following aims: a) social sustainability and the development of social services; b) optimum 
and sustainable utilisation of natural resources; c) human settlements; d) agricultural 
sustainability and development of agricultural productivity; and e) local entrepreneurship and 
industrial development for economic viability.
268
  
Owing to limited success in meeting these set targets, the completion date of the GAP has 
constantly been revised. The current set date for completion, according to the present GAP 
Administrator Chairman, Sadrettin Karahocagil, ‘of all main and sub-projects is the end of 
2017’.269 One of the factors, if not the main factor, for its continual postponement is the 
limited success in attaining the set objectives in areas other than the energy projects. That is 
to say, even after the systematic shift within GAP from dam-building or hydroelectric 
production project to a multi-sectoral and sustainable socio-economic regional development 
program, the overriding concern has been electricity production. The ‘hydro-imperative’ 
aspect (Kolars, 1986), as well as the enduring aim of controlling Kurdish heartlands, has thus 
far largely ignored the long-term and most beneficial facets crucial for the development of the 
South-East: irrigation; agricultural training; crop breeding; industrial development; education; 
and improving health services.  
By the end of 2006, nearly two decades after the commencement of GAP, only 14 per cent of 
the projected irrigation investments materialised, while 74 per cent of the planned 
hydroelectric energy investments were realised. Eight hydroelectric power stations were in 
operation – in 2006, the GAP accounted for 48.5 per cent of Turkey’s total hydroelectric 
electricity production (USARM, 2009: 42). As of 2007, the monetary value of the energy 
obtained from the GAP region, $17.9 billion, was near equivalent to public investments made 
                                                          
268
 For detailed and differing analyses of the evolution and objectives of GAP, see: Kolars (1986); Mutlu (1996); 
Unver (1997) and Çarkoğlu and Mine (2005). 
269
 Today’s Zaman, 17/09/2013. 
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for the project up until that point, $18.9 billion. The great majority of the electricity generated 
in the Southeast was, however, consumed outside of this region: in the mid-2000s, in spite of 
electricity consumption per capita in Turkey being 202 kilowatt-hour (kWh), electricity usage 
per capita in the GAP region was 78 kWh (ibid.: 66).  
The large and persistent socio-economic disparities, as exhibit above by the UNDP HDI of 
2000 as well as the SDI of the SPO in 1996 and 2003, confirm that GAP project objectives 
concerning sustainable regional development and minimising regional discrepancies between 
the ESA and the rest of the Turkey have largely stayed on paper. Likewise, there is a gap 
between the Turkish state’s alleged aims of minimising migration and promoting human 
settlements in the region and what it applies on the ground in the Euphrates-Tigris basin.  
As briefly alluded to above, the construction of dams as part of GAP – Keban (1974), Ataturk 
(1992), Birecik (2000) and the pending Ilisu Dam – have resulted in the forced displacement 
of people and evacuation of villages in ESA, augmenting the total number of forced 
migrations from the South-East. Estimates in relation to the number of Internally Displaced 
Peoples (IDPs) arising from the construction of the dams vary. The number of IDPs was 
197,732, according to the DSI in 1999. Other sources do not authenticate official Turkish 
sources with regard to the number of deportations. Based on a report from a fact-finding 
mission in Southeastern Anatolia, The Corner House in the UK in the year 2000 claimed that 
the forced migrants ranged from between 150,000 to 200,000 people (The Corner House, 
2000). Comparatively, in 2004, individual resources reported that around 350,000 people had 
been displaced by the GAP project (Morvaridi, 2004: 729). Based on the different estimates, 
it is safe to suggest that the IDPs produced by GAP range from between 200,000 to 350,000 
people, which raises the total number of forced deportations in the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries from ESA to around 1.5 million. 
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In light of the disclosure of the memorandum in 1993 from the then President, Özal, to 
Demirel, then the Prime Minister, advocating the construction of large dams in order to 
prevent the return of the local deportees back to the South-East, dam-related forced 
displacements have naturally raised major doubts regarding the actual purpose of GAP from 
the local population. In 1998, according to a poll conducted by the Union of Chambers of 
Turkish Engineers and Architects (Türk Mühendis ve Mimar Odaları, TMMOB), only 42 per 
cent of the local population perceived GAP as a development project, and a mere 11 per cent 
had either short or long term expectations of GAP (McDowall, 2000: 448).  
Other factors fuelling the suspicions of the largely Kurdish population in the South-East with 
regard to GAP are closely associated with the shortcomings of the 28 sub-projects launched 
in the third or sustainable development phase of GAP
270
, like the Multi-Purpose Community 
Centers (Çok Amaçlı Toplum Merkezleri, ÇATOM)271 and the GAP Entrepreneur Support 
and Guidance Centres (GAP-Girişimci Destekleme Merkezi, GAP-GIDEM)272. By 2004, 
eight years after the inauguration of GAP-UNDP sustainable development programme, only 
1.3 million dollars of the 5.2 million dollars raised for this programme had been spent on the 
28 sub-projects. This low level of investment is not only indicative of the limitations of 
transforming GAP into a sustainable development project, but also lays bare the rationale for 
the Turkish state pursuing the fashionable sustainable development strategy advocated by 
prominent international developments agencies: to raise funds from a wide range of 
international institutions like the UNDP, UNICEF and the EU. In addition, the local 
inhabitants have also questioned the motives of the some sub-projects such as the ÇATOM. 
The perception of some of ÇATOM’s services – like the birth control training as an effort to 
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 For a full list of these mentioned projects, see GAP (1997). 
271
 ÇATOM started in 1995 and aimed to ensure the participation of women in the following services: literacy 
courses in Turkish, health education, housekeeping courses, maternal education, knitting and weaving courses 
and poly-clinical services. 
272
 GAP-GIDEM was founded in 1996 and is financed by EU grants aimed at providing consultancy services to 
businesses and promotion of private sector investments in the GAP region. 
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‘contain’ the rise of the Kurdish population273  or the literacy courses in Turkish as an 
assimilation strategy (Çarkoğlu & Eder, 2005: 179) – is symptomatic of both the local 
populaces’ estrangement from GAP and the immense influence the Kurdish question has over 
GAP.   
Another issue closely connected with Turkey’s Kurdish question as well as the socio-
economic development of the South-East, which to date has largely been ignored by GAP, is 
the unequal distribution of land ownership and the consequential perseverance of the 
traditional relations of production and social structure in the GAP region. Contrary to the 
avowed ‘urgent’ need of land reform in the GAP Master Plan (GAP, 1990: 23), the traditional 
land tenure system as well as the disproportionate power of the co-opted Kurdish landed elite 
in the Southeastern Anatolia region remained untouched by successive governments 
responsible for implementing GAP. 
In 1990, within the GAP Region 8 per cent of farming families owned over 50 per cent of all 
land, while 41 per cent held between 10 and 50 dönüms and another 38 per cent held no land 
at all. Of the large landowning families, significant portions were absentee, content to allow 
ineffective farming with the proviso that they attain a satisfactory income from their lands   
(McDowall, 2000:434). Relatedly, without a land reform it was implausible that the majority 
of agrarian population could benefit from GAP. The unequal distribution of land ownership 
system inherited from the late-Ottoman period and tenaciously preserved ever since the single 
party period remained devoid of a fundamental reform, nonetheless.  
According to the latest Agricultural Census of 2001, in the Southeastern Anatolian region 
there is in total 264.361 agricultural enterprises. Of these, 2.7 per cent are large-sized 
enterprises (i.e. farms over 500 hectares), owned by the wealthy landowning families, 
account for 33.2 per cent off all land, while 56 per cent are small-sized enterprises (i.e. 
                                                          
273
 According to official statistics pertaining to the mid-1990s, average fertility in the East and Southeast is 4.37 
per cent, while this figure is 2.65 in other regions of Turkey. Relatedly, almost 35 per cent of the whole in these 
regions is under 15 years of age (GAP, 1998).   
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holdings less than 50 hectares) and they only account for 9.7 per cent of all land. In 
Diyarbakir, more strikingly, 3.3 per cent of the large-sized enterprises owned by the 
traditional landowning class, account for 41.2 per cent of all land in the province. And in 
Şanlıurfa 1.5 per cent of the large-sized enterprises controlled by the wealthy landowning 
class, accounted for 28.7 per cent of all land (USARM, 2009: 33).  
Despite such inequalities in land ownership, the issue of land reform went unmentioned in the 
latest GAP Action Plan (2008-2012) launched by the then Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdoğan, 
in Diyarbakir in 2008 in order to ‘complete’ GAP (GAP, Eylem Planı, 2008). As a result of 
which, Erdogan, like his predecessors, indirectly assured the pro-government Kurdish landed 
elite that their wealth, and the immense political power yielding from it, will be conserved. 
Thus, yet again, the long-simmering issue of land reform, like other exigent prerequisites for 
the development of the region, has been substituted for political concerns of the ruling 
classes, in this context, the maintenance of the convenient alliance between the co-opted 
Kurdish landowning class and the governors. 
 Pursuing the goal of electoral gains as well as controlling Kurdish heartlands through the co-
opted propertied Kurdish elite perpetuates the status quo, which hampers the necessary socio-
economic transformation and development of ESA. So long as the local intercessors of the 
Turkish state own most of the land in these regions, even the positive features of GAP, such 
as the much-need irrigation projects, will only enhance the exploitation of the local peasantry 
and perhaps aggravate their mass resentment. This comes to show that the success of GAP as 
well as economic development in these regions hinges, above all, on a political resolution of 
the Kurdish question.   
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                   Chapter 6 
                                                              Conclusion  
The evidence in the preceding chapters of this study on economic, political and social life in 
the predominantly Kurdish regions of ESA necessitates a reconsideration of the role and 
impact of economic development in ESA on the rise and evolution of the Kurdish question. 
An appropriate way of starting this reassessment, as well as summarising the findings of this 
study, can be by returning to one of the initial research questions set by this investigation: 
how economically developed or underdeveloped were the predominantly Kurdish domains of 
the Ottoman Empire? 
At this point, it is worth recalling that, albeit on differing causal grounds, the development 
literature on the primarily Kurdish territories of ESA converges on the postulate that a 
unilinear continuum of underdevelopment has characterised the economic history of these 
regions, as outlined in Chapter 1. The findings of this study challenge this prevailing 
interpretation. The analysis of the vicissitudes in the primarily Kurdish provinces of ESA 
within the last four centuries, outlined in the previous sections of this study, paints a non-
stagnant picture of economic life in these regions, which has important implications for the 
study of the link between economic development in these localities and Turkey’s Kurdish 
question.   
Hitherto, for manifold reasons expounded in Chapter 1, studies on the primarily Kurdish 
areas of ESA have either overlooked its Ottoman past or analysed Ottoman Kurdistan solely 
in terms of its political relations to the Imperial capital. This resulted in the failure of a proper 
analysis of the historical antecedents of the principally Kurdish provinces of Eastern Turkey. 
Such neglect was hazardous chiefly because it gave birth to a stationary understanding of 
economic (under)development in the predominantly Kurdish provinces of ESA. When the 
changes in Ottoman Kurdistan and its modern remnants in present-day Turkey are 
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concurrently considered, a new periodization for economic history of these regions emerges. 
The periodization is no longer centred on a unilinear continuum of inadequate development. 
Rather, there are three distinct periods: the first of these begins from the early sixteenth 
century and ends with the arrival of the third decade of the nineteenth century, characterised 
by economic development. The second period commences c.1830 up until the first quarter of 
the twentieth century, and the major theme of this period is economic underdevelopment. The 
final period is an age of economic de-development, beginning from around the first quarter of 
the twentieth century, and continuing through the early 2000s.    
As the data in Chapters 2 & 3 delineates, between the early sixteenth century and the early 
nineteenth century, the two paradigmatic Ottoman provinces predominantly inhabited by 
Kurds throughout the Ottoman period, Diyarbekir and Erzurum, were economically 
burgeoning areas, and constituted important sources of income for the Ottoman central 
treasury. The sheep breeding and sheep trade, textile production and trade, mining and 
mineral manufacturing and trade, as well as the international and interregional trade passing 
through Kurdistan, played an important role in the economic expansion of these regions. Up 
until the early nineteenth century, the revenues attained from these sectors of the local 
economy constituted the bulk of the provincial revenues of Diyarbekir and Erzurum. In the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the provincial revenues in these two provinces grew at 
a rate faster than that of the bordering Anatolian regions of which modern-day Turkey 
comprise, and were among the principal revenues of the Imperial Treasury.  
The exploration of the economic and political history of Ottoman Kurdistan outlined in 
Chapters 2 and 3, besides challenging the hypothesis of continual underdevelopment in this 
region, also oppugns the causal underpinnings proposed by scholarly studies for this 
postulate. The autonomous administrative structures founded in this region after 1514 are 
commonly thought to have occasioned the ‘minimal implementation’ of the governing timar 
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or dirlik system and facilitated the ‘centuries-long unbroken autonomy’ of the ‘economically 
disinterested’ Kurdish rulers. The peculiar land holding regime put in place after the 
incorporation of the Kurdish principalities in the early sixteenth century is habitually seen as 
constituting a formidable and obstinate impediment to economic development in the 
predominantly Kurdish regions of ESA, by incessantly preserving the feudal relations of 
production in these domains after the nineteenth century. The findings of this study suggest 
quite the reverse.  
The degree of autonomy enjoyed by the Kurdish rulers was gradually eroded by the Ottoman 
state in the years following the incorporation of the Kurdish principalities into the Ottoman 
Empire. As charted in Chapter 2, in the period between the early sixteenth century and the 
late seventeenth century the degree of autonomy enjoyed by almost all of the Kurdish polities 
was reduced to the extent that the majority became very responsive to Ottoman demands. 
Consequently, in almost all of these administrative structures the dirlik or timar system was 
in operation. However, as explained in Chapter 3, during the eighteenth century, in virtue of 
the tax farming policy in the Ottoman Empire, certain Kurdish notables, despite the Ottoman 
state overseeing the function of the Kurdish administrative units, gained immense fiscal and 
landed wealth. Indeed, some of these governors, such as Mir Muhammed of Rawanduz and 
Bedirhan Bey of Botan, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries enjoyed de facto 
autonomy.  
Nevertheless, because of the centralisation policies implemented by the Ottoman state within 
the first half of the nineteenth century, long-standing Kurdish polities were eradicated and by 
1847, there was not a single Kurdish administrative unit in existence. The fully-fledged 
suppressive centralist reforms implemented in Ottoman Kurdistan after 1834, as revealed by 
the empirical evidence in Chapter 3 had severe economic and social ramifications. Ottoman 
state expropiatation of land previously owned by Kurdish notables governing the Kurdish 
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administrative units was an indispensable part of the centralisation process. During the late 
eighteenth century in Ottoman Kurdistan, as in other parts of the Empire, tax farming 
facilitated large-scale private ownership of land by the notables and engendered the gradual 
dissolution of the dirlik or timar system. This steady process enabled locally powerful 
groups, comparatively free from the supervision of the central authority, to respond to 
expanding opportunities of commodity production for long-distance markets during the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries through possessing private ownership of large 
estates and by escalating the exploitation of the dependent peasantry.  
The domineering policies of the Ottoman state after the third decade of the nineteenth century 
instituted a major barrier to the expansion of commerce and export trade by inhibiting the 
development of export-oriented agricultural production in Ottoman Kurdistan. Put 
differently, economic underdevelopment in Ottoman Kurdistan after the 1830s was directly 
related to barriers to the penetration of market-induced commercialisation of agriculture in 
this region, which was closely connected to the negative repercussions of the centralisation 
policies of the Ottoman central authorities on regional agricultural production. 
After the early 1830s, as the accounts of the contemporaries in Ottoman Kurdistan outlined in 
Chapter 3 emphasise, the central authorities seized almost all the lands previously owned and 
cultivated by the Kurdish notables, and, more importantly, large tracts of these repossessed 
lands remained uncultivated for a long period after their appropriation. Three decades after 
these lands were seized from the Kurdish notables, the greater part of the confiscated lands 
were either abandoned or were not resourcefully allocated to peasants by the Ottoman state. 
Such ill use of land, as well as the three decades of sporadic violence in this region had 
inauspicious consequences for agricultural output and trade—as evinced by the relatively 
low-level cultivated land and production data in Ottoman Kurdistan in Chapter 3—and 
augmented the pauperisation of agrarian labourers previously working in these lands. The 
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British and Russian consular reports from Ottoman Kurdistan referred to in Chapter 3 convey 
that after 1830s the impecunious peasants in Ottoman Kurdistan, in absence of state guidance 
and support, turned to usurers for financial support. Considering the very high rate of interest 
on loans during the nineteenth century in Ottoman Kurdistan, most peasants gave large 
sections of their agricultural yields to the moneylenders or ended up losing their land on 
account of defaulting on their debts. Furthermore, unsurprisingly, after the third decade of the 
nineteenth century, commerce in this region also suffered a huge blow. During 1833-1860, 
the trade of native products in Ottoman Kurdistan, as well as the transit trade passing through 
this region, which was an important source of the provincial revenue and economic vibrancy, 
witnessed a steep drop. In sum, the destruction of autonomous Kurdish polities and the 
decline in economic development in this region went hand in glove.  
Moreover, the intrusive policies of the Ottoman state in Kurdistan after the 1830s triggered 
major social and political changes in this Ottoman borderland. A large section of the Ottoman 
Kurdish notable families and merchant elites both voluntarily and involuntarily resettled in 
Western Anatolia, particularly in Constantinople, far from Kurdistan, during the time of the 
Tanzimat and the initials years of the twentieth century where they became increasingly 
integrated into the Ottoman state, language and discourse. This process is exhibited with the 
participation of émigré Kurds in the CUP and their support for the Young Turk Revolution of 
1908.   
Relatedly, the eradication of Kurdish administrative structures, by instigating a power 
vacuum in Kurdistan, created fertile conditions for the strengthening of tribal frameworks and 
deepened the feudalisation of Kurdish society. It is not a coincidence that with the 
obliteration of the Kurdish emirates tribal confederacies occupied the central stage in Kurdish 
society and politics thereafter. Consequently, there was a significant rise in the number of 
tribal rifts, resulting in less law and order, particularly in the Kurdish countryside. Thus, the 
347 
 
centralist modernisation policies implemented in Ottoman Kurdistan after the 1830s, on top 
of having damaging consequences for the means of production and relations of production in 
this region, paradoxically enhanced the feudalisation and fragmentation of society. The 
concurrence of these factors engendered socio-economic underdevelopment in this region.  
In light of what has been summarised thus far, it might seem plausible to explain the socio-
economic underdevelopment that befell Ottoman Kurdistan after the early 1830s through the 
binary and hierarchical state-versus-Kurdish society model outlined in Chapter 1. However, 
such an analysis does not enable us to attain an adequate understanding of the underlying 
causes of political change and economic underdevelopment in this period. The reforms 
during and after the early nineteenth century in the Ottoman Empire surfaced against the 
backdrop of the Ottoman leaders’ increased awareness of the necessity for transformation and 
reform of the ancien regime to preserve the Empire, on the one hand. On the other, these 
reforms were shaped by the conflict among the Great Powers and their increased penetration 
into the Empire. Accordingly, the elimination of the Kurdish polities by the Ottoman state in 
the early nineteenth century was part of the general process of overthrowing semi-
independent local potentates to enhance the efficacy and the centrality of the regime, as well 
as to extricate the Empire from the weaknesses that bogged it down since the 18
th
 century. At 
the same time though, as outlined in Chapters 1 and 3, this elimination process materialised 
as a result of the increasing incorporation of capitalism into the Empire and the imperialist 
conflict between Britain and Russia, against the background of the Ottoman defeats in wars 
against Russia, and the mounting tensions among the Muslim and the Christians in Ottoman 
Kurdistan.  
The impact of political transformations over economic and social life in nineteenth-century 
Ottoman Kurdistan summarised above do also suggest that underdevelopment in this region 
cannot be adequately explained by the ‘isolation’ of Ottoman Kurdistan from the 
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transformatory economic changes caused by the increasing incorporation of capitalism into 
the Ottoman Empire throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Because of the 
absence of railroads and efficient transportation infrastructure in Ottoman Kurdistan, it is 
commonly hypothesised, that this region, more than any other part of the Empire, was 
secluded from the changes invoked by the penetration of the capitalist system throughout the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The seclusion of Ottoman Kurdistan from the 
Ottoman and the European markets is often posited as a prime example of this phenomenon.  
As findings of Chapter 3 uncover, up until the early 1830s, commercial activity in Ottoman 
Kurdistan was as vibrant as it was in the late eighteenth century. In the years 1833-60, the 
commerce of this region witnessed a swift decline. From c.1860 up until the outbreak of the 
Turco-Russian War of 1877-8, even in the face of transportation barriers, with the arrival of 
relative stability to the region, commerce to and from Kurdistan did recover. Between 1890 
and the outbreak of the First World War interregional and intraregional trade reached new 
and important heights.  
These developments in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries coincided 
with the Hamidian Period (1876-1908). In this era the politically co-opted (predominantly 
Sunni) Kurdish tribal elite, like Milli Ibrahim Pasha (Chief of the Milan confederation), with 
economic and extra-economic means largely designated by the Ottoman state, accumulated 
immense landed wealth, reinvigorated the lord-peasant bonds, and aimed to minimise the 
economic fortunes of the Christian community in Ottoman Kurdistan. Such factors did not 
only enable the aggrandisement of the politically receptive Kurdish elite; they also provided 
fertile conditions for commodity production and export orientation in the local economy by 
enabling the possession of private ownership of large estates and by accelerating the 
exploitation of the dependent peasantry. As outlined in Chapter 3, the rise in urban population 
in most of the provinces in ESA in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries, 
349 
 
coupled with the above-mentioned favourable factors for commodity production and export 
orientation, was highly influential in the rise of intraregional and interregional trade in ESA 
during the latter part of the Hamidian era. Yet the growth in the local economy was not a 
harbinger of structural change and nor was it long-term. In other words, the expansion in 
trade was not accompanied by a transformation of the relations of production, since it was 
based on usury and extraction of rent payments from direct producers. The combination of 
the outbreak of the First World War in addition to the destructive population policies had a 
deleterious impact on all of the previously recorded economic expansion in this region.  
The politically integrated Kurdish rulers were neither autonomous nor did they request 
autonomy from the central state, because the nature and the maintenance of their power and 
wealth were grounded in the support provided by the Ottoman state. This helps explain why, 
in contrast to the Kurds in the Ottoman metropolis who were largely in support of the 1908 
Revolution, the clientele Kurdish elite in Kurdistan, vehemently opposed the notions of 
‘nation’ and ‘society’ adopted by the Ittihadists Ottoman reformers in place of the ‘umma’, 
and were very hostile to the 1908 Revolution (McDowall, 2000:96). Following the First 
World War, when the map of the Middle East was being redrawn, these schisms amidst 
Kurdish society played a pivotal role in the void of a leadership that could fill a role akin to 
that held by the Hashemite emirs in Hejaz in the emergence of the Arab national movement 
and the development of Arab nationalism during and after the Great War. 
On the eve of World War I, as explicated in Chapter 4, the Young Turk regime adopted 
ideological, political and economic programs that were substantially different from those of 
previous Ottoman administrations. After the 1913 coup d’état, the late-Ottoman rulers 
abandoned economic liberalism and, alternatively, embraced the economic model of ‘Milli 
İktisad’ (National Economy), and concomitantly an ideological shift from pan-Islamism to 
pan-Turkism occurred among the political elite in the Empire. The economic development 
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and ideological paradigms espoused by the Young Turk rulers were inherited by their 
Kemalist heirs and formed the basis of the policies implemented in the Turkish Republic 
throughout the Republican era.  
In the years 1913-1950 the two operational codes of the state programmes in the residues of 
the Ottoman Empire was the construction and preservation of the Turkish national economy. 
This entailed the protection and elevation of the Muslim/Turkish bourgeoisie and the 
Turkification of the ethnically heterogeneous demographic landscape. These objectives of the 
Turkist rulers after 1913, at a time when the Empire was largely reduced to its Anatolian 
heartlands, entailed policies of genocide, forced migration, confiscation of economic 
resources, and the suppression of all forms of non-Turkish identities and cultures in the 
ethnically mixed ESA provinces. These novel features of state policy persistently 
implemented in these regions during the first half of the twentieth century unleashed a unique 
and new economic process of de-development, proactively created by state policies geared 
towards precluding the possibility of an economic base to support independent indigenous 
existence. This process came to fruition in ESA by policies that not only hindered but also 
deliberately and assiduously blocked internal economic development and the structural 
reforms upon which it is based.     
De-development in ESA commenced as a result of the state policies implemented by the 
Young Turks and their ideological heirs, the Kemalist, centred on the objectives of nationalist 
demographic (i.e. turkification) and economic (i.e. Turkish National Economy) 
reorganisation. These state programmes differed greatly from those of the previous regimes.  
Prior to the first decade of the twentieth century, at no point in the history was ethnic 
nationalism a notion that struck a chord with the Ottoman political leaders. The Ottoman 
political establishment was above all occupied with preserving the territorial and political 
integrity of a multi-national Empire. The heterogeneous character of the Ottoman Empire 
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recurrently informed the policies of the Ottoman political leaders and there was no 
predisposition towards formulating a nationalist agenda, which would have been antithetical 
to the prevalent aim of holding the multi-cultural domains together. 
Turkish nationalism essentially emerged as a reaction to imperial disintegration, in a political 
milieu where imperial and multi-ethnic projects failed to stimulate a sense of Ottoman 
patriotism. The dismal image of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century, powerless to 
reverse the secessionist dynamics and fighting for existence, weighed heavily in the minds of 
the Kemalist rulers, and it was the lessons drawn from this century that gave Turkish 
nationalism its most durable characteristics. For instance, the Kemalist tendency to analyse 
the Kurdish question along conspiratorial modes, with frequent reference to the ‘Eastern 
Question’ and the Sevres Treaty, is prototypical illustration of this deeply rooted survivalist 
feature of Turkish nationalism.  
Pursuant to what has been explained above and the findings of Chapters 4 and 5, it would be 
a mistake to confine Turkish nationalism exclusively to the post-Ottoman era, to trace the 
barriers to economic development stemming from the nationalist reorganisation of ESA only 
as far as 1923, and to perceive the obstacles to economic development in these regions as 
derivatives of the uneven development of capitalism in the Turkish Republic. Such 
inaccuracies result in the inability to identify the peculiar obstacles to economic development 
in ESA, as well as to detect the policy roots of the de-development programmes in ESA, and 
to discern the link between the Kurdish question and de-development in Turkey. 
Existing development theories fail to account comprehensively for the deliberate economic 
and social extortion and destruction witnessed by the Kurdish and other autochthonic peoples 
of ESA, which this study argues is a constituent and indispensable feature of de-development 
in these Anatolian territories. The Turkist demographic engineering policies systematically 
implemented all over ESA during the CUP period and the Republican era instigated de-
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development in these regions by, above all, mass murder, uprooting the indigenous 
population from their ancestral habitat, confiscating their moveable and immovable 
properties, and assimilating them into the Turkish nation and culture. Consequently, there 
was an indivisible and organic link between the economic and noneconomic aspects of 
dispossession or disarticulation in the state policies in these regions. 
Between 1915 and 1950, in light of the figures given in Chapter 4, the non-existence of actual 
and definite statistics notwithstanding, ESA witnessed a depopulation of no less than three 
million, at least half of which perished. Bearing in mind that the Armenian Genocide (1915) 
and the first wave of forced deportation of Ottoman Kurds in ESA (1916) accounted for 
around two million of the deported and massacred, the greater part of these killings and 
banishments occurred prior to 1923. Reducing the acts of the Young Turk government in 
ESA after the spring of 1915 to ‘mere’ mass murder and deportation would curtail its 
complexity and downplay the long-term repercussions for these regions.   
The Armenian genocide and the ensuing mass expatriation of Kurds consisted of a set of 
coinciding processes that geared into each other and together engendered a deliberate and 
coherent system of destruction in ESA. As outlined in Chapter 4, these processes were 
expropiatation, massacre, deportations, forced assimilation and construction of a destitute 
region. The overall aim of obstructing the possibility of autonomous existence of the 
indigenous populations in ESA within separate polities, which would have imperilled the 
Turkish nationalist reorganisation projects embarked on by the Young Turks, tied these 
processes together.   
These atrocious engagements of the Young Turk government aimed to rescind the prospect of 
an independent Armenian state within the relics of the Ottoman Empire, which was ushered 
by the reform agreement of February 1914. Besides, the CUP targeted the territorial and 
cultural unity of the Kurds, the other autochthonic community densely populated in ESA, 
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through mass deportation to Turkish populated regions to thwart them from ‘preserving their 
nationality’ and ‘becoming harmful elements’. Heedless of the Ottoman Interior Ministry’ 
circular in November 1915 that accentuated the economic debilitation created in ESA by the 
clearance of the Armenian community, the Young Turk administration zealously continued 
with their nationalist demographic policies in these domains by evacuating the Kurds en 
masse in 1916. This disregard to economic life in ESA by the CUP government is a clear 
indication that the hegemonic forces conceived economic devastation as a means of inhibiting 
even the possibility of independent existence of the non-Turkish populaces in these regions, 
which with the exodus of Armenians was vastly inhabited by Kurdish. Resultantly, by the end 
of 1917 ESA was a famine region.  
Following the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, the Kemalist rulers unremittingly 
implemented nationalist population policies in ESA, reneged on their promise to recognise 
the collective rights of the Kurds, denied even the basic linguistic rights granted to them in 
the Lausanne Treaty, and systematically hindered economic development in ESA. These 
concurrent decisions of the rulers of the Turkish Republic gave birth to the Kurdish question 
of Turkey and prolonged de-development in ESA. Thus, while the modernisation policies of 
the single-party regime integrated Turkey into the capitalist world economy and fostered 
remarkable economic development, the predominantly Kurdish regions of Turkey continued 
to endure economic de-development.  
The nationalist demographic policies adroitly and meticulously implemented by the veteran 
Turkist demographic engineers during the Republican era constituted an important policy tool 
of protracting economic de-development in the predominantly Kurdish regions of ESA. 
These policies consisted of forced deportation of the Kurdish populace from their homelands 
and the dragooning of the Kurds into the dominant Turkish culture. The Kemalist rulers by 
means of these repressive social engineering objectives aimed to mutilate the territorial and 
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cultural unity of the Kurds and exile the politically and economically prominent Kurdish 
families in line with the objective of obstructing the Kurdish elite ‘from reviving as a ruling 
class’, as instructed in the 1925 Report on the Reform of the East. Therefore, it was not by 
happenstance that by the late 1930s, at around the same time when the then Economic 
Minister Celal Bayar’s report testified both the collapse and the ensuing birth of a self-
sufficient Eastern economy, foreign observers in ESA reported that there were no wealthy 
Kurdish families to be found in these regions. Policies directed against the wealth owning 
Kurds prevented capital accumulation in these regions and played a key role in the creation of 
an ESA economy wherein production beyond that of personal use was non-existent. As a 
result, the state of the economy of ESA during the Republican era was inferior to what it was 
in the 1890s. 
The other policy that nurtured economic de-development in this region is the paucity of state 
investments dispensed to the predominantly Kurdish ESA throughout the Republican period. 
According to Heper, a staunch defender of the Kemalist policies, ‘in the early decades of the 
Republic, Chief of the General Staff Field Marshall Fevzi Çakmak had hampered investments 
in border areas…because it would have been difficult them’ (2007: 6). The rationale offered 
by Çakmak for the derisory state investments in ESA, delineated in Chapter 3, suggest that 
the state during the RPP era had allocated infinitesimal investments in the predominantly 
Kurdish regions in order to retard economic development. The seasoned politician posited 
that by hastening the level of cognizance of the Kurds economic development and wealth 
creation in ESA, this would endanger the policy of extinguishing the Kurdish identity and 
stimulate the development of Kurdish nationalism. Put differently, economic de-development 
was conceived by the Kemalist officials in the early decades of the Republic as an 
indispensable means of foiling the possibility of autonomous existence of the Kurds and 
fostering the turkification of Kurdish lands. Such an outlook precipitated major social and 
355 
 
economic divergences between the ESA and the rest of Turkey in the years 1923-1950, 
demonstrated in Chapter 4. 
Relatedly, the peculiar policies of the Turkish state in the predominantly Kurdish ESA during 
the single party period were not motivated by economic projects—like surplus appropriation 
and labour integration—per se as argued by Aydin and Boran, but by political imperatives of 
assimilation, sovereignty and territorial unity of the Turkish Republic. In order to safeguard 
these interrelated political-national aims and to encumber Kurdish nationalism, economic 
development in the overwhelmingly Kurdish regions was deliberately blocked. Hence, the 
overriding political objectives of the Kemalist rulers in this dictatorial era played a 
determinate role in the minimal contact these regions had with capitalist development and the 
formation of the long-enduring features of the Kurdish question in Turkey. The systematic 
denial of the Kurdish identity, the negation of the collective rights of the Kurds as well as the 
profound socioeconomic disparities between ESA and the rest of Turkey were all corollaries 
of the tyrannical RPP rule in the remnants of Ottoman Kurdistan.     
As the findings of Chapter 4 exhibit, in the years after the one-party dictatorship and before 
the outbreak of the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state in 1984, the 
hegemonic forces in Turkey discarded the project of ‘dismembering’ the predominantly 
Kurdish ESA regions and instead opted to ‘incorporate’ these domains of Turkey. The 
increasing incorporation of the Turkish Republic into the liberal world order in the years after 
the Second World War initiated major readjustments in the Turkish political and economic 
system that resulted in the gradual erosion of the then existing structure in the country. The 
other influential factor in this policy alteration with reference to ESA is the incessant rise of 
Kurdish radicalism from the 1960s onwards through multifarious means, among which were, 
mass protests and electoral advances of pro-Kurdish candidates in ESA. The end of the 
‘period of silence’ in Kurdish politics compelled the Turkish political elite to seek alternative 
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modalities of suppressing Kurds. One of the underlying reasons for the institution and 
conservation of ties of all the post-single-party period administrations with the Kurdish 
clientele propertied class was to substitute and repress the radical Kurdish challenge against 
the Turkish state.    
The policy oscillation from ‘destruction’ to ‘incorporation’ of the predominantly Kurdish 
regions did not implicate the recognition of the Kurdish identity and neither did it involve the 
modernisation of the ancient land ownership and large-scale investment in land, human 
resources or physical equipment in ESA necessary for structural change. By hampering land 
reform and investments, the state facilitated the endurance of economic de-development 
because such negligence rid the ESA economy of its capacity and potential for structural 
transformation by engendering four inauspicious factors for development.   
The first of these is the insufficiency of modern infrastructure and industry, both of which are 
necessary for capital accumulation and private investment. By 1988, despite the long period 
of planned import substitution industrialisation (1963-1979), according to a survey by the 
SPO, there were merely 41,411 workers in all of the manufacturing establishments in ESA. 
Of these, 30,777 (74.3%) were in public manufacturing enterprises and the remaining 10,634 
(25.7%) in private establishments (Kutbay and Çınar, 1989: Table 5). As evinced with the 
composition of the four quinquennial plans in ESA during 1963-1983, investments in modern 
infrastructure, particularly transport, were negligible. The pre-modern infrastructure in these 
regions played a pivotal role in the near absent private investment throughout 1968-1980. 
Overall, despite the remarkable development in Turkey in those years, the predominantly 
Kurdish regions witnessed inhibited industrial development.    
The second factor hindering development is the preservation of the landholding regime 
bequeathed from the Ottoman period devoid of land reform. In the second half of the 
twentieth century, the predominantly Kurdish regions were—and still are—the only domains 
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in Turkey bereft of modernisation of the ancient land regime. After 1950, the banished 
Kurdish landed rural elite returned to their homelands, the land they or their ancestors held 
from the Ottoman period were reimbursed, and a sizeable section of them were politically 
incorporated into the political system. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, the inaction of the state 
over the much-needed land reform, besides occasioning the aggrandisement of the ağas, the 
pauperisation and the resultant emigration of the peasants, also played a pivotal factor in 
stunting agricultural development. The archaic land ownership and relations of production in 
the predominantly Kurdish provinces inhibited agricultural productivity and the expansion of 
commodity production in agriculture.   
The third factor that inhibited development is the occupational reorientation of the labour 
force away from the local economy mainly to the industrial metropolis of Turkey, which 
further weakened the local productive capacity and dependence on sources of income outside 
of the Eastern economy. During 1960-90, the predominantly Kurdish regions had the highest 
rate of landless peasants in Turkey and, unsurprisingly, one of the uppermost mass migrations 
to the major cities mainly in Western Turkey. 
From the early 1980s through to the initial years of the 2000s, as the findings of Chapter 5 lay 
bare that the predominantly Kurdish provinces of ESA continued to endure stunted economic 
development, which, in turn, yet again, denied the economy of these territories the aptitude 
and prospect for structural transformation. The destruction wrought by the war between the 
PKK and the Turkish state, resulting in the forced displacement of large numbers of civilians 
and the destruction of Kurdish villages, along with adverse conditions for the agricultural 
sector created by the neoliberal policies, and the preservation of the antiquated land regime, 
played a vital role in the continuance of stunted development. Another important factor for 
arrested economic development is the failure of the GAP to fulfil promises of industrial 
development, irrigation, agricultural training, crop breeding, education and improving health 
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services. Ever since its birth, GAP has been a strategic energy project. Despite official claims 
to the contrary, it has not promoted sustainable socio-economic regional development in the 
GAP region.  
As outlined in Chapters 4 and 5, the ESA, alongside hosting vital international and national 
oil and natural gas pipelines, constitutes the most hydrocarbon-rich areas of Turkey. 
Resultantly, these domains have unceasingly met the bulk of the energy demands of Turkey, 
particularly in the neoliberal era wherein persistent industrial development – almost all of 
which has occurred outside ESA – has engendered an ever-growing requirement for energy. 
The state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation (Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı, 
TPAO), which regularly realises over 70 per cent of the oil production in the country, relays 
the following illuminating datum pertinent to this phenomena: ‘72% of our [TPAO] total oil 
production is from Batman Region, 27% is from Adıyaman Region and 1% is from Thrace 
Region’ (TPAO, 2014). In other words, ESA accounts for 99 per cent of crude extracted in 
Turkey. Concurrent to this extraction, the gargantuan twin Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipelines from 
Iraq to the Mediterranean snakes its way through the Kurdish mountains, transporting 1.6 
million barrels of oil every day (see Map 11). Moreover, in late 2012, ‘Royal Dutch Shell Plc 
and TPAO started exploring for shale gas in Diyarbakir’s Saribugday-1 field…[t]here may be 
13 trillion cubic meters of shale gas reserves [in Turkey], 1.8 trillion cubic meters of which is 
recoverable, Ismail Bahtiyar, chairman of the Turkish Association of Petroleum Geologists.’ 
(Ersoy, 2012).  
However, the energy sources of ESA has functioned as a resource curse rather than as 
resource wealth, thereby deepened, and protracted the de-development of these regions. 
Specifically, as the findings of the two preceding Chapters elucidate, the bulk of the public 
investments in ESA have chronically been energy-oriented and directed towards meeting the 
continually increasing energy demands of industrial Turkey. Put differently, the biggest 
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recipient of the public investments in ESA, i.e. the energy sector, has nominal benefits or use 
to these predominantly agrarian domains and overshadows the exigent needs of the populace 
of these areas, e.g. transport infrastructure, which are essential for socio-economic 
development. Additionally, demands for political pluralism, enhanced socio-economic rights 
and/or autonomy by the Kurds were, and largely still is, unremittingly negated by the Turkish 
state because it has incessantly conceived these long-standing appeals as tantamount to or as 
a building block of secessionism and the resultant loss of these hydrocarbon-blessed ESA 
provinces.         
Between the mid-1980s and the early years of 2000s, socio-economic divergences between 
the predominantly Kurdish regions and the rest of Turkey deepened, and the radical challenge 
of the Kurds against the exclusionary and assimilationist tendencies of the Turkish state 
entered its most vibrant and violent stage. As accentuated by the findings of Chapters 4 and 5 
outlined above, neither the Kurdish question nor the peculiar form of underdevelopment in 
ESA owe their existence to the years of the armed conflict. The Kurdish question and the 
economic de-development in ESA pre-dates the years of war and are corollaries of the denial, 
by the dominant state ideology, Turkish nationalism, of differences in general, and the Kurds’ 
existence, issues, and rights in particular. The monist and monolithic understanding of society 
and nation – invariably as Turkish – by the hegemonic forces in Turkey resulted in the 
economic de-development in ESA after 1913 and triggered the Kurdish question after the 
proclamation of the Turkish Republic. Economic de-development policies in ESA after 1923 
have become a means of protecting this monist and monolithic understanding of society and 
nation, as lucidly exhibited in the preamble of the current constitution of Turkey, which 
exemplifies much of the general tenor of the core ideology of the state: 
‘In line with the concept of nationalism and the reforms and principles introduced by the 
founder of Republic of Turkey, Atatürk, the immortal leader and the unrivalled hero, this 
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Constitution, which affirms the eternal existence of the Turkish nation and motherland and 
the indivisible unity of the Turkish state, embodies…the principle of the indivisibility of the 
existence of Turkey with its state and territory, Turkish historical and moral values or the 
nationalism, principle, reforms and modernism of Atatürk.’274  
Hence, there is a symbiotic relationship between economic de-development and the Kurdish 
question and until the Kurdish question is resolved; the peculiar form of underdevelopment in 
ESA will endure.    
The Kurdish Question in the 21
st
 Century 
After the turn of this century, as discussed in Chapter 5, the intersection of five pivotal events 
within and outside of the border of Turkey necessitated all of the relevant stakeholders in the 
Kurdish question to re-evaluate their conceptualisation of and preoccupation with the issue. 
These were, first, the recognition of Turkey as a candidate for EU membership in 1999, 
conditional on its adequate progress in meeting the EU’s Copenhagen political criteria, which 
specifically include democratisation and safeguarding of minority rights
275
. Second, the 
capture of Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 and his subsequent replacement of the project of 
establishing an ‘independent Kurdish state’ by means of a ‘national liberation struggle’ with 
that of ‘democratisation of Turkey’ and ‘democratic self-government or autonomy’ for 
Kurds
276
. Third, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the ensuing formalisation of the Kurdistan 
Regional Government (KRG) as well as the desire of the US for Turkey to support the 
                                                          
274
 Emphasises added. The full text of the Turkish Constitution of 1982 is available at: 
http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/images/loadedpdf_dosyalari/the_constitution_of_the_republic_of_turkey.pdf  
275
 For a detailed exploration of the spillover effects of Turkey’s EU Accession on Turkey’s Kurdish Question, 
see: K. Yıldız (2006). 
276
 In the political writings of Öcalan after his capture and imprisonment in Turkey, which set the ideological 
framework of the PKK after 2000, the project of democratisation of the Turkish Republic denotes the 
disassociation of citizenship in Turkey from Turkish nationalism. The idea of democratic autonomy for Kurd 
twinned to the idea of democratic confederalism refers to the right of Kurds to determine their own economic, 
cultural, and social affairs (Öcalan, 2008). These projects are elaborated in the ‘defence texts’ submitted to the 
Turkish courts and to the European Courts – the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) Grand Chamber in 
2001 and a court in Athens in 2003 concerning his expulsion from Greece. These ‘defence texts’ was translated 
and published in English under the From Sumerian Clerical State towards People’s Republic I-II (2001), The 
defense of Free Man (2003), and Defending a People (2004).   
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political stability of Iraq and patronise Iraq Kurds. Fourth, the rise and dominance of the 
majority government of the AKP in Turkey and its search for neoliberal pro-Islamic politics 
in the Middle East, the Balkans, and Caucasia. AKP’s pursuit of such politics has 
necessitated the reorganisation and normalisation of the Turkish political system in accord 
with liberal democratic polity and attempts to eliminate long-simmering issues like the 
Kurdish question (Bahcheli and Noel, 2011; Çiçek, 2014). Lastly, the consolidation of pro-
Kurdish politics in Turkey, and the recurrent electoral success of pro-Kurdish candidates and 
parties, particularly in EAS regions. The pro-Kurdish candidates from 1999 onwards have 
subsequently won the Municipality of Greater Diyarbakir, regarded as the Kurdish political 
and cultural centre by the pro-Kurdish political actors. In the 2003 municipal elections, the 
number of overall municipalities won by the DTP, sympathetic to the PKK, astonishingly 
rose to 54. In 2009, it climbed to 99. Moreover, in the general elections held on June 12, 
2011, Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP), the successor to the 
then banned DPT, succeeded in getting 36 candidates elected to the National Assembly 
(Çandar, 2013). 
These manifestations engendered the re-evaluation of the Kurdish question by the two main 
adversaries on this issue, namely the PKK and the Turkish state, and crystallised the 
limitations of their traditional approaches to the decades-long problem. That is to say, just as 
the latter recognised that it was unable to eliminate the Kurdish identity and its political 
expressions through decades of negationist notions and brute force, the former realised it had 
been unable to materialise its project of overthrowing the ‘colonial’ state system by means of 
a ‘national liberation movement’. Hence, both parties revised their ‘default positions’, and 
presented differing ‘democratisation initiatives/projects’.  
The PKK and the legal political parties/actors sympathetic to it re-conceptualised the Kurdish 
question, as outlined in almost all of the ‘defence texts’ by Öcalan, which over three million 
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Kurds see as their ‘political will’277, in accordance with the two main democracy projects: 
democratisation of the Republic of Turkey and democratic autonomy for Kurds in Turkey. 
Essentially, as announced by Öcalan in 2009, these projects entail the recognition by the 
Turkish state of the collective cultural rights of the Kurds, disassociation of citizenship in 
Turkey from the uniform Turkish national identity, and regional self-governance for the 
Kurds
278
.  
For the state authorities, as exhibited with the series of ‘democratisation packages’ proposed 
by the AKP government as of 2002, ‘democratisation’ entailed the removal of suppressive 
measures implemented during the 1980s and 1990s and the recognition of certain limited 
individual rights for Kurds. Thus far, the following steps have been implemented as a result 
of these ‘democratisation packages’: the removal of the OHAL in the Kurdish region; 
assisting internally displaced Kurds to return to their former homes and properties; the 
launching of TRT6, the first official Kurdish TV channel; optional Kurdish courses in private 
schools; the right of villages to return to their original names; and the right of establishing 
institutions for living languages. The leading actors and supporters of pro-Kurdish politics 
have seen these steps, as emphasised by Bahcheli and Noel (2011), Çandar (2013), Çiçek 
(2014), as ‘piecemeal and half-hearted’ or ‘too little, too late’, and more importantly, falling 
short of their persistent demands of cultural recognition and some form of self-government. 
As a prerequisite for the resolution of the Kurdish question, this thesis proposes the 
‘Democratic Autonomy Project’, launched by the Democratic Society Congress, a broad 
platform that brought together Kurdish NGOs and intellectuals in Diyarbakir in December 
2010. The ‘Democratic Autonomy Project’ set forth the restructuring of the Turkish political 
                                                          
277
 In a signature campaign, started on 18 August 2005 with the slogan of ‘Öcalan is our political will’ on the 
extended geography where Kurds live in Middle East and Europe, was ended on 20 October 2006 after the 
collection of 3 million 243 thousand signatures. 2 million and 243 thousand were collected in Turkey. 
Subsequent to the campaign, the sympathisers of the PKK branded Öcalan the ‘Kurdish people’s leader’ 
(Çandar, 2012: 45). 
278
 Özgür Gündem, 27/11/2010.  
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and administrative system as a precondition for the resolution of the Kurdish question. This 
restructuring involves the following pivotal six elements: 
(a) The drafting of a new constitution which would introduce a more pluralist concept of 
citizenship, (one that is not based on an ethnocentric understanding of Turkishness); 
(b) The removal of all barriers to cultural expression of diversity, including the use of 
languages other than Turkish, in the public sphere, education and politics; 
(c) Decentralisation and the institution of regional assemblies responsible for providing 
services in the areas of education, health, culture, social services, agriculture, and 
industry, among others, leaving the conduct of foreign affairs, the economy and 
defence to the central government, and assuming shared responsibility for judicial 
services; 
(d) The allocation of part of local revenues to regional assemblies; 
(e) Unconditional return to villages evacuated by the Turkish military during the fight 
against the PKK; 
(f) Purging previously inhabited areas of land mines, and compensation to those affected 
by forced deportation; 
(g) Removal of the Village Guard System; 
(h) The creation of a peaceful atmosphere, which above all necessitates the cessation of 
hostilities, in the process that leads up to a new constitution.  
A nationwide survey conducted after the declaration of the ‘Democratic Autonomy Project’ 
by the well-regarded public opinion research and consultancy company KONDA, in 59 
provinces with 10,393 people confirms that the Kurdish population at large generally endorse 
this project. The result of this survey suggests that most respondents expressed their support 
for policies that entailed the constitutional recognition of Kurdish identity, education and 
broadcasting in the mother tongue, decentralisation and economic development of regions 
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where the Kurds are concentrated, and the abolition of the 10 per cent threshold for 
parliamentary representation (KONDA, 2011: 83-150). 
The restructuring of the Turkish political and administrative system is an urgent and 
necessary step, but it is not sufficient for the resolution of the Kurdish question; it needs to be 
accompanied by a comprehensive regional development strategy that can remedy the long-
standing socio-economic issues in the regions. Both domestic (i.e. GAP) and international 
experiences (i.e. the EU, UNDP) prove that top-down development plans devoid of the 
participation of local actors are unlikely to be successful (TESEV, 2006). In order to identify 
accurately the needs of the ESA regions, the participation of the locally elected administrative 
bodies, like Metropolitan Municipalities, and the local NGOs in the preparatory phase is 
necessary. Morover, regional development programmes should incorporate the economic, 
social, environmental and cultural aspects of development. 
Investment policies are among the most important tools of development for regions that have 
witnessed decades long neglect. The devastating result of neoliberalism in ESA outlined in 
Chapter 5, steers this thesis towards recommending a public sector-led development policy. 
Employment-oriented investment should be the top priority of the public sector-led 
development programme. Creation of long term and unionised employment is vital in order to 
overcome the long-enduring problem of high unemployment in these regions and to increase 
the income of the local citizens. The creation of new and sustainable jobs is also necessary to 
prevent the occupational reorientation from these regions to other parts of Turkey and to 
prevent the ‘brain drain’.  
In accordance with enhancing human development, investments in all sectors of education 
should be increased and education should be free. These investments should not be seen as an 
instrument of cultural assimilation: education should be in both Kurdish and Turkish. 
Investments in the health sector are also vital for human development, so health investments 
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should be multiplied, and health should be free at the point of use. Investments in 
transportation and communications should also be enhanced and prioritised. 
In order to be able to subsidise these investments the income generated from local resources, 
such as the energy revenues from GAP, should be kept by the local administrative bodies, 
and, if need be, a diametric fund transfer from the developed regions to these regions could 
also be considered. These funds could partly be used to subsidise cooperatives that provide 
public credit support for the purchase of machinery and equipment for the peasants in the 
predominantly agrarian ESA, which will furnish the impecunious peasants with the necessary 
resources as well as enhance agricultural production in these domains.  
Beside large-scale public investment, another important apparatus of development in ESA is 
root and branch land reform, without which the archaic relations of production and the 
resultant dependency of the landless peasants will persevere. In order to prevent additional 
inequitable land ownership, small-sized family enterprises should be encouraged instead of 
larger agricultural enterprises, which conserve and promote concentration of land.  
The irrigation projects of GAP need also to be concluded forthwith. Thus, all irrigation 
projects of GAP need to be prioritised, and the project should be completed by the newly set 
date of 2017. Alongside the execution of irrigation projects, GAP should train farmers to 
enrich their knowledge and skills in agricultural production. This training is also crucial to 
avoid ill-use of irrigation and prevent salinization. 
Historically, the weakest link of the ESA economy has been the industrial sector. Growth of 
this sector is necessary for decreasing the dependence of these regions on other parts of 
Turkey and/or foreign dependency as well as for the complementation of the different sectors. 
Natural and mineral resources of ESA should not be processed outside, but within these 
regions. Large-scale investment in industry is critical for the expansion of industry in these 
regions.   
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The account of the Kurds in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic in this thesis 
underlined the linkages between the social, political, cultural and economic factors and life. 
The suppressive and/or negationist policies of the ruling elites in both of these polities 
regarding the Kurds have not only fettered economic development in ESA but also targeted 
the cultural, political and social progression of the Kurds. Nevertheless, the inexhaustible 
struggle of the Kurds against oppression, assimilation, and destruction has played a defining 
role in countering the imperialistic objectives of the dominant classes, in exhibiting the brute 
policies of the hegemonic elite in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, and in 
asserting the need for a peaceful resolution to Turkey’s Kurdish question as well as for the 
thorough democratisation of the Turkish Republic in the 21
st
 century.   
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Appendix 1- List of Interviews undertaken in the explanatory phase of fieldwork 
 
1) Mr. Dirk Verbeken, European Commission, Lead Economist – Desk Officer for 
Turkey. 
2) Mr. Özgür Altınoklar, Sector Manager for Infrastructure and Small and Medium 
Enterprises Programme, Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey. 
3) Mr. Mesut Kamiloğlu: Head of Department for the General Directorate of Regional 
Development and Structural Adjustment Department of EU Economic and Cohesion, 
State Planning Organisation (SPO), Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry. 
4) Mr. Mehmet Aydin: Head of Centre for Regional Competitiveness Programme 
Coordination and Implementation Centre, Ministry of Industry and Trade. 
5) Mr. Yusuf İzzettin İymen, Deputy Secretary General of Gaziantep Chamber of 
Industry. 
6) Mr. Hasan Baran Uçaner, EU & Foreign Relations Representative of the Gaziantep 
Chamber of Commerce. 
7) Mr. Mehmet Galip Ensarioğlu, former Head of Diyarbakır Chamber of Commerce, 
currently AKP Diyarbakır Member of Parliament. 
8) Şahismail Bedirhanoğlu, President of Southeastern Industrialists and Businessmen 
Association (GUNSIAD).   
9)  Mr. Hasan Kılıç, GAP, Lead Economist for Regional Development. 
10) Mr. Ahmet Türk, former Chairman of the Democratic Society Party (DTP), currently 
Mayor of Mardin. 
11) Mr. Şeyhmus Diken, Advisor to the Diyarbekir Metropolitan Municipality. 
12) Mrs. Nurcan Baysal, former member of the United Nations Development Programme, 
currently a Social Worker in Diyarbakır. 
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13) Mr. Hasan Maral, Development Specialist at the KARACADAĞ Development 
Agency in Diyarbakır. 
14) Mr. Osman Baydemir, former Mayor of Diyarbakır and President of USARM . 
15) Mr. Ahmet Çakır, Member of the Executive Committee of the Diyarbakır Branch of 
General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSİ).    
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Appendix 2- Diyarbakir Commerce, 1863 
Table 2.43 Foreign Exports of Diyarbekir, 1863    
(In pounds sterling) 
  
 
Madder Roots        271 
Cotton   92,916 
Wool 1st Quality   64,090 
Wool 2nd Quality   10,909 
Mohair White     8,180 
Mohair Red     1,970 
Mohair Black     1,900 
Polecat Fur        900 
Buffalo Skins      6,337 
(Re-exported: from Baghdad) 
Buffalo Skins   2,112 
(Re-exported: from Russia) 
Cows Skin      492 
Galls Best Blues 17,549 
Galls White 1st Sort   5,991 
Saltpetre       908 
Orpiment in leaves                         491 
Orpiment Red             67 
Orpiment Lust             45 
Wax                27 
Gum                                              2,374 
Total                                          217,529  
Source: FO 195/799 Trade and Agriculture for Kurdistan for 1863, pp.63, enclosed in 
Taylor at Diarbekir, 13/07/1864. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Names of Articles                  Value 
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Table 2.44 Home Exports of Diyarbekir, 1863    
(In pounds sterling) 
Names of Articles                    Value           Remarks 
Madder Roots       542           Sent to Bitlis 
Olive Oil                                      487            Sent to Sivas and Kharput 
Olive Sesame                                950           Sent to Sivas and Kharput 
Manufactures                            3,000           of Aleppo sent to Baghdad 
Manufactures of Diyarbekir   71,511           Sent to Northern Turkey and Baghdad 
Fox &Wolf Skins                          638           600 pieces Fox, 200 Wolf sent to Aleppo 
Leather dyed Red                      5,813           Diabekir works sent to Aleppo 
Leather dyed Yellow                 1,093           Diabekir works sent to Erzurum and Treibizon 
Leather dyed Red                         786           Mardin works sent to Aleppo 
Leather dyed Yellow                    200           Mardin works sent to Erzurum and Treibizon 
Leather dyed Red                         786           Saert work sent to Aleppo 
Leather dyed Yellow                    200           Saert work sent to Erzurum and Treibizon 
Galls White 1st Sort   2,770 Sent to Baghdad 
Galls White 2nd Sort   8,583 Sent to Baghdad 
Hantoof      966          Sent to Aleppo and Orfa 
Orpiment in leaves                        491 Sent to Aleppo and Orfa 
Orpiment Red           67 Sent to Aleppo and Orfa 
Orpiment Lust           45 Sent to Aleppo and Orfa 
Tallow 283 Sent to Aleppo and Orfa 
Clarified Butter                           4,500 Sent to Aleppo and Orfa 
Dried Fruits                                 1,500 Sent to Baghdad 
Pales and Rafters                         2,000 Sent to Baghdad and Mosul 
Sheep                                         11,000 4000 in number, for Aleppo and Damascus 
Camels                                         9,100 2000 in number for Kaiserieh  
Saltpetre      908 Sent to Aleppo and Orfa 
Total                                       128,174  
Source: FO 195/799 Trade and Agriculture for Kurdistan for 1863, pp.77, enclosed in 
Taylor at Diyarbekir, 13/07/1864. 
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Table 2.45 Foreign Imports into Diyarbekir, 1863    
(In pounds sterling) 
Names of Articles                Value               Remarks 
Coffee via Aleppo     727            of the West Indies from England 
Coffee via Baghdad  2,325            of the East Indies from Baghdad 
Sugar Leaf  2,000 
Sugar Crushed     900 
Sugar Candy  1,625 
Pepper     408 
Sal Ammoniac       435 
Tea      306 
Zinc         66 
Tin Sheets in boxes      727 
Window Glass in boxes   1,090 
Lead       812 
Iron English        68 
Iron Russian    812 
Steel    727 
Spelter      871 
Indigo 5,042 
Timbeki Isfahan [Tobacco]     681 
Timbeki Shiraz [Tobacco]         454 
Silk Persian  3,130 
Alum   1,530 
Cochineal   2,110             from France 
Buffalo Skins Russian  4,116             via Erzeroom from Erivan 
Spices  2,000 
Drugs  1,500 
Hardware     300 
Earthenware  1,325 
British Manufactures            75,000              via Aleppo 
Sundries    2,500             from France and Switzerland  
Total                                    113,587 
Source: FO 195/799 Trade and Agriculture for Kurdistan for 1863, pp.74, enclosed in 
Taylor at Diarbekir,13/07/1864. 
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Table 2.46 Home Imports of Diyarbekir, 1863    
(In pounds sterling) 
Names of Articles                       Value           Remarks 
Soap Aleppo                                      300 
Soap Orfa                                            90 
Lead     54        from Eggil in small pieces 
Silk                                               10,338  from Amasia and Bursa 
Buffalo Skins     6,300  from Baghdad 
Cow     1,067        from Baghdad 
Orpiment in leaves                          818 from Hakkari 
Orpiment Red              90 from Hakkari 
Orpiment Lust              59 from Hakkari 
Manufactures   4,000       of Aleppo similar to those of Diabekir 
Hanne     541 from Persian coast via Baghdad   
Specie                                           50,000 from Aleppo and Damascus 
Total                                           73,657  
Source: FO 195/799 Trade and Agriculture for Kurdistan for 1863, pp.79, enclosed in 
Taylor at Diyarbekir, 13/07/ 1864. 
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